St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Company v. United States

362 F. Supp. 674, 32 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5679, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12139
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedAugust 27, 1973
DocketCiv. 71-425
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 362 F. Supp. 674 (St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Company v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Company v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 674, 32 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5679, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12139 (M.D. Fla. 1973).

Opinion

OPINION

HODGES, District Judge.

St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Company (the Bank) instituted this suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(a)(1) for the recovery of income taxes paid by it as a result of a deficiency assessment made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the tax years 1965 and 1966. The issue is the propriety of certain deductions made by the Bank for entertainment expenses during those years. The governing provisions of the Code are Sections 162 and 274, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (26 U.S.C.A. §§ 162 and 274).

The Bank was organized in 1955 by Mr. Hubert Rutland and others. Mr. Rutland, a well-known St. Petersburg businessman, is the controlling shareholder, president and chairman of the board of directors. From its inception the Bank has aggressively and successfully sought out business from large depositors, borrowers and settlors of trusts. Taking the view that competition in the banking industry is largely confined to the area of personal services and relationships, the Bank has consistently endeavored to project the image of a local institution offering friendly, efficient and personal services to local businessmen, governmental entities and residents. Its implementation of that concept has principally focused upon and emphasized the management position of Hubert Rutland, and virtually all of the Bank’s public advertising has sought to exploit both his professinal and social reputation in the community.

The expenses in dispute were incurred as a result of certain cocktail and dinner parties held at the Rutland home in St. Petersburg, and certain dove shoots and barbecues held at the Rutland ranch in Manatee County, approximately 30 miles to the South and East of St. Petersburg. In 1965 there were two such parties or receptions in the Rutland home, and three dove shoots at the Rutland ranch. In 1966 there was one reception in the home, a second party at another location and four dove shoots at the ranch. Attendance at these functions was by invitation only, and the written invitations were issued in the names of Mr. and Mrs. Rutland. The number of guests varied from approximately 50 persons to as many as 250, and there was no outward indication to those in attendance that any of the affairs were sponsored by the Bank. The costs, however, were paid by the Bank with the apparent approbation of its board of directors. The guest lists were compiled so as to include customers or potential customers of the Bank, business leaders, public officials, persons of substantial wealth and others in a position to control large deposits or otherwise direct beneficial business to the Bank. In addition, a number of the Bank’s officers and key employees were invited on each occasion. Most of these persons clearly understood that they were asked to attend only because they were Bank employees, and many were specifically instructed to circulate among the guests, pass out their business cards, and generally tout the services of the Bank while nurturing a personal rapport with established or potential customers. On several occasions the employees took advantage of the opportunity to discuss specific transactions, either pending or contemplated.

The evidence generally supports the conclusion that these parties enhanced the good will of the Bank, contributed to its substantial growth, and constituted a *676 shrewd and fully justifiable expenditure by the Bank or its board of directors in pursuit of economic success. As a result —and the Government at least tacitly conceded the point — such expenses would appear to be deductible as “ordinary and necessary” business expenses within the purview of Section 162 of the Code (26 U.S.C.A. § 162) as interpreted and applied through 1962. See First National Bank of Omaha v. United States, 276 F.Supp. 905 (D.Neb.1967). The ultimate issue in the case, therefore, is the proper construction to be made of Section 274 (26 U.S.C.A. § 274), and a determination as to whether the subject expenses meet the admittedly more stringent requirements of that provision.

Section 274 was added to the Code in 1962, 1 and its genesis is best described in the Senate Committee Report: 2

“The Treasury brought to the attention of Congress that widespread abuses have developed through the use of the expense account. In his tax message to the Congress last year, the President stated his conviction that entertainment and related expenses, even though having a connection with the needs of business, confer substantial tax-free personal benefits on the recipients, and that in many instances deductions are obtained by disguising personal expenses as business expenses. He recommended that the cost of such business entertainment and the maintenance of entertainment facilities be disallowed in full as a tax deduction and that restrictions be imposed on the deductibility of business gifts and travel expenses.
“Much of the abuse described by the President can be traced to the broad judicial and administrative interpretation given to the term ‘ordinary and necessary’ which has resulted in many entertainment expenses being allowed as deductions where their connection with a trade or business is quite remote. Under present laws, where a business purpose, however slight, exists, then the entertainment expenses generally are fully deductible if they are ‘ordinary and necessary’ business expenses.
“After careful consideration of the proposal, your committee has concluded that deductions for entertainment and traveling expenses and business gifts should be restricted to prevent abuses.”

Congress thus resolved to make the law more restrictive in the area of business entertainment deductions, not by amendment of ' Section 162 governing business expenses in general, but by the passage of a new and separate provision dealing solely with items of entertainment. As it ultimately evolved and became enacted, Section 274(a)(1)(A) provides as follows:

“§ 274. Disallowance of certain entertainment, etc., expenses
(a) Entertainment, amusement, or recreation.—
(1) In general. — No deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed for any item—
(A) Activity. — With respect to an activity which is of a type generally considered to constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation, unless the táxpayer establishes that the item was directly related to, or, in the case of an item directly preceding or following a substantial and bona fide business discussion (including business meetings at a com vention or otherwise), that such item was associated with, the active conduct of the taxpayer’s trade or business, . . . ”

Careful reading of this provision discloses a rather curious dichotomy of *677 standards — “directly related” and “associated with.” The statute clearly creates two classes of entertainment expenses which are measured by separate tests in determining deductibility. One class is general, the other is specific.

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Bluebook (online)
362 F. Supp. 674, 32 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5679, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12139, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/st-petersburg-bank-trust-company-v-united-states-flmd-1973.