Crumpton v. Roberts

697 P.2d 180, 298 Or. 774
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 19, 1985
DocketSC S31516
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 697 P.2d 180 (Crumpton v. Roberts) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crumpton v. Roberts, 697 P.2d 180, 298 Or. 774 (Or. 1985).

Opinion

LENT, J.

A prospective petition for a state measure to be initiated has been filed with the respondent pursuant to ORS 250.045. Acting under ORS 250.065(2), the respondent has sent copies of the measure to the Attorney General, who has provided to the respondent a ballot title for the measure pursuant to ORS 250.065(3). The provided title follows:

“AMENDS CONSTITUTION: REDUCES PROPERTY TAX RATE OVER THREE YEAR PERIOD
“QUESTION: Shall Constitution cut real property tax rates, limit assessed value increases and tax elections, and require elections for new taxes?
“EXPLANATION: Constitutional amendment cuts allowable property tax rate 10% per year over three years to 70% of 1984-85 rates. Freezes maximum rate after third year. Exempts taxes for existing bonds. Limits assessed value growth to 2% annually. Majority of electors must approve new or increased taxes. Limits tax elections to two each year and requires vote by mail option. Limits license, user, service fees to actual cost of service. Continues low income homeowner, renter tax relief.”

Petitioners1 in this court allege that they are persons dissatisfied with the title provided by the Attorney General and seek, pursuant to ORS 250.085(1), a different title, averring that the provided title is insufficient and unfair in various particulars.

Petitioners aver that the provided 10-word caption is insufficient and unfair because it is “misleading.” They allege that the caption suggests that the effect of the measure is “complete” after three years, but actually the measure would “affect the future far beyond three years.” They ask that the reference to “three years” be deleted.

[777]*777Petitioners also urge that the caption is insufficient and unfair because it omits “reference to a major change in the democratic voting system.” This contention arises from the text of subsection (5) of the measure, which provides that a taxing unit “shall not increase a tax rate or special assessment or levy a new tax or special assessment, if such action would cause an increase in governmental revenues, unless such action is approved by a majority vote of the electors of the taxing unit.” Petitioners argue that this text requires an affirmative vote of the majority of all registered voters in the taxing unit rather than a majority of those who vote.

The statute, ORS 250.035(1)(a), directs that the caption shall be “not more than 10 words by which the measure is commonly referred to.” The respondent argues correctly that this court less than a year ago in Ferry v. Paulus, 297 Or 70, 682 P2d 262 (1984), stated that it was the responsibility of this court to apply the statutory text. That text speaks to identification of a measure, not to its summarization.

As was the case with respect to the ballot title before us in Ferry v. Paulus, supra, neither the petitioners nor the respondent has argued to us that there are presently extant words by which this particular measure is “commonly referred to.” In Ferry v. Paulus, supra, we implied that where such words did not exist, the caption might attempt the necessary identification by using words by which the measure will be commonly referred to in circulating petitions and in electioneering if that stage is reached. We did so by directing attention to Young v. Neuner et al, 178 Or 625, 630, 169 P2d 124 (1946), which employed that very course in addressing the sufficiency of a caption.

One of the chief “petitioners,” in the ORS 250.045 sense as sponsor of this measure, has been instrumental in gaining a place on the ballot for somewhat similar measures in several recent elections. The election year, measure number and caption for those measures were as follows:

1978, No. 6, “LIMITATIONS ON AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXES.”
1980, No. 6, “CONSTITUTIONAL REAL PROPERTY TAX LIMIT PRESERVING 85% DISTRICTS’ 1977 REVENUE.”
[778]*7781982, No. 3, “CONSTITUTIONAL REAL PROPERTY TAX LIMIT PRESERVING 85% DISTRICTS’ 1979 REVENUE.”
1984, No. 2, “CONSTITUTIONAL REAL PROPERTY TAX LIMIT.”

It is reasonable to infer that this latest effort may be identified in like terms.

The provided caption identifies the measure as one that would amend the constitution and reduce property taxes. That caption is neither unfair nor insufficient to carry out the mandate of ORS 250.035(l)(a).

Under ORS 250.035(1)(b) a ballot title must also contain a question in not more than 20 words which plainly states the purpose of the measure in such terms that an affirmative answer to the question corresponds to an affirmative vote on the measure. The petitioners propose a differently worded question from that provided by the Attorney General, but their petition does not directly specify any perceived insufficiency or unfairness in the provided question. Petitioners propose:

“QUESTION: Shall Constitution limit property tax rates, assessed values, and limit power of majority voting to approve of revenue increases?”

The first part of petitioners’ proposed question is clearly insufficient and unfair in failing to state that the measure would not only limit, but more importantly would reduce, property tax rates. The second part of petitioners’ proposed question, if adopted by this court, would tentatively decide an issue of law not yet presented and briefed adversarially in the context of a judicial controversy. Although the text of subsection (5), quoted above, may arguably mean something akin to petitioners’ proposed question, that is by no means certain.

In light of the foregoing and the absence of any direct allegation of insufficiency or unfairness in the Attorney General’s provided question, we decline to order any change in the question provided.

The third part of a ballot title must consist of “a concise and impartial statement of not more than 75 words of the chief purpose of the measure.” Petitioners allege that the [779]*779explanation provided is “misleading.” Although that adjective is not one of those specified in ORS 250.085(1), we take it to be a claim of unfairness or of insufficiency, or both.

Petitioners’ point is that the text of subsection (5) of the measure above quoted would require for passage of a measure enhancing governmental revenues that a majority of all registered voters

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Related

Stanwood v. Roberts
697 P.2d 183 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
697 P.2d 180, 298 Or. 774, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crumpton-v-roberts-or-1985.