Stanley Tsuji v. Kamehameha Schools

Ninth Circuit

Stanley Tsuji v. Kamehameha Schools

678 F. App'x 552

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedFebruary 23, 2017

Docket16-15105

StatusUnpublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 678 F. App'x 552 (Stanley Tsuji v. Kamehameha Schools) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Stanley Tsuji v. Kamehameha Schools, 678 F. App'x 552 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Stanley R. Tsuji appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his employment action alleging claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Smith v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2013), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tsuji’s discrimination claim because Tsuji failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was disabled, and whether defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his employment were pretex-tual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining disability); Smith, 727 F.3d at 955 (setting forth elements of a prima facie case of ADA discrimination); Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2001) (outlining requirements for showing that termination was pretextual).

The district court'properly granted summary judgment on Tsuji’s failure-to-accommodate claim because Tsuji failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether he was disabled. See Allen v. Pac. Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of prima facie case under the ADA for failure-to-accommodate).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tsuji’s retaliation claim because Tsuji faked to raise a triable dispute as to whether there was a causal link between Tsuji’s protected activity and his termination, and whether defendant’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual. See Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of a prima facie case of ADA retaliation, and requirements for establishing pretext).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

*553 Tsujfs motion to vacate his reply brief is denied as -unnecessary.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Stanley R. Tsuji appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his employment action alleging claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Smith v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2013), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tsuji’s discrimination claim because Tsuji failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was disabled, and whether defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his employment were pretex-tual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining disability); Smith, 727 F.3d at 955 (setting forth elements of a prima facie case of ADA discrimination); Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2001) (outlining requirements for showing that termination was pretextual).

The district court'properly granted summary judgment on Tsuji’s failure-to-accommodate claim because Tsuji failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether he was disabled. See Allen v. Pac. Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of prima facie case under the ADA for failure-to-accommodate).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tsuji’s retaliation claim because Tsuji faked to raise a triable dispute as to whether there was a causal link between Tsuji’s protected activity and his termination, and whether defendant’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual. See Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of a prima facie case of ADA retaliation, and requirements for establishing pretext).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

*553 Tsujfs motion to vacate his reply brief is denied as -unnecessary.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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678 F. App'x 552, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stanley-tsuji-v-kamehameha-schools-ca9-2017.

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