Smith v. McDowell

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: September 24, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01441
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Michelet Michael Smith, No. CV-25-01441-PHX-JJT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 David McDowell, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 At issue is Defendants Judge David McDowell and Jeff Fine’s Motion to Dismiss 16 (Doc. 38, MTD), to which Plaintiff Michelet Michael Smith responded in opposition 17 (Doc. 45, Resp.) and Defendants replied in support (Doc. 47, Reply.) Also at issue is 18 Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (Doc. 40, Defs.’ Mot. Leave) and 19 Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply (Doc. 49, Pl. Mot. Leave). The Court has 20 reviewed the parties’ briefs and finds this matter appropriate for decision without oral 21 argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f). 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 This matter arises out of a family law case in Maricopa County, Arizona in which 24 Defendant Judge McDowell permitted a substitution of opposing counsel over Plaintiff’s 25 avid objections. Plaintiff alleged the following claims against Defendants: (1) violation of 26 due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) violation of equal protection under the 27 Fourteenth Amendment; (3) violation of privacy rights under HIPAA and RFPA; (4) 28 constitutionally tortious conduct under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) declaratory and injunctive 1 relief under the Ex parte Young Doctrine; (6) failure to protect confidential records; and, 2 (7) arbitrary and unequal application of judicial standards. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 20–39.) 3 As a matter of course, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on 4 June 23, 2025, and added an eighth count of “Negligence Under Arizona Law (Standard of 5 Care Informed by HIPAA.)” (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶¶ 52–59.) 6 On July 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) adding a 7 ninth count entitled “Systemic Misuse of Public Resources and Abuse of Taxpayer-Funded 8 Authority” and a tenth count entitled “Denial of Access to Court and Retaliation for 9 Asserting Legal Rights.” (Doc. 24, SAC, ¶¶ 75–97.) 10 On August 11, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC. Defendants’ 11 Motion to Dismiss was three pages over the limit set forth in Local Rule 7.2, so Defendants 12 separately requested leave to file excess pages for the same. (Defs.’ Mot. Leave.) Plaintiff 13 objected to both. (Resp.; Doc. 46.) Later, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a surreply to 14 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Pl. Mot. Leave), to which Defendants responded (Doc. 52) 15 and Plaintiff replied (Doc. 53). 16 On September 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Notice Clarifying Scope of Claims and 17 Relief, in which he voluntarily withdraws the state-law tort claims without prejudice under 18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). (Doc. 50, Pl. Not., ¶ 2.) Therein, Plaintiff also 19 clarified that he sought no damages from Defendants in their individual capacity, and that 20 he seeks “prospective, not retroactive” federal relief. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 3.) 21 First, the Court must evaluate which, if any, claims survive Defendants’ Motion to 22 Dismiss. Second, the Court will determine whether Plaintiff should be granted leave to 23 amend his Complaint. Lastly, the Court will address the remaining pending motions that 24 include Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages and Plaintiff’s Motion for 25 Leave to File Surreply. 26 II. MOTION TO DISMISS 27 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC under multiple theories including, as 28 relevant here, lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 1 Procedure 12(b)(1), and judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. As a matter of procedure, the 2 parties improperly treat Plaintiff’s SAC as the operative complaint. Plaintiff’s SAC was 3 filed without leave of this Court or Defendants’ prior consent as required by Federal Rule 4 of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). The operative complaint in this matter is Plaintiff’s FAC. 5 Despite this procedural technicality, it is still appropriate to consider the parties’ complete 6 briefing on the issue of whether Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed. As Plaintiff himself 7 represents, the function of the SAC was to add claims and allegations, not to subtract them. 8 (Doc 23.) Therefore, the parties’ briefing of the claims and facts alleged in the SAC 9 encompasses all of Plaintiff’s operative claims and facts asserted in the FAC. The parties 10 have had ample opportunity to be heard on whether Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed 11 from both the FAC and SAC, so any ruling reached by this Court on the Motion to Dismiss 12 will apply with equal force to the SAC as it does to the FAC. 13 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 14 1. Legal Standard 15 “A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may 16 attack either the allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer upon the court subject 17 matter jurisdiction, or the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Renteria v. 18 United States, 452 F. Supp. 2d 910, 919 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citing Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. 