Mr. Justice Field
delivered the opinion of the court.
On the 7th of December, 1860, the Commissioner of the
General Land-Office at Washington issued a patent of ther United States to the corporate authorities of the city of Portland, Oregon, for lands within the limits of the city to the extent of three hundred and seven acres and forty-nine hundredths of an acre, in trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof. This patent was issued upon an entry made by the city authorities, on the belief that the lands were brought under the operation of the Town-Site Act of May 23, 1844, by the Organic Act of 1848, establishing the territorial government of Oregon, and wéfe not subject to disposition under the Donation Act of 1850. The patent embraced the premises in controversy in this suit, but reserved from its operation any valid claims that might exist in virtue of the several donations to Benjamin Stark and others.
On the following day, Dec. 8, 1860, the Commissioner of the General Land-Office also issued a patent to Stark for land situated within the limits of Portland, claimed by him under the Donation Act, subject, however, to such rights as might exist in virtue of the entry by the city. This patent also covered the premises in controversy.
For several years before these patents were issued, the complainant, with his brother, had been in the occupation, use, and enjoyment of the premises, and had erected upon them expensive and permanent improvements. During this time they asserted, that, by virtue of a certain agreement made by Stark with parties through whom they had obtained their interest, they had acquired a right to have the legal title transferred to them, whenever that was obtained from the United States. After Stark had secured his patent, they applied to him for a release; but he refused to give them one, and threatened them with legal proceedings to recover possession of the premises. They thereupon brought a suit in equity in the State court to compel a release of his interest. In their bill, which was filed in January, 1864, they set forth their long and peaceable possession; that they had made large and valuable improvements ; that the defendant asserted title to the premises under his patent, and threatened suits for their recovery; and stated the conveyances under which they claimed, and the agreement upon which they founded, their right to a re
lease of his interest;, and they prayed a decree compelling such release.
Subsequently, the bill was amended by the addition of clauses setting forth the patent of the United States issued to the corporate authorities of the city, in trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants, and alleging that the complainants, as beneficiaries, claimed an interest in the premises under that instrument.
The State court appeared to consider these two grounds for equitable relief — one founded upon the agreement of Stark with the parties through whom the complainants claimed, and the other founded upon the city patent — as inconsistent with each other, and compelled the complainants to elect upon which they would proceed. They objected to the order, but, under its compulsion, elected to proceed upon the city patent. The bill was accordingly amended so as to present their claim for relief solely as beneficiaries under that instrument. The point in contention, then, was, which of the two patents carried the title to the premises. If the patent to the city authorities was valid, Stark took nothing by his patent.' If, however, his patent was valid, the city had acquired no interest in the premises.
The State Circuit Court and the State Supreme Court held that the patent to Stark was void as against the complainants, and enjoined him from taking legal proceedings to eject tAm from the premises. The case having been brought to this court, the decree of the Supreme Court was reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the suit. Upon our mandate the suit was accordingly dismissed in September, 1868. In deciding the case, we held that the act of 1848, organizing the Territory of Oregon, did not extend over the country the Town-Site Act of 1844, and that the patent to the city authorities, being made upon an entry under that act, passed no title to the land covered by the donation claim of Stark. His right to a patent had been previously perfected, and his claim had been surveyed before the passage of the act of 1854, by which the Town-Site Act was first extended with qualifications to the Territory.
Stark
v.
Starrs,
6 Wall. 402.
After the suit was thus dismissed, Stark commenced actions
of ejectment against the tenants of the complainant for possession of the-premises. These were consolidated into one action, in which Stark recovered judgment, with damages, for use and occupation. The complainant thereupon commenced the present suit in equity,' alleging that he has a good, and equitable title to the premises as against Stark, and praying an injunction against any legal proceedings for their possession, and a decree that he be required to release such title as he may have acquired by his donation claim and patent. In the bill the complainant sets up substantially the same matter, though with greater fullness and detail, which was originally averred in the first suit brought by himself and his brother, and omitted in the amended bill in that suit upon the election required by the court; and also claims that the defendant is estopped by his acts from asserting title to the premises.
The first question presented for our determination is, whether the complainant is concluded upon that matter in the present suit, by reason of the proceedings and decree in the first suit. While that. suit' was pending, the complainant acquired the interest of his brother.
