Spangler v. CDOC

Opinion

25CA0444 Spangler v CDOC 07-30-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0444 State Personnel Board 24B039

Gary Spangler,

Complainant-Appellee,

v.

Colorado Department of Corrections,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

State Personnel Board,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Johnson and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 30, 2026

Law Offices of Gregory E. Givens, P.C., Gregory E. Givens, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Complainant-Appellee

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Eric Freund, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Dominick Schumacher, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jenna H. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 After respondent, the Colorado Department of Corrections (the

CDOC), terminated the employment of complainant, Gary Spangler,

an administrative law judge (ALJ) reversed that termination. And

the State Personnel Board (the Board) then affirmed the ALJ’s

order. The CDOC now appeals the Board’s order. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2015, the CDOC Office of the Inspector General (OIG) hired

Spangler as a Criminal Investigator II. Spangler’s duties included

detecting crime, enforcing the law, collecting and analyzing evidence

and complaints, and planning and conducting complete criminal

and administrative investigations.

¶3 Between 2015 and early 2023, the OIG’s Chief Investigator,

and Spangler’s direct supervisor, was Grace Novotny. Spangler

received no disciplinary actions while working for Novotny and

consistently received above average performance evaluations.

Following Novotny’s retirement in March 2023, Daniel Lake became

the OIG Chief Investigator and Spangler’s appointing authority.

¶4 In April 2023, Spangler applied for, but did not receive, a

promotion within the OIG. Spangler made Lake aware of his

disapproval of Lake’s decision. In July 2023, Spangler was

1 relocated from CDOC headquarters in Colorado Springs to the

Arrowhead Correctional Facility in Cañon City due to a “business

need.” Spangler packed up his office in boxes and placed the boxes

in the trunk of his car. He drove to Arrowhead and unpacked the

boxes in his new office. Unbeknownst to Spangler, evidence from

two of his old cases (the 2017 “shank” case and the 2018

“suboxone” case) fell out of the boxes during the move and

remained undiscovered in the trunk of his car.

¶5 In September 2023, Spangler was placed on administrative

leave for unrelated allegations of misconduct. He returned all

CDOC property before leaving, including his state-issued car.

During the code of conduct investigation, CDOC Criminal

Investigator Mike Barnett found evidence from two of Spangler’s

closed cases, the shank and suboxone cases, in the trunk of

Spangler’s car. The found evidence prompted Barnett to open a

professional standards (PS) investigation. The PS investigation

ended with the district attorney filing criminal charges against

2 Spangler for abuse of public records and second degree official

misconduct.1

¶6 Shortly thereafter, Spangler received notice of a Rule 6-10 pre-

disciplinary meeting (6-10 meeting), named such based on the

applicable agency regulation number. Lake conducted the meeting,

and it was attended by Spangler and Warden Siobhan Burtlow.

Burtlow began the meeting by reading a summary of Barnett’s PS

investigation report.

¶7 Burtlow said, “By failing to file the cases with the District

Attorney’s Office and log and enter the evidence into OIG evidence,

as noted within the OIG database; after noting within official

reports that this had been completed, [you] may have violated”

administrative regulations concerning crime scene management,

evidence handling, and Brady reporting and disclosures. Barnett

reported that Spangler had entered the evidence into the CDOC’s

1 According to the public record, the last pleading filed was the

district attorney’s motion to dismiss, and the case was ordered sealed. See People v. Parks, 2021 COA 61, ¶ 1 n.1 (we may take judicial notice of the contents of court records in related proceedings).

3 case management system at the time, the Inspector General Offense

Reporting system (IGOR), but Spangler never noted how the

evidence ended up in the trunk of his car. Barnett also discovered

that the district attorney’s office assigned to the shank case had no

record of the case being forwarded to it. Barnett reported that

Spangler accessed the IGOR case file in March 2022 but did not

add any new information about the shank evidence’s location.

¶8 Spangler explained that he stored the 2017 shank case

evidence in the evidence locker of the Buena Vista Correctional

Center (BVCC), then the CDOC headquarters’ evidence locker when

he was transferred to Colorado Springs, and then in boxes that

were placed in the trunk of his car when he moved to the

Arrowhead facility. He said the evidence must have fallen out of its

box, said he did not realize it was left in the trunk, and accepted

responsibility for it.

¶9 Spangler further explained that he met in person with the

district attorney about the shank case and that a no-file decision

was made. He reported this verbally to Novotny, who did not

require that he do anything further. Spangler said that neither “the

e-File system” nor the EvidenceOnQ system existed in 2017. As

4 part of the CDOC’s investigation, Spangler asked Lake during the

meeting to speak with Novotny about the procedures in place at

that time to confirm. Spangler also identified Ava Heath and Adam

Cummings as witnesses who could confirm the procedures that

existed in 2017.

¶ 10 The 2018 suboxone case involved an envelope containing

suboxone that was confiscated in the Cheyenne Mountain Reentry

Center (CMRC) mailroom. Spangler’s report said the case was

closed due to lack of evidence and that the envelope with the

suboxone strips was “labeled for destruction.” His report was

reviewed and approved by Novotny. In May 2019, the report was

updated to add photographs of the evidence to the exhibits page.

When the CMRC closed, Spangler placed the evidence in the

evidence locker located at CDOC headquarters. When Spangler was

required to move offices, he took the evidence with him. Later at

the hearing before the ALJ, Spangler testified that he had verbally

communicated with the district attorney about the case and the

district attorney declined to file a case.

¶ 11 Several weeks later, Lake asked Barnett to interview Heath,

Cummings, and Novotny. Lake never shared Spangler’s

5 explanations with Barnett, nor did he believe Barnett needed to

speak with Spangler. Barnett interviewed Heath and Cummings in

addition to two other witnesses, but he never interviewed Novotny.

