Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit

190 N.W.2d 97, 385 Mich. 519

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: February 28, 1972
• Docket: 18 April Term 1971, Docket No. 52,678
• Status: Published

Opinions

Swainson, J.

I agree with the opinion of Justice Williams that the trial court erred in holding that the Detroit Common Council did not have the power to pass Ordinance 327-G.

I dissent from Part IV of my Brother’s opinion which holds that Ordinance 327-G violates the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and of the Michigan constitution.

The test for validity under the equal protection clauses, as noted by Justice Williams, is stated in Tracer v. Bushre (1968), 381 Mich 282, 286, 287:

“ ‘These constitutional provisions [the Federal and state equal protection clauses] do not mean that there can be no classification in the application of statutes and ordinances, but only that the classification must be based on natural distinguishing characteristics and must bear a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.’ Cook Coffee Co. v. Village of Flushing (1934), 267 Mich 131, p 134.”

The job of a policeman does have “natural distinguishing characteristics” from all other city employees. There is a special relationship between the community policed and a policeman. A policeman’s very presence, whether actually performing a specified duty during assigned hours, or engaged in any other activity during off-duty hours, provides a trained person immediately available for enforcement purposes.

Policemen are required by department order to be armed at all times, and why is this ? Simply because by such requirement they are, no matter where they are or what they are doing, immediately prepared to perform their duties. They are charged with law enforcement in the City of Detroit, and obviously must be physically present to perform their duties. The police force is a semi-military organization subject at all times to immediate mobilization, which distinguishes this type of employment from every other in the classified service.

I would reverse the decision of the trial court and hold that Ordinance 327-Gr is valid in its totality.

T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Black, T. E. Brennan, and T. G. Kavanagh, JJ., concurred with Swainson, J.