Smith v. Miller

514 P.2d 377, 213 Kan. 1, 1973 Kan. LEXIS 590

• Court: Supreme Court of Kansas
• Decided: September 11, 1973
• Docket: 47,028
• Status: Published

Opinions

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Harman, C.:

Gary L. Smith, a student, was expelled from school by the board of education of Unified School District No. 259, Sedgwick county. Upon judicial review the expulsion was upheld and Gary brings the matter here. Primarily, procedural defects are urged upon appeal.

Brief review of the facts and administrative proceedings should first be made.

On September 11, 1972, four separate assaults upon students occurred in and about the hallways of Wichita West High School. Three of the persons assaulted came either to the school office or the nurse’s office to report the assaults and to obtain medical treatment. None of these three could identify his assailant. The fourth student assaulted was Martin W. Clemence. The attack upon him was reported the next morning when his mother telephoned the principal. Later Martin told the principal he knew his assailant by sight but not by name and that the same person had assaulted him the year before. Martin identified a picture of Gary L. Smith which appeared in the 1971-1972 school annual as that of his assailant. The picture was a one inch square photograph of Gary. Gary had been suspended twice for assaults during the 1971-1972 school year, the first coming in the second week of school and the second occurring in February after his readmission for the second semester.

Martin indicated to school authorities that he preferred not to testify in person. Accordingly an affidavit stating the essentials of the assault was prepared, which Martin signed. The affidavit stated that Martin encountered a group of seven to ten black students as he was walking through a corridor. While going through the group he was “hit by a fist on the right side of [his] face.” The affidavit concluded with this paragraph:

“3. I recognized my assailant, but did not know him by name until I went to the office of the principal of West High School and positively identified Gary Smith as the assailant from looking at the School Annual. Likewise, I am sure that he is the one that assaulted me last year. There is no question in my mind when reviewing the photographs that Gary Smith was my assailant.”

On September 12, 1972, the principal addressed the following letter to Gary’s parents:

“This is to inform you that your son, Gary Smith, has been suspended from Wichita High School West for gross misconduct.

“I am also recommending that Gary be expelled for the remainder of the school year. A hearing has been set by Mr. Jim Gates, Director of Pupil Adjustment, Educational Services Building, Room 101, 640 North Emporia, Monday, September 18, 1972, at 10:00 a. m. You are invited to attend this hearing if you so desire. The hearing will be conducted by Mr. Gates or a committee of certified employees which he may appoint. Whether or not Gary is to return to school will be determined at this hearing. He may not return to school under any circumstances until after the hearing.

“We are enclosing a copy of the regulations of the Board of Education covering school procedure, as well as a copy of Chapter 300, 1970 Session, Laws of Kansas.

“Please contact the school office (267-8361) if you have any questions.”

A hearing on the matter was held September 18, 1972, before Examiner Gates, who was coordinator of the department of pupil welfare and attendance for the board of education. Gary and his mother were present but were not represented by counsel. The examiner had before him Martin’s affidavit and the principal’s testimony as to Martin’s identification. Gary’s mother voiced complaints that the key witness against him was not present at the hearing.

On September 20, 1972, the examiner approved and adopted the recommendation to expel Gary and so advised Gary’s parents by letter. His report contained no finding as to whether or not Gary should be permitted to return to school pending any appeal or during the time allowed for notice of appeal.

Gary, through counsel, appealed to the board of education and requested permission to return to school pending the appeal. On October 3, 1972, the examiner wrote a letter to Gary’s parents indicating he should be returned to school and recommending his attendance at the Metro Program for the remainder of the semester. Gary declined this program because it was not a regular school with a normal curriculum and he would also have a transportation problem.