¶ 12 In a notice of disciplinary action dated January 3, 2024, Lake

terminated Spangler’s employment. The notice stated as follows:

Based on all of the information I have received, including your statements at the [6-10] meeting, and PS Case 2023002840, I have reached the following conclusions:

You reported in your OIG case reports for [the shank case and the suboxone case] that the evidence collected was placed into the OIG evidence (lockers). This is not accurate as the evidence was found in the trunk of your assigned vehicle and was not signed out of the OIG evidence storage. You stated in your typed case report [for the shank case] that the case would be forwarded to the District Attorney’s Office. On October 26, 2023 Chief Barnett confirmed with the 11th Judicial District Attorney’s Office, that there is no record of [the shank case], Dangerous Contraband, or homemade weapon [case] being submitted.

Both aforementioned cases are Felonies in the State of Colorado. The statute of limitations in Colorado for the aforementioned cases is three (3) years. In addition, concerns about the evidence chain of custody seriously impact the ability to prosecute these cases, which negatively impacts both the victims and the Colorado Department of Corrections.

6 ....

I have determined that you have violated the performance expectations as set forth in provisions of [CDOC] Administrative Regulations Code of Conduct 1450-01 Section IV., Subsubsections, A.1; A.3.; & A.8.;B. 1.; E. 1.; Administrative Regulation 1150-07, Crime Scene Management and Criminal Evidence Handling Section IV., Subsection D. 2.; J. 3. & J. 4.; K.1.& K.3.; Administrative Regulation 1150-20, Brady Reporting and Disclosures Section IV, Subsection A.; & D; and State Personnel Board Rule 6-12, 1, 3.

¶ 13 Spangler appealed to the Board.

¶ 14 In June 2024, an ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing at

which Lake, Barnett, Spangler, Novotny, Cummings, and Heath

testified. The ALJ found that (1) the CDOC had not established, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that Spangler had violated the

administrative regulations alleged; (2) Spangler’s conduct was in

compliance with the OIG’s practices under Novotny’s supervision;

and (3) Spangler’s actions had been approved by Novotny. The ALJ

found the termination decision was arbitrary, capricious, and

contrary to rule or law, noting that a reasonable person would not

conclude that Spangler’s actions were so egregious as to warrant

termination. The ALJ reversed Spangler’s termination and awarded

7 him attorney fees. The CDOC appealed the ALJ’s initial decision to

the Board, which affirmed.

¶ 15 On appeal, the CDOC contends that the ALJ (1) erred in

finding that Spangler did not commit the misconduct alleged;

(2) misapplied the legal standard in deciding the termination was

arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to rule or law; (3) violated the

party presentation principle in finding that the administrative

regulations cited by the CDOC were not applicable in 2017 and

2018; and (4) erroneously awarded attorney fees. We address and

reject each contention.

II. Failure to Prove Misconduct

¶ 16 The CDOC contends the ALJ erred in finding that Spangler did

not commit the acts for which he was terminated. We are not

persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 17 The Board is an administrative agency governed by the State

Administrative Procedure Act, §§ 24-4-101 to -109, C.R.S. 2025.

We may only reverse the Board’s decision if it is arbitrary or

capricious, unsupported by the record, contrary to law, or in excess

of the Board’s jurisdiction. See § 24-4-106(7)(b), C.R.S. 2025;

8 Lawley v. Dep’t of Higher Educ., 36 P.3d 1239, 1247 (Colo. 2001).

Conversely, we must uphold the decision “if a consideration of the

record as a whole reveals that the decision is supported by

substantial evidence.” Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. State Pers. Bd., 2016

COA 37, ¶ 13. In conducting this review, we must accept the ALJ’s

factual findings unless they have no support in the record. Id. at

¶ 14.

¶ 18 As relevant here, certified state employees have a property

interest in their positions and may only be disciplined for just cause

based on constitutionally specified criteria. Colo. Const. art. XII,

§§ 13-15; § 24-50-101, C.R.S. 2025; Dep’t of Corr. v. Stiles, 2020 CO

90M, ¶ 23; Dep’t of Insts. v. Kinchen, 886 P.2d 700, 707 (Colo.

1994). Colorado State Personnel Board Rules 6-10, 6-11, and 6-12,

4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1, discuss employee rights and employer

duties in cases involving disciplinary actions.

¶ 19 Rule 6-10 provides in pertinent part:

C. When considering discipline, the appointing authority shall meet with the employee [a 6-10 meeting] before making a final decision . . . .

D. During the Rule 6-10 meeting, the appointing authority shall:

9 1. Disclose the alleged performance issues or conduct that may result in discipline;

2. Disclose the source of the information about the alleged performance issues or conduct (unless prohibited by law); and

3. Give the employee an opportunity to respond to the alleged performance issues or conduct.

State Pers. Bd. Rule 6-10, 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1.

¶ 20 Rule 6-11 also provides in pertinent part the factors to

consider in imposing discipline. It provides:

The decision to take disciplinary action of a certified state employee shall be based upon:

1. The nature, extent, seriousness, and effect of the performance issues or conduct;

2. Type and frequency of prior unsatisfactory performance or conduct (including any prior performance improvement plans, corrective actions or disciplinary actions);

3. The period of time since any prior unsatisfactory performance or conduct;

4. Prior performance evaluations;

5. Mitigating circumstances; and

6. Information discussed during the Rule 6-10 meeting, including information presented by the employee.

State Pers. Bd. Rule 6-11(A), 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1.

10 ¶ 21 Rule 6-12 provides in pertinent part:

A. Disciplinary actions are as follows: an adjustment of base pay to a lower rate in the pay grade; base pay below the grade minimum for a specified period not to exceed twelve (12) months; demotion; dismissal; and suspension without pay, subject to FLSA provisions. Administrative leave with pay during a period of investigation is not a disciplinary action.

B. Reasons for discipline include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Failure to perform competently;

....

3. Failure to comply with the Board Rules, Director’s Procedures, department’s rules and policies, state universal policies, or other departmental directives.

State Pers. Bd. Rule 6-12, 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1.

¶ 22 In the event a certified employee timely appeals an appointing

authority’s disciplinary action and requests a hearing, an ALJ may

conduct the hearing on behalf of the Board. § 24-50-103(7), C.R.S.

