Harshbarger, Justice:
Thirteen applicants were selected by the Police Civil Service Commission for the City of Charleston for final appointment to the Charleston Police Department and were to be sworn in November 4, 1974. But on November 1 the Fraternal Order of Police petitioned for an injunction against their induction. A temporary injunction was issued but then, after hearings, permanent injunction was refused by the Kanawha County Circuit Court.
The Fraternal Order of Police appealed, contending as it did in the trial court, that the applicants did not comply with W.Va. Code, 8-14-12.1
[770]*770Specifically, the FOP alleges that the applications of the thirteen failed to comply with a mandate of Code, 8-14-12, that applicants must state under oath or affirmation certain information;2 two applicants did not meet residency requirements;3 and one was older than allowed.
We find that the application forms signed by the thirteen meet the statutory requirement of oath or affirmation. The forms contained this language: “I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THERE ARE NO WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATIONS IN, OR FALSIFICATIONS OF, THE ABOVE STATEMENTS AND ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.” Then followed the signature lines.
[771]*771An oath or affirmation is a subscription to the truth of that to which it is made. See, In re Rice, 35 Ill. App.2d 79, 181 N.E.2d 742, (1962); Greenwald v. State, 221 Md. 235, 155 A.2d 894 (1960); and Spangler v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 104 Utah 584, 140 P.2d 755 (1943).
In State v. Nuckols, 152 W. Va. 736, 166 S.E.2d 3 (1968), we said: “The word ‘oath’ in this state includes both swearing and affirming....” 152 W. Va. at 748, 166 S.E.2d at 11.4 The Random House Dictionary (1973), defines ‘certify’ as “1. to attest to or vouch for in writing ....” It defines ‘affirm’ — “1. to state or assert positively; maintain as true ... 2. to confirm or ratify ... 4. to declare solemnly before a court or magistrate, but without oath.” We discern no difference between an affirmation of truth, and a certification of truth. They both vouch for truthfulness.
The second issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of the residency requirement of Code, 8-14-12.5 The general rule is that statutes regulating appointments under civil service are mandatory and must be strictly complied with and construed. Cawley v. Board of Trustees, 138 W. Va. 571, 76 S.E.2d 683 (1953). In particular, we have held that the police civil service commission “owes its creation and existence to statute. It has no inherent powers... [but] only such powers as are conferred upon it by statute, either expressly or by necessary or fair implication.” State ex rel. City of Huntington v. Lombardo, 149 W. Va. 671, 681, 143 S.E.2d 535, 542 (1965). See also: Miller v. City of Morgantown, W. Va., 208 S.E.2d 780 [772]*772(1974) and State ex rel. City of Charleston v. Hutchinson, 154 W. Va. 585, 176 S.E.2d 691 (1970).
Thus, the Charleston Police Civil Service Commission cannot legally act beyond the powers bestowed upon it by statute [8-14-12] and must strictly abide by the requirements in that law. Since the statute clearly states that an applicant must have been a resident of the city to which he is applying, for at least one year prior to the date of his application, the question is whether the commission acted ultra vires by certifying applicants for police officers who did not meet the residency requirement of the statute, or whether the requirement itself is void, as contended by the appellees.
Residence requirements have been discussed in numerous cases since Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), when the United States Supreme Court recognized the right to travel as a fundamental constitutional right and struck down a state statute requiring one year residency prior to seeking welfare assistance. The Court found that the durational requirement divided welfare applicants into two groups “indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction. On the basis of this sole difference the first class is granted and the second class is denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsist — food, shelter, and other necessities of life.” 394 U.S. at 627. Because the requirement infringed upon the right to travel, a fundamental constitutional right, by denying welfare benefits to those who had exercised it, the Court applied the compelling state interest test, and then held the requirement violated the equal protection clause because there was no such interest. Id. at 634.
After Shapiro, the Court found that durational residency requirements for eligibility to vote6 and for hospi[773]*773tal and medical services7 unconstitutionally infringe upon an individual’s fundamental right to travel.
Then, in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 U.S. 645 (1976), a Philadelphia municipal regulation requiring that city employees be residents of the city, was upheld. Emphasizing the novelty of the particular question it must decide — the validity of a requirement that a person be a resident at the time of his application, the Court said:
We have previously differentiated between a requirement of continuing residency and a requirement of prior residency of a given duration. Thus in Shapiro, supra, at 636, we stated: “The residence requirement and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites.” And in Memorial Hospital, supra, at 255, quoting Dunn, supra, at 342 n. 13, the Court explained that Shapiro and Dunn did not question “ ‘the validity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence requirements.’ ” 424 U.S. at 647.
