Smith v. Haley

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: July 10, 2023
• Docket: 4:23-cv-02043
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LESLIE ROSALEE SMITH, Case No. 23-cv-02043-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL 9 v.

10 ALLISON HALEY, et al., 11 Defendants.

12 13 Plaintiff has filed a pro se action. Her amended complaint (Dkt. No. 6) is now before the 14 Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma 15 pauperis in a separate order. 16 DISCUSSION 17 A. Standard of Review 18 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 19 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 21 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 22 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 23 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 24 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 26 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 27 necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 1 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, 2 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). 3 A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 4 cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. 5 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 6 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 7 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 8 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 9 B. Procedural History 10 Plaintiff commenced this action on or about April 28, 2023, when she filed a complaint 11 with this Court on a civil rights complaint form, naming as defendants Napa District Attorney 12 Allison Haley, Napa County Superior Court Judge Mark Boessenecker, United States District 13 Court for the Northern District Judge James Donato, the State of California, and Does Nos. 1-100. 14 In this complaint, she alleged that defendant Haley “acted in concert and engaged in court 15 processes that were illegal and unconstitutional” to deprive Plaintiff of her rights, resulting in 16 Plaintiff’s property being seized, Plaintiff suffering numerous assaults on her body, and Plaintiff 17 being subjected to false imprisonment and kidnapping. She further alleged that defendant 18 Boessenecker acted in concert with defendant Haley and practiced law from the bench; that 19 defendant Donato has a conflict of interest and violated Plaintiff’s rights by not being impartial 20 and not allowing her due process claims to be heard; and that California and the Doe defendants 21 fund defendants Haley, Boessenecker, and Donato, thereby facilitating their wrongful actions. See 22 generally Dkt. No. 1. 23 Before the Court could screen the complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff 24 filed an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 6. Because an amended complaint completely replaces any 25 prior complaints, Dkt. No. 6 is now the operative complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 26 F.3d 896, 925 (9th Cir. 2012) (amended complaint completely replaces previous complaints). 27 C. Operative Complaint (Dkt. No. 6) 1 Corrections pursuant to a 2020 criminal case, C No. 20-CR-002208, charging her with one count 2 of felony stalking, four misdemeanor counts of violating a court order after a harassment hearing, 3 and one misdemeanor count of vandalism. The criminal case appears to be still pending, with a 4 Cal. Penal Code § 1368 competency hearing recently held on May 15, 2023. Dkt. No. 6 at 8-18. 5 The complaint names the following as defendants: Napa District Attorney Michelle 6 Roberts, Napa District Attorney Allison Haley, United States District Court for the Northern 7 District Judge James Donato, Napa County Superior Court Judge Mark Boessenecker, Joseph 8 Solga, Napa County Superior Court Judge Elia Ortiz, Napa County Superior Court Judge Diane 9 Price, Napa District Attorney Katy Yount, Napa County Deputy District Attorney Allyson 10 Taguchi, Napa County public defender Alex Zocchi, the Napa County Department of Corrections, 11 and the State of California. 12 The complaint requests that the Court immediately order that all federal funding to the 13 State of California be ended so that Defendants will cease violating people’s rights; that the Court 14 immediately order the release of the following persons who are being held hostage by the Napa 15 County Department of Corrections; Plaintiff, Anna Servin, Tammy J. Jones, Agnes Castillo, Elena 16 L. Leon, and Nicol Turner; and that the Court issue a warrant or indictment for Defendants. 17 The complaint makes the following allegations. 18 Defendant Zocchi is practicing law without a license; is in a legal racketeering business 19 and committing legal malpractice; colludes with the prosecution and uses coercion and 20 misrepresentation to defraud people out of their rights and due process; and if he cannot get his 21 client to bend on his rights, he challenges his client’s competency to stand trial. Defendant Haley 22 has failed to prove jurisdiction and do a pre-filing investigation on her cases; and she uses illegal 23 practices and court procedures to destroy lives and cause injury and damage to “so many people.” 24 Because defendants Zocchi and Haley are paid by Napa County, which is funded by the State of 25 California and the federal government, defendants Zocchi and Haley are “in violation of the 26 people’s rights and due process for a fair hearing / standing in court.” 