2025. If an ALJ does so, the ALJ must make written findings of fact

and conclusions of law and render an initial decision affirming,

modifying, or reversing the disciplinary action. §§ 24-50-

125(4), -125.4(3), C.R.S. 2025; Colo. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v.

Maggard, 248 P.3d 708, 712 (Colo. 2011).

11 ¶ 23 The employer carries the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the acts or omissions on which

the discipline was based occurred and that just cause warranted

the discipline imposed. Kinchen, 886 P.2d at 707-78. The Board

may reverse or modify the employer’s decision if the action is found

to be arbitrary and capricious or contrary to rule or law. § 24-50-

103(6); Stiles, ¶4 n.1.

B. Additional Facts

¶ 24 At the hearing before the ALJ, Lake was questioned regarding

Spangler’s 6-10 meeting. In pertinent part, Lake said the following:

[Counsel]: Did you tell Mr. Barnett what Mr. Spangler told you about his explanations for the evidence being in his trunk or why he didn’t send the information to the DA in 2017?

[Lake]: No, I don’t believe I did. I just told Mr. Barnett that the question to ask is, what was the evidentiary — evidence practices in 2017 and 2018?

[Counsel]: Just the evidentiary practices, right?

[Lake]: Yeah. With the — how evidence was documented, collected, kept, and things like that. That was it. I gave him no other information.

12 ¶ 25 Novotny was questioned about the procedures that existed for

criminal investigators during the time Spangler handled the shank

case and the suboxone case. She stated that in 2017 and 2018, an

investigator under her supervision would investigate a matter, write

a case report in IGOR, note any physical evidence associated with

that matter, and secure the physical evidence in either a

correctional facility’s evidence locker or the investigator’s office

evidence locker. Every Colorado correctional facility relevant to this

matter had an evidence locker where physical evidence was stored.

OIG investigators were responsible for maintaining their own

physical evidence.

¶ 26 An investigator under Novotny’s supervision who moved

physical evidence from one location to another was not required to

document that action in either IGOR or EvidenceOnQ. Investigators

under Novotny’s supervision were not required to enter “nuisance”

contraband into IGOR or EvidenceOnQ unless the contraband was

part of a larger case. Nuisance contraband included items that

offenders were prohibited from having but would not be the subject

of criminal prosecutions. OIG investigators were not required to

document a change in location of physical evidence. It was up to

13 the individual investigators to keep track of their own evidence. If

they chose to put the change in location in their notes or in a

supplemental report, it was up to them. Nothing in IGOR required

or necessitated updating because it was not an evidence tracking

system.

¶ 27 Novotny opined that Spangler did not violate any agency rules

or policies with regard to the shank case or the suboxone case. She

also stated during cross-examination that she believed that

Spangler’s reports were complete.

[Counsel]: You testified that you reviewed the report for criminal investigation in 2017 02485 regarding the shank and white powder.

[Novotny]: Yes.

[Counsel]: Okay. And in your belief, that report was complete?

[Novotny]: Yes.

[Counsel]: Okay. And you approved and closed the report?

[Novotny]: I approved it. I didn’t close it. It has to be closed before it comes to me.

¶ 28 Counsel also questioned Novotny about the suboxone case.

[Counsel]: You also approved Mr. Spangler’s report in criminal investigation 2018 001294 regarding the suboxone strips; is that correct?

14 [Novotny]: I believe so, yes.

¶ 29 Spangler also testified that he had taken the suboxone case to

the district attorney, who decided not to file a case, and that he

communicated that to Novotny.

[Counsel]: With respect to the suboxone, did Ms. Novotny, who — who’s your supervisor at that period — at that time?

[Spangler]: That would have been Ms. Novotny.

[Counsel]: Okay. Did she know that no criminal filings would be in that case?

[Spangler]: Yes, she would have reviewed my report and saw [sic] that.

....

[Counsel]: Okay. Tell me a little bit about the procedure for filing or no filing with the DA’s Office in 2017. Can you tell us how that worked?

[Spangler]: There are different ways to do it. If it is a major case, we would forward the whole case to the DA without asking permission, whether, you know, they wanted to file it or not. On the minor cases, someone like alcohol in the facility, there’s standing rules that they won’t even prosecute that. We already know about that, so we’re not even going to waste our time asking about it. We’ll just make a decision as to no file, move on our way. Some of the cases that are more murky, and I wasn’t sure because like I said, I was only out there

15 for a three-month period during this period of time — first time I worked at Buena Vista.

[Counsel]: Okay.

[Spangler]: So I wasn’t familiar with all the rules. So I contacted the DA on the cases and see what they wanted to do.

[Counsel]: Was that something that was approved by your supervisor?

[Spangler]: Yes, and that was what I was taught to do . . . .

¶ 30 Novotny was also asked about the no-filing system at the time.

She responded in pertinent part,

[Counsel]: Okay. One of the charges that’s being alleged against Mr. Spangler is that in his narrative in his report, he writes that the case is going to be referred to the 11th Judicial DA’s Office for our — for referral — referred to it for prosecution.

[Novotny]: Okay.

[Counsel]: Okay. And ultimately, the case is not referred to the District Attorney’s Office.

[Novotny]: Okay.

[Counsel]: Okay. Did that happen with your investigators from time to time?

[Novotny]: Yes.

[Counsel]: Did it happen with Mr. Spangler?

[Novotny]: I would imagine it did.

16 [Counsel]: And one of the other allegations is that Mr. Spangler did not supplement his report by indicating that the DA was not going to file.

[Novotny]: Well, and there wouldn’t — there isn’t usually a supplemental report. It’s usually done on the referral page of IGOR.

[Counsel]: Okay. Okay.

[Novotny]: And I will say that sometimes those things did fall through the crack [sic]. And if I could explain why that happened.

[Counsel]: Why did they fall through the cracks?