It is undoubtedly a settled principle that a party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, of both, all the grounds upon which he expects a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demand and prosecute it by piecemeal, or present only a portion .of the grounds upon which special relief is sought, and leave the rest to be presented in a second suit, if the first fail. There would be no end to litigation if such a practice were permissible. But this principle does not require distinct causes of action, — that is to say, distinct matters, — each of which would authorize by itself independent relief, to be presented in a single suit, though they exist at the same time and might be considered together. The agreemen t between Stark and the parties through whom the complainants claimed constituted a cause for relief, distinct from and independent of that arising from the interest asserted by them as beneficiaries under the patent to the city authorities. There was, therefore, no rule of law which compelled the presentation of the two causes of relief in the same suit. They required different alie
gations in the bill, and different evidence on the bearing. Tbe court might have considered one cause insufficient, and sustained the bill on the other.
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Mr. Justice Field
delivered the opinion of the court.
On the 7th of December, 1860, the Commissioner of the
General Land-Office at Washington issued a patent of ther United States to the corporate authorities of the city of Portland, Oregon, for lands within the limits of the city to the extent of three hundred and seven acres and forty-nine hundredths of an acre, in trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof. This patent was issued upon an entry made by the city authorities, on the belief that the lands were brought under the operation of the Town-Site Act of May 23, 1844, by the Organic Act of 1848, establishing the territorial government of Oregon, and wéfe not subject to disposition under the Donation Act of 1850. The patent embraced the premises in controversy in this suit, but reserved from its operation any valid claims that might exist in virtue of the several donations to Benjamin Stark and others.
On the following day, Dec. 8, 1860, the Commissioner of the General Land-Office also issued a patent to Stark for land situated within the limits of Portland, claimed by him under the Donation Act, subject, however, to such rights as might exist in virtue of the entry by the city. This patent also covered the premises in controversy.
For several years before these patents were issued, the complainant, with his brother, had been in the occupation, use, and enjoyment of the premises, and had erected upon them expensive and permanent improvements. During this time they asserted, that, by virtue of a certain agreement made by Stark with parties through whom they had obtained their interest, they had acquired a right to have the legal title transferred to them, whenever that was obtained from the United States. After Stark had secured his patent, they applied to him for a release; but he refused to give them one, and threatened them with legal proceedings to recover possession of the premises. They thereupon brought a suit in equity in the State court to compel a release of his interest. In their bill, which was filed in January, 1864, they set forth their long and peaceable possession; that they had made large and valuable improvements ; that the defendant asserted title to the premises under his patent, and threatened suits for their recovery; and stated the conveyances under which they claimed, and the agreement upon which they founded, their right to a re
lease of his interest;, and they prayed a decree compelling such release.
Subsequently, the bill was amended by the addition of clauses setting forth the patent of the United States issued to the corporate authorities of the city, in trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants, and alleging that the complainants, as beneficiaries, claimed an interest in the premises under that instrument.
The State court appeared to consider these two grounds for equitable relief — one founded upon the agreement of Stark with the parties through whom the complainants claimed, and the other founded upon the city patent — as inconsistent with each other, and compelled the complainants to elect upon which they would proceed. They objected to the order, but, under its compulsion, elected to proceed upon the city patent. The bill was accordingly amended so as to present their claim for relief solely as beneficiaries under that instrument. The point in contention, then, was, which of the two patents carried the title to the premises. If the patent to the city authorities was valid, Stark took nothing by his patent.' If, however, his patent was valid, the city had acquired no interest in the premises.
The State Circuit Court and the State Supreme Court held that the patent to Stark was void as against the complainants, and enjoined him from taking legal proceedings to eject tAm from the premises. The case having been brought to this court, the decree of the Supreme Court was reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the suit. Upon our mandate the suit was accordingly dismissed in September, 1868. In deciding the case, we held that the act of 1848, organizing the Territory of Oregon, did not extend over the country the Town-Site Act of 1844, and that the patent to the city authorities, being made upon an entry under that act, passed no title to the land covered by the donation claim of Stark. His right to a patent had been previously perfected, and his claim had been surveyed before the passage of the act of 1854, by which the Town-Site Act was first extended with qualifications to the Territory.
Stark
v.
Starrs,
6 Wall. 402.
After the suit was thus dismissed, Stark commenced actions
of ejectment against the tenants of the complainant for possession of the-premises. These were consolidated into one action, in which Stark recovered judgment, with damages, for use and occupation. The complainant thereupon commenced the present suit in equity,' alleging that he has a good, and equitable title to the premises as against Stark, and praying an injunction against any legal proceedings for their possession, and a decree that he be required to release such title as he may have acquired by his donation claim and patent. In the bill the complainant sets up substantially the same matter, though with greater fullness and detail, which was originally averred in the first suit brought by himself and his brother, and omitted in the amended bill in that suit upon the election required by the court; and also claims that the defendant is estopped by his acts from asserting title to the premises.
