Stanwood v. Roberts

697 P.2d 183, 298 Or. 796, 1985 Ore. LEXIS 1123
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 19, 1985
DocketSC S31365
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 697 P.2d 183 (Stanwood v. Roberts) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stanwood v. Roberts, 697 P.2d 183, 298 Or. 796, 1985 Ore. LEXIS 1123 (Or. 1985).

Opinion

PER CURIAM

Petitioner Stanwood challenges the ballot title prepared by the Attorney General for an initiative petition that proposes, inter alia, to place in the Oregon Constitution a 5% sales and use tax with the provision requiring implementing legislation at some future date by the legislature. Pursuant to ORS 250.035 and 250.065, the Attorney General drafted a ballot title.1

Petitioner challenged the original title as insufficient or unfair in seven different ways and urges the court to make the following changes:

THE CAPTION

1. The words “use tax” should be deleted because the use tax aspect of the proposed measure plays such a small role in the sales tax scheme.

2. The phrase “partial funding of schools” should be included so that the voter will understand that it is the intent of the proposed measure to reduce, not eliminate, property tax funding of schools.

THE QUESTION

3. The question should also include the phrase “partial funding of schools” for the above stated reason.

4. The phrase “most school levy authority” is redundant and should be replaced with the words “no referendum permitted on implementing legislation” so that the voter is made aware of the fact that the proposed measure is not subject to referendum.

[799]*799THE EXPLANATION

5. The explanation should include the phrase “tax on goods” so that the voter will know that the proposed sales tax is on tangible personal property alone and does not affect services.

6. The word “statewide” should be inserted before the phrase “personal income growth rate” so as to inform the voter that property taxes for schools will not be tied to fluctuations in the voter’s individual income.

7. Finally, the explanation should reiterate the point that if this proposed measure passes, it will preclude a voter referendum.

In light of these objections, petitioner requested that an alternative ballot title be adopted and certified by this court.2

The Attorney General concedes that several of petitioner’s objections are sufficiently valid to require appropriate changes. He concedes that the caption and the question should denote that the measure will only partially fund schools, and that the word “use-tax” is only incidental to this purpose. The Attorney General agrees that the explanation should mention that the required implementing legislation passed by the legislature is non-referable. The Attorney General also agrees that the proposed measure would limit future school district levy increases by statewide personal income growth, as opposed to individual personal income growth.3

[800]*800In response to the “valid” contentions of petitioner, the Attorney General proposes the following alternative ballot title:

“CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT REQUIRES 5% SALES TAX FOR PARTIAL SCHOOL FUNDING
“Question: Shall adoption of 5% sales tax be required, to aid schools, replace much school tax levy authority, reduce income taxes?
“Explanation: Constitutional amendment requires legislature to adopt 5% sales tax, not referrable [sic]. States exemptions. Net proceeds go 80% to schools, 20% to reduce income tax. Schools’ levy authority, tax bases adjusted for sales tax receipts. With exceptions, school levy growth cannot exceed state personal income growth rate. Requires state support of schools, community colleges, from other funds at 1983 proportion of state budget. Low income property tax relief continues under present law. Bans other sales taxes.”

Generally, in considering a ballot title, our initial task is to determine whether the title prepared by the Attorney General is unfair or insufficient. Bartels v. Paulus, 293 Or 47, 645 P2d 1059 (1982). Frank concessions by the Attorney General help this court in making that determination, but are not necessarily binding on our own independent inquiry. In this case, we agree with the Attorney General that the conceded changes are required. Our statutory duty remains to certify a title that meets the requirements of ORS 250.035 and 250.039, pursuant to ORS 250.085(3). Remington v. Paulus, 296 Or 317, 675 P2d 485 (1984).

We shall examine the objections of petitioner, in light of the concessions of the Attorney General, where such concessions apply:

The Attorney General’s revised caption refers to the measure as a constitutional amendment requiring a 5% sales [801]*801tax for partial school funding. Such a modification substantially meets both objections of petitioner.

It is this court’s responsibility to insure that the caption properly identifies the proposed measure. We do not seek to write a better caption; we do no more than decide that the provided caption is sufficient, concise and fair. Ferry v. Paulus, 297 Or 70, 682 P2d 262 (1984); see also Crumpton v. Roberts, 298 Or 774, 697 P2d 180 (1985). We conclude that the following caption meets this standard:

“CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT REQUIRES 5% SALES TAX FOR PARTIAL SCHOOL FUNDING”

Petitioner claims that the phrase, “replace much school tax levy authority,” is redundant in light of the preceding phrase, “to fund schools.” Moreover, petitioner convincingly argues that the deletion of this phrase would allow for the insertion of the words “with no referendum permitted on the implementing legislation” which would inform voters of their loss of this right.

ORS 250.035 provides:

“(1) The ballot title of any measure to be initiated or referred shall consist of:
«* * * * *
“(b) A question of not more than 20 words which plainly states the purpose of the measure, and is phrased so that an affirmative response to the question corresponds to an affirmative vote on the measure;”

The Attorney General maintains that the purpose of the proposed measure is to require the legislature to pass a sales tax, and is not to eliminate the right of referendum. Therefore, he argues that the inclusion of this phrase does not serve the purpose of the question. We deem this part of the proposed measure to be highly significant. We shall set forth our reasons.

Clause (3) (a) of Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution declares:

“The people reserve to themselves the referendum power, which is to approve or reject at an election any Act, or part [802]*802thereof, of the Legislative Assembly thát does not become effective earlier than 90 days after the end of the session at which the Act is passed.”

Article IV, section 28 states:

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Related

Priestley v. Roberts
697 P.2d 188 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
697 P.2d 183, 298 Or. 796, 1985 Ore. LEXIS 1123, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stanwood-v-roberts-or-1985.