Snow v. President of Bowdoin College

175 A. 268, 133 Me. 195, 1934 Me. LEXIS 71
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedNovember 10, 1934
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 175 A. 268 (Snow v. President of Bowdoin College) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Snow v. President of Bowdoin College, 175 A. 268, 133 Me. 195, 1934 Me. LEXIS 71 (Me. 1934).

Opinion

Thaxter, J.

This is a bill in equity brought by the trustees of the will of Almira K. Hasty seeking a construction of two separate provisions of her will. The case is before us on report, on bill, answers and certain stipulations. The facts are not in dispute.

The testatrix died in 1912, and her will was duly admitted to probate in April of that year. Trustees, of whom the plaintiffs are the successors, qualified November 20, 1912. After disposing of a parcel of real estate she made bequests to certain friends, relatives and charities, and left by the eighth clause of her will the balance of her property in trust, the income of which was to be paid to certain enumerated persons during their lives,, and on the death of the [197]*197last survivor the trustees were required to pay $1,000 each to the Home for Aged Men in Portland, to the Home for Aged Women in Portland, to the Portland Provident Association, and to the President and Trustees of Bowdoin College for a special purpose, and the balance of the fund to the President and Trustees of Bowdoin College in trust under the following terms and conditions:

“All the said property given and bequeathed by the terms of this will to said The President and Trustees of Bowdoin College, excepting said Hasty Scholarship Fund, shall be and constitute a permanent fund to be called the “Elihu Hasty Fund” to be controlled, invested and reinvested by it, the said The President and Trustees of Bowdoin College, who shall annually or oftener apply and dispose of the income thereof as follows: Two-thirds of said income of said fund in their hands from time to time and all accretions thereof are to be used for the purposes of the Medical School of Maine and the remaining one-third of said income is to be added yearly, or oftener" if may be, to said fund, that is to say, said Elihu Hasty Fund, until said fund shall reach the sum of fifty thousand dollars, when the entire income thereof is to be expended and used for the purposes of the Medical School of Maine.”

By the same clause of her will the trustees were directed, upon the decease of Almeda P. Sawyer, who happens to have been the last survivor of the beneficiaries having a life interest, to pay the sum of five hundred dollars to her son, Charles Llewellyn Sawyer. The specific terms of this bequest are as follows:

“. . . upon the decease of said Almeda P. Sawyer, in case she survive me, I direct my trustees to pay her son, Charles Llewellyn Sawyer, the sum of five hundred dollars.”

No provision was made for any gifts over on the lapse of any legacy.

The trustees ask the court for instructions as to the payment of this bequest, also as to the status of the bequest to the President and Trustees of Bowdoin College in trust for the purposes of the Medical School of Maine.

[198]*198The question with respect to the Sawyer gift is whether the beneficiary had a vested interest on the death of the testatrix. Both the son and mother survived Mrs. Hasty but the son died before his mother. If his interest was contingent, it lapsed and became a part of Mrs. Hasty’s estate; if it was vested, it is now a part of his estate.

The fulfillment of no condition precedent was prescribed to entitle the beneficiary to come into possession of this legacy. The time of payment of it was only postponed. That this time might not come until after his death does not make his interest a contingent one. It was vested, and the legacy should be paid to those persons who under such circumstances are found to be entitled to it. Moulton v. Chapman, 108 Me., 417, 81 A., 1007; Bryant v. Plummer, 111 Me., 511, 90 A., 171; Davis v. McKown, 131 Me., 203, 160 A., 458.

The disposition of the bequest for the purposes of the Medical School of Maine involves the application of the doctrine of cy pres.

This school ivas incorporated by an act of the legislature in 1820, and placed under the direction and control of the President and Trustees and Overseers of Bowdoin College. Its purpose was to instruct students in “medicine, anatomy, surgery, chemistry, mineralogy and botany.” The school continued under the guidance of the college in accordance with its charter purposes until July 1, 1921, when, pursuant to a vote of the Trustees and Overseers of Bowdoin College, it ceased to function. Since that time no instruction in medical courses has been given through such school. The college has, however, provided instruction in chemistry, mineralogy, physics, botany, biology, anatomy, zoology, bacteriology, pathology and embryology. The number and range of these courses is sufficient to give a student a full four years of such medical preparatory work as is required for admission to medical schools.

The heirs of Mrs. Hasty now claim the fund in the hands of the trustees, which has not as yet been turned over to The President and Trustees of Bowdoin College. The college contends that it is entitled to it to hold in trust, and as the exact intent of the testatrix can not be carried out, that it should be applied cy pres either for support of the pre-medical courses at the college, or to provide scholarships for deserving students pursuing pre-medical courses [199]*199at the college or for graduates pursuing courses at approved medical schools in other states.

The equitable jurisdiction of the court under such circumstances as these is derived from its general power over the administration of trusts. Charitable trusts are objects of its peculiar regard. As these are not-subject to the ordinary rules against perpetuities and may continue indefinitely, special problems arise with respect to their administration. However wise a testator may be, it is impossible for him to foresee all the vicissitudes, which may affect the object of his bounty through the passage of time and the happenings of chance. Thus, after the abolition of negro slavery in this country the Massachusetts courts were called on to decide what use should be made of a fund to be expended in creating a public sentiment against slavery. Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539. After the extinction of the plague in England it became necessary to determine what should be done with a trust, the income of which was to be devoted to maintaining a hospital for the victims of that scourge. Attorney General v. Craven, 21 Beav., 392. Similar instances might be cited where courts of equity have been called on to intervene; and it is perfectly obvious in view of the advances which are being made in science and medicine that many other maladies, which afflict mankind, will be conquered. What shall become of endowments in such cases, when the specific objects of the donors shall have been fulfilled, will constitute problems for the courts for many years to come.

In dealing with this subject equity has a wide discretion. Its power is, however, limited to carrying out the intention of the donor of such a trust. As was said by the court in Jackson v. Phillips, supra, page 591, “The intention of the testator is the guide, or, in the phrase of Lord Coke, the lodestone, of the court.”

That the intent of the donor can not be exactly carried out does not mean that there must be a failure of his general benevolent purpose. The rule has been many time expressed by this court that a fund for a charity will be administered cy

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Bluebook (online)
175 A. 268, 133 Me. 195, 1934 Me. LEXIS 71, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/snow-v-president-of-bowdoin-college-me-1934.