[Novotny]: Well, it’s not so much falling through the cracks. It was more — a case like with the shank and that white substance, it’s — in the IGOR case, you can open and close that case as many times as you need to, to add a supplement or to change or modify something. Most of the investigators, when they do something like that — and if I remember correctly, that shank was found — it wasn’t in a common area, it was with that particular individual. So it’s a pretty quick, open/close type case. So when you write the report, you’re writing it all at one time.

[Counsel]: Okay.

[Novotny]: And I would say that initially when you look at that, that yeah, you’re going to submit that to the DA for review.

17 [Counsel]: Would the — Mr. Spangler write that report, complete it, submit it to you for approval, and then he contacts the DA?

[Novotny]: Usually, yes.

[Counsel]: Okay. Would there be times where he would be writing his report and it’d be — and he was — contact the DA and receive word from the DA, prior to the completion of his report.

[Novotny]: Yes. I mean, that’s what I’m saying is, that is a living document. It changes all the time. So it’s — that may have been what he finished on that particular day when he wrote that report and then something changed after that — but he didn’t go back in and update the report.

¶ 31 During the hearing, Cummings was asked whether keeping

evidence inside a state-issued vehicle would violate the chain of

custody. Cummings responded, “I don’t think I’ve actually done

that, but it would be acceptable to do that, yes.”

C. Analysis

¶ 32 The ALJ concluded, as a preliminary matter, that the CDOC

had failed to admit into evidence the policies that were in effect at

the time Spangler allegedly violated them. Instead, the CDOC

admitted policies that went into effect on September 15, 2019, and

February 15 and November 15, 2023. The ALJ concluded the

18 CDOC failed to meet its burden of proof because he was unable to

find a violation of the policies in effect at the time the violations

allegedly occurred and that this alone justified reversing the

termination.2 Nevertheless, he decided the allegations on their

merits, so we address each alleged violation of the 2023 regulations

and conclude that the initial decision is also supported by the

record.

¶ 33 The CDOC first alleged that Spangler violated DOC Admin.

Reg. 1450-01(IV)(A)(1) (effective Nov. 15, 2023), which requires

employees to avoid situations that give rise to direct, indirect, or

perceived conflicts of interest. Lake struggled to explain the conflict

that the shank and suboxone cases created and testified that

Spangler’s failure to document the no-file decision in the shank

case created a conflict of interest between him and the district

attorney’s office. However, Novotny testified that such

documentation was not required and that Spangler complied with

2 The CDOC separately challenges this finding as a violation of the

party presentation principle, which we address below.

19 the procedures in effect at the time. Moreover, the record showed

that Spangler discussed the cases with the district attorney, who

decided not to file charges. Accordingly, we conclude the record

supports the ALJ’s finding that no violation of this regulation

occurred.

¶ 34 The CDOC next alleged that Spangler violated DOC Admin.

Reg. 1450-01(IV)(A)(3), which requires employees to comply with

administrative regulations, procedures, operational memorandums,

implementation adjustments, rules, duties, legal orders, and

administrative instructions. The ALJ found Novotny’s firsthand

testimony more credible than Lake’s testimony, and we must defer

to that finding. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Indus. Claims Off., 989 P.2d

251, 252 (Colo. App. 1999) (citing Dover Elevator Co. v. Industrial

Claim Appeals Office, 961 P.2d 1141 (Colo.App.1998).). Novotny

testified that she was Spangler’s supervisor in 2017 and 2018 and

that Spangler never violated the provisions of this regulation with

regards to the shank case or the suboxone case. Accordingly, we

conclude that the record supports the ALJ’s finding that no

violation of this regulation occurred.

20 ¶ 35 Next, the CDOC alleged that Spangler violated DOC Admin.

Reg. 1450-01(IV)(A)(8), which requires employees to exercise good

judgment and sound discretion at all times. Novotny testified that

Spangler was an outstanding investigator who conformed to her

expectations and CDOC policies during the handling of the shank

and suboxone cases. Moreover, Spangler admitted that carrying

evidence in the trunk of a car is not a good practice, but he

explained that this was unintentional, he did not know the evidence

had fallen from the boxes, and its location in the trunk was

accidental. As well, Cummings confirmed that Spangler’s action did

not violate the chain of custody so long as the investigator could

testify that it remained in a locked trunk until removed. Therefore,

we conclude that the record supports the ALJ’s finding that

Spangler’s accidental oversight of having the shank and suboxone

evidence in his trunk did not constitute a violation of this

regulation.

¶ 36 The CDOC next alleged that Spangler violated DOC Admin.

Reg. 1450-01(IV)(B)(1), which provides:

Any action on or off duty on the part of employees, contract workers, and volunteers that jeopardizes the integrity or security of the

21 Department, calls into question one’s ability to perform effectively and efficiently in their position, adversely affects public safety, casts doubt upon the person’s integrity or which reflects discredit upon the individual as an employee, contract worker, or volunteer is expressly prohibited as conduct unbecoming and may lead to corrective and/or disciplinary action.

¶ 37 Lake testified that Spangler’s failures to document the

evidence in the evidence tracking system, submit the suboxone case

for prosecution, destroy the suboxone evidence, and submit the

shank case for prosecution jeopardized Spangler’s and the CDOC’s

integrity and adversely affected the public’s safety. In contrast,

Novotny testified that

• Spangler entered the evidence into the system that

existed at the time, conferred with the district attorney in

the shank case and communicated the no-file decision to

her;

• the district attorney at that time did not wish to

document no-file decisions;

• in the suboxone case, there was insufficient evidence to

submit to the district attorney; and

22 • Spangler otherwise complied with all procedures in both

cases.

¶ 38 Because the ALJ credited Novotny’s testimony over Lake’s, we

conclude that the record supports the ALJ’s finding that Spangler

did not violate this regulation.

¶ 39 Next, the CDOC alleged that Spangler violated DOC Admin.

