NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3375-22
SONIA COLON and LUIS REINOSO,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY and PORT AUTHORITY TRANSIT CORPORATION, a/k/a PATCO,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
AP CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Defendant,
AE STONE, INC. and S. BATATA CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Defendants-Respondents,
DELAWARE RIVER PORT AUTHORITY and PORT AUTHORITY TRANSIT CORPORATION, a/k/a PATCO,
Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants,
AE STONE, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant/Fourth- Party Plaintiff-Respondent,
S. BATATA CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Fourth-Party Defendant-Respondent. ____________________________________
Argued September 18, 2024 – Decided August 8, 2025
Before Judges DeAlmeida and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-4463-19.
Shawn C. Huber argued the cause for appellants (Brown & Connery, LLP, attorneys; Shawn C. Huber, Joseph T. Carney and Gina Roswell, on the briefs).
Brian S. Chacker (Gay & Chacker, PC) argued the cause for respondents Sonia Colon and Luis Reinoso.
James J. Law (Dengler & Lipski) argued the cause for respondent AE Stone, Inc.
A-3375-22 2 Virginia Hughes argued the cause for respondent S. Batata Construction, Inc. (Zirulnik, Demille & Vilachá, attorneys; Virginia Hughes, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendants/third-party plaintiffs Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA)
and Port Authority Transit Corporation a/k/a PATCO (PATCO) (collectively,
defendants) appeal from four pretrial Law Division orders, a judgment
memorializing an approximately $1.7 million jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs
Sonia Colon and Luis Reinoso, and an order denying their motion for a new trial
in this negligence action arising from a trip and fall.
Defendants appeal: (1) the October 22, 2021 order granting summary
judgment to third-party defendant/fourth-party plaintiff AE Stone, Inc. (AE
Stone); (2) the October 22, 2021 order granting summary judgment to fourth-
party defendant S. Batata Construction, Inc. (Batata); (3) the March 20, 2023
order denying their motion to preclude the testimony of plaintiffs' medical cost
projection expert; (4) the March 20, 2023 order denying their motion to exclude
lay opinion testimony regarding the condition of the sidewalk where Colon fell
and the cause of that condition; (5) the March 31, 2023 judgment memorializing
the verdict; and (6) the June 9, 2023 order denying their motion for a new trial.
A-3375-22 3 We affirm both October 22, 2021 orders and reverse the March 20, 2023
order admitting portions of a witness's deposition testimony containing his lay
opinion with respect to the condition of the sidewalk where Colon fell and the
cause of that condition. Because the lay opinion testimony had the significant
potential to taint the verdict, we vacate the March 31, 2023 judgment and remand
for a new trial. In light of those decisions, we need not address the remaining
orders on appeal.
I.
In November 2019, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants and AP
Construction, Inc. (AP Construction) alleging Colon fractured her wrist and
suffered other injuries on May 30, 2018, when she tripped and fell on a sidewalk
at the Collingswood PATCO speed line train station. Plaintiffs alleged DRPA,
which owned the sidewalk, and PATCO and AP Construction, which maintained
the sidewalk, negligently allowed two slabs of the sidewalk to become uneven,
which created a dangerous condition that caused Colon to fall. Reinoso, Colon's
spouse, alleged loss of consortium.
Defendants filed an answer and cross-claim against AP Construction.
They alleged if plaintiffs' allegations were true, AP Construction's negligence
when it constructed or repaired the sidewalk resulted in the uneven surface that
A-3375-22 4 caused Colon's fall. Thus, defendants alleged AP Construction was either liable
for Colon's injuries or, as a joint tortfeaser, required to contribute to or
indemnify defendants for any damages awarded against them.
Defendants also filed a third-party complaint against AE Stone. They
alleged that in December 2013 they executed a contract with AE Stone to repair
the sidewalks at the Collingswood PATCO station. Defendants alleged if
plaintiffs' allegations were true, AE Stone's negligence resulted in the uneven
sidewalk that caused Colon's fall, rendering AE Stone liable for her injuries.
Defendants also alleged breach of contract by AE Stone and sought defense and
indemnification from AE Stone.
AE Stone filed an answer and fourth-party complaint against Batata, the
subcontractor AE Stone retained to complete the concrete work, including
sidewalk repairs, required by its December 2013 contract with defendants. AE
Stone alleged if plaintiffs' allegations were true, Batata's negligence resulted in
the uneven sidewalk that caused Colon's fall. AE Stone sought contribution and
indemnification from Batata for any damages awarded against AE Stone.