October 12, 1972, Gary’s appeal was heard by a hearing officer appointed by the board. At this hearing, which was de novo, the principal and the examiner testified, and Martin W. Clemence’s affidavit as well was offered, in behalf of expulsion. Gary testified in his own behalf. He stated he was in the hall at Wichita West en route to his loclcer on the afternoon in question when he saw a student being struck; he did not think the student looked at him after he was hit; Gary stated he did not strike anyone that afternoon; he was about five or six feet away when the assault occurred; possibly more than seven boys could have been involved in the assault; he did not know the boy who did the striking and had never seen him before; he knew by name only two of the boys who were involved. Gary stated he was accompanied in the hall by a friend. This friend testified and generally corroborated Gary’s statements.

Other testimony received at this hearing will be alluded to in connection with the points raised on appeal.

During the hearing the issue of confrontation and cross-examination of the witness against him was raised on behalf of Gary and inquiry was made as to whether the hearing officer would issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses. Request was again made for Gary’s reinstatement pending final determination.

The hearing officer promptly prepared a written report containing her findings and a recommendation that Gary be expelled for the 1972-1973 school year, which recommendation was approved and adopted by the board on October 16, 1972.

Immediately, appeal to the district court was taken pursuant to K. S. A. 60-2101 (a). There additional pleadings were filed in which Gary asserted violation of his rights to due process in the actions taken and he also challenged the constitutionality of certain parts of the Kansas statutes pertaining to school expulsion. He requested injunctive and declaratory relief.

The trial court heard the appeal October 20, 1972, and held that the challenged statutes were constitutional, that Gary had been afforded procedural due process throughout, and there was substantial evidence to support the board’s ruling. Relief was denied and the matter is here for review. Although in a sense the case is moot in that the school term for which appellant was expelled ended prior to its submission to this court, despite accelerated action at most stages, nonetheless the appeal will be entertained since a real controversy existed and declaratory relief was sought which included the construction, validity and constitutionality of statutes of statewide interest and importance.

We shall refer to the defendant school board and its members simply as appellees.

At this point mention should be made of legislation enacted in 1970 which as amended now appears as K. S. A. Chapter 72, Article 89, entitled Suspension and Expulsion of Pupils. The first section, K. S. A. 72-8901, provides that a public school board or certain of its designated employees may suspend or expel a pupil guilty of particular- misconduct. Grounds specified for such action include conduct which substantially disrupts, impedes or interferes with the operation of a school and conduct which substantially impinges upon or invades the rights of others.

K. S. A. 72-8902 establishes a procedure for the administration of three types of disciplinary action: (1) Short term suspension of not to exceed five days in which there is no entitlement to a hearing; (2) extended term suspension for more than five days but not beyond the current school semester, in which a hearing must be afforded the student or his parents or guardians; and (3) expulsion but not beyond the current school year, in which a hearing likewise must be afforded. This section further provides:

“(a) . . . In all cases wherein a pupil or student might be suspended for an extended term or might be expelled, he shall first be suspended for a short term. A written notice of any short term suspension and the reason therefor shall be given to the pupil or student involved and to his parents or guardians within twenty-four (24) hours after such suspension has been imposed. A written notice of any proposal to suspend for an extended term or to expel and the charges upon, which the same is based shall be given to the pupil or student proposed to be suspended or expelled and to his parents or guardians within forty-eight (48) hours after the pupil or student has had imposed a short term suspension. Any such notice of a proposal to suspend for an extended term or to expel shall state the time, date and place that the pupil or student will be afforded a hearing, and such date shall be not later than the last day of the short term suspension of such pupil or student. . . .

“(c) Whenever any such hearing results in suspension for an extended term or expulsion, the person or committee conducting such hearing may make a finding that return to classes by such student or pupil, pending any appeal or during the period allowed for notice of appeal, is not reasonably anticipated to cause continuing repeated material disorder, disruption or interference with the operation of any public school or substantial and material impingement upon or invasion of the rights of others, in which case such student or pupil may return to his regular classes until the period for filing a notice if appeal has expired with no such notice filed, or until the determination of any such appeal if a notice of appeal is filed. Whenever the person or committee conducting such a hearing fails to make the findings specified in this subsection, the report of the hearing shall provide that the suspension shall continue until appeal therefrom is determined or until the period of suspension or expulsion has expired, whichever is the sooner.”

