Standard Insurance v. McKee

205 S.W.2d 362, 146 Tex. 183, 1947 Tex. LEXIS 79
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 5, 1947
DocketNo. A-1286
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 205 S.W.2d 362 (Standard Insurance v. McKee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Standard Insurance v. McKee, 205 S.W.2d 362, 146 Tex. 183, 1947 Tex. LEXIS 79 (Tex. 1947).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Smedley

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Holding that there was evidence to support the jury’s finding that respondent, when injured, was not an independent contractor, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in respondent’s favor for payments of $20.00 per week for 401 weeks under the Workmen’s Compensation Law. 201 S. W. (2d) 627. The sole question presented here is as to the correctness of that ruling.

Respondent was employed by Branscum, superintendent of the Valley Osage Oil Company, petitioner’s insured, to drill oil wells on its lease in Shackleford County. He drilled in order its wells Nos. 8, 9 and 10, and was injured while working on well No. 10. The agreement for his employment was partly written and partly oral, the written part being the following letter relating- to well No. 8 written by respondent to the oil company and endorsed “accepted” by Branscum:

“This is to outline Mr. Branscum and my agreement for me to drill a well on your Alexander lease in Shackleford County, Texas.

[185]*185“I am to drill a well on your lease to the depth of 900 feet, unless oil or gas is .encountered at a lesser depth for the price of $2.25 per foot, and $40.00 per 8 hour tour for day work. I will furnish all water, slush pit, fuel, water and 8” and 7” casing, but you are to furnish the oil string and pay for any pipe that is left in the hole. I will carry Workmen’s Compensation and Liability Insurance. Drilling is to start within 30 days from this date.”

After the completion of well No. 8 Branscum telegraphed the respondent to begin drilling well No. 9, “same basis well Number Eight .” Respondent’s undisputed testimony is that when well No. 9 was finished he was directed to proceed with well No. 10 on the basis of No. 8 and No. 9.

Since the letter and the directions to drill the second and third wells are brief and general in their terms, and do not undertake to define the relation between the parties or the right of control, it becomes necessary to look to the evidence as to the situation of the parties, the facts and circumstances touching the relation, and particularly the evidence as to the nature and extent of the control that was actually exercised over the performance of the work. Dave Lehr, Inc. v. Brown, 127 Texas 236, 91 S. W. (2d) 693; Blankenship v. Royal Indemnity Co., 128 Texas 26, 95 S. W. (2d) 366; Southern Underwriters v. Samanie, 137 Texas 531, 535-536, 155 S. W. (2d) 359; 27 Am. Jur., p. 488, Sec. 6; Note 20 A. L. R. pp. 684, 725.

There are no material contradictions in the testimony. Respondent, an experienced driller, owned his drilling rig and too’s and for several years had been making contracts for the drilling of oil wells. He employed the helpers who worked with him on the three wel’s, paid them and carried workmen’s compensation. The helpers were never on the payroll of the Valley Osage Oil Company.

. The method and manner of drilling and completing the wells were as fol’ows: The top of the pay lime was reached at about 880 feet. Thereupon Branscum ordered respondent to stop drill-, ing. While the well was being drilled down to the lime the operations were under the control of McKee, who gave all orders and directions; and during that time respondent was an independent contractor. When the top of the lime was reached Branscum furnished the oil pipe and told respondent to run and set it. He directed that the pipe be cemented, which was done, [186]*186and the cement was allowed to set until Branscum directed that the plug be drilled out. After the plug was drilled out Branscum directed that the tubing be run in order to acidize the well, and when that process had been completed by another company the rods for pumping were run at Branscum’s direction. Thereupon Branscum gave instructions that the well be pumped, telling them when to pump and how long. It was pumped from the rig for a few hours. .Thereupon the well was put on the pump jack, connected with the oil company’s power. That marked the end of respondent’s services on the well and of the use of his rig and tools.

Well No. 10 was not fully completed while respondent was working on it. After the oil pipe in that well was first comented, respondent himself drilled the plug. It was found that the cement did not hold and the Halliburton Company cemented it again. That stood for about 48 hours, when Branscum told respondent to go out, pick up the tools, dress the bit, and get ready to drill the new plug. While dresing the bit respondent suffered the injury on account of which this suit was filed. His clothing was ignited from fire in the forge.

The controversy is about the nature of the relation between the oil company and respondent that existed after well No. 10 had been drilled to the top of the lime. Petitioner contends that there was one contract for the completion of the well, that respondent began his work on it as an independent contractor, and that there is no testimony from which it can reasonably be inferred that at the time of his injury respondent had been transformed from an admitted independent contractor into an employee. It argues that the control exercised by Branscum, the oil company’s superintendent, was of a nature necessary to secure the performance of the contract and to accomplish the results contemplated by the parties, and that the control dealt with what should be done under the contract and not with the details of how respondent should perform the work. On the other hand, respondent’s contention is that after the well was drilled to the pay lime Branscum, the oil company’s superintendent, exercised authoritative control in the direction of the manner, means and details of the work performed for the completion of the well.'

The record contains evidence of elements bearing upon the relation between respondent and the oil company from which it could reasonably be inferred that respondent continued to be' an independent contractor during the time when the well was-being finished. We believe, however, that" the solution [187]*187of the question presented in this case is correctly reached by the application of the test of right of control, which, according to our decisions and most of the modern cases, is used as the supreme test. Ochoa v. Winerich Motor Sales Co., 127 Texas 542, 94 S. W. (2d) 416; Blankenship v. Royal Indemnity Co., 128 Texas 26, 95 S. W. (2d) 366; Southern Underwriters v. Samanie, 137 Texas 531, 155 S. W. (2d) 359; Industrial Indemnity Exchange v. Southard, 138 Texas 531, 160 S. W. (2d) 905; Dennis v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n., 116 S. W. (2d) 492; Khoury v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 265 Mass. 236, 164 N. E. 77, 60 A. L. R. 1159; Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tone, 125 Conn. 183, 4 Atl. (2d) 640, 121 A. L. R. 993; 27 Am. Jur., p. 486, Sec. 6.

Respondent McKee, Branscum, superintendent of the oil company, and three drillers who were employed by respondent and worked on the lease testified as to the orders given and the work done after the wells reached the lime. The testimony of the three drillers is in most respects substantially the same. It is that while respondent had supervision and direction over what they did until the lime was reached, thereafter Branscum told them what to do and when to do it. Branscum instructed them when and where to set the pipe, when to drill the plug, when to tube the well, and when to put it on the pump, giving directions and orders for the several operations that were necessary to bring the well into production.

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205 S.W.2d 362, 146 Tex. 183, 1947 Tex. LEXIS 79, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/standard-insurance-v-mckee-tex-1947.