Reg. 1450-01(IV)(E)(1), which provides that employees will neither

falsify any documents nor willfully depart from the truth either in

giving testimony or in connection with any official duties or

investigation. Lake testified that Spangler violated this regulation

in the shank case by reporting he would refer it to the district

attorney for filing, failing to do so, and also failing to document his

claim that there was a no-file decision. Novotny testified that

Spangler took the case to the district attorney and communicated

verbally to her that there was a no-file decision. She said he was

not required to memorialize this decision in IGOR. And she

confirmed that at the time of that case, the district attorney’s office

did not wish to document its no-file decisions. Accordingly, we

conclude that the record supports the ALJ’s finding that Spangler

did not violate this regulation.

23 ¶ 40 The CDOC next alleged that Spangler violated DOC Admin.

Reg. 1150-07(IV)(D)(2) (effective Sep. 15, 2019), which provides the

following:

It is a criminal offense to conceal, destroy, or alter any physical evidence that may aid in a discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, corrective, or disciplinary action. Any contraband item or drug, as defined in this administrative regulation, is evidence of a crime and will be treated according to proper criminal evidence procedures, to include the proper reporting to an OIG investigator.

¶ 41 Lake testified that Spangler violated this regulation by not

properly logging the evidence into IGOR or EvidenceOnQ and by

keeping the evidence in the trunk of his car. However, according to

Novotny, Spangler was not required to document when he moved

evidence from one location to another. She also explained that the

evidence was properly logged into IGOR and that both cases were

closed with no identifiable suspects to prosecute. Novotny

explained that when EvidenceOnQ was implemented, the system

automatically transferred the data from IGOR to EvidenceOnQ,

which accounted for the four-month delay in the shank evidence

appearing in EvidenceOnQ. As well, Spangler testified that he did

not know the evidence had fallen from the boxes into the trunk,

24 that he rarely accessed his trunk, and that he might not have seen

it due to other items in the trunk. While Barnett testified that he

took a photograph of the trunk, he never offered it into evidence.

Therefore, we conclude that the record supports the ALJ’s finding

that Spangler did not conceal the evidence in his trunk and the

ALJ’s finding that no violation of the regulation occurred.

¶ 42 Next, the CDOC alleged that Spangler violated DOC Admin.

Reg. 1150-07(IV)(J)(3), which requires that evidence be secured in

the OIG criminal evidence storage area except when submitted for

laboratory testing or use in court. Spangler testified that both the

shank and the suboxone evidence were always secured in evidence

lockers until they inadvertently fell into his trunk when moving to

the Arrowhead facility. The ALJ found this allegation was proved by

a preponderance of the evidence based on Spangler’s admission.

The ALJ further noted that this regulation was in effect at the time

of the violation. Because the record supports a violation of this

regulation, we affirm the ALJ’s finding.

¶ 43 The CDOC next alleged that Spangler violated DOC Admin.

Reg. 1150-07(IV)(J)(4), which requires that when a crime is

committed, adjudicated and disposed of, the evidence must be

25 transferred to the master evidence/property depository maintained

by the OIG Region II office in Cañon City and that it be disposed of

only by the criminal evidence custodian when released by the

appropriate district attorney or designee. Because the record shows

that neither the shank case nor the suboxone case was adjudicated

or disposed of, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that this regulation is

inapplicable and that the CDOC failed to prove it by a

preponderance of the evidence.

¶ 44 Next, the CDOC alleged that Spangler violated DOC Admin.

Reg. 1150-07(IV)(K)(1), which provides that dangerous evidence,

including drugs and weapons, will be destroyed. However, this

regulation provides no timeline or time limits for destruction. The

ALJ found, and the record shows, that it would be too speculative to

conclude that the evidence would not have been destroyed at a

future date, and that the evidence’s location in evidence lockers and

the car trunk did not present a danger to anyone. Accordingly, we

affirm the ALJ’s finding that Spangler did not violate this

regulation.

¶ 45 The CDOC next alleged that Spangler violated DOC Admin.

Reg. 1105-07(IV)(K)(3), which requires that when evidence is

26 destroyed, it be documented on the chain of custody form and the

AR Form 1105-07C, Evidence Disposal Record. Lake testified that

because Spangler marked in IGOR that the suboxone was labeled

for destruction, but had not been destroyed, this violated the

regulation. But the plain language of the regulation pertains to

evidence that is destroyed, not evidence that is labeled for

destruction. And because the record shows that the evidence was

never destroyed, we conclude it supports the ALJ’s finding that

Spangler did not violate this regulation.

¶ 46 Next, the CDOC alleged that Spangler violated DOC Admin.

Reg. 1150-20(IV)(A) (effective Feb. 15, 2023), which provides that

employees have an affirmative duty to conduct themselves in a

manner which reflects honesty, integrity and truthfulness. Novotny

testified that Spangler was not required to update the location of

physical evidence when moved, including the shank and suboxone

evidence. She also said he was never required to document the

district attorney’s no-file decision and that he did not violate any

policy or regulation in his handling of the two cases. Furthermore,

Cummings testified that he had known Spangler for twenty years in

various capacities at the CDOC and that Spangler was the most

27 honest person he had met. Because the record supports the ALJ’s

finding that Spangler did not violate this regulation, we affirm his

decision.

¶ 47 The CDOC next alleged that Spangler violated DOC Admin.

Reg. 1150-20(IV)(D), which requires disclosure under Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), of an employee’s accepting or

soliciting a bribe, engaging in unlawful conduct, sustaining a

criminal conviction, engaging in or committing deceptive acts, or

intentionally departing from the truth. The record contains no

evidence relating to bribes, a criminal conviction, or unlawful

conduct. Further, Novotny confirmed that Spangler did not falsify

his report in the shank case because he referred the case to the

district attorney by speaking with the district attorney personally,

and that he was not required to update the report with the no-file

decision. Additionally, nothing in the record contradicted

Spangler’s testimony that he did not know the evidence was in his

trunk until it was found by Barnett. Accordingly, the record

supports the ALJ’s finding that no violation of the regulation

occurred.

