OPINION
SOSA, Senior Justice.
Plaintiff-Appellant, Shawn Smith (Smith) filed a claim for benefits under New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act), NMSA 1978, Sections 52-1-1 through 52-1-69 (Orig.Pamp. and Cum.Supp.1982) against his former employer Dowell Corporation (Dow). The district court granted summary judgment for Dow, stating plaintiff’s claim was barred by his failure to timely file under Section 52-l-31(A). In a memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari and reverse the Court of Appeals.
The sole issue before the Court is when will a worker with a latent injury be held to reasonably recognize the nature and probable, compensable character of the injury, thus activating the running of the statute of limitations.
While in Dow’s employ on August 12, 1980, Smith suffered an accidental injury when a cement truck he was driving left the road and flipped over, crushing the cab. Smith continued working his regular job, but a month following the accident he had to be placed on light duty for a three week period. He then returned to his normal job. He continued to work for Dow until he was terminated December 4, 1981.
The record reflects that at Dow’s request Smith was examined and treated at least twice by Dr. Hillmer, an orthopedic specialist, chosen by the company. Two letters written by Dr. Hillmer were placed in evidence as exhibits. The insurance company and Dow received the letters.
In a June 1, 1981 letter, Dr. Hillmer noted the following: Smith had three weeks of light duty about a month after the accident and then returned to his normal duties; his present job (at Dow) involved “heavy duty” work; his visits to a chiropractor were decreasing in frequency; and “[cjomplaints will become less severe * * * I do not feel he will have any permanent impairment from this accident.” There was no finding of disability in the letter. In a second letter dated October 19, 1981, Dr. Hillmer concluded: “I still feel he will ultimately make a good recovery.” Two months later Smith was terminated. He then joined the army.
Approximately three months after Dr. Hillmer’s October letter, on January 25, 1982, army doctors informed Smith he had a permanent disability to his back resulting from the August 1980 accident. He received a medical discharge from the army. Thereafter, he attempted to find light duty work but was unsuccessful.
Smith filed a workmen’s compensation complaint on November 18, 1982, within a year of the time the army doctors informed him of his disability. The complaint for benefits was denied by the district court under the statute of limitations bar, Section 52-l-31(A).
First, we set forth principles that are fundamental to the concept of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Since its inception, we have held that the Act was adopted to provide a humanitarian and economical system of compensation for the injured worker and should be liberally construed in favor of the claimant. Gonzales v. Chino Copper Co., 29 N.M. 228, 222 P. 903 (1924). That is still the law today. Transport Idemnity Co. v. Garcia, 89 N.M. 342, 552 P.2d 473 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 9, 558 P.2d 621 (1976). If no guidelines are given by statute, fundamental fairness must be the guideline. Id. The Act was adopted for the protection of the worker, not the employer. Clark v. Electronic City, 90 N.M. 477, 565 P.2d 348 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977).
Smith relies on De La Torre v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 89 N.M. 683, 556 P.2d 839 (Ct.App.1976) as authority for the date to begin the running of the limitations statute. De La Torre holds: “Time does not begin to run until the disability is discovered rather than from the accidental occurrence.” Id. at 686, 556 P.2d at 842 (emphasis added). The De La Torre court used the rationale that to hold otherwise would oppose the public policy of the State and the philosophy underlying the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Id.
Under Section 52-1-30 of the Act the employer is obligated to pay compensation on the “occurrence of disability.” In a case recognizing the occurrence of latent injuries, the Court of Appeals has explained the difference between the terms “date of disability” and “date of accident” by stating:
[I]f the claimant suffers an accident in the course of his employment which does not disable but ultimately leads to a later “malfunction of the body” resulting in disability, the continuing pain and degenerating ability to function constitute the operative “accident” which brings about the compensable “accidental injury” on the date of disability.
Casias v. Zia Co., 93 N.M. 78, 79, 596 P.2d 521, 522 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 8, 595 P.2d 1203 (1979).
The record states that Smith was performing his regular job, one which Dr. Hillmer’s letter described as “heavy duty.” While Smith does not deny he had pain, he functioned in his regular job and the company doctor reported he would not have “permanent impairment from this accident,” and would “make a good recovery.”
The Court of Appeals states that “[t]he physician’s reports, contained in the record, do not affirmatively state that plaintiff was not disabled.” Smith continued to work, but because he had pain, the Court of Appeals held he could not reasonably rely on the diagnosis of the company’s medical specialist. The Court of Appeals concluded “the workman was aware at all times of a compensable injury, even though he may not have appreciated its degree.”
