[140] OPINION BY Judge PELLEGRINI.
Renee Snizaski (Claimant) appeals from an order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) reversing a grant of counsel fees and a penalty award from the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ).
Claimant is the widow of Randy Snizaski (Decedent). Decedent was employed as a coal mine superintendent for Rox Coal Company (Employer), and on the morning of May 7, 1996, he died in a one-car motor vehicle accident on his way to work. Claimant filed a fatal claim petition alleging that the death of her husband was a compensable event under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).1 The WCJ denied the petition, but on October 21, 1999, the Board reversed the denial of benefits and remanded the case for the computation and award of benefits. On June 13, 2000, the Board ordered Employer to pay Claimant and her four children compensation at a rate of $527.00 per week.2
On July 6, 2000, Employer filed an application for supersedeas with the Board. The Board’s regulations in effect at the time this case was filed required that the petition be filed within 20 days of the Board’s order, and the party opposing a supersedeas had ten days in which to respond to the petition.3 34 Pa.Code §§ 111.22, 111.23.4 The Board was then required by 34 Pa.Code § 111.24(b)5 to render a decision granting or denying su-persedeas within 20 days following the receipt or due date of a claimant’s answer, and if no decision was rendered by that time, the request for supersedeas was deemed denied.6 While the supersedeas request was pending before the Board but after the 30-day time period for payment of an award, Claimant threatened to execute against Employer’s property as allowed under Section 428 of the Act.7 Due [141] to that threat, on July 25, 2000, Employer paid Claimant total back due compensation in the amount of $147,000.00. On July 31, 2000, within the required 20-day time period, the Board denied Employer’s request for supersedeas.8
Because Employer did not pay Claimant within 30 days of the Board’s June 13, 2000 order, on November 13, 2000, Claimant filed a penalty petition alleging that by not paying the award within 30 days, Employer violated Section 428 of the Act. The Employer filed an answer denying the allegation and contending that the payment was not late because, during that period, it had a petition for supersedeas pending, and the Board regulations contemplated that an employer would not make payment within the 30 days provided for in the Act. In any event, it argued that a penalty would not be appropriate because its payment was only 12 days late. Rejecting Employer’s argument, the WCJ granted the petition and awarded Claimant a penalty of $14,771.92 and attorney’s fees of $2,810.80, concluding that a penalty was appropriate because it was not made within the required 30 days and a pending supersedeas did not vitiate that obligation.9 On appeal, the Board reversed both the penalty award and grant of attorney’s fees, reasoning that Employer had no obligation to pay while its supersedeas request was still pending before the Board. This appeal followed.10
The issue in this case then is whether the WCJ committed an abuse of discretion when he awarded penalties for a 12-day delay in payment when that payment was made within the period envisioned by the Board’s own supersedeas regulations.
Claimant contends that the Board erred in reversing the WCJ’s award of a penalty and attorney’s fees because the filing of an appeal and a request for supersedeas is not sufficient to suspend Employer’s obligation to pay benefits under the Act. She argues that under the Act, where an employer does not pay an award within 30 days of the date on which its obligation to pay arose, a violation of the Act has occurred. Section 428 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 921.11 In support of her position, she cites Hoover v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (ABF Freight Systems), 820 A.2d 843 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), where we held [142] that a WCJ did not abuse his ■ or her discretion by awarding penalties for an employer’s delay in making payment of an award in excess of 30 days just because a request for supersedeas was pending. In Hoover, an award was paid 36 days after the Board’s decision to award payments. Like here, a request for supersedeas was pending before the Board. Again, like in this case, the claimant filed a penalty petition contending that because payment was not made within 30 days, an award of penalties was appropriate which a WCJ granted. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirmed the award of penalties because not paying the award within 30 days was in violation of the Act and employer’s request for a supersedeas did not suspend that obligation. Because Section 430(b) of the Act12 authorizes the imposition of penalties pursuant to Section 435 of the. Act when an employer refuses to pay benefits provided for in an order without filing a petition and being granted a supersedeas, we held that it was appropriate for the WCJ to impose penalties in Hoover.13
Not disputing that Hoover14 controls, Employer and the Board contend that it was wrongly decided and should be reversed. They argue that even though a penalty is authorized by the Act where payment is not made within 30 days, the imposition of a penalty is at the discretion of the WCJ, and penalties are not required to be awarded even if a violation of the Act is apparent on the record. Galloway v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Pennsylvania State Police), 756 A.2d 1209 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000). They contend that it is an abuse of discretion for a WCJ to award penalties where an employer was merely following the Board’s supersedeas regulations because the regulations anticipate that an employer’s obligation to pay is stayed while the petition for supersedeas is being processed by the Board.
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[140] OPINION BY Judge PELLEGRINI.
Renee Snizaski (Claimant) appeals from an order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) reversing a grant of counsel fees and a penalty award from the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ).
