Smith v. United States

165 Ct. Cl. 233, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 76, 1964 WL 8541
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMarch 13, 1964
DocketNo. 203-59
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 165 Ct. Cl. 233 (Smith v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 233, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 76, 1964 WL 8541 (cc 1964).

Opinion

Per Curiam :

Plaintiff sues to recover the costs he incurred in returning himself, his family, and his household furnishings to the United States from a foreign-duty post. The costs followed plaintiff’s voluntary resignation from his position to accept a position in private employment.

The facts and pertinent parts of the regulations are set out in detail in the findings of fact submitted by the trial commissioner, which findings we have approved and make the findings of the court.

Briefly, the issue arises in this way. In 1943, plaintiff was employed by the OfB.ce of Education, Federal Security Agency, and served in several capacities; for the most part in Washington, D.C., although his duties occasionally entailed travel to points outside the United States.

On June 24, 1952, plaintiff became separated from the Federal Security Agency in order to transfer to the Department of State. He accepted a position in the Division of Foreign Service Personnel under an indefinite appointment to serve as Program Officer in Baghdad, Iraq. The minimum duration of a tour of duty was, in the absence of special agreement at the time of assignment, 2 years from the date of the employee’s arrival at the post.

Plaintiff’s initial tour of duty in the Baghdad post expired on July 30,1954, although he might have remained at that post for an additional tour or tours of duty.

However, prior to the expiration of his initial tour of duty in Baghdad, plaintiff concluded that he did not wish to remain at this post beyond the minimum expiration date of this tour. He was especially dissatisfied with the educational facilities available for his sons, and, primarily in the interests of his sons’ education, wanted to return to the United States. He indicated his desire for a suitable position with [235]*235the staff of the Foreign Operations Administration in Washington, D.C.

About the middle of May 1954, the Foreign Operations Administration in Washington authorized the Baghdad Mission to issue travel orders to the plaintiff in accordance with his request. Such orders were issued July 21,1954, for plaintiff’s “transfer” to Washington, D.C. These orders authorized the transportation for plaintiff and his three dependents, as well as the shipment of plaintiff’s automobile and the family’s household effects. However, plaintiff sold his automobile locally, and arranged for passage for himself and family, and caused his household furnishings to be packed and made ready for shipment. On July 28, 1954, 2 days before plaintiff was scheduled to depart, the Foreign Operations Administration cabled plaintiff an offer of an assignment in Beirut.

Although plaintiff was interested, the offer came too close to his scheduled departure date, all arrangements having been made by then for return to the United States, including the relinquishment of the lease of the house he had occupied. Plaintiff at the time was uncertain whether the educational facilities in Beirut for his sons would, be satisfactory. Plaintiff and his family left Baghdad on July 31, 1954, as originally scheduled. His household furnishings were shipped at defendant’s expense to Washington, D.C.

Upon his return to Washington, plaintiff was given a temporary assignment as a consultant on the Iraq program and budget. During this period, plaintiff, still persisting in his desire for relocation to Washington, discussed with various officials of the Foreign Operations Administration the possibility of being appointed to the Washington staff of that agency. However, at that time there was no suitable position within the agency in plaintiff’s field of specialization. Plaintiff then accepted the assignment to Beirut.

Plaintiff stated that he desired to ship his automobile and household effects to Beirut at defendant’s expense. This presented a problem to the agency. Ordinarily, in transferring a foreign service officer from one post to another, defendant simply paid the transportation from the old to the new assignment. The agency officials finally concluded, how[236]*236ever, under what was considered to be the proper interpretation of the applicable statutes and regulations, that since the effects had now been shipped from the Baghdad assignment to Washington, D.C., they could not now be shipped from Washington to the second post if plaintiff’s service was considered as a continuing one. They felt that a foreign service employee was entitled to have only one shipment of his household effects at Government expense from Washington, D.C., to an overseas post and return; and that the return shipment takes place at the termination of service as a foreign service employee. Transportation had already been furnished for such shipment to and back from Baghdad, and the agency was being asked to make another shipment to Beirut, and then back from Beirut again upon the completion of the second tour.

The Director of Personnel concluded that the only possible way to accomplish what the regional operations officers desired was to have plaintiff separated from the agency and thus terminate his status as a foreign service employee. Immediately thereafter the plaintiff was to receive a new appointment and assignment to the Beirut post. The forms, however, included the words “without break in service” and “continuous service.” This was done for such purposes as annual leave, sick leave, and retirement benefits. This would enable annual leave to be transferred.

There was no understanding between plaintiff and any agency official that these phrases on the form were intended to mean anything else. At the time of plaintiff’s assignment to the Beirut post, it was his intention to remain there for the full 2 years, and the agency officials expected him to. serve at least for such period of time.

In the absence of special agreement at the time of assignment, the minimum duration of a tour of duty was 2 years from the date of the employee’s arrival at the post.

On February 17,1956, about 9 months prior to the scheduled completion date of plaintiff’s 2-year tour of duty in Beirut, he was offered a non-Government position in Washington, D.C. He delayed accepting the offer for a short time in an effort to ascertain whether the defendant could be induced to pay the expenses of his return prior to the expira[237]*237tion of a minimum normal tour of duty. In the meantime, he was offered a position with the agency in Washington. This he declined since he desired to resume his university teaching, in which line of work he had been engaged prior to his entering Government service. Plaintiff returned to Washington with his family and his effects, the transportation costs of which he personally paid. He sought reimbursement for the expenses thus incurred. Upon his return to Washington, he was employed by the National Education Association.

We here quote from finding 15 the following, which we think disposes of the issue involved in this case:

Since it was generally understood that the service of such a full 2-year foreign tour of duty was a prerequisite to the return of the employee, his family, and household effects at defendant’s expense, an appointment with the right reserved in the employee to serve less than 2 years and still have such transportation expenses defrayed by defendant would, in accordance with standard administrative practice, have such right specifically reflected in the appointment papers.

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Related

Trifunovich v. United States
196 Ct. Cl. 301 (Court of Claims, 1971)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
165 Ct. Cl. 233, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 76, 1964 WL 8541, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-united-states-cc-1964.