The rule for the discovery of a disability is that discovery occurs “[a]s soon as it becomes reasonably apparent, or should become reasonably apparent, to a workman that he has an injury on account of which he is entitled to compensation * * *” ABF Freight System v. Montano, 99 N.M. 259, 260, 657 P.2d 115, 116 (1982), (quoting Noland v. Young Drilling Co., 79 N.M. 444, 447, 444 P.2d 771, 774 (Ct.App.1968)).
It is essential to this limitations issue that we decide whether Smith should have known he was disabled prior to being so advised by army doctors. Here we have an employee performing his normal work duties. Additionally he is reassured twice by a company doctor, specializing in back injuries, that he has no permanent impairment. It would be patently unfair to expect the common laborer to have greater knowledge than the medical expert. See Duran v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 83 N.M. 38, 487 P.2d 1343 (1971); Pena v. New Mexico Highway Department, 100 N.M. 408, 671 P.2d 656 (Ct.App.1983); Sedillo v. LeviStrauss Corp., 98 N.M. 52, 644 P.2d 1041 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M.
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OPINION
SOSA, Senior Justice.
Plaintiff-Appellant, Shawn Smith (Smith) filed a claim for benefits under New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act), NMSA 1978, Sections 52-1-1 through 52-1-69 (Orig.Pamp. and Cum.Supp.1982) against his former employer Dowell Corporation (Dow). The district court granted summary judgment for Dow, stating plaintiff’s claim was barred by his failure to timely file under Section 52-l-31(A). In a memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari and reverse the Court of Appeals.
The sole issue before the Court is when will a worker with a latent injury be held to reasonably recognize the nature and probable, compensable character of the injury, thus activating the running of the statute of limitations.
While in Dow’s employ on August 12, 1980, Smith suffered an accidental injury when a cement truck he was driving left the road and flipped over, crushing the cab. Smith continued working his regular job, but a month following the accident he had to be placed on light duty for a three week period. He then returned to his normal job. He continued to work for Dow until he was terminated December 4, 1981.
The record reflects that at Dow’s request Smith was examined and treated at least twice by Dr. Hillmer, an orthopedic specialist, chosen by the company. Two letters written by Dr. Hillmer were placed in evidence as exhibits. The insurance company and Dow received the letters.
In a June 1, 1981 letter, Dr. Hillmer noted the following: Smith had three weeks of light duty about a month after the accident and then returned to his normal duties; his present job (at Dow) involved “heavy duty” work; his visits to a chiropractor were decreasing in frequency; and “[cjomplaints will become less severe * * * I do not feel he will have any permanent impairment from this accident.” There was no finding of disability in the letter. In a second letter dated October 19, 1981, Dr. Hillmer concluded: “I still feel he will ultimately make a good recovery.” Two months later Smith was terminated. He then joined the army.
Approximately three months after Dr. Hillmer’s October letter, on January 25, 1982, army doctors informed Smith he had a permanent disability to his back resulting from the August 1980 accident. He received a medical discharge from the army. Thereafter, he attempted to find light duty work but was unsuccessful.
Smith filed a workmen’s compensation complaint on November 18, 1982, within a year of the time the army doctors informed him of his disability. The complaint for benefits was denied by the district court under the statute of limitations bar, Section 52-l-31(A).
First, we set forth principles that are fundamental to the concept of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Since its inception, we have held that the Act was adopted to provide a humanitarian and economical system of compensation for the injured worker and should be liberally construed in favor of the claimant. Gonzales v. Chino Copper Co., 29 N.M. 228, 222 P. 903 (1924). That is still the law today. Transport Idemnity Co. v. Garcia, 89 N.M. 342, 552 P.2d 473 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 9, 558 P.2d 621 (1976). If no guidelines are given by statute, fundamental fairness must be the guideline. Id. The Act was adopted for the protection of the worker, not the employer. Clark v. Electronic City, 90 N.M. 477, 565 P.2d 348 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977).
Smith relies on De La Torre v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 89 N.M. 683, 556 P.2d 839 (Ct.App.1976) as authority for the date to begin the running of the limitations statute. De La Torre holds: “Time does not begin to run until the disability is discovered rather than from the accidental occurrence.” Id. at 686, 556 P.2d at 842 (emphasis added). The De La Torre court used the rationale that to hold otherwise would oppose the public policy of the State and the philosophy underlying the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Id.