Numerous lower federal and state courts have decided residency requirement issues. After the Supreme Court cases, some adopted the fundamental “right to travel” rationale, then applied the strict compelling state interest test to invalidate the requirements,8 and at least one federal court has applied the same reasoning but found the necessary compelling state interest.9 However, more [774]*774often, to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel,10 and hence, need not be justified by a compelling state interest, but merely have a rational basis. See Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Harshbarger, Justice:
Thirteen applicants were selected by the Police Civil Service Commission for the City of Charleston for final appointment to the Charleston Police Department and were to be sworn in November 4, 1974. But on November 1 the Fraternal Order of Police petitioned for an injunction against their induction. A temporary injunction was issued but then, after hearings, permanent injunction was refused by the Kanawha County Circuit Court.
The Fraternal Order of Police appealed, contending as it did in the trial court, that the applicants did not comply with W.Va. Code, 8-14-12.1
[770]*770Specifically, the FOP alleges that the applications of the thirteen failed to comply with a mandate of Code, 8-14-12, that applicants must state under oath or affirmation certain information;2 two applicants did not meet residency requirements;3 and one was older than allowed.
We find that the application forms signed by the thirteen meet the statutory requirement of oath or affirmation. The forms contained this language: “I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THERE ARE NO WILLFUL MISREPRESENTATIONS IN, OR FALSIFICATIONS OF, THE ABOVE STATEMENTS AND ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.” Then followed the signature lines.
[771]*771An oath or affirmation is a subscription to the truth of that to which it is made. See, In re Rice, 35 Ill. App.2d 79, 181 N.E.2d 742, (1962); Greenwald v. State, 221 Md. 235, 155 A.2d 894 (1960); and Spangler v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 104 Utah 584, 140 P.2d 755 (1943).
In State v. Nuckols, 152 W. Va. 736, 166 S.E.2d 3 (1968), we said: “The word ‘oath’ in this state includes both swearing and affirming....” 152 W. Va. at 748, 166 S.E.2d at 11.4 The Random House Dictionary (1973), defines ‘certify’ as “1. to attest to or vouch for in writing ....” It defines ‘affirm’ — “1. to state or assert positively; maintain as true ... 2. to confirm or ratify ... 4. to declare solemnly before a court or magistrate, but without oath.” We discern no difference between an affirmation of truth, and a certification of truth. They both vouch for truthfulness.
The second issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of the residency requirement of Code, 8-14-12.5 The general rule is that statutes regulating appointments under civil service are mandatory and must be strictly complied with and construed. Cawley v. Board of Trustees, 138 W. Va. 571, 76 S.E.2d 683 (1953). In particular, we have held that the police civil service commission “owes its creation and existence to statute. It has no inherent powers... [but] only such powers as are conferred upon it by statute, either expressly or by necessary or fair implication.” State ex rel. City of Huntington v. Lombardo, 149 W. Va. 671, 681, 143 S.E.2d 535, 542 (1965). See also: Miller v. City of Morgantown, W. Va., 208 S.E.2d 780 [772]*772(1974) and State ex rel. City of Charleston v. Hutchinson, 154 W. Va. 585, 176 S.E.2d 691 (1970).
Thus, the Charleston Police Civil Service Commission cannot legally act beyond the powers bestowed upon it by statute [8-14-12] and must strictly abide by the requirements in that law. Since the statute clearly states that an applicant must have been a resident of the city to which he is applying, for at least one year prior to the date of his application, the question is whether the commission acted ultra vires by certifying applicants for police officers who did not meet the residency requirement of the statute, or whether the requirement itself is void, as contended by the appellees.
Residence requirements have been discussed in numerous cases since Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), when the United States Supreme Court recognized the right to travel as a fundamental constitutional right and struck down a state statute requiring one year residency prior to seeking welfare assistance. The Court found that the durational requirement divided welfare applicants into two groups “indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction. On the basis of this sole difference the first class is granted and the second class is denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsist — food, shelter, and other necessities of life.” 394 U.S. at 627. Because the requirement infringed upon the right to travel, a fundamental constitutional right, by denying welfare benefits to those who had exercised it, the Court applied the compelling state interest test, and then held the requirement violated the equal protection clause because there was no such interest. Id. at 634.
After Shapiro, the Court found that durational residency requirements for eligibility to vote6 and for hospi[773]*773tal and medical services7 unconstitutionally infringe upon an individual’s fundamental right to travel.
Then, in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 U.S. 645 (1976), a Philadelphia municipal regulation requiring that city employees be residents of the city, was upheld. Emphasizing the novelty of the particular question it must decide — the validity of a requirement that a person be a resident at the time of his application, the Court said:
We have previously differentiated between a requirement of continuing residency and a requirement of prior residency of a given duration. Thus in Shapiro, supra, at 636, we stated: “The residence requirement and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites.” And in Memorial Hospital, supra, at 255, quoting Dunn, supra, at 342 n. 13, the Court explained that Shapiro and Dunn did not question “ ‘the validity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence requirements.’ ” 424 U.S. at 647.
