Smith v. Commonwealth Of Pennsylvania

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 11, 2022
Docket1:21-cv-01181
StatusUnknown

This text of Smith v. Commonwealth Of Pennsylvania (Smith v. Commonwealth Of Pennsylvania) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Commonwealth Of Pennsylvania, (M.D. Pa. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA MICHAEL SCOTT SMITH, : Civil No. 1:21-CV-1181 : Plaintiff, : : v. : : COMMONWEALTH OF : PENNSYLVANIA, : : Defendant. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court for screening is Plaintiff Michael Scott Smith’s complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis and has filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief. (Docs. 2, 9, 11.) For the reasons that follow, the court will grant Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis but dismiss the complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Based on the dismissal of the complaint, Plaintiff’s unbriefed motion for injunctive relief will be denied as moot. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff Michael Scott Smith (“Smith”) is a pretrial detainee held at the Franklin County Jail in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1.) In his complaint, Smith claims the events giving rise to his complaint against the sole Defendant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, occurred between June 27, 2007 and March 29, 2021 and relate to his various criminal proceedings. (Id., pp. 4.)1 Smith claims he was arrested and coerced into plea that resulted in the denial of his universal rights,

detention, enslavement, and unlawful servitude. Although Smith’s handwriting is difficult to read at times, and the factual allegations of his complaint are sparce, as relief he seeks his criminal record expunged, his intellectual property rights

restored, monetary damages, and his release from “illegal slavery and detention.” (Id., pp. 5, 7.) On August 6, 2021, Smith cross filed the same motion for preliminary injunction in several of his pending actions in this court. The focus of his request

for injunctive relief is unclear at best. Nonetheless, even though Smith was provided with excerpts of this court’s local rules, Smith did not file a brief in support of his motion. See Doc. 3-2.

JURISDICTION The court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which allows a district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

1 For ease of reference, the court utilizes the page numbers from the CM/ECF header. STANDARD OF REVIEW When a litigant seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, without the prepayment

of fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 requires the court to screen the complaint. Likewise, when a prisoner seeks redress from a government defendant in a civil action, whether proceeding in forma pauperis or not, the court must screen the complaint.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915(A) give the court the authority to dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii); 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1)–(2). In deciding whether the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, the court employs the standard used to analyze motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d

366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003)). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all well pleaded allegations as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Doe v. Univ. of the Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020).

The pleadings of self-represented plaintiffs are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys and are to be liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Higgs v. Att’y Gen.,

655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d. Cir. 2011). Self-represented litigants are to be granted leave to file a curative amended complaint even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile. See

Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). However, a complaint that sets forth facts which affirmatively demonstrate that the plaintiff has no right to recover is properly dismissed without leave to amend. Dooley, 957

F.3d at 376 (citing Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002)). DISCUSSION

A. Failure to State a Claim Although unclear, Plaintiff alleges that he has been deprived of certain constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The sole named Defendant is the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1.) Section 1983 provides that

persons acting under color of state law may be held liable if they deprive an individual of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead two essential elements: (1) the conduct complained of was

committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1998); Malleus

v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 60 (1989) (neither

the state nor an official of the state acting in his or her official capacity is a “person” within the meaning of section 1983). Additionally, it is well settled that the Eleventh Amendment precludes federal claims for monetary damages against a

state, its agencies, departments, or officials acting in their official capacity. See A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schools, 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment further bars Smith’s claims against the Commonwealth. See Tarapchak v. County of Lackawanna, 739 F. App’x 172, 178 n. 7 (3d Cir.

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Related

Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Karen Malleus v. John George
641 F.3d 560 (Third Circuit, 2011)
Mark Mitchell v. Martin F. Horn
318 F.3d 523 (Third Circuit, 2003)
Phillips v. County of Allegheny
515 F.3d 224 (Third Circuit, 2008)
A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schools
341 F.3d 234 (Third Circuit, 2003)
Casey Dooley v. John Wetzel
957 F.3d 366 (Third Circuit, 2020)
John Doe v. University of the Sciences
961 F.3d 203 (Third Circuit, 2020)

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Smith v. Commonwealth Of Pennsylvania, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-commonwealth-of-pennsylvania-pamd-2022.