19 Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979)). “Where the jurisdictional 20 issue is separable from the merits of the case, the [court] may consider the evidence 21 presented with respect to the jurisdictional issue and rule on that issue, resolving factual 22 disputes if necessary.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733; see also Autery v. United States, 424 23 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2005) (“With a 12(b)(1) motion, a court may weigh the evidence 24 to determine whether it has jurisdiction.”). The burden of proof is on the party asserting 25 jurisdiction to show that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. See Indus. Tectonics, Inc. 26 v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990). “[B]ecause it involves a court’s power 27 to hear a case,” subject matter jurisdiction “can never be forfeited or waived.” United States 28 v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). Courts “have an independent obligation to determine 1 whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any 2 party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513–14 (2006). 3 The Rooker–Feldman doctrine provides that a federal district court lacks subject 4 matter jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the final judgment of a state court. Noel v. 5 Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2003). As the Ninth Circuit has noted, the doctrine 6 is easy to apply in its routine form; a disappointed party may not seek reversal of a state 7 court judgment by appealing to a federal district court. Id. at 1155. The Rooker–Feldman 8 doctrine also prohibits federal district courts from considering de facto appeals—suits in 9 which “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling.” Bianchi v. 10 Rylaardsam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, Rooker–Feldman “looks to federal 11 law to determine whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state 12 court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment.” Id. at 901 (citation and internal 13 quotation marks omitted). And when refusing to consider a forbidden de facto appeal, a 14 federal district court must also decline “to decide any issue in the suit that is ‘inextricably 15 intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.” Noel, 341 16 F.3d at 1159 (quoting D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)). “If 17 a federal plaintiff has brought a de facto appeal from a state court decision—alleging legal 18 error by the state court and seeking relief from the state court’s judgment—he or she is 19 barred by Rooker-Feldman.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 20 2004). 21 2. Analysis 22 Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed under the Rooker- 23 Feldman doctrine because Plaintiff essentially “asks this Court to reverse Judge 24 McDowell’s ruling and Clerk Fine’s filing of the same.” (MTD at 8–9.) Plaintiff argues 25 that he is not requesting the Court to vacate the fee award or reverse findings; rather, he is 26 “alleging independent constitutional injuries caused by defendants’ conduct—even if 27 related to, or occurring in the shadow of, state proceedings.” (Resp. at 5.) In reply, 28 Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims are, in essence, seeking “to enjoin (and 1 essentially vacate) state court orders regarding a substitution of counsel and a resulting 2 judgment he does not like, because he lost.” (Reply at 5.) 3 Whether Rooker–Feldman bars Plaintiff’s claims turn on what Plaintiff alleges as 4 his harm and from where that harm arose. The FAC and SAC are both replete with alleged 5 errors of the state court. At the heart of Plaintiff’s allegations is a minute entry granting the 6 substitution of counsel for Plaintiff’s opposing party (“Minute Entry”) issued by Defendant 7 Judge McDowell and entered by Defendant Fine. (FAC ¶ 7; SAC ¶ 10.) That Minute Entry, 8 according to Plaintiff, was not signed or entered as an order under procedural rules unique 9 to Arizona family law courts. (Id.) Following this allegedly defective Minute Entry, 10 Defendant Judge McDowell awarded the opposing party attorney’s fees and costs “based 11 on pleadings filed by an attorney whose representation was procedurally defective.” (FAC 12 ¶ 14; SAC ¶ 17.) Defendant Judge McDowell also denied Plaintiff’s motions challenging 13 the Minute Entry in further violation of Arizona family law court rules. (FAC ¶ 15–16; 14 SAC ¶ 18–19.) Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Judge McDowell “inconsistently 15 applied legal standards” as to him, “requiring Plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, to strictly 16 support his motions with detailed legal authority while failing to hold the opposing party 17 to the same procedural standard.” (FAC ¶ 17; SAC ¶ 20.) 18 For Defendant Fine’s part, Plaintiff alleges he erroneously issued several subpoenas 19 that were requested by the substituted counsel who—according to Plaintiff—gained entry 20 to the family law proceedings under the facade of a defective state court ruling (the Minute 21 Entry). (FAC ¶¶ 7–8; SAC ¶¶ 10–11.) As a direct result of the Minute Entry granting 22 substitution of counsel, Plaintiff alleges that his health and financial records were illegally 23 obtained by the substituted counsel in accordance with the subpoenas issued by Defendant 24 Fine. (FAC ¶ 18; SAC ¶ 21.) 25 Accordingly, Plaintiff pleads:

26 The court’s actions, based on an unsigned and unentered 27 minute entry, deprived Plaintiff of due process and created a void foundation for subsequent orders[.] Despite these 28 procedural defects, the Court permitted Jessica Reynolds to act 1 as counsel of record, and Jeff Fine, Clerk of the Superior Court, issued subpoenas at her request without verifying the validity 2 of her representations. These actions contributed to ongoing 3 violations of Plaintiff’s due process rights and facilitated unauthorized access to protected information. 4 5 (FAC ¶¶ 11–12; SAC ¶¶ 14–15.) Against this backdrop, the Court turns to each of 6 Plaintiff’s claims to determine whether it may consider any of them in light of Rooker– 7 Feldman. 8 First, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants, in acting under the color of state law, 9 deprived Plaintiff of due process, “fair notice, [and] a meaningful opportunity to be heard” 10 by “failing to enforce required substitution protocols under ARFLP Rule 9(d), permitting 11 unauthorized counsel to act without court approval, and enabling legal actions to proceed 12 without valid representation or notice.” (FAC ¶ 23; SAC ¶ 27.) Plaintiff further alleges that 13 Defendant Judge McDowell failed to rule on pending motions within the sixty-day deadline 14 imposed upon the state court by the Arizona Constitution and state court rules. (FAC ¶¶ 24– 15 26; SAC ¶¶ 28–30.) Plaintiff’s due process claims turn on whether the Minute Entry was 16 issued and entered in error, thereby rendering later state court actions to also be in error 17 such that Plaintiff was deprived of due process. This is precisely the kind of appellate 18 review that Rooker-Feldman prohibits. Plaintiff’s first claim against Defendants is barred. 19 Next, Plaintiff brings a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 20 Amendment, arguing that Defendants disparately held Plaintiff to a higher procedural 21 standard in comparison to the substituted counsel. (FAC ¶ 28; SAC ¶¶ 32–34.) Plaintiff 22 specifically asserts that Defendant Judge McDowell “awarded attorney fees based on 23 filings from improperly substituted counsel while denying Plaintiff’s motions without 24 explanation.” (SAC ¶ 57; see FAC ¶¶ 44–49.) As for Defendant Fine, Plaintiff alleges he 25 “fail[ed] to ensure the legal sufficiency” of the Minute Entry permitting substitution of 26 opposing counsel. (FAC ¶ 50; SAC ¶ 64.) But as discussed, Plaintiff cannot show the state 27 court treated him disparately without upending the Minute Entry and scrutinizing 28 Defendant Judge McDowell’s judgements that reportedly “denied, delayed, or dismissed” 1 Plaintiff’s motions for technical non-compliance with state court rules. Plaintiff’s second 2 and seventh claims are therefore barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 3 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his privacy rights “by permitting 4 unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s sensitive medical and financial records through the 5 issuance and use of improperly obtained subpoenas.” (FAC ¶ 30; see SAC ¶¶ 36–41.) This 6 alleged conduct gave rise to Plaintiff’s separately pled “negligence under Arizona Law” 7 claim and a “constitutional tort” claim, in that Defendants breached their duty of care 8 established by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and Right to 9 Financial Privacy Act. (FAC ¶¶ 36–37, 52–59; SAC ¶¶ 42–46, 66–74.) Relatedly, Plaintiff 10 asserted a “failure to protect confidential records” claim, alleging that Defendants “failed 11 to issue a protective order or seal the records” of Plaintiff’s medical and financial 12 documents released in accordance with the subpoenas issued by the state court. (FAC 13 ¶¶ 40–42; SAC ¶¶ 52–55.) Once again, each of these claims turn on—or are inextricably 14 intertwined with—whether Defendant Judge McDowell’s Minute Entry and Defendant 15 Fine’s subsequent subpoenas issued to the substituted counsel were made and entered in 16 error. Rooker-Feldman bars counts three, four, six, and eight.1 17 Formulated as Plaintiff’s fifth claim against Defendants, Plaintiff asserts that he 18 seeks “declaratory and injunctive relief” under the Ex parte Young doctrine. (FAC ¶ 38; 19 SAC ¶¶ 47–50.) Plaintiff’s requested relief is predicated upon whether this Court has 20 jurisdiction to grant such relief. As shown above, the Court has no subject matter 21 jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants under the Rooker-Feldman 22 doctrine because such claims require judicial scrutiny of the Minute Entry permitting 23 substitution of opposing counsel. Therefore, Plaintiff’s fifth claim is barred. 24 25 1 After full briefing on the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed “any state- 26 law tort counts remain[ing] in the operative pleading” in his Notice Clarifying Scope of Claims and Relief. (Pl. Not. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff later attempts to rescind the voluntary dismissal, 27 writing that he “merely clarified that [he] is not pursuing state-law tort claims at this stage.” (Doc. 53.) While Plaintiff’s Notice appears to comport with Federal Rule of Civil 28 Procedure 41, the Court will treat Plaintiff’s state-law tort claim (count eight) as ongoing for the purposes of resolving the present Motion to Dismiss. 1 As to his ninth claim brought exclusively in the SAC,2 Plaintiff alleges that 2 Defendants abused governmental power and public resources in violation of the Public 3 Trust doctrine, § 1983, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (SAC ¶¶ 76–87.) The 4 factual underpinning of this claim requires that the Minute Entry, and all rulings and filings 5 that cascaded therefrom, were done in error such that the Defendants’ actions amount to an 6 abuse and misuse of power and public resources. Such an inquiry is prohibited under the 7 Rooker-Feldman doctrine, so Plaintiff’s ninth claim is also barred. 8 Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct “deprived Plaintiff of his 9 constitutionally protected right to access the courts and petition the government for redress 10 of grievances in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments” and the Arizona 11 constitution. (SAC ¶ 89). Once again, Plaintiff’s claim rises or falls upon whether the 12 Minute Entry was made and entered in error. Plaintiff’s tenth and final claim against 13 Defendants is barred. 14 In sum, each of Plaintiff’s claims and requested relief is grounded upon alleged 15 injuries caused by the Minute Entry itself. The Court may not “undercut the state ruling” 16 found in the Minute Entry, nor may it consider the award of attorney’s fees and costs 17 against Plaintiff, the issuance of subpoenas, or the release of medical or financial 18 documents in response to those subpoenas because they are “‘inextricably intertwined’ 19 with that state ruling. See Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898; Noel, 341 F.3d at 1159. Accordingly, 20 the Court must dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims for lack subject matter jurisdiction. 21 B. Immunity Defense 22 1. Legal Standard 23 Judicial and quasi-judicial immunity protect a defendant from personal immunity 24 when “the plaintiff seek[s] to impose individual liability upon a government officer for 25 actions taken under color of . . . law.” Acres Bonusing, Inc. v. Marston, 17 F.4th 901, 909 26 (9th Cir. 2021). Judges enjoy judicial immunity from claims based on a “judicial act,” such

27 2 While the assessment of the operative claims under the FAC ends with Plaintiff’s eighth claim, the Court has already noted that the parties extensively briefed Plaintiff’s ninth and 28 tenth claims brought under his SAC. As such, this Court will address whether those claims could survive under Rooker-Feldman. 1 as those acts “involved in resolving disputes between parties.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 2 219, 225–27 (1988). Courts will find an act is judicial if it “relate[s] to the nature of the act 3 itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations 4 of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. 5 Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). In addition to “protecting the finality of judgments” 6 and “discouraging inappropriate collateral attacks,” judicial immunity “protect[s] judicial 7 independence by insulating judges from vexatious action prosecuted by disgruntled 8 litigants.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 348 (1871)). 9 Only two exceptions exist. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial 10 actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not 11 immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all 12 jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (internal citations omitted). 13 “Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights 14 violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis 15 v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1987). “When judicial 16 immunity is extended to officials other than judges, it is because their judgements are 17 functionally comparable to those of judges—that is, because they, too, exercise a 18 discretionary judgment as part of their function.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 19 U.S. 429, 436 (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For example, a clerk 20 is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for filing a document with the court, provided the acts 21 complained of are within the clerk’s jurisdiction. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390. 22 2. Analysis 23 Defendants assert that they are immune from suit pursuant to judicial and quasi- 24 judicial immunity. (MTD at 5–7.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants enjoy no immunity from 25 his claims because Defendants’ conduct falls outside the scope of judicial acts, and he 26 alleges prospective, not retroactive, relief that falls outside the scope of this type of 27 immunity. (Resp. at 7–8.) 28 1 Whether judicial or quasi-judicial immunity applies depends, in part, on whether a 2 plaintiff is seeking relief from the defendant in his or her official or individual capacities. 