Claimant is the widow of Randy Snizaski (Decedent). Decedent was employed as a coal mine superintendent for Rox Coal Company (Employer), and on the morning of May 7, 1996, he died in a one-car motor vehicle accident on his way to work. Claimant filed a fatal claim petition alleging that the death of her husband was a compensable event under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).1 The WCJ denied the petition, but on October 21, 1999, the Board reversed the denial of benefits and remanded the case for the computation and award of benefits. On June 13, 2000, the Board ordered Employer to pay Claimant and her four children compensation at a rate of $527.00 per week.2
On July 6, 2000, Employer filed an application for supersedeas with the Board. The Board’s regulations in effect at the time this case was filed required that the petition be filed within 20 days of the Board’s order, and the party opposing a supersedeas had ten days in which to respond to the petition.3 34 Pa.Code §§ 111.22, 111.23.4 The Board was then required by 34 Pa.Code § 111.24(b)5 to render a decision granting or denying su-persedeas within 20 days following the receipt or due date of a claimant’s answer, and if no decision was rendered by that time, the request for supersedeas was deemed denied.6 While the supersedeas request was pending before the Board but after the 30-day time period for payment of an award, Claimant threatened to execute against Employer’s property as allowed under Section 428 of the Act.7 Due [141] to that threat, on July 25, 2000, Employer paid Claimant total back due compensation in the amount of $147,000.00. On July 31, 2000, within the required 20-day time period, the Board denied Employer’s request for supersedeas.8
Because Employer did not pay Claimant within 30 days of the Board’s June 13, 2000 order, on November 13, 2000, Claimant filed a penalty petition alleging that by not paying the award within 30 days, Employer violated Section 428 of the Act. The Employer filed an answer denying the allegation and contending that the payment was not late because, during that period, it had a petition for supersedeas pending, and the Board regulations contemplated that an employer would not make payment within the 30 days provided for in the Act. In any event, it argued that a penalty would not be appropriate because its payment was only 12 days late. Rejecting Employer’s argument, the WCJ granted the petition and awarded Claimant a penalty of $14,771.92 and attorney’s fees of $2,810.80, concluding that a penalty was appropriate because it was not made within the required 30 days and a pending supersedeas did not vitiate that obligation.9 On appeal, the Board reversed both the penalty award and grant of attorney’s fees, reasoning that Employer had no obligation to pay while its supersedeas request was still pending before the Board. This appeal followed.10
The issue in this case then is whether the WCJ committed an abuse of discretion when he awarded penalties for a 12-day delay in payment when that payment was made within the period envisioned by the Board’s own supersedeas regulations.
Claimant contends that the Board erred in reversing the WCJ’s award of a penalty and attorney’s fees because the filing of an appeal and a request for supersedeas is not sufficient to suspend Employer’s obligation to pay benefits under the Act. She argues that under the Act, where an employer does not pay an award within 30 days of the date on which its obligation to pay arose, a violation of the Act has occurred. Section 428 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 921.11 In support of her position, she cites Hoover v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (ABF Freight Systems), 820 A.2d 843 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), where we held [142] that a WCJ did not abuse his ■ or her discretion by awarding penalties for an employer’s delay in making payment of an award in excess of 30 days just because a request for supersedeas was pending. In Hoover, an award was paid 36 days after the Board’s decision to award payments. Like here, a request for supersedeas was pending before the Board. Again, like in this case, the claimant filed a penalty petition contending that because payment was not made within 30 days, an award of penalties was appropriate which a WCJ granted. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirmed the award of penalties because not paying the award within 30 days was in violation of the Act and employer’s request for a supersedeas did not suspend that obligation. Because Section 430(b) of the Act12 authorizes the imposition of penalties pursuant to Section 435 of the. Act when an employer refuses to pay benefits provided for in an order without filing a petition and being granted a supersedeas, we held that it was appropriate for the WCJ to impose penalties in Hoover.13
Not disputing that Hoover14 controls, Employer and the Board contend that it was wrongly decided and should be reversed. They argue that even though a penalty is authorized by the Act where payment is not made within 30 days, the imposition of a penalty is at the discretion of the WCJ, and penalties are not required to be awarded even if a violation of the Act is apparent on the record. Galloway v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Pennsylvania State Police), 756 A.2d 1209 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000). They contend that it is an abuse of discretion for a WCJ to award penalties where an employer was merely following the Board’s supersedeas regulations because the regulations anticipate that an employer’s obligation to pay is stayed while the petition for supersedeas is being processed by the Board.
In Candito, we addressed whether penalties should be imposed while an employer’s request for supersedeas was pending, albeit before this Court. At issue in that case was whether it was an abuse of discretion not to award penalties where payment was not made with the 30-day time period when the Board had denied the supersedeas request but then this Court had ultimately granted it. In holding that it was not an abuse of discretion, we noted that to award penalties where an employer expeditiously filed a request for a superse-deas, the Board’s own regulations reasonably allowed it to file its order denying or allowing the supersedeas bequest within 20 days after the 30 days for payment was to commence. We then stated that, “[t]o [143] hold that an employer is hable for penalties for not paying compensation when its request for supersedeas is pending is, in effect, to make an employer’s right to seek a supersedeas in most instances a nullity.” Candito, 785 A.2d at 1110.15 Because the Board has promulgated regulations that, in effect, purport to stay an employer’s obligation to pay when a proper request for a supersedeas has been filed and, in Candi-to, the employer was merely following those regulations, it was an abuse of discretion for the WCJ in that case to award penalties for the period in which a request for supersedeas was pending before the Board.
In accord with Candito, we agree that our decision in Hoover should be overruled because we failed to adequately focus on the fact that Employer was merely following the Board’s duly promulgated regulations when it failed to pay within the 30-day time period of the Act. Because the Board’s own regulations provided that Employer’s obligation to pay was, in effect, stayed, it was an abuse of discretion for the WCJ to award penalties for the period during which the supersedeas was being processed.
Accordingly, the decision of the Board is affirmed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 19th day of March, 2004, the order of the Workers’ Compensátion Appeal Board at No. A01-1460 dated December 20, 2002, is affirmed.
FRIEDMAN, J., dissented and filed opinion.