K. S. A. 72-8903 provides:

“The hearing provided for in K. S. A. 1970 Supp. 72-8902 shall be conducted in accordance with regulations relating thereto adopted by the board of education. Such regulations shall afford procedural due process, including the following:

“(a) The right of the student or pupil to have counsel of his own choice present and to receive the advice of such counsel or other person whom he may select, and

“(b) the right of the parents or guardians of the student or pupil to be present at the hearing, and

“(c) the right of the student or pupil and Ins counsel or advisor to hear or read a full report of testimony of witnesses against him, and

“(d) the right of student or pupil to present his own witnesses in person or their testimony by affidavit, and

“(e) the right of the student or pupil to testify in Iris own behalf and give reasons for his conduct, and

“(f) the right of the student or pupil to have an orderly hearing, and

“(g) the right of the student or pupil to a fair and impartial decision based on substantial evidence. . . .”

K. S. A. 72-8904 provides that any pupil or student who has been suspended for a long term or expelled may appeal such action to the board of education. Such an appeal is to be conducted under rules consonant with K. S. A. 72-8903 and may be heard either by the board or by a hearing officer appointed by it (a member of the board or a certificated employee of the school district). If the appeal is heard by a hearing officer, such person is required to make written report to the board, which then determines the appeal, with or without additional hearing.

K. S. A. 72-8906 authorizes any person, hearing officer or member of a committee or the board of education holding a hearing under Article 89, Chapter 72, to administer oaths for the purpose of taking testimony. The act contains no authorization for the issuance of subpoenas.

Appellant’s contentions on appeal will be considered in chronological sequence.

Appellant asserts he was denied due process of law under the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution when he was not furnished the names of any witnesses against him and the substance of the charges against him prior to the first hearing. In their brief appellees acknowledge a student has a legal right to attend public school, subject to valid regulation, and that prior to expulsion he must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. They assert appellant was given notice of the charges against him — this on the basis that prior to the second de novo hearing before the delegated hearing officer appellant knew what evidence would be offered against him. Appellees do not contend appellant had any other kind of advance notice. They further argue that appellant’s timely appeal and consequent de novo hearing “waived” any procedural defect in the first administrative hearing. The September 12th letter advising of that hearing simply stated appellant was being suspended “for gross misconduct” and that his expulsion was being recommended.

The term due process refers primarily to the methods by which the law is enforced; however the term has no fixed technical concept unrelated to time, place and circumstances. In Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420, 4 L. ed. 2d 1307, 1321, 80 S. Ct. 1502, 1514, this comment was made:

“ ‘Due process’ is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts. . . . Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding are all considerations which must be taken into account.” (p. 442.)

Prior to the decision in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 150 (5 CA, 1961), cert. den. 368 U. S. 930, 7 L. ed. 2d 193, 82 S. Ct. 368, little attention was paid to the subject of due process in student disciplinary actions based upon misconduct. There a number of students were summarily expelled from a tax-supported college after they had been involved in civil rights demonstrations. Their notice of expulsion did not assign any specific reason for the action but cited only in general terms "the problem” at the college. The circuit court, proceeding on the fundamental principle that “Whenever a governmental body acts so as to injure an individual, the Constitution requires that the act be consonant with due process of law” (id., p. 155), voided the expulsion edict, holding that notice and some opportunity for hearing is required before a student at a tax-supported college is expelled for misconduct. The court specified certain standards requisite, saying in part:

“The notice should contain a statement of the specific charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion under the regulations of the Board of Education. The nature of the hearing should vary depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. . . . [A] hearing which gives the Board or the administrative authorities of the college an opportunity to hear both sides in considerable detail is best suited to protect the rights of all involved. This is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is required. Such a hearing, with the attending publicity and disturbance of college activities, might be detrimental to the college’s educational atmosphere and impractical to carry out. Nevertheless, the rudiments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved without encroaching upon the interests of the college. In the instant case, the student should be given the names of the witnesses against him and an oral or written report on the facts to which each witness testifies. He should also be given the opportunity to present . . . his own defense against the charges and to produce either oral testimony or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf.” (pp. 158-159.)