3 See Acres Bonusing, Inc., 17 F.4th at 908–09 (distinguishing suits against officials in their 4 personal capacities, as opposed to their official capacities, in which the former may be 5 shielded by judicial immunity but not the latter). Plaintiff has vacillated between asserting 6 his claims against Defendants in their official or individual capacities.3 Plaintiff has 7 nonetheless been clear that he seeks relief from Defendants in a way that avoid Eleventh 8 Amendment sovereign immunity issues under Ex parte Young. (FAC ¶ 38; SAC ¶¶ 48–50; 9 Resp. at 2, 8–9; see also Pl. Not. ¶¶ 1, 3.) In taking substance over form, the Court will 10 consider Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition to Defendants’ immunity defense in the 11 context of avoiding sovereign immunity under the Ex parte Young doctrine. 12 Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, a plaintiff can seek relief against a state official 13 in their individual, not official, capacity to avoid summoning Eleventh Amendment 14 immunity of the sovereign state itself. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908). As 15 applied here, Plaintiff effectively seeks relief from Defendants in their individual capacity 16 not only in the substance of the facts he alleges, but under the Ex parte Young doctrine as 17 a matter of law. This is a critical distinction because, if Plaintiff was truly seeking relief 18 from Defendants in their “official” capacity, the State of Arizona would be a party in 19 interest and Defendants would have to assert sovereign immunity to be completely 20 protected from this suit. However, because Plaintiff seeks relief from Defendants in their 21 individual capacity in fact and law, Defendants could successfully dismiss all of Plaintiff’s 22 claims under a theory of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity. 23 Here, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ acts are non-judicial or administrative and 24 therefore do not receive the protection of judicial immunity. While Plaintiff paints 25 Defendant Judge McDowell’s acts as “non-judicial” (FAC ¶ 22; see SAC ¶ 26), his ruling 26 to allow substitution of counsel, denial of a protective order, and discretion in denying 27 3 For example, Plaintiff stated that the damages he seeks are against Defendants in their 28 individual capacities, (Resp. at 8-9), then represented that he seeks no damages against Defendants in their individual capacities. (Pl. Not. ¶¶ 1, 3). 1 additional briefing on issues before him are certainly judicial in nature and in clear design 2 to resolve the disputes before him. Similarly, the issuance of subpoenas by Defendant Fine 3 is an integral part of the judicial process squarely within a clerk’s role and authority. Both 4 Defendants are immune from suit under the judicial and quasi-judicial immunity doctrine. 5 Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. 6 Plaintiff further argues that Defendants are not protected by judicial or quasi-judicial 7 immunity because he seeks prospective, not retroactive, relief. (FAC ¶ 38; SAC ¶¶ 48–50; 8 Resp. at 7–9.) The kind of relief sought by a plaintiff has no part to play in whether this 9 kind of immunity applies, “[b]ecause judicial immunity is an immunity from suit and not 10 just from damages . . .” Acres Bonusing, Inc., 17 F.4th at 916 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 11 362). Because Defendants are immune from Plaintiff’s suit, Plaintiff’s requested relief is 12 barred no matter if it was prospective or retroactive. 13 III. LEAVE TO AMEND 14 In his Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff requested leave of court 15 to amend his SAC. (Resp. at 2, 13–14.) At this stage, a party must seek leave to amend 16 from the court absent the opposing party’s written consent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 17 Although the decision to grant or deny a motion to amend is within the trial court’s 18 discretion, “Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so 19 requires.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citation and internal quotation marks 20 omitted). “In exercising its discretion with regard to the amendment of pleadings, a court 21 must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15—to facilitate a decision on the merits 22 rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th 23 Cir. 1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 24 The policy in favor of allowing amendments is subject to limitations. After a 25 defendant files a responsive pleading or a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), the propriety 26 of leave to amend is determined by five factors: “bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the 27 opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously amended 28 the complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011). 1 “Futility alone can justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.” Nunes v. Ashcroft, 2 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2003). Relatedly, if defective claims in a complaint can be cured, 3 the plaintiff is entitled to amend the complaint before his claims are dismissed with prejudice. 4 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 5 Here, nothing in the record or the parties’ briefing suggests that Plaintiff seeks an 6 amendment in bad faith. Still, any amendment will be futile. Plaintiff has already amended 7 his Complaint once as a matter of course. His SAC, while procedurally inoperative, 8 suffered the same fatalities of his FAC that cannot survive Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. 