Baldwin v. United States

175 Ct. Cl. 264, 1966 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 281, 1966 WL 8863
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 15, 1966
DocketNo. 300-64
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 175 Ct. Cl. 264 (Baldwin v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baldwin v. United States, 175 Ct. Cl. 264, 1966 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 281, 1966 WL 8863 (cc 1966).

Opinion

Jones, Senior Judge,

delivered the opinion of tbe court:

Plaintiff is a clerk-stenographer who was separated from her grade GS-4 position with the Norfolk, Virginia, facility of the Federal Aviation Agency (hereinafter “FAA”) on August 29,1963, because of a reduction in force. At the time of her discharge plaintiff was a non-veteran career civil servant who had been in the position she then held for 4% years. In this suit plaintiff asserts that her dismissal was arbitrary [266]*266and contrary to law, and claims judgment against tbe Government for her loss of pay.

The August 1963 reduction in force at Norfolk was the end result of a program by the FAA to phase out and consolidate nine Air Traffic Control Centers. The FAA facility at Norfolk, prior to this consolidation, performed a dual operation: (1) control of aircraft operations to and from local airports via the local control tower, and (2) control and guidance of aircraft enroute between airports other than the local Norfolk airfields, i.e., an Air Eoute Traffic Control Center. These two missions were performed by a combined Center/Tower; the controlling being done by a number of employees who were called Air Traffic Controllers.1

The consolidation affected only the Air Boute mission of the Norfolk Center/Tower. The FAA decided to combine this mission with the Washington Air Boute Center at Lees-burg, Virginia. Both of these facilities were located within Begion 1 of the FAA which included the eastern seaboard States from Virginia northward. This consolidation caused the control of all enroute traffic in the general area of Maryland, Virginia, eastern West Virginia, and eastern North Carolina to be centralized in one place — Leesburg, Virginia. However, all local air controlling was left with the various local towers and so the Norfolk facility retained its local control tower mission.

The Leesburg, Virginia, consolidation required many of the Norfolk air controllers to be transferred to Leesburg. The rest remained at Norfolk to conduct local tower operations. The FAA determined which air controllers would be transferred by applying a retention-point system. No administrative or clerical personnel were transferred. The reduced staff of air controllers remaining at Norfolk, however, caused a lessening of the overall administrative and clerical workload. This is what led to plaintiff’s discharge.

At the time of this consolidation there were three individ[267]*267uals at Norfolk performing the administrative and clerical duties for the combined Center/Tower. The senior position in this category was that of Administrative Assistant, a grade GS-7, occupied by Mrs. Reece. The two other positions were a grade GS-5, Secretary (Stenographer), occupied by Mrs. Loher, and a grade GS-4, Clerk-Stenographer, occupied by the plaintiff. The Administrative Assistant was responsible for the administration, housekeeping and personnel functions necessary to the operation of the Norfolk ■facility. The duties of the two stenographers included taking dictation, maintaining files, reading and routing mail, and other normal secretarial functions.

As a result of the relocation and decreased workload at Norfolk tower, the position of Administrative Assistant was abolished. Under applicable reduction-in-force procedures, the Administrative Assistant was permitted to retreat to the GS-5 Secretary (Stenographer) position, and the latter was in turn allowed to retreat to the GS-4 Clerk-Stenographer position held by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had fewer retention points than either of these other two individuals. Since there were no other suitable vacancies for the plaintiff in the local commuting area to which she possessed retreat rights, she was separated by reduction in force on August 29,1963.

On October 23,1963, the Regional Office of the Civil Service Commission, after a full and complete investigation of the matter here in dispute, denied plaintiff’s appeal. This decision was upheld by the Board of Appeals and Review on May 7,1964, after a further investigation of the case. The Civil Service Commission sustained this decision on August 12,1964, and suit was instituted in this court on September 10, 1964 for loss of pay due to the alleged unlawful separation.

In challenging her separation, the plaintiff does not allege any procedural violations. The required 30 days’ notice was given and all appeal rights have been granted. What the plaintiff does allege as grounds for recovery is that the FAA violated its own regulations and those of the Civil Service Commission in separating her, and also that these regulations were arbitrarily applied. If either of these two allegations [268]*268cab. be substantiated by tibe plaintiff, then ber separation was unlawful and sbe must be awarded ber lost pay. Smith v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 205 (1960).

Tbe plaintiff bases ber contention on two grounds: (1) That tbe relocation of tbe enroute mission from tbe Norfolk Center/Tower to Leesburg was a transfer of function as defined in tbe applicable Civil Service Regulations and that tbe position of Administrative Assistant was identified with this function and should have been transferred to Leesburg with tbe enroute function. Tbe Administrative Assistant could therefore not have set off the chain reaction at Norfolk thait caused plaintiff to lose her j ob. (2) That tbe position of Administrative Assistant is not one of tbe “general clerical, typists, or other positions which traditionally have been filled on a local basis * * *”2 and so is not in tbe same competitive area with tbe two stenographic positions at Norfoik. Rather, tbe Administrative Assistant is allegedly included within: tbe broad general competitive area in FAA Region 1 which includes all employees except “general clerical, typists, * * Therefore, since one cannot normally exercise retreat rights outside his or ber competitive area, plaintiff contends that even if Mrs. Reece did not have to relocate to Leesburg, she should not have been allowed to retreat to the stenographic position. The plaintiff would therefore still have her job since both stenographic positions remained intact after the reduction in force at Norfolk. Plaintiff therefore contends that the FAA acted arbitrarily [269]*269and contrary to its own regulations in separating her from her position.

Turning to plaintiff’s first contention, the applicable Civil Service Regulations, Part 20, entitled “Retention Preference Regulations For Use In Reduction In Force [Revised],” 5 C.F.R. (January 1,1963 supp.), define a transfer of function as meaning “the transfer of the performance of a continuing function from, one competitiva area and its addition to one or more other competitive areas, or the movement of the competitive area in which the function is performed to another commuting area.” [Emphasis added.] § 20.103(b). Plaintiff argues that the relocation of the Norfolk enroute mission to Leesburg falls within this definition of a transfer of function and that for this reason section 20.303(g) should have been applied to the reduction in force. It provides, in part, that:

Before any reduction in force is made in connection with the transfer of any or all of the functions of an agency to another continuing agency, all competing employees in positions identified with such function or functions shall be transferred to such continuing agency * * *. [Emphasis added.]

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Bluebook (online)
175 Ct. Cl. 264, 1966 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 281, 1966 WL 8863, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baldwin-v-united-states-cc-1966.