28 ¶ 48 The CDOC last alleged that Spangler violated Board Rule 6-

12(B) by failing to perform competently and by failing to comply

with the Board Rules, Director’s Procedures, department’s rules and

policies, state universal policies, or other directives. State Pers. Bd.

Rule 6-12(B)(1), (3). The record shows that Spangler consistently

received above-average performance evaluations and, according to

Novotny, fully complied with her expectations and with the

Department’s regulations and policies. Therefore, the record

supports the ALJ’s finding that Spangler did not violate this

regulation.

¶ 49 Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the ALJ’s

findings that Spangler did not commit all of the acts for which he

was disciplined and affirm the Board’s order on this basis.

III. Termination Decision

¶ 50 The CDOC next contends that the ALJ misapplied the

standards for determining whether Spangler’s termination was

arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to rule or law. We disagree and

conclude that the record supports the ALJ’s determination that

Spangler was wrongfully terminated.

29 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 51 An agency decision may be reversed only if the agency acted in

an arbitrary and capricious manner, made a determination

unsupported by evidence in the record, or exceeded its

constitutional or statutory authority. § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 2025;

Ginny’s Kids Int’l, Inc. v. Off. of Sec’y of State, 29 P.3d 333, 335

(Colo. App. 2000). If we perceive no such error, the agency action

must be affirmed. § 24-4-106(7)(a).

¶ 52 “In applying this standard, we presume the validity and

regularity of administrative proceedings and resolve all reasonable

doubts as to the correctness of administrative rulings in favor of the

agency.” Gessler v. Grossman, 2015 COA 62, ¶ 11, aff’d, 2018 CO

48. Ultimately, “[t]he burden is on the party challenging the agency

action to overcome the presumption that the agency’s acts were

proper.” Wildwood Child & Adult Care Program, Inc. v. Colo. Dep’t of

Pub. Health & Env’t, 985 P.2d 654, 655 (Colo. App. 1999).

¶ 53 A “[c]apricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion” occurs when

a decision-making body (1) “neglect[s] or refus[es] to use reasonable

diligence and care” to procure evidence it is authorized to consider;

(2) fails to “give candid and honest consideration to evidence before

30 it”; or (3) bases its decision on conclusions from the evidence that

“reasonable persons fairly and honestly considering the evidence

could not reach.” Rice v. Auraria Higher Educ. Ctr., 131 P.3d 1096,

1100 (Colo. App. 2005). “So long as the agency decision reflects

conscientious effort to reasonably apply legislative standards to

particular administrative proceedings, it is neither arbitrary nor

capricious.” Moya v. Colo. Ltd. Gaming Control Comm’n, 870 P.2d

620, 624 (Colo. App. 1994).

¶ 54 We also review de novo the agency’s interpretations of law.

Citizens for Clean Air & Water in Pueblo & S. Colo. v. Colo. Dep’t of

Pub. Health & Env’t, 181 P.3d 393, 396 (Colo. App. 2008). But “[a]s

part of our de novo review, ‘we may consider and defer to an

agency’s interpretation of its own enabling statute and [of]

regulations the agency has promulgated.’” Gessler v. Colo. Common

Cause, 2014 CO 44, ¶ 7 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Colo. Pub.

Utils. Comm’n, 157 P.3d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 2007)); see Chostner v.

Colo. Water Quality Control Comm’n, 2013 COA 111, ¶ 24

(“[A]though we are not bound by an agency decision that misapplies

or misconstrues the law, we defer to an agency’s interpretation of

the statute or regulation it is charged with administering.” (citing El

31 Paso Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Craddock, 850 P.2d 702, 705

(Colo. 1993)). An agency’s interpretation is “most useful to the

court when the subject involved calls for the exercise of technical

expertise which the agency possesses.” Craddock, 850 P.2d at 705.

B. Analysis

¶ 55 We begin our review of Lake’s decision with the first

capricious-or-arbitrary-exercise-of-discretion factor and note that

Lake was required to use reasonable diligence to procure all

information and, under Board Rule 6-11, to consider this evidence

prior to exercising his discretion to terminate Spangler. We discern

no error by the ALJ in finding that Lake failed to use reasonable

diligence to procure all information, for three reasons. First, during

the 6-10 meeting, Lake never asked Spangler what the procedures

were in 2017 and 2018 or how they differed from the regulations

Spangler was claimed to have violated. Moreover, the ALJ noted

that, at the hearing, Lake never submitted the administrative

regulations in effect when the alleged violations occurred,

demonstrating that he made little if any effort to ascertain the

applicable policies and expectations regarding evidence handling

and case reporting in effect in 2017 and 2018. Thus, the ALJ and

32 the Board were left with little choice but to find no violation, except

for the one admitted to by Spangler.

¶ 56 Second, Lake never informed Barnett of Spangler’s contentions

or explanations during the 6-10 meeting, which precluded Barnett

from fully developing his interviews with the witnesses he

interviewed after the 6-10 meeting. Indeed, the hypotheticals

Barnett presented did not mirror the facts or what Spangler

claimed. Compounding this problem was Lake’s suggestion that

Barnett need not interview Spangler.

¶ 57 Third, Barnett never spoke with Novotny, who, as Spangler’s

direct supervisor in 2017 and 2018, possessed the best evidence of

whether Spangler followed the applicable regulations and

expectations. Barnett left messages for Spangler on a phone asking

for Novotny’s contact information, but that phone number was not

Spangler’s, and the record contains no evidence showing that

Barnett undertook any other efforts to locate Novotny, beyond

leaving unanswered messages, before submitting his interviews to

Lake.

¶ 58 The second factor requires the ALJ to determine whether the

appointing authority gave “candid and honest consideration” to the

33 relevant evidence and whether “reasonable [people] fairly and

honestly considering the evidence must reach contrary

conclusions.” Lawley, 36 P.3d at 1252 (quoting Van De Vegt v. Bd.

of Comm’rs, 55 P.2d 703, 705 (Colo. 1936)). This factor is satisfied

if the “appointing authority considered, in good faith, the relevant

evidence, including the evidence related to the factors that an

appointing authority must consider under Rule 6-9 in exercising its

discretion on disciplinary matters.” Stiles, ¶ 47.