Numerous lower federal and state courts have decided residency requirement issues. After the Supreme Court cases, some adopted the fundamental “right to travel” rationale, then applied the strict compelling state interest test to invalidate the requirements,8 and at least one federal court has applied the same reasoning but found the necessary compelling state interest.9 However, more [774]*774often, to uphold statutory residency requirements for firemen and policemen, courts have found that they do not penalize the fundamental right to travel,10 and hence, need not be justified by a compelling state interest, but merely have a rational basis. See Andre v. Board of Trustees of Village of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977); Wright v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975); Miller v. Krawczyk, 414 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Ector v. City of Torrence, 10 Cal.3d 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849, 514 P.2d 433 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935, 94 S.Ct. 1451, 39 L.Ed.2d 493 (1974); Detroit Police Officers Association v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971), appeal dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question, 405 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 1173, 31 L.Ed.2d 227 (1972); Hattiesburg Firefighters Local 184 v. City of Hattiesburg, 263 So.2d 767 (Miss. 1972); Abrahams v. Civil Service Commission, 65 N.J. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974); Jackson v. Firemen’s and Policemen’s Civil Service Commission of Galveston, Tex. Civ. App., 466 S.W.2d 412 (1971); Salt Lake City Firefighters Local 1645 v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 115, 449 P.2d 239 (19691.
Among the bases often asserted as justification for municipal residency requirements in the latter group of cases are those quoted from Ector, supra, in Justice Pashman’s dissenting opinion in Abrahams, supra:
[PJromotion of ethnic balance in the community; reduction in high unemployment rates of inner-city minority groups; improvement of relations between such groups and city employees; enhancement of the quality of employee performance by greater personal knowledge of the city’s conditions and by a feeling of greater personal stake in the city’s progress; diminution of absen[775]*775teeism and tardiness among municipal personnel; ready availability of trained manpower in emergency situations; and the general economic benefits flowing from local expenditure of employees’ salaries. [Citation omitted] 319 A.2d at 497.
And there are particular reasons recognized for residency requirements for police officers:
[Residents would be more likely to be immediately familiar with the community. Knowledge of the local geography would allow quicker response, and knowledge of the people could lead to a greater interest and more conscientious effort in the performance of duty ... the likelihood that members of the community would be better acquainted with its police officers and, hence, more likely to trust and cooperate with them ... the importance of having police present in the community during off-duty hours to facilitate individual response to matters requiring police intervention as well as to facilitate emergency mobilization. Town of Milton v. Civil Service Commission, 365 Mass. 368, 312 N.E.2d 188, 193-194 (1974).
The durational residency requirement of Code, 8-14-12, would fail by Shapiro standards; and gives none of the benefits of continuing residency the cases have mentioned. Under either the compelling state interest or rational basis test, the requirement must fail.11
The statute’s weakness is illustrated by its application in this case. Applicant Fannin’s residency in Kanawha County was only during the first 18 months of his life— more than the “... year, during some period of time prior to the date of his application” that Code, 8-14-12 prescribes. At age 18 months he certainly was not developing community knowledge or otherwise gaining advantageous qualities that would make him a better po[776]*776liceman in Charleston when he was appointed more than two decades later. Yet, by the words of Code, 8-14-12 he was eligible for appointment to the exclusion, say, of another who during mature life had lived eleven months in the city or county, engaged in community activities educating him in intimate details of the population and geography of the area, and had resided across the street from police headquarters.
We therefore find the one year residence requirement as stated in the statute, void.
There is no reason to strike the entire statute because of the invalidity of this one requirement. The remainder of the statute is severable and survives.
The final issue is applicant Lee’s age. The statute in pertinent part states: “No application for original appointment shall be received if the individual applying is less than eighteen years of age or more than thirty-five years of age at the date of his application....”
As we stated earlier, a civil service statute such as Code, 8-14-12 is to be strictly construed. However, a statute that is unambiguous requires no construction at all, and our duty is simply to apply it as written. Cawley v. Board of Trustees, supra. See also: In re Resseger’s Estate, 152 W. Va. 216, 161 S.E.2d 257 (1968), and State ex rel. Riffle v. City of Clarksburg, 152 W. Va. 317, 162 S.E.2d 181 (1968).
We are directed to other code provisions that reveal legislative age-requirement language: (1) for judges, retirement when they “... shall have reached the age of sixty-five years ...” [Code 51-9-6]: (2) for municipal employees’ retirement “... after attainment of age sixty ...” [Code 8-22-7]; and (3) for retirement of policemen and firemen .. upon his attaining the age of fifty years ...” [Code 8-22-25]. We recognize these are dates set for eligibility for benefits, but find it impossible to make ineligibility for employment depend upon our reading into the statute that an applicant must not have attained his or her thirty-fifth birthday to be eligible, [777]*777which is what the FOP would have us do. Its argument suggests that we interpret the statute to say that when an applicant is a day past the thirty-fifth anniversary of his or her birth, the applicant is ineligible.
Ivin Beatrice Lee was born July 22, 1938 and filed her application September 5, 1973. Her thirty-fifth birthday was July 22, 1973. In common understanding she was “thirty-five” until her thirty-sixth birthday. Only then, we believe, would she be more than thirty-five years old.
The Kanawha County Circuit Court is affirmed.
Affirmed.