27 Defendant Solga, Boessenecker, Ortiz, and all the judicial officers of Napa County 1 Office and the Public Defender’s Office to violate the people’s rights under color of state law; and 2 have conflicts of interests in all cases that they preside over. 3 Plaintiff requests that her case, the cases of the other named inmates, and every case 4 brought by defendant Haley be reviewed by a federal or Supreme Court judge or by an attorney 5 for the people. She also requests that she and each named inmate be compensated $1 million per 6 day in custody due to defendant Zocchi’s negligence; be compensated $100 million for each case 7 brought by defendant Haley “against us the people;” and be compensated $200 million for each 8 case that the judicial officers “has ordered on us the people.” She also requests expungement of 9 all their convictions. She also requests that the bar cards of defendants Zocchi and Haley, and of 10 all the Napa Superior Court judicial officers, be revoked and that they all be put in prison for life. 11 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are public actors and that that the Tuckers Act and the 12 Administrative Act of 1946 strips public actors of immunity. 13 D. Dismissal with Prejudice 14 The Court DISMISSES the complaint for the reasons set forth below. The dismissal is 15 with prejudice because amendment would be futile. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 16 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (futility of amendment is basis for denial of leave to amend). 17 First, this action may not proceed with co-plaintiffs, i.e. Plaintiff along with inmates Anna 18 Servin, Tammy J. Jones, Agnes Castillo, Elena L. Leon, and Nicol Turner, or with Plaintiff 19 proceeding on behalf of a class of prisoners. Generally, a pro se plaintiff is prohibited from 20 pursuing claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity. See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 21 546 F.3d 661, 664-65 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 22 1962) (“a litigant appearing in propria persona has no authority to represent anyone other than 23 himself”); see also Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) 24 (“Ability to protect the interests of the class depends in part on the quality of counsel, and we 25 consider the competence of a layman representing himself to be clearly too limited to allow him to 26 risk the rights of others.”) (citation omitted). The use of co-plaintiffs presents a procedural 27 problem unique to prisoner litigation. The main problem with having unrepresented inmates 1 prepare documents and prosecute a case. Inmates are frequently moved. The plaintiffs may not 2 have access to each other in the future to prepare documents and to discuss the case. Even inmates 3 who initially are physically close to each other often do not remain so for the months or years that 4 it takes for a case to work its way through to judgment. Perhaps one plaintiff will be moved to a 5 different facility or be released from custody all of which will make their joint prosecution of this 6 case inordinately more difficult. The slow pace of plaintiffs’ communications with each other will 7 result in extensive delays at each point in the litigation where they are required to file anything 8 with the court. Thus, this case will be delayed as any potential filing from the plaintiffs is shuttled 9 back and forth between the plaintiffs until both are comfortable signing it. One alternative is to 10 permit the plaintiffs to file separate documents, but this essentially results in multiple cases within 11 a case, which has few benefits to match the substantial confusion caused. Delay caused by 12 proceeding with co-plaintiffs is especially likely here where the inmates may be pre-trial detainees 13 and may be moved to a different facility should they be convicted. In addition, Plaintiff lacks 14 standing to bring suit or seek relief on behalf of other inmates. Under the prudential limitations of 15 standing, “‘a litigant must normally assert his own legal interests rather than those of third 16 parties.’” Fleck & Assocs., Inc. v. Phoenix, 471 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips 17 Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985)). 18 Second, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Heck doctrine. Pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 19 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a court must dismiss a Section 1983 action where the plaintiff’s success in 20 the action would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, and the 21 conviction or sentence has not yet been invalidated. Id. at 486–87. Where the conviction or 22 sentence has not yet been invalidated, the Section 1983 suit is barred no matter the relief sought 23 (damages or equitable relief) and no matter the target of the suit (conduct leading to conviction or 24 internal prison proceedings), see Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005), and the suit 25 should be dismissed, see Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 649 (1997). Plaintiff is challenging 26 the Napa County District Attorney’s decision to bring a criminal complaint against her in People 27 v. Smith, C No. 20-cr-002208; defendant Zocchi’s representation of her in that case; and the 1 on Plaintiff’s claims would necessarily invalidate any conviction or sentence resulting from 2 People v. Smith, C No. 20-cr-002208. 