Since Dixon there have been many court decisions made across the country and numerous law review treatises written on due process in student disciplinary actions. Various viewpoints have been expressed concerning particular aspects of the subject (for an excellent study see Buss, “Procedural Due Process For School Discipline: Probing The Constitutional Outline”, 119 U. of Penn. L. Rev., Feb., 1971, p. 545). An oft-quoted expression where students are involved is one found in Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (SDWVA, 1968), affirmed 399 F.2d 638 ( 4 CA, 1968), cert. den. 394 U. S. 905, 22 L. ed. 2d 217, 89 S. Ct. 1009 (1969):

“. . . the touchstones of the application of due process are reasonableness and fairness in view of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” (p. 237.)

The general rules which have emerged are somewhat more refined in this statement found in! Wright, “The Constitution on the Campus,”22 Vand. L. Rev. (Oct., 1969) 1027:

“There is general agreement that four fundamental safeguards are required in every proceeding that may lead to a serious penalty. The student must be advised of the grounds of the charge, he must be informed of the nature of the evidence against him, he must be given an opportunity to be heard in his own defense, and he must not be punished except on the basis oí substantial evidence. These requirements are so obvious, and so fundamental, that they require little elaboration.” (pp. 1071-1072.)

As already shown, the Kansas response has been the enactment of legislation on the subject of suspension and expulsion of students.

The very rudiments of fair play dictate that a student should have specific and timely notice of the charges against him. Nearly all courts dealing with the subject have so held. Indeed, that seems to be the plain import of 72-8902 (a) which, after providing that in all cases wherein a student may be expelled or suspended for misconduct he shall first be suspended for a short time, toritten notice of which short term suspension and the reason therefor shall be given within twenty-four hours after imposition, states:

“. . . A written notice of any proposal to suspend for an extended term or to expel and the charges upon which the same is hosed shall be given to the pupil or student proposed to be suspended or expelled and to his parents or guardians within forty-eight (48) hours [amended to 72 hours by enactment of SB 25 in 1973] after the pupil or student has had imposed a short term suspension. . . .” (Emphasis added.)

Notice of the charges implies giving a student a statement in sufficient detail and sufficiently in advance of the hearing to enable him to prepare a defense (see Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 [1950], 94 L.ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652) or to present any mitigating circumstances. What is to be considered a “sufficient” statement must depend on the circumstances in each particular case, but at least the substance of the charges and the name of the principal witness to support them should be supplied the student in advance.

Although it may be that appellant, by reason of his appeal and subsequent appearance at the de novo hearing, has suffered no prejudice from the failure of the September 12th letter to contain the substance of the charges or the name of any witness, we think it was nonetheless deficient in the respects asserted. A student might fail to appear at the first administrative hearing and thereby be finally expelled on the basis of an initial notice which really told him nothing at all. Due process should not be departed from upon the theory that future appearance will render the issue moot.

Appellant complains that the examiner failed to base his decision entirely on the evidence presented at the first hearing. This complaint derives from the examiner’s testimony at the de novo hearing before the board’s delegated officer that he did receive opinions from others respecting Gary’s placement in school pending the first appeal. It goes without saying that a fair and impartial decision is contemplated and no one should be required to accept clouded disposition of his cause. However, we think a situation is presented where misinterpretation has been placed upon the challenged statements by the examiner. There was nothing to indicate he received or took into account any opinions on the issue of guilt or innocence respecting the assault. He testified specially to the contrary — that he had based his decision solely on his evaluation of the evidence before him. He was interested in appellant’s continued attendance in school and in fact recommended his admittance to the Metro school, which offer was declined. We see no factual basis for the charge asserted against the examiner.

Appellant further complains the examiner did not comply with the requirements of 72-8902 (c) in that his report contained no finding respecting appellant’s return to school pending any appeal or during the time allowed for appeal. This complaint likewise lacks merit. Return to school lies within the sound discretion of the examiner, based on his assessment of the entire situation as stated in the statute. The examiner testified he decided against appellant’s return to normal classes, although he failed to put that specific finding in his report as, permissively, he might have done, and he subsequently advised appellant in writing he might attend the Metro school. No prejudicial error appears.

