Smith v. O'Malley

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedAugust 7, 2024
Docket7:23-cv-00228
StatusUnknown

This text of Smith v. O'Malley (Smith v. O'Malley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. O'Malley, (W.D. Va. 2024).

Opinion

CLERK'S OFFICE U.S. DISTRICT COURT AT ROANOKE, VA IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Au eto □□□□ FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA LAURA AUSTIN. CLERK ROANOKE DIVISION BY: s/ M.Poff, Deputy Clerk ANGELA S.,! ) ) Civil Action No. 7:23-CV-00228 Plaintiff, ) ) Vv. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ) MARTIN O’MALLEY,? ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) By: C. Kailani Memmer ) United States Magistrate Judge Defendant. )

Plaintiff Angela S. (“Angela”) filed this action challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) finding her not disabled and therefore ineligible for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act (“Act”). 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433, 1381-1383f. This case is before me by referral pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). I now submit the following report and recommended disposition. Neither party has requested oral argument; therefore, this case is ripe for decision. For the reasons detailed below, I recommend the presiding District Judge DENY Angela’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 12, GRANT the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 15, AFFIRM the Commissioner’s final decision, and DISMISS this case from the Court’s active docket.

' Due to privacy concerns, I use only the first name and last initial of the claimant in social security opinions. > Martin O’Malley became the Commissioner of Social Security on December 20, 2023. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Martin O’Malley should be substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi as the defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

STANDARD OF REVIEW The court limits its review to a determination of whether substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s conclusion that Angela failed to demonstrate that she was disabled under the Act.3 Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it

consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal citations and alterations omitted); see also Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (emphasizing that the standard for substantial evidence “is not high”). “In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court should not] undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d at 589). Nevertheless, the court “must not abdicate [its] traditional functions,” and it “cannot escape [its] duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are rational.” Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). The

final decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed where substantial evidence supports the decision. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F. 2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In contrast, remand is appropriate if the ALJ’s analysis is so deficient that it “frustrate[s] meaningful review.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that “remand is necessary” where the court is “left to guess [at] how the ALJ arrived at his conclusions”). The ALJ

3 The Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period for not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Disability under the Act requires showing more than the fact that the claimant suffers from an impairment which affects her ability to perform daily activities or certain forms of work; instead, a claimant must show that her impairments prevent her from engaging in all forms of substantial gainful employment given her age, education, and work experience. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2), 1382c(a)(3)(B). must sufficiently articulate his findings such that the district court can undertake meaningful review. See Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2016).

CLAIM HISTORY On December 31, 2020, Angela filed an application for DIB, alleging disability starting on

October 30, 2015. R. 189–91. On March 31, 2021, she filed an application for SSI, also alleging disability starting on October 15, 2015. R. 194–99. The Commissioner denied Angela’s claim initially and on reconsideration. R. 110, 129. On January 21, 2022, Angela requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). R. 141. On July 7, 2022, Angela appeared before ALJ David Lewandowski by telephone. R. 37–64. Angela amended her alleged onset date to July 25, 2018. R. 41. Robert Lester testified at the hearing as an impartial vocational expert. R. 61–63. On August 25, 2022, the ALJ entered a decision analyzing Angela’s claims under the familiar five- step process4 and denying her request for benefits. R. 15–32. At the first step, the ALJ found that Angela had not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since July 25, 2018, the alleged onset date. R. 21. At the second step, the ALJ found that Angela has the following severe impairments: supraventricular tachycardia (“SVT”), obesity, and edema of the ankles and feet. Id.

4 The five-step process to evaluate a disability claim requires the Commissioner to ask, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) is working; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment; (4) can return to her past relevant work; and if not, (5) whether she can perform other work. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 654 n.1 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R.§ 404.1520); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-62, 103 S. Ct. 1952, 76 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1983). The inquiry ceases if the Commissioner finds the claimant disabled at any step of the process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four to establish a prima facie case for disability.

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Bluebook (online)
Smith v. O'Malley, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-omalley-vawd-2024.