Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar

381 F. Supp. 282, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20004, 7 ERC (BNA) 1076, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7103
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedAugust 19, 1974
DocketCiv. A. 74-208 and 74-219
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 381 F. Supp. 282 (Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Brinegar, 381 F. Supp. 282, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20004, 7 ERC (BNA) 1076, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7103 (D.N.H. 1974).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

BOWNES, District Judge.

The Appalachian Mountain Club (A. M.C.) and the Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests (Society) have brought separate actions against Federal and State Highway officials asking that construction of the Little-ton-Waterford segment and the Waterford-St. Johnsbury segment of Interstate Highway 93 be enjoined pending the completion of an Environmental Impact Statement (E.I.S.) that takes into consideration the impact of the entire proposed route of 1-93 on Franconia Notch State Park. 1 Since both plaintiffs take essentially the same position, I treat them as one for purposes of this opinion.

The immediate issue before me is plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The traditional test for the granting of preliminary relief depends on a showing by the plaintiffs that irreparable harm will result if the relief is not granted and that there is a probability of success on the merits. In a case involving the long-term effects of automotive traffic with its attendant noise, vibration, and air pollution on a small unique area of incomparable natural beauty, the word “irreparable” must be given a broad and expansive meaning. 1-29 why? Association v. Burns, 372 F.Supp. 223, 262-263 (D.Conn.1974). In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 477 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1973), the court recognized that the traditional definition of irreparable harm might not fit an environmental situation:

We recognize that the injunction is the vehicle through which the congressional policy behind NEPA can be effectuated, and that a violation of NEPA in itself may constitute a sufficient demonstration of irreparable harm to entitle a plaintiff to blanket injunctive relief. Id. at 1037.

Another factor to be considered on the issue of preliminary relief is a balancing of the harm to the plaintiffs as against the harm to the defendants if the project is halted. Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973); Allison v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1972); County of Santa Barbara v. Hickel, 426 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1970).

The real issue in any environmental case is the long-range public interest. Both parties here really represent the public. The basic question is balancing the need of the travelling public to have 1-93 extended from Littleton to Waterford and then to St. Johnsbury (which means a linkup with Interstate *284 91 to the Canadian Border and on to Montreal, Exhibit 44) against the need of the public to preserve an area unique to New Hampshire and the nation in as near its pristine state as possible.

It is clear that the court has jurisdiction both as to the issues and the parties. Calvert Cliffs’ Coord. Com. v. United States Atomic Energy Com., Inc., 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109 (1971); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., et al. v. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, et al., 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971).

The plaintiffs allege that the defendants have violated the law in several particulars:

1. That the E.I.S. required by the National Environmental Protective Act (NEPA) is limited to the Littleton-Waterford-St. Johnsbury segments of 1-93 only and does not take into consideration the impact of the entire Interstate Highway on Franconia Notch, does not present alternatives to the construction of 1-93 through the Notch, and that the E.I.S. for Littleton-Waterford-St. Johns-bury segments were prepared, in fact, by State Highway officials and not the Federal Agency, all contrary to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) and (D);

2. That the construction of the Littleton-Waterford-St. Johnsbury segments without first completing an E.I.S. of the effects of the entire route on Franconia Notch directly violates the Federal Highway Department’s own regulation; PPM 90-1, 23 C.F.R. 1.1, et al, Appendix to Part 1, Page 17, Par. 6; and

3. That the construction of the Littleton-Waterford-St. Johnsbury segments of 1-93 is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Parklands Act, 23 U.S. C. § 138, and section (f) of 49 U.S.C. § 1653, both of which statutes are identical.

The A.M.C. also claims a violation of civil rights by the Federal Highway Department for failure to follow its own regulation. I do not think this claim has any merit and it is dismissed.

The defendants take the position that the E.I.S. prepared for the Littleton-Waterford-St. Johnsbury segments are complete and meet all the requirements of the law and that there is no necessity for such statement to take into consideration the impact of Interstate 93 as a whole on Franconia Notch. The defendants also assert that before any new highway of any sort is put through Franconia Notch, a full E.I.S., including the consideration of alternate routes, will be completed and they point to a contract entered into between the State of New Hampshire and VTN Consolidated, Inc., for this purpose, dated June 14, 1974. Exhibit 4B.

The defendants also contend that the Littleton-Waterford-St. Johnsbury segments of 1-93 will also serve as an East-West Highway from Berlin to St. Johnsbury, and that such highway is needed regardless of whether or not the Notch is utilized to extend 1-93 northerly.

The pertinent provisions of NEPA are:

The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered ' in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall—
* * * * *
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
******

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Bluebook (online)
381 F. Supp. 282, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20004, 7 ERC (BNA) 1076, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7103, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/society-for-the-protection-of-new-hampshire-forests-v-brinegar-nhd-1974.