A-3375-22 5 Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint alleging negligence
claims directly against AE Stone and Batata. Plaintiffs alleged all defendants
were jointly and severally liable for their damages.1
Discovery revealed that in 2014, Batata, acting as a subcontractor for AE
Stone, installed one sidewalk slab between two existing sidewalk slabs at the
location where Colon fell. Defendants inspected and accepted Batata's
installation of the sidewalk slab. AE Stone contracted with a third party to
inspect Batata's sidewalk installation. When Colon tripped and fell, a difference
in height of approximately three-quarters of an inch had developed between the
sidewalk slab installed by Batata and the existing adjacent sidewalk slab.
Adam Jacurak, a professional engineer and, at various times, director of
track and facilities for PATCO and manager for construction and maintenance
at DRPA, was produced for a deposition as a representative for defendants.
Jacurak was not named as an expert witness, did not inspect the sidewalk, and
did not produce an expert report. Jacurak reviewed photographs of the sidewalk
where Colon fell. He opined, based on his experience, that a difference in height
of a half-inch or more between sidewalk slabs was a tripping hazard and the
1 On January 28, 2021, the claims against AP Construction were dismissed without prejudice. A-3375-22 6 sunken sidewalk slab was likely caused by settlement of the slab after
installation. Jacurak opined a sidewalk slab settlement significant enough to
create a tripping hazard does not normally occur when the slab was properly
installed. He acknowledged, however, it was possible the existing sidewalk slab
adjacent to the slab installed by Batata heaved upward and caused the difference
in height between the slabs. In addition, Jacurak testified a sinking slab could
be caused by a leaking water pipe in the area of the sidewalk, causing erosion
of the soil below the slab.
Following discovery, Batata moved for summary judgment, arguing there
was no evidence it either failed to adhere to applicable construction standards
when it installed the sidewalk slab or such a failure, if it occurred, was a
proximate cause of Colon's fall. AE Stone subsequently cross-moved for
summary judgment raising the same arguments. Defendants opposed the
motions, arguing Jacurak's deposition testimony created an issue of fact for the
jury to resolve with respect to whether Batata's negligent installation of the
sidewalk slab caused a tripping hazard and whether that hazard was the
proximate cause of Colon's fall.
On October 22, 2021, the motion court issued an oral decision granting
AE Stone's and Batata's motions. The court found Jacurak's testimony contained
A-3375-22 7 inadmissible lay opinions with respect to the likely cause of and danger posed
by the difference in height between the sidewalk slabs. In addition, the motion
court concluded even if Jacurak's testimony was considered to be that of an
expert, he offered an inadmissible net opinion of the likely cause of, and danger
posed by, the tripping hazard. This is so, the court concluded, because Jacurak
did not visit the site of the fall, inspect the sidewalk or ground conditions, or
undertake any testing of the subsurface beneath the sidewalk slab Batata
installed. The court found Jacurak identified no evidence, such as negligent soil
compaction, to support his opinion and failed to identify engineering standards
or other standards of care he believed Batata negligently failed to follow when
installing the sidewalk slab.
The motion court entered two October 22, 2021 orders granting summary
judgment in favor of AE Stone and Batata, respectively, on all claims asserted
against them.
Defendants thereafter filed two motions in limine. First, defendants
moved to preclude plaintiffs from offering, through introduction of Jacurak's
deposition testimony, his lay opinion concerning the cause of the height
differential between the sidewalk slabs, whether Batata departed from
construction standards when it installed one of the slabs, or whether the height
A-3375-22 8 differential was an unreasonably hazardous and/or dangerous condition on
defendants' property.2 Defendants argued Jacurak could not offer either lay
opinion or expert testimony on those topics. In addition, defendants argued
plaintiffs could not establish their negligence claim without expert opinion
testimony establishing a breach of duty by defendants.
On March 20, 2023, the court denied the motion in an oral decision. The
court's reasoning is difficult to discern because oral argument on the motion
devolved into a line-by-line review of Jacurak's deposition transcript. Although
the court expressed concern about Jacurak offering opinion testimony, it
ultimately allowed Jacurak's opinions to be read to the jury. At trial, the court
stated:
Jacurak is going to testify per – per the deposition and – and say a lot of things that (indiscernible) kind of limit some of the areas that . . . I think are maybe beyond the scope of what he should be testifying to. But I think we're clear on what those areas are. But so, you know . . . we're going to . . . permit that.
A March 20, 2023 order memorialized the motion court's decision and listed the
lines of Jacurak's deposition that could be read to the jury.