Appellant further attacks the constitutionality of 72-8902 (a) (c). The thrust of his argument really is that it contemplates short-term suspensions before there has been a hearing and it permits continued removal from school pending final determination. He argues the status quo should be preserved meanwhile. We are aware of no authority or cogent reason for his position where the misconduct charged is of a nature disruptive to the orderly operation of school. Imposition of relatively minor sanctions should not require a hearing. Subsection (a) specifically authorizes a suspension of not to exceed five days without a hearing (in appellant’s case his suspension prior to the initial hearing amounted to four school days). Suspension for five days is certainly not an unreasonable period of time within which to conduct an investigation or to attempt to resolve administratively problems arising which are inimical to school welfare. Where disciplinary action no more drastic than that is imposed due process requires no more than that which the statute directs. In Baker v. Downey City Board of Education, 307 F. Supp. 517 (C. D. Cal., 1969), the court opined:

“. . . [I]f the temporary suspension of a high school student could not be accomplished without first preparing specifications of charges, giving notice of hearing, and holding a hearing, or any combination of these procedures, the discipline and ordered conduct of the educational program and the moral atmosphere required by good educational standards, would be difficult to maintain.” (pp. 522-523.)

In similar vein, in Hernandez v. School District Number One, Denver, Colo., 315 F. Supp. 289 (Colo., 1970), we find this:

“The application of such a rule [a hearing prior to suspension] would mean that the plaintiffs could, and the evidence indicates they would, continue their disruptive conduct during the period that written charges were being prepared, an ‘impartial decision maker’ selected, reasonable notice of the time and the place of the hearing given the plaintiffs, the time necessary to subpoena witnesses and the time required for the hearing. ... In the meantime, the other students would be denied their right to the educational processes of the school. The requirements of procedural due process cannot be so construed.” (p. 293.)

Where long-term suspension or expulsion is proposed then procedural safeguards must be afforded, but once that type of hearing is had and a finding reached that the student is guilty of misconduct warranting his removal from school then there is no due process entitlement to interim reinstatement pending appeal. We see no constitutional infirmity in the challenged statute.

Appellant’s principal contention is he was deprived of procedural due process in the denial of the right of confrontation and cross-examination of the witness against him. He presents authority emphasizing the importance of cross-examination where disputed facts are involved, including student discipline cases in which it has been required. Appellees respond with authority to the contrary. They also point out the lack of subpoena power in school authorities to compel attendance of witnesses and they assert the legislature contemplated affidavits might be used without the affiant being present when it provided in 72-8903(c) for a student’s right “to hear or read a full report of testimony of witnesses against him”. Appellees concede cross-examination would be in order as to adverse witnesses who voluntarily appear at a hearing.

Courts which have considered the issue of the student’s right to cross-examination of the witnesses against him have divided in different directions, indicating the difficulty of prescribing any hard and fast rule applicable to all situations. It would appear at the present time that a majority of jurisdictions favors granting the right under situations similar to that present here. We will attempt no analysis of the many decisions other than to say that in some cases it appears no question has been raised where the right has been exercised, in some it has been either unqualifiedly granted or denied and in others either qualifiedly granted or refused. Although a federal constitutional right is involved the United States supreme court has not spoken directly on the issue. It has held in a free speech and expression case where no disruptive conduct was involved that students in school are “persons” -under the constitution (Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 [1969], 21 L. ed. 2d 731, 89 S. Ct. 733; see also Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 [1943], 87 L.ed. 1628, 63 S. Ct. 1178).

