Stanley Seabrook v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: May 7, 2012
• Docket: A12A0064
• Status: Published

Opinion

THIRD DIVISION MIKELL, P. J., MILLER and BLACKWELL, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. (Court of Appeals Rule 4 (b) and Rule 37 (b), February 21, 2008) http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/

May 7, 2012

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A12A0064. SEABROOK v. THE STATE.

MILLER, Judge.

Stanley Seabrook, proceeding pro se, appeals from the dismissal of his petition

for a writ of error coram nobis challenging his 1994 guilty plea to the charges of

aggravated assault (OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2)), armed robbery (OCGA § 16-8-41 (a)),

and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (OCGA § 16-11-131 (b)). On appeal,

Seabrook contends that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his petition

without holding a hearing, and that the writ of error coram nobis was the only remedy

available to challenge his guilty plea and assert his claims of actual innocence and

ineffective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. The record shows that in September 1994, Seabrook, with the assistance of

counsel, entered a negotiated Alford1 plea to three counts of aggravated assault, one

count of armed robbery, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon. The trial court sentenced Seabrook to serve an aggregate of three years in

prison and four years on probation.

On July 21, 2010, Seabrook filed the instant petition for writ of error coram

nobis. In that petition, Seabrook argued that his 1994 convictions should have been

vacated because he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea process;

he was innocent of the charges; and he did not enter his plea intelligently, knowingly,

and voluntarily. At the time Seabrook filed his petition, he was serving a federal

sentence that was enhanced by his 1994 convictions. The trial court dismissed

Seabrook’s petition, concluding that the writ offered no relief since his claims were

not based on newly discovered evidence. The trial court also found that it lacked

jurisdiction to consider his petition as a motion to withdraw guilty plea, and that the

petition could not be considered as a writ of habeas corpus since the period for filing

a habeas corpus petition had expired.

1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25 (91 SC 160, 27 LE2d 162) (1970).

2 On appeal, Seabrook contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his

petition without holding a hearing to determine whether his 1994 guilty plea was

voluntary. He also contends that his petition was the appropriate vehicle to assert his

claims of actual innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree.

A petition for writ of error coram nobis is an obsolete writ, and its use

discouraged. See Harris v. State, 269 Ga. App. 92, 93 (1) (603 SE2d 490) (2004).

However, as it is the ancestor of an extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly

discovered evidence, the prerequisites for issuing

a writ of error coram nobis or for granting an extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence appear to be identical. Before a court authorizes either, it is generally required that the moving or petitioning party base the pleading on facts which are not part of the record and which could not by due diligence have been discovered at the time of the trial.

(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Moss v. State, 255 Ga. App. 107, 108 (564 SE2d

516) (2002).

Here, Seabrook failed to point to any newly discovered evidence that would

have authorized the trial court to grant the writ. Rather, his claims regarding the

validity of his plea, his attorney’s alleged ineffectiveness in the plea process, and his

actual innocence “all deal with evidence which was known to [Seabrook] . . . at the

3 time he entered his plea of guilty. Thus, [Seabrook] could not properly challenge his

plea under a writ of error coram norbis.” (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Id.

Even if we were to consider Seabrook’s petition as a motion to withdraw his

guilty plea, he was still not entitled to relief.

The superior court’s jurisdiction to entertain a motion to withdraw a guilty plea ends after the term of court in which the judgment of conviction was rendered. And it is well establish that after the expiration of the term and of the time for filing an appeal from the conviction, the only remedy available to the defendant for withdrawing a plea is through habeas corpus proceedings.

(Punctuation and footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.) LaFette v. State, 285 Ga.

App. 516, 516 (1) (646 SE2d 725) (2007). Since Seabrook filed his petition more than

15 years after the expiration of the term of court in which his judgment of conviction

was entered, the trial court had no jurisdiction to rule on his petition as a motion to

withdraw a guilty plea. See, e.g., Harris, supra, 269 Ga. App. at 93 (2). Moreover,

even construing his petition as a writ for habeas corpus, Seabrook’s petition was

likewise untimely. Seabrook had until July 1, 2008, to file a habeas corpus petition,

but he did not file the present petition until July 2010. OCGA § 9-14-42 (c) (1)

(“[A]ny person whose conviction has become final as of July 1, 2004, regardless of

the date of conviction, shall have until . . . July 1, 2008, in the case of a felony to

4 bring an action” for habeas corpus relief.). Since Seabrook had no remedy to

challenge his guilty plea, the trial court properly dismissed his petition.

Judgment affirmed. Mikell, P. J., and Blackwell, J., concur.