Smith v. United States

151 Ct. Cl. 205, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 151, 1960 WL 8450
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedNovember 2, 1960
DocketNo. 261-55
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 151 Ct. Cl. 205 (Smith v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 205, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 151, 1960 WL 8450 (cc 1960).

Opinion

Labamokb, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, an employee in the classified civil service and entitled to veterans’ preference, was separated from his grade GS-12 position with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as the result of a reduction in force. His claim is founded upon an alleged violation of the procedural guarantees of the Veterans’ Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. 863, the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, 5 CFR (1952 Supp.) 20.5, and upon the alleged arbitrary and capricious action of the officials of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in abolishing plaintiff’s position and reassigning him to the same abolished position in order to effect a wrongful separation under the guise of a reduction in force.

The questions presented are: (1) Were the actions of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation officials in abolishing plaintiff’s position, reassigning him to the same abolished position and then separating him in a reduction in force, arbitrary, capricious and in bad faith; (2) were any of the procedural requirements of the Veterans’ Preference Act or of the regulations of the Civil Service Commission promulgated thereunder violated, making the civil service review improper because it was based upon a finding that plaintiff was “* * * considered for and made an offer of reassignment to another position * * which statement was in error.

At all times plaintiff was given an efficiency or performance rating of either “good” or “satisfactory.” Never was plaintiff notified of any action, nor was any action taken to separate him for inefficiency.

On May 31,1945, plaintiff transferred from the Treasury Department, Procurement Division, to the Foreign Economic Administration in the position of buyer, CAF-12. Plaintiff’s division and function in the Foreign Economic Administration was transferred by Executive Order to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation on October 20, 1945.

Upon his entry to duty with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation plaintiff was assigned to the U.S. Commercial Company as a buyer at Reconstruction Finance Corporation Agency grade 15. On July 1,1946, under a pay adjustment plaintiff was arbitrarily reclassified to Reconstruction Finance Corporation Agency grade 14, with no immediate [208]*208resulting loss of pay. On March 23, 1947, plaintiff was reassigned from the U.S. Commercial Company to the Agency Division of Eeconstruction Finance Corporation as an examiner, grade 14. Plaintiff’s Eeconstruction Finance Corporation Agency grade was converted to Classification Act grade GS-12, on October 30,1949.

On April 16, 1950, plaintiff was reassigned from the position of examiner in the Agency Divison to the grade GS-12 position of cost analyst, PE-439, in the Office of Production, Synthetic Eubber Division, Production Branch, Production Control Section of Eeconstruction Finance Corporation in Washington, D.C.

This position was established by the Production Control Section as a new position and designated with the Civil Service Occupational Series Designation 501. There was no civil service standard published or written for this particular position which served as a guide to enable Eeconstruction Finance Corporation to classify plaintiff’s position as series 501.

Every person in the branch who was directly involved in the cost analysis function was given a reduction in force notice and either separated or reassigned to a new position except plaintiff. Had plaintiff been given the same treatment as other employees, the opportunity to be considered for reassignment to another position in the same or lower level in the Comptroller’s Office to which the Eeconstruction Finance Corporation’s function was transferred, would have been accorded him. Instead, plaintiff was reassigned and retained in an identical position to the one which had just been abolished by the reduction-in-force action. This placed plaintiff in the absurd position of having only himself to compete with in any future reduction in force.

Since the separating officials of the Eeconstruction Finance Corporation took the position that plaintiff’s assigned job had been abolished, no work was assigned him. As a matter of fact, plaintiff’s desk was even removed and relocated on a different floor in a different office. When plaintiff complained of this action, he was told by the Director of Personnel that arrangements were being made to put him in another job. Instead, on June 4, 1953, plaintiff was given [209]*209a notice of proposed separation through reduction in force. Effective July 6,1953, plaintiff was separated from the rolls of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in spite of the fact that plaintiff had 19 and one-half years of Government service.

When the circumstances of plaintiff’s separation are coupled with the testimony of William Carley Fisher, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation’s Director of Personnel, to the effect that everybody who ever had supervision of plaintiff wanted to get rid of him, we are compelled to the conclusion that plantiff was a victim of a scheme to ultimately achieve that end by abolishing his position and still retaining him in the abolished position.

An employee with 19 and one-half years of Government service with a rating at all times of either “good” or “satisfactory” is entitled to better and different treatment. Thus we must conclude that the action of the officials in transferring plaintiff to an abolished position was arbitrary and capricious and in bad faith.

Plaintiff further contends that in his appeal to the Civil Service Commission he detailed all the facts of his 1952 assignment, pointing out how these resulted in too narrow a competitive group. The decision of the Appeals Examining Office of the Commission, dated February 16,1954, failed to consider this contention, and the decision of the Commission’s Board of Appeals and Review affirming the above found, among other things, “* * * that you (plaintiff) were considered for and made an offer of reassignment to another position on the basis of your qualifications and experience.”

The Commission’s regulations, 5 CFR (1952 Supp.) 20.5 (b) (2) and (d) require such offers of reassignment and have the binding effect and force of law. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363.

The record, however, conclusively shows that no such offer of reassignment was ever made1 and this failure constitutes [210]*210a violation of the Veterans’ Preference Act and the Civil Service regulations. Since plaintiff’s discharge was not consistent with the regulations, he was not validly separated, and recovery of back pay must follow. Crocker v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 567; Knotts v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 489; Stringer v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 30.

Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to recover his back pay from July 6, 1953, the date of separation, to date of judgment, at the rate of pay he was receiving on the date of discharge, together with legislative and periodic step increases provided by law and regulations, less any outside earnings. Crocker v. United States, supra; McGuire v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 17; Harris v. United States, 149 Ct. Cl. 15.

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Bluebook (online)
151 Ct. Cl. 205, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 151, 1960 WL 8450, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-united-states-cc-1960.