2 Jacurak was unable to appear at trial. A-3375-22 9 At trial, several passages of Jacurak's deposition testimony concerning
defendants' practices with respect to inspecting sidewalks for hazards were read
to the jury. In addition, portions of Jacurak's testimony the motion court found
to be inadmissible lay opinion or inadmissible net expert opinion were read to
the jury.3 Jacurak's testimony that "normally . . . when sidewalks are properly
installed you will not get large settlements, you get negligible settlement
between the two" slabs was read to the jury. In addition, his testimony that the
sidewalk slab installed by Batata had "a large settlement" between it and the
existing sidewalk slab and, as a result, "should have been ripped out and redone"
was read to the jury.
Second, defendants moved to preclude testimony of plaintiffs' proposed
medical cost projection expert, Linda Lajterman. Lajterman, a nurse, issued a
report projecting the future medical care and treatment Colon would need as a
result of the injuries she sustained in the fall. The report detailed the medical
records, standards of care, treatment patterns, treatment data, clinical practice
guidelines, and other materials on which Lajterman relied. Lajterman described
the likely long-term consequences of Colon's injuries and opined as to the cost
3 The judge who presided at trial was not the judge who decided the summary judgment motions. A-3375-22 10 of the treatments she is likely to require. Defendants argued Lajterman's opinion
was an inadmissible net opinion.
On March 20, 2023, the court issued an oral opinion denying the motion,
finding Lajterman adequately described the basis of her opinion. A March 20,
2023 order memorialized the motion court's decision.
The matter was tried to a jury over four days. The jury returned a verdict
in plaintiffs' favor attributing 100 percent of liability to defendants. The jury
awarded Colon $1.25 million, inclusive of $500,000 in pain and suffering and
$750,000 in future medical expenses. The jury awarded Reinoso $300,000. A
March 31, 2023 judgment memorialized the verdict, including interest.
Defendants thereafter moved for a new trial based on comments made by
plaintiffs' counsel in his closing statement and the trial court's decision to
preclude a proposed witness who intended to testify about the absence of
complaints to defendants about the condition of the sidewalk. On June 9, 2023,
the court issued an oral decision denying the motion. A June 9, 2023 order
memorialized the court's decision. This appeal followed.
With respect to the two October 21, 2022 orders, defendants argue the
motion court erred when it: (1) sua sponte raised the issue of whether Jacurak
offered expert testimony; (2) did not issue sufficient findings of fact and
A-3375-22 11 conclusions of law as required by Rule 1:7-4; (3) incorrectly concluded Jacurak
offered a net expert opinion when he offered either fact testimony or an
admissible lay opinion; and (4) failed to address defendants' breach of contract
claims against AE Stone and contribution and indemnification claims against
AE Stone and Batata.
With respect to the two March 20, 2023 orders, defendants argue the trial
court erred: (1) when it permitted the jury to hear Jacurak's lay opinion and net
expert opinion with respect to the cause of and hazard posed by the height
differential between the two sidewalk slabs; and (2) when it concluded
Lajterman's opinion was not a net opinion.
Defendants also argue the verdict is excessive and against the weight of
the evidence. Finally, defendants argue the trial court erred when it denied their
motion for a new trial and in its calculation of prejudgment interest.
II.
A. October 22, 2021 orders granting summary judgment to AE Stone and Batata.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the motion court. Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). That
standard requires us to "determine whether 'the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
A-3375-22 12 show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.'" Branch
v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).
"Summary judgment should be granted . . . 'against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'"
Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (quoting Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). We do not defer to the motion court's legal
analysis or statutory interpretation. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018); Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 209 (2014).
Self-serving assertions that are unsupported by evidence are insufficient
to create a genuine issue of material fact. Miller v. Bank of Am. Home Loan
Servicing, L.P., 439 N.J. Super. 540, 551 (App. Div. 2015). "Competent
opposition requires 'competent evidential material' beyond mere 'speculation'
and 'fanciful arguments.'" Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super.
415, 426 (App. Div. 2009). We review the record "based on our consideration
of the evidence in the light most favorable to the parties opposing summary
judgment." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 523-24 (1995).
A-3375-22 13 We begin with defendants' argument the motion court failed to make
sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law when it granted summary
judgment to AE Stone and Batata. Rule 1:7-4(a) states a motion court "shall, by
an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and
state its conclusions of law thereon . . . on every motion decided by a written
order that is appealable as of right . . . ." The October 22, 2021 orders were not
appealable as of right.
Under Rule 2:2-3(a)(1), an appeal as of right may be taken to this court
only from a "final judgment" of the trial court, subject to exceptions not
applicable here. "To be a final judgment, an order generally must 'dispose of all
claims against all parties.'" Janicky v. Point Bay Fuel, Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 545,
549-50 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting S.N. Golden Estates, Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co.,
317 N.J. Super. 82, 87 (App. Div. 1998)). The October 21, 2022 orders resolve
only the claims against AE Stone and Batata and not plaintiffs' claims against
defendants.