¶ 59 We discern no error in the ALJ’s finding that Lake did not give

candid and honest consideration to the relevant evidence for four

reasons. First, Lake relied on Barnett’s interviews following the

6-10 meeting, which, as described above, provided little useful

information because they did not mirror the case facts or Spangler’s

explanations.

¶ 60 Second, Barnett failed to interview the most important witness

with the most useful information, Novotny. And his only attempts

to locate her were phone calls that went unanswered because she

was out of the country without access to her phone.

¶ 61 Third, the record shows that Barnett’s report did not

accurately summarize information and often omitted exculpatory

34 information he received from the witness interviews. For example,

he asked Cummings whether an investigator like Cummings would

make a notation in the investigative narrative about evidence.

Cummings said that he had filed cases where he had not mentioned

the evidence and that there was no hard and fast rule on this point.

He also said that just because a narrative did not mention the

evidence did not mean he did not handle the evidence appropriately

and that so long as he could testify about how the evidence had

been handled, his chain of custody would be legally sound and

acceptable. Barnett’s report, however, stated that Cummings

“confirmed the evidence location would have been documented in a

narrative or IGOR, and eventually the new file on Q.”

¶ 62 Another example was when Barnett also asked Cummings

whether an investigator should drive around with evidence in the

trunk of his car for extended periods of time. Cummings

responded, “Yeah, I mean, I — well, I guess I — could tell you that

as long as the evidence is secured somewhere and you can maintain

your chain of [custody], I don’t think it’s best practice but it’s not

necessarily wrong.” Barnett did not include this response in his

report to Lake.

35 ¶ 63 Barnett also downplayed Cummings’ praise for Spangler.

While he reported that Cummings said Spangler was the most

honest person he knew, he never mentioned that Cummings had

also indicated he had known Spangler for two decades and that

Spangler had more integrity than anyone Cummings had worked

with in his life. Barnett also did not include Cummings’ statement

that whatever Spangler was accused of doing, “[he] would doubt

that with every cell in [his] core.”

¶ 64 And Barnett interviewed two additional witnesses not provided

by Spangler: Darren Cortese and Darren Adams. Neither witness

had firsthand knowledge of the allegations because they were not

supervised by Novotny in 2017 and 2018 and had no relevant

experience with IGOR.

¶ 65 Fourth, Lake’s disciplinary notice contained several

statements that were contradicted by the hearing evidence. For

example, it stated that Spangler delayed entering evidence in the

shank case for four months. But the record shows that Spangler

entered the evidence into IGOR in 2017 and that the information

was migrated automatically to a new case management system,

36 EvidenceOnQ, in 2018. The migration thus caused the delayed

date, not Spangler.

¶ 66 Another example was that Lake said Spangler took possession

of the suboxone evidence five years before it was found in his trunk,

implying that it was in the trunk for the entire time. This assumes

facts that were not known at the time and that were contradicted by

later evidence presented at the hearing showing the suboxone was

stored at CMRC until it closed in 2020, when Spangler took

possession of it.

¶ 67 Likewise, Lake alleged that Spangler was required to enter the

suboxone into the OIG evidence database; however, Novotny said

this was not required in 2018.

¶ 68 And Lake misstated Spangler’s 6-10 meeting testimony by

saying that Spangler reported he routinely accessed the trunk of his

car, contrary to Spangler’s actual testimony that he rarely accessed

the trunk.

¶ 69 Lake’s notice also stated that the current and former OIG

investigators did not support or corroborate Spangler’s assertions

and actually disputed them. As described above, Barnett’s report

excluded or misreported much exculpatory information that

37 corroborated Spangler’s contentions. Indeed, had Lake listened to

the tapes of Barnett’s interviews, rather than relying on Barnett’s

written summary, he would have known about and could have

considered this exculpatory information.

¶ 70 Lake’s notice also alleged that the shank and suboxone cases

involved felonies subject to the three-year statute of limitations and

that concerns with the chain of custody seriously impacted the

ability to prosecute them, thereby negatively impacting the victims

and the CDOC. But the record shows that the no-file decision was

made in the shank case well before the statute of limitations ran

and that insufficient evidence of a suspect’s identity precluded the

filing of charges in the suboxone case, a decision made before the

statute of limitations had expired.

¶ 71 Accordingly, we conclude that ample evidence supports the

ALJ’s finding that Lake did not candidly and honestly procure and

consider all relevant evidence in making his decision to terminate

Spangler’s employment.

¶ 72 Next, the third factor requires us to consider whether

reasonable people fairly and honestly considering the evidence must

reach a decision contrary to the appointing authority’s, which

38 “assesses the appointing authority’s weighing of the evidence and

the reasonableness of the appointing authority’s disciplinary

action.” Stiles, ¶ 52. Based on the hearing record, which

established that Spangler violated only one administrative

regulation in his handling of the shank and suboxone evidence,

coupled with Lake’s failure to obtain and consider highly relevant

and exculpatory information from Novotny and other witnesses

before making a disciplinary decision, we agree with the ALJ that

reasonable people honestly considering this evidence would at most

entertain the possibility of a corrective action for the single

administrative regulation violation, but would not entertain

termination.

¶ 73 Finally, we consider whether Spangler’s termination was

contrary to rule or law. See § 24-50-103(6). Notably, Board Rule 6-

2 provides that a certified employee be subject to corrective action

before discipline “unless the act is so flagrant or serious that

immediate discipline is proper.” State Pers. Bd. Rule 6-2, 4 Code

Colo. Regs. 801-1. As noted above, the record shows only one

violation of the CDOC’s administrative regulations, and nothing in

the record shows that holding evidence from long-closed cases in a

39 car trunk was so flagrant or serious as to warrant immediate

discipline before corrective action. As noted by the ALJ, Spangler’s

unintentional act was inconsequential since neither case was

prosecutable in 2023. Moreover, the record shows that Spangler’s

failure to document the evidence’s location on an ongoing basis did

not violate any regulation in 2017 and 2018 and that Spangler kept

the evidence secured in lockers except for the time it was in his

trunk.