3 Third, the Court must abstain from considering the claims in this case pursuant to the 4 Younger abstention doctrine because this action would interfere with Plaintiff’s ongoing state 5 court proceedings, People v. Smith, C No. 20-cv-002208. The Younger abstention doctrine 6 provides that, under principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should not interfere with 7 ongoing state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory relief absent 8 extraordinary circumstances. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971). Younger 9 abstention is required when: (1) state proceedings, judicial in nature, are pending; (2) the state 10 proceedings involve important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford adequate 11 opportunity to raise the constitutional issue. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State 12 Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). A fourth requirement has also been articulated by the Ninth 13 Circuit: that “the federal court action would enjoin the state proceeding or have the practical 14 effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the state proceeding in a way that Younger 15 disapproves.” SJSVCCPAC v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 16 cases). Here, state proceedings are ongoing. People v. Smith, C No. 20-cr-002208 is currently 17 pending in Napa County Superior Court. Second, state criminal proceedings implicate important 18 state interests. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (“states’ interest in administering 19 their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the 20 considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief”) (holding that 21 federal bankruptcy court should not invalidate results of state criminal proceedings). Third, the 22 state proceedings afford Plaintiff adequate opportunity to raise this issue, through direct appeal or 23 state collateral proceedings. Finally, the practical effect of granting relief in this action would 24 require this Court to actively monitor and interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding. The 25 Younger abstention principle compels the Court to abstain from considering any issues arising out 26 of, or related to, People v. Smith, C No. 20-cr-002208. 27 Fourth, the claims against the judicial officer defendants and the district attorney 1 Plaintiff is challenging the actions these defendants took in their judicial capacity. A state judge is 2 absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for acts performed in his judicial capacity. See 3 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (applying judicial immunity to actions under 42 4 U.S.C. § 1983). Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit for damages, not just from an 5 ultimate assessment of damages. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)); see also 6 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity 7 because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or in excess of his authority; rather, 8 he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”) 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). With respect to the district attorney defendants, 10 Plaintiff has challenged their actions in their prosecution of her. A state prosecuting attorney 11 enjoys absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his or her conduct in 12 “pursuing a criminal prosecution” insofar as he acts within his role as an “advocate for the State” 13 and his actions are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler 14 v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). 15 Fifth, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to challenge the validity of her custody by the Napa 16 County Department of Corrections, she must seek relief via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 17 not via a civil rights action. Habeas is the “exclusive remedy” for the prisoner who seeks 18 “‘immediate or speedier release’” from confinement. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 533-34 19 (2011) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)); see also Hill v. McDonough, 547 20 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) (“‘Challenges to the lawfulness of confinement or to particulars affecting its 21 duration are the province of habeas corpus.’”) (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 22 (2004)). If Plaintiff is seeking either early or immediate release, she must seek such relief in a 23 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 24 Finally, neither the Tucker Act nor the Administrative Act of 1946 are applicable here. 25 The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, applies to claims against the United States arising out of 26 express or implied contract to which the government was a party, or for liquidated or unliquidated 27 damages in cases not sounding in tort. The Administrative Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DISMISSES this action with prejudice. The 3 || Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff, and close the case. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 || Dated: = 7/10/2023

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 a 12

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