Even though Rule 1:7-4(a) does not apply, precedents interpreting it guide
our analysis of whether the motion court sufficiently explained the basis for its
decision to grant summary judgment. "[A]n articulation of reasons is essential
to the fair resolution of a case." Schwarz v. Schwarz, 328 N.J. Super. 275, 282
A-3375-22 14 (App. Div. 2000). Effective appellate review of a motion court's decision
requires examination of the basis for a motion court's decision. See Raspantini
v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 533-34 (App. Div. 2003).
We are satisfied the motion court adequately explained the reasons it
granted summary judgment to AE Stone and Batata. The court found defendants
did not raise a disputed issue of material fact with respect to whether any
conduct by AE Stone or Batata caused the height differential between the two
sidewalk slabs plaintiffs alleged caused Colon to fall. In reaching that decision,
the motion court found defendants' attempt to rely on Jacurak's testimony to
establish Batata's negligence was insufficient to survive summary judgment
because his opinion testimony was inadmissible.
"To sustain a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish four
elements: '(1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate cause, and
(4) actual damages.'" Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015) (quoting Polzo
v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 584 (2008)). "Proximate cause connotes not
nearness of time or distance, but closeness of causal connection." Cruz-Mendez
v. ISU/Ins. Servs. of S.F., 156 N.J. 556, 577 (1999) (quoting Powers v. Standard
Oil Co., 98 N.J.L. 730, 732 (Sup. Ct. 1923)). "[T]o be a proximate cause . . .
conduct need only be a cause which sets off a foreseeable sequence of
A-3375-22 15 consequences, unbroken by any superseding cause, and which is a substantial
factor in producing the particular injury." Showalter v. Barilari, Inc., 312 N.J.
Super. 494, 503 (App. Div. 1998) (alterations in original) (quoting Yun v. Ford
Motor Co., 276 N.J. Super. 142, 159 (App. Div. 1994) (Baime, J.A.D.,
concurring and dissenting)).
In opposition to the summary judgment motions, defendants argued AE
Stone and Batata breached a duty of care to plaintiffs when Batata negligently
installed one of the sidewalk slabs in 2014. However, the motion court found
to establish such a breach of duty it was necessary to produce expert testimony
that the 2014 installation of the sidewalk slab was negligent and the negligent
installation caused movement in the sidewalk that created the height differential
plaintiffs identify as the cause of Colon's fall.
Defendants relied on Jacurak's opinion that the tripping hazard was caused
by Batata's improper installation of the sidewalk slab. Defendants did not
identify Jacurak as an expert, or request the court qualify him to give expert
testimony. Jacurak did not produce an expert report, and he did not identify any
evidence or relevant construction standards supporting his opinion. The record
establishes Jacurak gave a lay opinion about the cause of the height differential
between sidewalk slabs.
A-3375-22 16 N.J.R.E. 701 provides:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it:
(a) is rationally based on the witness' perception; and
(b) will assist in understanding the witness' testimony or determining a fact in issue.
A witness may give a lay opinion that "falls within the narrow bounds of
testimony that is based on the perception of the witness and that will assist the
jury in performing its function." State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 14 (2021) (quoting
State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 456 (2011)).
Perception is based on the acquisition of knowledge through one's sense
of touch, taste, sight, smell, or hearing. McLean, 205 N.J. at 457. Lay opinion
testimony must "assist the trier of fact either by helping to explain the witness's
testimony or by shedding light on the determination of a disputed factual issue."
Singh, 245 N.J. at 15 (quoting McLean, 205 N.J. at 458). A lay witness may not
give opinion testimony on a matter "as to which the jury is as competent as [the
witness] to form a conclusion . . . ." McLean, 205 N.J. at 459 (quoting Brindley
v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 35 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 1955) (second alteration in
original)).
A-3375-22 17 The admissibility of opinion evidence rests within the discretion of the
trial court. Townsend, 221 N.J. at 52. We will not reverse a decision with
respect to the admissibility of lay opinion testimony unless it "was so wide of
the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted." Singh, 245 N.J. at 13
(quoting State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001)).
We see no basis on which to disturb the motion court's determination
Jacurak, in effect, did not offer a lay opinion based on his perceptions, but an
inadmissible expert opinion with respect to the cause of the tripping hazard.
Jacurak's testimony was not based on his perception of Batata's installation of
the sidewalk or the condition of the sidewalk at the time of Colon's fall. At best,
Jacurak offered an opinion based on his perception of the photographs of the
sidewalk slab. Based only on his viewing of the photographs, Jacurak offered
an opinion of what caused what he perceived in the photographs. As the motion
court concluded, that testimony was outside the permissible bounds for an
admissible lay opinion.