¶ 74 Additionally, Board Rule 6-10(C) requires the appointing

authority to meet with the employee before making a final decision.

The record shows that following the 6-10 meeting, Lake never met

with Spangler to discuss the results of the witness interviews before

making his termination decision. The record also shows that Lake

and Barnett referred the PS investigation report to the district

attorney’s office for the filing of charges on November 10, 2023, two

weeks before scheduling the 6-10 meeting of November 27. This

implies that Lake had already determined Spangler’s culpability

before conducting the 6-10 meeting.

¶ 75 Accordingly, we discern no error in the ALJ’s finding that

Lake’s decision was contrary to rule or law or the ALJ’s ultimate

40 finding that Lake’s decision to terminate Spangler was arbitrary,

capricious, and contrary to rule or law.

IV. Party Presentation Principle

¶ 76 The CDOC next contends that the ALJ violated the party

presentation principle when he found that the administrative

regulations admitted into evidence by the CDOC were not applicable

to the allegations against Spangler because Spangler never made

this argument. We disagree and conclude that the ALJ reasonably

inferred, from the properly admitted evidence, that the regulations

did not apply to the allegations.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 77 Whether a judge’s decision violated the party presentation

principle is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. See

Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44, 252 (2008).

¶ 78 The party presentation principle is a core component of our

adversary system. See id. at 243 (“In our adversary system, in both

civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we

follow the principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on the

parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role

of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present. . . . [A]s a general

41 rule, ‘[o]ur adversary system is designed around the premise that

the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for

advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief.’”

(citations omitted)); Compos v. People, 2021 CO 19, ¶ 35.

¶ 79 The ALJ, as fact finder, weighs the evidence, determines the

credibility of witnesses, and draws all justifiable inferences of fact

from the evidence. See People v. Reed, 2013 COA 113, ¶¶ 46-47

(the fact finder is free to use its common knowledge and experience

when assessing evidence); People v. Perea, 74 P.3d 326, 331 (Colo.

App. 2002); Lawry v. Palm, 192 P.3d 550, 558 (Colo. App. 2008).

B. Analysis

¶ 80 We discern no violation of the party presentation principle.

While we acknowledge that Spangler never argued at the hearing

that the 2023 regulations relied on by the CDOC were inapplicable

to his case, the regulations spoke for themselves by containing an

effective date. Thus, a fair reading of the regulations demonstrated

that they were not in effect in 2017 and 2018. Because the fact

finder must consider the evidence and reasonable inferences from

that evidence in reaching a decision, the ALJ committed no error by

finding that the admitted regulations did not apply to the

42 allegations at issue. And even assuming, arguendo, that the ALJ

had erred, the CDOC was not prejudiced because the ALJ decided

the allegations asserted against Spangler on their merits, not on the

inapplicability of the regulations.

V. Attorney Fees

¶ 81 The CDOC last contends that the ALJ erroneously awarded

Spangler attorney fees that are unsupported. We disagree.

¶ 82 We review a court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse of

discretion and will reverse an award only if it is not supported by

the evidence. Spring Creek Ranchers Ass’n v. McNichols, 165 P.3d

244, 246 (Colo. 2007).

¶ 83 Board Rule 8-51(B) provides the following:

Upon final resolution of a proceeding under this Chapter 8, Resolution of Appeals and Disputes, Part A, attorney fees and costs may be assessed against a party if the Board finds that the personnel action from which the proceeding arose, or the appeal of such action was frivolous, in bad faith, malicious, a means of harassment, or was otherwise groundless.

1. Frivolous means that no rational argument based on the evidence or law was presented.

2. In bad faith, malicious, or as a means of harassment means that the appeal or defense was pursued to annoy or harass, made to be

43 abusive, stubbornly litigious, or disrespectful of the truth.

3. Groundless means that despite having a valid legal theory, a party fails to offer or produce any competent evidence to support the theory.

State Pers. Bd. Rule 8-51(B), 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1.

¶ 84 Additionally, section 24-50-125.5, C.R.S. 2025, permits an

award of attorney fees and costs if a personnel action is “instituted

frivolously, in bad faith, maliciously, or as a means of harassment

or was otherwise groundless.” Even if a basis exists for imposing

some level of discipline, whether a particular action is groundless

focuses on the particular disciplinary action that was taken. Coffey

v. Colo. Sch. of Mines, 870 P.2d 608, 610 (Colo. App. 1993) (finding

that while the evidence supported a three-day suspension, attorney

fees were recoverable because the employer lacked grounds to

discharge the employee); see also Ehrle v. Dep’t of Admin., 844 P.2d

1267, 1272 (Colo. App. 1992) (awarding attorney fees where the

employer manipulated funding to make a prospective employee

ineligible to fill the position and conducted a sham interview of that

employee).

44 ¶ 85 Based on the record before us, which shows that Spangler

violated a single administrative regulation, we agree with the ALJ

that the CDOC terminated Spangler without discovering and

considering the true circumstances that existed in 2017 and 2018

and, thus, imposed discipline based on incomplete and flawed

information. Accordingly, we discern no error in the ALJ’s finding

that the allegations disrespected the truth and were generally

groundless, and we affirm the award of attorney fees and costs.

VI. Appellate Fees and Costs

¶ 86 Spangler requests appellate attorney fees and costs pursuant

to C.A.R. 39, section 24-50-125.5(1), and Board Rule 8-51(B), which

generally provide for appellate fees to a party who successfully

defends the appeal. Because Spangler has prevailed on appeal, we

award reasonable appellate fees and costs. Because this will

require the presentation of additional evidence, we remand the case

for a determination and award of reasonable attorney fees and

costs.

45 VII. Disposition

¶ 87 The order is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the

administrative agency for the determination and award of

reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE KUHN concur.