Hippodrome Oldsmobile, Inc. v. United States

474 F.2d 959, 31 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 851, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 11438
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 27, 1973
Docket72-1375
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 474 F.2d 959 (Hippodrome Oldsmobile, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hippodrome Oldsmobile, Inc. v. United States, 474 F.2d 959, 31 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 851, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 11438 (6th Cir. 1973).

Opinion

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.

This case presents the question as to whether under a 1962 amendment to the Internal Revenue Code a corporate taxpayer may deduct as ordinary and necessary business expenses the depreciation and expenses of a pleasure boat, when concededly the company customers entertained thereon were not subjected to any specific exposure to taxpayer’s products or suggestion that they buy them while being thus entertained.

The District Judge who heard the taxpayer’s suit for refund of taxes paid under protest found these facts:

(1) A number of automobile agencies in Nashville owned boats for the purpose of entertaining past and future customers, to obtain business. This practice was an accepted business procedure in this area.
(2) This was a method of competition for business between automobile agencies.
(3) The accepted method while utilizing these craft with guests thereon was the use of the “soft sell.” The representative of the automobile agency would not initiate business conversation but would wait for the guests to mention the product of the host. As a practical matter, there was an unspoken awareness of the reason for the entertainment.
(4) This business tactic was, from an economic standpoint, very successful. In fact, during the taxable years when the corporate taxayer spent the total sum for the three-year period of slightly more than $11,000, it made direct sales during the same three years to the persons so entertained of $180,-988.11, plus $91,232.11 in subsequent years. The amount of sales does not include sales to persons influenced by the guests.

He held that the use of the boat for taxpayer’s “soft sell” entertainment of customers was an “ordinary and necessary business expense” within the meaning of that language in 26 U.S.C. § 162 (1970), and that it also was deductible under the language of 26 U.S.C. § 274 (1970), Int.Rev.Code of 1954, D.C., 339 F.Supp. 826.

We reverse.

At the outset we accept the above-noted facts as found by the District Judge. We also recognize that expenses at issue on this appeal would probably have been treated as deductible prior to 1962. In that year, however, Congress gave searching attention to claimed abuses of the business expense deduction. The statute finally adopted contains this language:

(B) Facility. — With respect to a facility used in connection with an activity referred to in subparagraph (A), unless the taxpayer establishes that the facility was used primarily for the furtherance of the taxpayer’s trade or business and that the item was directly related to the active conduct of such trade or business,
26 U.S.C. § 274(a)(1)(B) (1970).

We see no need to plant our decision upon the regulations adopted under § 274(a)(1)(B), upon which the government strongly relies, or upon the government’s claims of failure of taxpayer properly to substantiate his claims under certain of those regulations.

The plain language of § 274 which we have quoted bars a tax deduction for the type of “soft sell” entertainment described by the District Judge. We hold as a matter of law that the deductions claimed by the taxpayer for the entertainment of customers shown in this record were not “directly related to . . . the active conduct of the taxpayer’s . . . business.”

*961 The entertainment activities on the corporate taxpayer’s boat (a 45 foot Chris Craft, Corvair) were, of course, a wholly legitimate method of developing business good will. The District Judge found: “This business tactic was, from an economic standpoint, very successful.” Since the District Judge also found that “This practice was an accepted business procedure in this area. . . . [and] a method of competition . . between . . . agencies,” it may well be regarded by the taxpayer as a practice which is either desirable or necessary for it to continue as a mater of sound business judgment. Our question, however, is not the legitimacy of the business practice. In this appeal we deal only with the question of whether expenses for such general good will type of entertainment are subject to deduction for income tax purposes under the terms of the 1962 amendments.

If the words “directly” and “active” in the key statutory phrase quoted above did not of themselves serve to bar such general good will entertainment as this record discloses (and as indicated above, we think they do), then the legislative history of the debate on the 1962 amendment serves to indicate a clear Congressional intent that general good will entertainment could no longer be deducted as a business expense.

26 U.S.C. § 274(a)(1)(B) (1970) as finally adopted was the result of a controversy between the House and the Senate over how restrictive the legislation should be. In its March 18,1962, Report to the House on § 274, the Ways and Means Committee staked out its posi-' tion:

With respect to expenses for entertainment activities, the bill provides that a deduction will be allowed only to the extent that the taxpayer establishes that the expense was directly related to the active conduct of his trade or business. This means that the taxpayer must show a greater degree of proximate relation between the expenditure and his trade or business than is required under present law. Among other things he will have to show more than a general expectation of deriving some income at some indefinite future time from the making of the entertainment-type expenditure ; however, he will not .be required to show that income actually resulted from each and every expenditure for which a deduction is claimed.
If the expenditure is for entertainment which occurs under circumstances where there is little or no possibility of conducting business affairs or carrying on negotiations or discussions relating thereto, the expenditure will generally be considered not to have been directly related to the active conduct of business.
H.R.Rep.No.2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1962).

The response of the Senate Finance Committee termed the House proposal too. harsh and proposed to amend it by allowing “entertainment expenses associated with the active conduct of a trade or business.”

Your committee’s bill to a considerable degree retains the basic structure of the House bill. However, the effect of the principal provision (the disallowing of a deduction for certain entertainment expenses) has been modified to permit the deduction of expenses for goodwill where a close association is established between the expense and the active conduct of a trade or business.

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Bluebook (online)
474 F.2d 959, 31 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 851, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 11438, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hippodrome-oldsmobile-inc-v-united-states-ca6-1973.