In addition, to the extent the motion court considered Jacurak's testimony
as expert testimony, we agree he offered an inadmissible net opinion. N.J.R.E.
703 addresses the foundation for expert testimony. Townsend, 221 N.J. at 53.
"[A]n expert's opinion must be based on 'facts, data, or another expert's opinion,
A-3375-22 18 either perceived by or made known to the expert, at or before trial.'" Carbis
Sales, Inc. v. Eisenberg, 397 N.J. Super. 64, 78-79 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting
Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 352 N.J. Super. 385, 401 (App. Div. 2002)). "[A] trial
court may not rely on expert testimony that lacks an appropriate factual
foundation and fails to establish the existence of any standard about which the
expert testified." Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344,
373 (2011). "Under the 'net opinion' rule, an opinion lacking in such foundation
and consisting of 'bare conclusions, unsupported by factual evidence' is
inadmissible." Carbis Sales, 397 N.J. Super. at 79 (quoting Johnson v. Salem
Corp., 97 N.J. 78, 91 (1984)).
Jacurak opined Batata's improper installation of the sidewalk slab caused
the slab to settle and created the height differential between the slab and the
adjoining sidewalk slab. As the motion court found, Jacurak offered no support
for that opinion other than his experience. He identified no evidence
establishing how Batata installed the sidewalk slab or what aspect of the
installation deviated from acceptable construction standards.
Jacurak also acknowledged bulging of the existing slab was a possible
cause of the tripping hazard. He did not, however, explain the basis on which
he discounted bulging as the cause of Colon's fall. Jacurak did not inspect the
A-3375-22 19 sidewalk, the conditions in which it existed, or the ground on which it was
installed. He did not write a report explaining the basis for his opinion. As the
motion court found, Jacurak offered a classic net opinion on the cause of the
height differential between the sidewalk slabs.
We also are not persuaded the motion court erred when it entered summary
judgment in favor of AE Stone and Batata on defendants' breach of contract,
contribution, and indemnification claims. Defendants' opposition to the
summary judgment motions, while briefly mentioning their contract,
contribution, and indemnification claims, did not identify any support for those
claims. Defendants did not identify the contractual provisions they allege AE
Stone breached. Nor did they provide legal or factual support for their claim
they are entitled to contribution and indemnification from AE Stone and Batata.
To the extent defendants' contribution claim is based on an allegation AE Stone
and Batata are joint tortfeasors, such a claim was effectively nullified by the
motion court's grant of summary judgment to AE Stone and Batata on all
negligence claims alleged against them.
B. March 20, 2023 order denying defendants' motion to preclude Jacurak's opinion testimony.
We agree the trial court erred when it permitted the jury to hear portions
of Jacurak's deposition testimony conveying his opinion of the cause of, and
A-3375-22 20 hazard posed by, the height differential between the two sidewalk slabs and
suggesting defendants were negligent for not removing and replacing the slab
installed by Batata.
When deciding the summary judgment motions, the court concluded
Jacurak's opinion testimony was inadmissible, either as lay opinion or net expert
opinion. That decision formed the basis for the orders granting summary
judgment to AE Stone and Batata because the motion court found defendants
could not prove negligence in the installation of the sidewalk slab in 2014
without expert testimony.
Yet, the same testimony was admitted at trial against defendants to
establish their negligence by not properly inspecting the slab upon installation
or ordering its destruction and reinstallation when the tripping hazard
developed. In light of its relevance to the critical issue at trial – defendants'
negligence – and the absence of other expert testimony with respect to the
installation and inspection of the sidewalk slab, we agree the admission of
Jacurak's opinion testimony warrants reversal of the March 31, 2023 judgment.
Evidence was submitted to the jury that Jacurak was an engineer and a
representative of defendants. His opinion that the height differential between
the sidewalk slab likely was caused by negligent installation of the sidewalk
A-3375-22 21 slab, posed a tripping hazard, and that the sidewalk slab should have been
removed and replaced by defendants had the strong potential to influence the
jury's determination defendants' negligence was the proximate cause of Colon's
fall. That testimony was inadmissible either as lay opinion or net expert opinion.
Reversal of the verdict is warranted.
In light of our decisions, we need not address the remaining orders on
appeal.
The October 22, 2021 orders are affirmed. The March 20, 2023 order
denying defendants' motion to preclude portions of Jacurak's deposition
containing opinion testimony is reversed. The March 31, 2023 judgment is
vacated and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-3375-22 22