9 The heart of all facts alleged by Plaintiff is that the allegedly erroneous Minute Entry 10 granted by Defendant Judge McDowell and entered by Defendant Fine caused Plaintiff’s 11 various injuries. No matter how many federal laws or constitutional provisions Plaintiff 12 recites or how many amendments Plaintiff makes, these central facts have not changed, nor 13 will they. Upon these facts the Court finds it appropriate to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims 14 as alleged in his FAC and SAC, not only for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but under 15 judicial and quasi-judicial immunity that protects the Defendants from suit. Due to the 16 futility of any amendment to Plaintiff’s now-twice amended Complaint, the Court will deny 17 Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend and will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. 18 IV. REMAINING PENDING MOTIONS 19 Also pending before this Court are Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Excess 20 Pages and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply, each of which stem from the 21 Motion to Dismiss. This Court decided Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on arguments 22 presented in pages four through nine of the same. Because the Court’s decision rested on 23 the pages well within the page limit set forth in Local Rule 7.2, Defendants’ Motion for 24 Leave to File Excess Pages is moot. 25 As for Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply, Plaintiff argues that good cause 26 exists to permit a surreply because Defendants raised new arguments in their Reply to the 27 Motion to Dismiss. (Leave for Surreply at 1.) As relevant here, Plaintiff states that 28 Defendants “recast Plaintiff’s prospective relief as a request that this Court vacate state- 1 court orders (including Rooker-Feldman)” and “[e]xpand[ed] absolute judicial/quasi- 2 judicial immunity to non-adjudicative, administrative acts by clerical staff.” (Id. at 2.) 3 Plaintiff fails to persuade that good cause exists to extend briefing before this Court. 4 In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants staunchly cast Plaintiff’s relief as essentially asking 5 the Court to vacate the state court’s Minute Entry and related actions. (MTD at 8–9.) The 6 fact that Defendants cited language from Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint in their 7 Reply that they did not cite in their Motion to Dismiss does not mean Defendants raised a 8 new argument. The argument remained the same: that Plaintiff’s claims run afoul of the 9 Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 10 Next, Defendants did not expand their immunity defense “to non-adjudicative, 11 administrative acts by clerical staff.” (Leave for Surreply at 2.) Defendants have 12 maintained that their respective actions taken in the underlying family law matter were 13 judicial ones, thereby entitling them to immunity. The Court notes that, in apparent 14 confusion as to what capacity Defendants are sued, Defendants do suggest offhand that 15 qualified immunity may provide another immunity defense for the first time in their Reply. 16 (Reply at 6 n.2). Still, this Court already determined that Plaintiff repeatedly made clear 17 that he seeks damages against both Defendants under the Ex parte Young doctrine, thereby 18 requiring suit against Defendants in their individual capacities and permitting Defendants 19 to seek immunity from suit under the judicial and quasi-judicial immunity doctrine. Further 20 briefing on additional types of immunity are unnecessary. Because no new arguments were 21 raised that this Court relied upon in reaching this Ruling, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to 22 File Surreply is moot. 23 V. CONCLUSION 24 This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under the Rooker- 25 Feldman doctrine. Even if some or all of Plaintiff’s claims evaded dismissal for lack of 26 subject-matter jurisdiction, those claims still fail because Defendants are immune from suit 27 under the judicial and quasi-judicial immunity doctrine. The parties’ briefing—and this 28 Court’s Ruling—focus squarely on the issues raised in the first seventeen pages of || Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss such that Defendant’s request to extend the page limit and □□ Plaintiff’s request to file a surreply are both moot. Plaintiff, having already amended his 3 || Complaint twice to no avail, may not amend once more as the defect appearing in each amendment cannot be cured. All of Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice, and || Plaintiffs request for leave to amend is denied. 6 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 38.) 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 15) with prejudice. The Clerk of Court shall enter Judgment accordingly and 10 || terminate this matter. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Defendants’ Motion for Leave to || File Excess Pages (Doc. 40.) 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying as moot Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply (Doc. 49.) 15 Dated this 24th day of September, 2025. CN 16 “wok: 17 wef hlee— Unifga StatesDistrict Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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