The first question presented for our determination is, whether the complainant is concluded upon that matter in the present suit, by reason of the proceedings and decree in the first suit. While that. suit' was pending, the complainant acquired the interest of his brother.
It is undoubtedly a settled principle that a party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, of both, all the grounds upon which he expects a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demand and prosecute it by piecemeal, or present only a portion .of the grounds upon which special relief is sought, and leave the rest to be presented in a second suit, if the first fail. There would be no end to litigation if such a practice were permissible. But this principle does not require distinct causes of action, — that is to say, distinct matters, — each of which would authorize by itself independent relief, to be presented in a single suit, though they exist at the same time and might be considered together. The agreemen t between Stark and the parties through whom the complainants claimed constituted a cause for relief, distinct from and independent of that arising from the interest asserted by them as beneficiaries under the patent to the city authorities. There was, therefore, no rule of law which compelled the presentation of the two causes of relief in the same suit. They required different alie
gations in the bill, and different evidence on the bearing. Tbe court might have considered one cause insufficient, and sustained the bill on the other. It might have ruled against the agreement, and, sustaining the city patent, enjoined the defendant from asserting any interest in the premises; or it might have denied the validity of the patent, and decreed a release upon the agreement. The provisions of the decree would have conformed to the cause sustained; its directions in the one case would have differed from its directions in the other. It was competent, therefore, and within the discretion of the court, to compel the presentation of the two causes, calling as they did for different relief in separate suits. A decision upon one could not possibly be a bar to proceedings upon the other, from their intrinsically distinct nature. Having required the complainants to proceed in that suit only upon one cause or ground for relief, the court left the other cause open for any future suit which they might choose to bring.
To appreciate and give proper effect to the agreement made by Stark with parties through whom the complainant derives his interest, and upon which he founds his claim to equitable relief in this suit, reference must be had to the condition on which land in Oregon was held at that time. The entire land in the Territory belonged to the United States. No provision had been made for the sale or other disposition of any portions of it to private parties. The pre-emption law had not been extended over the country, nor until the passage of the act of September 27, 1850, usually designated as the Donation Act, was there any known mode for obtaining the legal title. And yet the inhabitants dealt in the land as though possessed of the fee. They not only occupied, cultivated, and improved such portions as their necessities required, but they bought and sold it as land is bought and sold where the title has passed out of the government. This dealing in the land without having the title arose necessarily from the settlement of the country before the laws of the United States were extended over it. Indeed, a large number of emigrants from the United States had settled in the country whilst its sovereignty was in dispute with Great Britain. It was not until the 15th of June, 1846, that its sovereignty was determined by the treaty; and previous to this
time, in 1845, the emigrants had formed for themselves a provisional government, under which laws were passed, protection to persons and property secured, and justice administered, with all the order and regularity of long-established'communities. The inhabitants engaged in the pursuits, industries, and enterprises which might be expected from an active, intelligent, and moral people. For the preservation of order and security, they were obliged to make some regulations for the possession and occupation of land among themselves. They accordingly established a land system, providing in what manner and to what extent land should be taken up and possessed. Under it each person over a specified age, upon complying with certain conditions, was allowed to hold six hundred and forty acres. He was required to designate the extent of his claim, either by natural or artificial boundaries; make, within prescribed periods, improvements thereon ; and have the claim recorded in the office of the territorial recorder, in a book kept for that purpose. All claims thus taken up and recorded were' respected by the people ; and the claimants were protected, not only by the law of the provisional government, but by the general public sentiment of the country, in their possession and enjoyment. They were at liberty to use the claims for any legitimate purpose as absolute owners, either for cultivation and residences, or as sites for villages or towns. They did not deny, in any of their dealings, the proprietorship of the United States; but they acted upon a confident expectation that their possessions and improvements would be respected by the government, and that ultimately they should acquire the title.
