Stalling v. Finra

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 5, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-08390
StatusUnknown

This text of Stalling v. Finra (Stalling v. Finra) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stalling v. Finra, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DAVID STALLING, Plaintiff, 21-CV-8390 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND FINRA, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. He alleges that he was not hired because of discrimination against him based on his race and sex, and that he was retaliated against for contacting the employer’s ombudsman during the application process. By order dated October 22, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must

determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND In September 2020, Plaintiff David Stalling applied for a position, which he does not identify, at the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in Manhattan. Plaintiff states that he has “no fixed abode” (ECF 2 at 2), and the complaint includes information suggesting that Plaintiff resides in Manhattan (id. at 2), or in Pennsylvania (ECF 2-1 at 1). Plaintiff makes the following allegations: [C]orrespondence began with a FINRA position and I was told and I was told to communicate with him during the processing of my application. After corresponding and providing him with detailing information upon request, still the progress was static. During January 2021 I was asked respond to 4 questions. I then asked him to provide me with his supervisor contact information. After another employee contacted me randomly who was not the overseer of the application process, then I asked her for the application supervisor contact information, after she fulfilled my request I contacted Kelly Unger and explained to her my issue. I was told to answer the same 4 questions by a specific date. I then contacted FINRA / Office of Ombudsman and the representative contacted FINRA in regards to my application. I then provided the application team with the requested information. Afterwards, my application was denied. (ECF 2 at 6.)1 Plaintiff also writes on the complaint form that he was discriminated against because of his black race and color “After Providing Social Media Profile” and that he was discriminated because of sex because he was “Denied By A Female.” (Id. at 3.) He further alleges that he was retaliated against for contacting the Office of the Ombudsman. (Id.) Plaintiff attaches to the complaint a notice of right to sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is dated September 30, 2021. (ECF 2-1 at 1.) He states that he received the notice on the same day that it issued. (ECF 2 at 7.) DISCUSSION Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer … to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Similarly, a plaintiff bringing a Section 1981 claim for employment discrimination must plausibly allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for his position, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to the inference of discrimination. Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2010).

1 The Court quotes the complaint verbatim, with all punctuation and errors in the original. These antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is

protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).

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Coppedge v. United States
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Ruiz v. County of Rockland
609 F.3d 486 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Chukwuka v. City of New York
513 F. App'x 34 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Patane v. Clark
508 F.3d 106 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
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222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District
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Stalling v. Finra, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stalling-v-finra-nysd-2021.