Under Section 52-1-30 of the Act the employer is obligated to pay compensation on the “occurrence of disability.” In a case recognizing the occurrence of latent injuries, the Court of Appeals has explained the difference between the terms “date of disability” and “date of accident” by stating:
[I]f the claimant suffers an accident in the course of his employment which does not disable but ultimately leads to a later “malfunction of the body” resulting in disability, the continuing pain and degenerating ability to function constitute the operative “accident” which brings about the compensable “accidental injury” on the date of disability.
Casias v. Zia Co., 93 N.M. 78, 79, 596 P.2d 521, 522 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 8, 595 P.2d 1203 (1979).
The record states that Smith was performing his regular job, one which Dr. Hillmer’s letter described as “heavy duty.” While Smith does not deny he had pain, he functioned in his regular job and the company doctor reported he would not have “permanent impairment from this accident,” and would “make a good recovery.”
The Court of Appeals states that “[t]he physician’s reports, contained in the record, do not affirmatively state that plaintiff was not disabled.” Smith continued to work, but because he had pain, the Court of Appeals held he could not reasonably rely on the diagnosis of the company’s medical specialist. The Court of Appeals concluded “the workman was aware at all times of a compensable injury, even though he may not have appreciated its degree.”
The rule for the discovery of a disability is that discovery occurs “[a]s soon as it becomes reasonably apparent, or should become reasonably apparent, to a workman that he has an injury on account of which he is entitled to compensation * * *” ABF Freight System v. Montano, 99 N.M. 259, 260, 657 P.2d 115, 116 (1982), (quoting Noland v. Young Drilling Co., 79 N.M. 444, 447, 444 P.2d 771, 774 (Ct.App.1968)).
It is essential to this limitations issue that we decide whether Smith should have known he was disabled prior to being so advised by army doctors. Here we have an employee performing his normal work duties. Additionally he is reassured twice by a company doctor, specializing in back injuries, that he has no permanent impairment. It would be patently unfair to expect the common laborer to have greater knowledge than the medical expert. See Duran v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 83 N.M. 38, 487 P.2d 1343 (1971); Pena v. New Mexico Highway Department, 100 N.M. 408, 671 P.2d 656 (Ct.App.1983); Sedillo v. LeviStrauss Corp., 98 N.M. 52, 644 P.2d 1041 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982); see also, 3 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, § 78.-42(a) at 15-221 (1983).
A sister state dealt with a similar fact pattern by holding the worker should not be barred by limitations. Bowerman v. Employment Security Commission, Mont., 673 P.2d 476 (1983). In Bowerman the worker fell down a stairwell in 1976. He continued to work, but saw medical specialists in 1977 and 1979. When his symptoms worsened in March, 1980, his job performance was impaired. The claim he submitted in December, 1980 was disallowed by the trial court because it was not timely filed.
The Montana Court in reversing referred to 3 A. Larson, supra, Sections 78.40 to 78.42. Larson states:
It is odd indeed to find, in a supposedly beneficent piece of legislation, the survival of this fragment of irrational cruelty surpassing the most technical forfeitures of legal statutes of limitation. Statutes of limitation generally proceed on the theory that a man forfeits his rights only when he inexcusably delays assertion of them, and any number of excuses will toll the running of the period. But here no amount of vigilance is of any help. The limitations period runs against a claim that has not yet matured; and when it matures, it is already barred.
A. Larson, supra, § 78.42(b), at 15-225, 15-226. (emphasis added).
Agreeing with the logic in Larson, supra, the Montana Supreme Court held that “in cases of latent injury * * * the time period for notice of claim does not begin to run until the claimant, as a reasonable man, should recognize the nature, seriousness and probable, compensable character of his latent injury.” Bowerman, Mont., 673 P.2d at 479. This standard should apply as well in New Mexico. Here, we are concerned with the date of the “occurrence of disability” under Section 52-1-31. The letters from the company doctor assured both the employer and the worker that there was no permanent impairment. Under the facts of this case, it could not have been reasonably apparent to the worker or his employer that he had a latent disability while being told by a specialist he would make a “good recovery.”
Under the Montana standard adopted by this Court for recognizing a latent injury, Smith could not have recognized the nature, seriousness and probable, compensable character of his back injury until he was so advised by army doctors on January 25, 1982. The statute of limitations therefore began to run on that date. Smith filed his workmen’s compensation complaint on November 18,1982, well within the limitations time under Section 52-1-31(A). See Montano.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. A full trial is proper on the issues presented by plaintiff Smith’s claim, including the question of when the plaintiff discovered that there was a compensable injury-
The district court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
FEDERICI, C.J., and RIORDAN, J., concur. WALTERS, J., not participating. STOWERS, J., dissenting.