This expectation was founded upon the uniform action of the government in its dealings with the public domain, occupied by settlers in advance of legislation for its sale. It was, therefore, understood by the people that, whenever the legal title was thus obtained, it should inure to the benefit of the grantees of the claimant who secured the patent of the United States. This understanding constituted, in reality, the unwritten conventional law of the State, which affected all transactions in land until the passage of the Dona
tion Act. That act shows- that Congress, in its passage, was cognizant of this fact; for it impliedly recognizes the validity of previous contracts for the transfer of land made by a claimant, to whom, upon proof of his settlement and its continuation for four years, a patent should be afterwards issued. This matter was considered by this court in
Lamb
v. Davenport, reported in the 18th of Wallace. It was there objected that a contract for the sale of lands thus held, made before the passage of the Donation Act, was void, because the proviso to the fourth section declares that all future contracts of sale by any person entitled to the benefit of the act, before he received a patent, should be void; but the court said, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller: “ The act was on its face intended to cover settlements already made, and the careful limitation of this proviso to future contracts of sale — that is, sales made after the passage of the act — raises a strong implication of the validity of such contracts made before the passage of the statute. It was well known that many actual settlers held under such contracts, and while Congress intended to protect the donee from future improvident sales, it left contracts already made undisturbed.” And the court held that the -purchaser by such a contract acquired, as against his vendor, an equitable right to the land, which would be enforced when the legal title was obtained.
In the present case, it appears that prior to March 22, 1848, one Francis W. Pettygrove held a claim to six hundred and forty acres, taken up under the law of the provisional government, upon which a great part of the present city of Portland is built. On that day he conveyed his claim, with the exception of certain lots, and - all his interest therein, “present and in expectancy,” to Daniel H. Lownsdale. In March, 1849, Lownsdale conveyed his interest in the claim, with a similar exception of certain lots, to Stephen Coffin, taking back a contract, to the effect, substantially, that Coffin would hold the property equally for his benefit, and execute to him a good title to one-half of the claim, with the improvements, upon the termination of the contract. In December following, Lownsdale and Coffin conveyed one undivided' third interest in the claim to Chapman. The three were, in fact, equal owners of the claim, and styled themselves partners in the property, although
the conveyances showed that the documentary title to it was in the names of Chapman and Coffin alone. These parties, while retaining the general possession and ownership of the claim, laid off upon it numerous blocks and lots, and sold a large number of the lots to different parties, publicly avowing at the time their intention to obtain, if possible, a title to the land from the United States, and thus to perfect the title of the purchasers.
In January, 1850, Lownsdale went to San Francisco, leaving a power of attorney with Chapman, to do any thing pertaining to his interest which Chapman might think advisable, particularly in signing deeds to lots in the city of Portland. Whilst in San Francisco, he met the defendant Stark, who claimed one-half interest ip the Portland land claim by purchase from one Lovejoy, who, he asserted, held the claim originally with Petty-grove. A settlement was accordingly made between them. It was agreed that Lownsdale should release, with certain exceptions, all claim to land north of a designated line, now known as Stark Street; and that Stark should release, with certain exceptions, all claim to land south of the line, and confirm certain sales and conveyances made within the tract released to him. This agreement was carried out by a deed of mutual release and quitclaim executed by them on the 1st of March, 1850. The deed confirmed the conveyances of certain lots made by Lownsdale or his attorney previous to Jan. 1, 1850, north of the line, and all subsequent conveyances to March 1, 1850; but with a proviso that Stark should receive the proceeds of the subsequent conveyances. The instrument also provided, that in case any person, with certain exceptions, holding or claiming under Lownsdale, referring to Chapman and Coffin, should'refuse to ratify and confirm the deed within six months, Stark might at his option have it cancelled.
Whilst Lownsdale was absent at San Francisco, three blocks were partitioned by Chapman and Coffin among the three owners, one block being taken by each at an agreed valuation. One of them, designated number 78, was assigned to Lownsdale, one, designated number 79, was assigned to Coffin, and one, number 81, was assigned to Chapman. This latter block lies north of the dividing line, within the tract falling to Stark,
and embraces tbe premises in controversy. Tbe assignment of this block is contained in a deed purporting to be a conveyance by Chapman, Coffin, and Lownsdale, — the latter by Chapman, his attorney. As a conveyance of any interest to Chapman from Lownsdale, it is waste paper. An attorney cannot convey to himself by a power from his principal. But at that time Coffin, as already stated, held in his name the interest of Lownsdale. The instrument was therefore effectual as a release to Chapman of the entire interest of both. No one but Lownsdale could object to the transaction; and he never complained of it, but,,on the contrary, approved of it. In the settlement between the joint owners or partners, Chapman was -charged with the estimated value of the block.
