Doyle v. Whalen

31 L.R.A. 118, 32 A. 1022, 87 Me. 414, 1895 Me. LEXIS 85
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedApril 13, 1895
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 31 L.R.A. 118 (Doyle v. Whalen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doyle v. Whalen, 31 L.R.A. 118, 32 A. 1022, 87 Me. 414, 1895 Me. LEXIS 85 (Me. 1895).

Opinion

Whitehouse, J.

On the fourteenth day of October, 1886, the town of Eastport in this State was the scene of a destructive conflagration which caused temporary destitution and distress among the inhabitants. News of the disaster awakened a widespread feeling of sympathy and a spirit of active benevolence which resulted in generous contributions of money and various articles of supplies from nearly all parts of New England and many points beyond, "for the relief of the sufferers by the fire.” The 'total amount of the money thus contributed exceeded thirty-eight thousand dollars. A relief committee of twenty was promptly organized at Eastport with appropriate officers and sub-committees for the purpose of making these voluntary offerings of the people at once available in relieving suffering and distress. During the fall and winter following the fire, the committee received applications and systematically dispensed the supplies and disbursed the funds thus received to those who appeared to be in need of immediate relief in consequence of the fire. A relief building was also erected at an expense of about five thousand dollars, taken from the relief fund, for the accommodation of those who were left homeless and shelterless by the fire.

But on the third day of March, 1887, the following resolution was adopted by the full committee : "Besolved, that the reduced condition of the relief fund together with the distressed condition of over fifty families comprising more than two hundred persons for which the committee is obliged to provide food, fuel and clothing for an indefinite period, forbid the appropriation of large sums of money aid in the future.” It appears, however, that at this time only three thousand dollars in money had been disbursed and that there xvas then in the hands of the finance committee an unexpended balance amounting to thirty-five thousand dollars, of which the sum of twenty thousand dollars was soon after invested in the four per cent bonds of the town of Eastport; and on the thirty-first day of March it was voted by the committee that the twenty thousand dollars, so invested "be made a permanent fund, the interest of which to be used in [423]*423aiding towards the support of the town poor.” On the twenty-first day of April, 1889, it was voted that the finance committee of the relief committee (the individual defendants in this proceeding) in connection with the treasurer of the relief committee, be authorized to act as trustees and to hold all bonds, property, money,” &c. ; and thereupon the committee "adjourned sine d,ie.”

It is not in controversy that since that date, the treasurer of the relief committee has been the custodian of the bonds in which this fund of twenty thousand dollars was invested ; that the income thereof has been regularly collected by him and turned over to the town treasurer, and that it has then been disbursed and distributed through the agency of the successive overseers of the poor for the purpose of relieving actual destitution and distress in the town without special reference to the inquiry whether the necessity for such relief was occasioned by the fire or otherwise. The "relief building” since that date has been used to furnish apartments and tenements free from rent to the worthy poor, some of whom met with losses by the fire ; and a portion of the building has been used as a school-house for a public school.

The plaintiffs represent that they suffered great loss by the fire, and complain on their own behalf, and in behalf of all others of like interest with themselves, that they are aggrieved by the refusal of the committee to distribute this generous fund among the sufferers by the fire in accordance with the intention of the donoi's. They contend that it should have been used to repair the losses as well as to relieve the destitution and distress of the sufferers by the fire; and that the appropriation of it as a supplement to the pauper fund of the town is wholly unauthorized for the reason that it aids the rich as well as the poor without distinguishing the sufferers by the fire, by relieving all alike of a part of the burden of taxation, and thus diverts these charitable donations from the purposes and uses for which they were designed.

The defendants say that these benevolent contributions came properly and rightfully into custody of the relief committee with an express or implied request that they should be distributed [424]*424in the sound discretion of the committee for the relief of actual suffering and distress caused by the fire ; that they labored faithfully and gratuitously to discharge the responsibility imposed upon them and distributed the supplies and disbursed the funds according to their best judgment for the real purpose for which they were donated, and that,"in so far as they were not required and could not be used specifically for the primary purpose for which they were intended, they have been used and are being-used by the inhabitants of Eastport for purposes which approximate as closely, and are as nearly akin, to the purpose for which they were designed as it is reasonable or practicable to do.” They further say that it was never the intention of the committee that the income of the twenty thousand dollars should be used as a part of the pauper funds of Eastport, or as a substitute therefor, or that the receipt of any part of it should affect the persons in whose favor it was applied with pauper disabilities. They accordingly contend that the mere fact that the plaintiffs’ applications for more of the funds than they have received have not been approved by the committee, does not give them the right to appeal from this domestic tribunal and call on the court to administer the fund.

The situation presents some novel inquiries which are not entirely free from difficulty. These prompt and liberal donations were acts of benevolence primarily designed undoubtedly for the immediate relief of the needy and distressed among the sufferers by the fire. The existence of a large surplus, after suitable relief had been afforded in all cases of actual distress, was probably a contingency not anticipated by the charitable donors. But in all the letters and telegrams received from them, it is either directly expressed or clearly implied that all contributions of money and supplies were to be applied "for the benefit of the sufferers by that fire.” There is nowhere any intention of a purpose to bestow these gifts upon all the worthy poor of Eastport; and it may fairly be assumed that it was never in their contemplation to create a permanent fund for such public charitable use in that town. The result of these gratuities was to create a private charity for .the benefit of a [425]*425designated class of persons who were already well-known or who wore capable of being readily ascertained. "A good charitable use is 'public’ not in the sense that it must be executed openly and in public, but in the sense of being so general and indefinite in its objects as to be deemed of common and public benefit. . . . It is public in its general scope and purpose, and becomes definite and private only after the individual objects have been selected.” Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 Allen, 456. The essential elements of a public charity are that it is not confined to privileged individuals but is open to the indefinite public. It is this indefinite, unrestricted quality that gives it its public character. Donohugh’s Appeal, 80 Pa. 306; Bangor v. Masonic Lodge, 73 Maine, 428. "Private trusts,” says Mr. Pomeroy, "are . . . for the benefit of certain and designated individuals in which the cestui que trust

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
31 L.R.A. 118, 32 A. 1022, 87 Me. 414, 1895 Me. LEXIS 85, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doyle-v-whalen-me-1895.