Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedSeptember 9, 2016
DocketCivil Action No. 2016-1534
StatusPublished

This text of Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, (D.D.C. 2016).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 16-1534 (JEB) U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

“Since the founding of this nation, the United States’ relationship with the Indian tribes

has been contentious and tragic. America’s expansionist impulse in its formative years led to the

removal and relocation of many tribes, often by treaty but also by force.” Cobell v. Norton, 240

F.3d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This case also features what an American Indian tribe

believes is an unlawful encroachment on its heritage. More specifically, the Standing Rock

Sioux Tribe has sued the United States Army Corps of Engineers to block the operation of Corps

permitting for the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL). The Tribe fears that construction of the

pipeline, which runs within half a mile of its reservation in North and South Dakota, will destroy

sites of cultural and historical significance. It has now filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction,

asserting principally that the Corps flouted its duty to engage in tribal consultations under the

National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and that irreparable harm will ensue. After digging

through a substantial record on an expedited basis, the Court cannot concur. It concludes that the

Corps has likely complied with the NHPA and that the Tribe has not shown it will suffer injury

1 that would be prevented by any injunction the Court could issue. The Motion will thus be

denied.

I. Background

DAPL is a domestic oil pipeline designed to move over a half-billion gallons of crude oil

across four states daily. The oil enters the pipeline in North Dakota, crosses South Dakota and

Iowa, and winds up in Patoka, Illinois, nearly 1,200 miles later. Although the route does not

actually cross the Standing Rock reservation, it runs within a half-mile of it.

A project of this magnitude often necessitates an extensive federal appraisal and

permitting process. Not so here. Domestic oil pipelines, unlike natural-gas pipelines, require no

general approval from the federal government. In fact, DAPL needs almost no federal permitting

of any kind because 99% of its route traverses private land.

One significant exception, however, concerns construction activities in federally

regulated waters at hundreds of discrete places along the pipeline route. The Corps needed to

permit this activity under the Clean Water Act or the Rivers and Harbors Act – and sometimes

both. For DAPL, accordingly, it permitted these activities under a general permit known as

Nationwide Permit 12. The Tribe alleges that the Corps violated multiple federal statutes in

doing so, including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Historic

Preservation Act (NHPA). In its Complaint, the Tribe asserts that this DAPL permitting

threatens its environmental and economic well-being, as well as its cultural resources.

Despite this broad lawsuit, however, the Standing Rock Sioux now seek a preliminary

injunction only on the alleged violation of the NHPA. That statute encompasses sites of cultural

or religious significance to Indian tribes and requires that federal agencies consult with tribes

prior to issuing permits that might affect these historic resources. The Tribe claims that the

2 Corps did not fulfill this obligation before permitting the DAPL activities. It bears noting that

the Tribe does not press its environmental claims under NEPA here. Nor does it seek a

preliminary injunction to protect itself from the potential environmental harms that might arise

from having the pipeline on its doorstep. Instead, it asserts only that pipeline-construction

activities – specifically, the grading and clearing of land – will cause irreparable injury to historic

or cultural properties of great significance.

The statutes and permitting scheme involved in this Motion are undeniably complex. The

Court first sets forth the operation of the NHPA, which the Tribe asserts was violated. It next

explains the Clean Water Act and the Rivers and Harbors Act, under which the Corps permitted

the DAPL activities. Subsequent sections lay out the factual and legal proceedings that have

taken place thus far.

A. National Historic Preservation Act

Congress enacted the NHPA in 1966 to “foster conditions under which our modern

society and our historic property can exist in productive harmony.” 54 U.S.C. § 300101(1). To

this end, Section 106 of the Act requires a federal agency to consider the effect of its

“undertakings” on property of historical significance, which includes property of cultural or

religious significance to Indian tribes. Id. §§ 306108, 302706(b). An undertaking is defined

broadly to include any “project, activity, or program” that requires a federal permit. Id.

§ 300320. Section 106, like the National Environmental Policy Act, is often described as a

“stop, look, and listen” provision. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Warwick Sewer Auth., 334

F.3d 161, 166 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d

800, 805 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). The agency must also give the Advisory Council on

Historic Protection, which is charged with passing regulations to govern the implementation of

3 Section 106, “a reasonable opportunity to comment on the undertaking.” 54 U.S.C. § 306108.

The agency must further consult with, inter alia, tribes “that attach religious or cultural

significance to [affected] property.” Id. § 302706(b). Once this is done, Section 106 is satisfied.

In other words, the provision does not mandate that the permitting agency take any particular

preservation measures to protect these resources. See CTIA-Wireless Ass’n v. FCC, 466 F.3d

105, 106-07 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).

The Advisory Council also promulgates the regulations necessary to implement Section

106, see 54 U.S.C. § 304108(a), and these regulations “command substantial judicial deference.”

McMillan Park Comm. v. Nat’l Capital Planning Comm’n, 968 F.2d 1283, 1288 (D.C. Cir.

1992). Under them, the permitting agency – here, the Corps – first determines “whether the

proposed Federal action is an undertaking . . . and, if so, whether it is a type of activity that has

the potential to cause effects on historic properties.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.3(a). Where the agency

decides either that there is no undertaking or that the undertaking is not the “type of activity” that

has the “potential to cause effects on historic properties, assuming such . . . properties were

present,” the Section 106 process is complete. Id. § 800.3(a)(1). No consultation happens and

the permit may issue. Id.

Things get more complicated where the agency cannot make this determination. In such

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kleppe v. Sierra Club
427 U.S. 390 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen
541 U.S. 752 (Supreme Court, 2004)
McCreary, Maurice v. Offner, Paul
172 F.3d 76 (D.C. Circuit, 1999)
Cobell, Elouise v. Norton, Gale A.
240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Circuit, 2001)
Apotex, Inc. v. Food & Drug Administration
449 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Circuit, 2006)
Davis v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.
571 F.3d 1288 (D.C. Circuit, 2009)
Sherley v. Sebelius
644 F.3d 388 (D.C. Circuit, 2011)
Winnebago Tribe Of Nebraska v. Col. James W. Ray
621 F.2d 269 (Eighth Circuit, 1980)
Buckingham Corporation v. Stephen I. Karp
762 F.2d 257 (Second Circuit, 1985)
Wilderness Society v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management
526 F. App'x 790 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Dodd v. Fleming
223 F. Supp. 2d 15 (District of Columbia, 2002)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/standing-rock-sioux-tribe-v-united-states-army-corps-of-engineers-dcd-2016.