When Chapman and Coffin learned of the agreement between Lownsdale and Stark, they refused to ratify it, unless it were modified so as to cover the transfers made by them during Lownsdale’s absence, referring particularly to the disposition made of the three blocks. During the previous year, Stark, on leaving Portland, had given a power of attorney to his partner, to do any and all acts during his absence which he could do if present. Accompanying this power was a letter, in which the land claim was mentioned, and a desire expressed that his interest in that claim should be particularly attended to, and the difficulty concerning his undivided half settled.' This attorney now undertook to remove the objection urged by Chapman and Coffin, and for that purpose, after some negotiation, he consented to the modification desired. The agreement was accordingly ratified by Chapman and Coffin, modified so as to place the disposition of property made by them previous to the time they received notice of the settlement upon the same footing with the disposition of property before the first of the previous January; and as thus modified the agreement was also ratified by the attorney. Afterwards, during the same year, and in January, 1851, Chapman sold the premises in controversy. A portion of them was purchased from him by the complainant and his brother. The rest of the premises was afterwards purchased by them from intermediate parties. They] were all acquired before the patent of the United States was issued to Stark. The different purchasers went at once into
possession; and they or their grantees have ever since, either by themselves or tenants, been in the occupation of the property, and have made extensive and valuable improvements. The property is situated in the business part of Portland, and has always been occupied for business purposes.
The ratification made by the attorney of Stark, it is said, applies in terms only to the attorney’s interest; but the answer is, that the attorney had no interest at the time, and acted only for Stark. If, as a ratification by Stark, it is insufficient in form, because of the manner in which the attorney has expressed his agency in appending his signature to the instrument, a court of equity will look beyond the form of the execution, and, having ascertained the intention of the attorney in signing the instrument, will, if possible, give it the effect intended. The ratification, such as it was, undoubtedly led to the purchase of the -property by the complainant and his brother and others. When Stark subsequently returned to Portland, in June, 1850, he was informed of the action of his attorney, and made no objection to it, although he understood that it was intended as a ratification on his part of the disposition of the block in question by Chapman and Coffin.
But more persuasive evidence of his approval of the modification is furnished by his action with respect to the property. As already stated, the documentary title to the entire claim was in Chapman and Coffin. Without their approval, the settlement between Stark and Lownsdale would have failed of any result. Upon the ratification by the attorney, Chapman and Coffin abandoned all interest in any other property than block 81 north of the agreed line; and Stark at the same time abandoned his interest in the tract south of that line, and appropriated in severalty all the other property released on the north. In other words, instead of calling for a cancellation of the deed upon the refusal of Chapman and Coffin to ratify it, as he was at liberty to do, he adopted it as approved by them; for, except as thus approved, it was without any efficacy. He held nothing in severalty, except by their consent; and upon his claim to hold the property released in this way he subsequently obtained his patent from the government, and sold to different parties portions of the land. Under
these circumstances, he cannot be permitted to go back upon the act of his attorney.
So far, therefore, as the transfer of block 81 to Chapman is concerned, the deed must be held to apply to it as fully as it applies to the conveyances specially designated and confirmed by that instrument. It operated as a confirmar tion of the transfer, and gave to Chapman an equitable right to call for a release of the legal title, when that was obtained. That right passed to the complainant claiming under him.
During the several years intervening between this transaction and the issue of the patent, Stark frequently conversed with the Starrs and the other purchasers respecting the property, assured them, in repeated instances, that he would convey to them the legal title when he obtained the patent from the government, and advised them to erect buildings and improve the property. Under his eye, and with full notice, and by his encouragement, the Starrs, and others from whom the Starrs purchased, made the improvements. If in the light of these facts, and all the attending circumstances, the defendant could now successfully impugn the ratification made by his attorney, deny the promises made by himself, and deprive the complainant of the property and improvements, it would be a reproach to the administration of justice. Upon every principle of law and morals, he should be for ever enjoined from the commission of such injustice, and be compelled to quiet the title of the complainant by a release of all claim to the premises.
Decree affirmed.
Note,- — In
Starh
v.
StarBand. Same
v.
Bacon,
appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Oregon, which were argued at the same time and by the same counsel as was the preceding case, Me. Justice Pield, in delivering the opinion of the court, remarked: “ These cases involve some of the questions discussed and decided in the above case; and, upon the authority of that decision, the decrees in both are affirmed.”