The federal supreme court has specifically required the right to cross-examination of adverse witnesses as a part of due process in hearings to determine fitness for admission to the bar (Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U. S. 96 [1963], 10 L. ed. 2d 224, 83 S. Ct. 1175); in state criminal proceedings (Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 [1965], 13 L.ed. 2d 923, 85 S. Ct. 1065); in juvenile delinquency proceedings (In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 [1967], 18 L. ed. 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 1428), and in hearings to terminate aid to dependent children payments (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 [1970], 25 L.ed.2d 287, 90 S. Ct. 1011). In the latter case the court remarked:

“In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” (p. 269.)

Earlier, in a revocation of security clearance proceeding, the court in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474 (1959), 3 L. ed. 2d 1377, 79 S. Ct. 1400, had this to say:

“Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment which provides that in all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases [citations] but also in all types of cases where administrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny [citations].” (pp. 496-497.)

The right to cross-examine adverse witnesses on disputed questions of fact can scarcely be over-emphasized. In V Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) § 1367, the eminent author expressed these views on its significance in determining truth:

“For two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of Evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by cross-examination as a vital feature of the law. The belief that no safeguard for testing the value of human statements is comparable to that furnished by cross-examination, and the conviction that no statement (unless by special exception) should be used as testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that test, has found increasing strength in lengthening experience.

“Not even the abuses, the mishandlings, and the puerilities which are so often found associated with cross-examination have availed to nullify its value. ... If we omit political considerations of broader range, then cross-examination, not trial by jury, is the great and permanent contribution of the Anglo-American system of law to improved methods of trial-procedure.” (pp. 28-29.)

Despite these pronouncements it must be recognized that, outside the criminal area, cross-examination is not an absolute right but depends rather upon a case by case assessment of the circumstances. This is particularly appropriate in student disciplinary cases in the light of the problems peculiar to the school setting where both institutional and individual rights of young people must be considered. We see no objection to the use of affidavits when the testimony is of minor importance or of a cumulative nature. But when the outcome is directly dependent on the credibility of two witnesses (possibly including the student threatened with expulsion) whose statements are directly conflicting, then cross-examination is imperative in establishing the truth, absent compelling reasons for dispensing with it. When cross-examination is required the schools interest can be protected by holding the hearing in private and by limiting the scope of cross-examination to prevent the student or his lawyer from badgering witnesses. Reasonable restraints on its use can be imposed. Hard and fast rules cannot be prescribed to fit all circumstances. In malting a preliminary judgment whether cross-examination should be allowed the question for the hearing officer or body must always be whether fundamental fairness requires it.

In the case at bar we have a situation where identity of the assailant was the critical issue. Such identification as was made came through use of a small year-old photograph. No reason appears in the record as to why the victim did not appear at the hearing other than the fact his parents indicated he preferred not to testify. Conceivably good reason for his nonappearance may have existed but appellees have made no showing on this issue which should be a part of their burden in malting the expulsion as they did. Here was a disputed issue of fact where credibility of witnesses was important in reaching a fair decision. This aspect is demonstrated by the report of the hearing officer in which she found the testimony of appellant to be “incredible” — yet the testimony of the opposing witness was never put in the crucible to be thus tested.

In enacting 72-8903 the legislature manifestly did not attempt to prescribe more than minimum standards of procedural due process applicable to all hearings. It could scarcely be expected to anticipate and to declare constitutional guidelines for every possible situation. Nor should its failure to place subpoena power in school authorities be decisive of the particular point at issue since the legislature has no authority to dispense with the requirements of procedural due process and it has not purported to do so. Accordingly we hold that as a matter of due process under the particular circumstances appellant should have been afforded the right to confront and cross-examine the principal witness against him and the trial court erred in ruling otherwise.

Finally, appellant contends the decision to expel him was not based on substantial evidence. His argument simply is that only hearsay evidence was presented against him and this supplies no basis for the action taken. We have already dealt with the confrontation-cross-examination aspect of the testimony. Aside from this issue, this court has many times held that the term “substantial evidence” means evidence which possesses something of substance and relevant consequence and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues can be reasonably resolved (see Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Prairie Village, 208 Kan. 246, 491 P. 2d 910). Measured by this standard the evidence against appellant was substantial.

The judgment is reversed in accordance with the views herein expressed.

approved by the court.