State, Department of Highways v. Singletary

185 So. 2d 642, 1966 La. App. LEXIS 5318
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 4, 1966
Docket6600
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 185 So. 2d 642 (State, Department of Highways v. Singletary) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State, Department of Highways v. Singletary, 185 So. 2d 642, 1966 La. App. LEXIS 5318 (La. Ct. App. 1966).

Opinion

185 So.2d 642 (1966)

STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Thomas J. SINGLETARY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 6600.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

April 4, 1966.
Rehearing Denied May 9, 1966.

*643 Charles Wm. Roberts, of Burton, Roberts & Ward, Philip K. Jones, D. Ross Banister, Glenn S. Darsey and B. B. Croom, Baton Rouge, for appellant.

R. Gordon Kean, Jr., of Sanders, Miller, Downing, Rubin & Kean, Baton Rouge, for appellee.

Before ELLIS, LOTTINGER, LANDRY, REID and BAILES, JJ.

BAILES, Judge.

Observing appropriate procedure, the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Highways, filed expropriation proceedings for the taking of certain property owned by defendant-appellee, Thomas J. Singletary. The property involved in this taking formed a part of the home property of Mr. Singletary, and was utilized in the construction of Highway I—10, commonly known in these environs as the Baton Rouge Expressway.

With their petition initiating this proceeding the plaintiff filed a certificate of estimate of just compensation executed by the right of way agent and Mr. John LeJeune, a licensed realtor of Baton Rouge, who appeared as a witness for the plaintiff in the trial of this action, certifying the value of land and improvements to be $1,025 and damages in the amount of $7,662. This amount was "rounded off" at $8,700 which was deposited in the registry of the court.

In his answer, the defendant does not question the expropriation per se but does affirmatively allege the property taken is worth $2,000 and the severance damages amount to $38,000.

After trial, the lower court awarded defendant the sum of $1,025 for the property expropriated and the sum of $38,000 as damages. From this judgment, the State of Louisiana appealed.

While the appellant did not set forth as such, any specifications of error, from our study of its brief we conclude the only serious complaint to the ruling and judgment of the trial court is the amount of severance or consequential damages. No objection is raised to the trial court's determination of value of the land expropriated. This amount, incidentally, is the same as that certified as the just amount in the certificate mentioned above. Therefore, we will confine this opinion to the examination of the correctness of the award of severance damages.

The defendant offered the testimony of two expert appraisers, Mr. Verdie Reece Perkins and Mr. Heidel Brown, both prominent realtors of Baton Rouge, and the State *644 of Louisiana offered the testimony of Mr. Leroy Cobb and Mr. John LeJeune, who were also qualified as experts in the field of appraising real estate.

To better understand the question to be resolved it is well to detail briefly the physical setup of Highway I—10 and the defendant's property.

Defendant's property is located in the corporate limits of the City of Baton Rouge in the City Park Lake area between City Park and Louisiana State University. Extending from City Park to within the campus of the University is Dalrymple Drive. This street is on the west side of and follows the meanderings of City Park and University lakes. In front of Defendant's property Dalrymple Drive courses north and south and Mr. Singletary's property is perpendicular thereto. There were no buildings or other structures whatever located between Dalrymple Drive and the lakes in the vicinity of defendant's property prior to the construction of Highway 10.

The directional location of Highway I—10 is not perpendicular to Dalrymple Drive but courses an angle from the northeast to the southwest. The property of Mr. Singletary is located on the right outbound or south side of the expressway. As the expressway approaches the elevated crossing of Dalrymple Drive and City Park Lake, a downramp takes off on the right or south side, runs along the north side of the Singletary property. As this downramp descends to Dalrymple Drive, it veers or turns to the right as it converges with Dalrymple Drive. The convergence is flared for access to Dalrymple. At this junction there are semaphore signals for control of traffic.

For the construction of the flare at the point of confluence of the downramp and Dalrymple Drive, the State required a portion of defendant's property, specifically a triangular shaped area located in the northeast corner of defendant's lot, measuring thirty feet in depth along the north line and approximately 89 feet across the front of his property. On the expropriated property there were shrubs and one live oak tree, but no buildings. Prior to the taking, defendant's property measured 153 feet on the front by a depth of 294 feet.

In controversies of this kind, the court must be guided by the testimony of expert witnesses. In determining the amount of damages, whether called severance or consequential, the testimony of the expert appraisers must stand the test of reasonableness. Opinion testimony is best based on the experience of the witness related to the particular problem before the court. Opinion testimony of experts who have experience in dealing with real estate within the area in which the subject property is located is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of an expert without such actual and practical experience.

As severance damages, the landowner is entitled to be awarded the difference between the market value of the property immediately prior to and immediately after the taking. This statement is too well established in our jurisprudence to need citation.

Frequently there is less divergence of opinion in determining the value of property prior to expropriation than there is in arriving at the market value of property after taking. No two severances are alike in most cases. Each expropriation must be considered in the light of the circumstances of severance created thereby.

Where there is a wide divergence or difference of opinion between the market value of property after the taking of witnesses for the State on the one hand and the defendant homeowner on the other hand, and such vast conflict cannot be reconciled otherwise, the court must look to the testimony of these experts to determine which is well grounded in good reasoning.

There does not appear to be very great difference of opinion of value of the defendant's *645 property prior to the expropriation. In fact, the plaintiff's witnesses attributed a greater value to the property prior to taking than did defendant's witnesses. For the plaintiff, Mr. Cobb appraised the property to be worth $97,800 and Mr. LeJeune, $97,410, whereas for the defendant, Mr. Brown found a value of $87,500 and Mr. Perkins computed the value to be $90,000. It was the value of the property after the taking which brought about the greatest differences. Mr. Cobb considered the property to be worth, on the market, the sum of $88,800, and Mr. LeJeune figured it to be worth $88,710. Mr. Brown testified he found the value after the taking to be $47,500 and Mr. Perkins reasoned the value to be $50,000.

From the standpoint of experience there is no question or doubt Mr. Brown and Mr. Perkins are the much more qualified to express an opinion as to worth of the property after the taking. The reasons stated by these witnesses favorably impressed the trial court, and we are likewise impressed with their testimony.

Mr. Cobb and Mr. LeJeune are certainly well qualified as expert appraisers, and the trial judge was correct in accepting them as experts in their field.

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Related

Maddox v. Percy
351 So. 2d 1249 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1977)
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. James
321 So. 2d 888 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1975)
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Riverside Realty Co.
317 So. 2d 693 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1975)
State, Department of Highways v. Banquer
308 So. 2d 520 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1975)
State, Department of Highways v. Smith
304 So. 2d 77 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1974)
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Hab Monsur Corp.
301 So. 2d 667 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1974)
State, Department of Highways v. Mayer
257 So. 2d 723 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1972)
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Rivers
242 So. 2d 916 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1970)
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Garrick
242 So. 2d 278 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1970)
State v. Jenkins
207 So. 2d 380 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1968)
Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Moore
197 So. 2d 100 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1967)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
185 So. 2d 642, 1966 La. App. LEXIS 5318, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-department-of-highways-v-singletary-lactapp-1966.