Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Sean Smith, No. CV-24-03545-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Sean Smith’s appeal from the Commission of 16 the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA,” “Commissioner,” or “Defendant”) denial of 17 Social Security benefits, (Doc. 7-3), Plaintiff’s opening brief, (Doc. 9), Defendant’s 18 response, (Doc. 13), and Plaintiff’s reply, (Doc. 14). 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 a. Factual and Procedural Overview 21 Plaintiff is 49 years old with “at least a high school education.” (Doc. 9 at 4). He 22 previously worked “as a user support analyst.” (Doc. 9 at 4). Plaintiff filed his Social 23 Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits application on November 11, 2022, 24 alleging disabilities beginning on June 26, 2022. (Doc. 7-3 at 17). The application “was 25 denied initially on April 23, 2023, and upon reconsideration on December 27, 2023.” (Doc. 26 7-3 at 17). After an administrative hearing, an ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim. (Doc. 7-3 at 27 14). The SSA Appeals Council denied a request for review of that decision and adopted 28 the ALJ’s decision as the agency’s final decision. (Doc. 7-3 at 2-5). 1 b. The SSA’s Five-Step Evaluation Process 2 To qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, a claimant must show 3 that he “is under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). To be “under a disability,” the 4 claimant must be unable to engage in “substantial gainful activity” due to any medically 5 determinable physical or mental impairment. Id. § 423(d)(1). The impairment must be of 6 such severity that the claimant cannot do his previous work or any other substantial gainful 7 work within the national economy. Id. § 423(d)(2). The SSA has created a five-step 8 sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled. See 20 9 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). The steps are followed in order, and each step is potentially 10 dispositive. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4). 11 At Step One, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in “substantial 12 gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that 13 is (1) “substantial,” i.e., doing “significant physical or mental activities;” and (2) “gainful,” 14 i.e., usually done “for pay or profit.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a)-(b). If the claimant is engaging 15 in substantial gainful work activity, the ALJ will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 16 404.1520(a)(4)(i). 17 At Step Two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has “a severe medically 18 determinable physical or mental impairment” or severe “combination of impairments.” Id. 19 § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). To be “severe,” the claimant’s impairment must “significantly limit” 20 the claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c). 21 If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ 22 will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 23 At Step Three, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairment(s) “meets or 24 equals” an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id. § 25 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the ALJ will find the claimant is disabled, but if not, the ALJ 26 must assess the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) before proceeding to 27 Step Four. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(e). The claimant’s RFC is his ability 28 perform physical and mental work activities “despite his limitations,” based on all relevant 1 evidence in the case record. Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). To determine RFC, the ALJ must 2 consider all the claimant’s impairments, including those that are not “severe,” and any 3 related symptoms that “affect what [the claimant] can do in a work setting.” Id. §§ 4 404.1545(a)(1)-(2). 5 At Step Four, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has the RFC to perform the 6 physical and mental demands of “his past relevant work.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 7 404.1520(e). “Past relevant work” is work the claimant has “done within the past 15 years, 8 that was substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1560(b)(1). If the claimant has the RFC to 9 perform his past relevant work, the ALJ will find the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 10 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform his past relevant work, the ALJ will 11 proceed to Step Five in the sequential evaluation process. 12 At Step Five, the final step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant “can make an 13 adjustment to other work,” considering his RFC, age, education, and work experience. Id. 14 § 404.1520(a)(v). If so, the ALJ will find the claimant not disabled. Id. If the claimant 15 cannot make this adjustment, the ALJ will find the opposite. Id. 16 c. The ALJ’s Application of the Factors 17 Here, at Step One, the ALJ concluded that the record established that Plaintiff “has 18 not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 26, 2022, the alleged onset date.” 19 (Doc. 7-3 at 19). 20 At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has the following severe 21 impairments: lumbar and thoracic spondylosis; L1 compression fracture deformity, 22 degenerative joint disease of the bilateral knees, flat feet, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, 23 major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder; unspecified and post-traumatic stress disorder 24 (PTSD).” (Doc. 7-3 at 19). 25 At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or 26 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 27 impairments” in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. (Doc. 7-3 at 20). 28 Subsequently, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to: 1 to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except he can sit for six hours out of an eight-hour day and stand and/or walk for four hours out of an eight- 2 hour day. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can occasionally balance, stoop, and crouch; never kneel or crawl. 3 He must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards, like dangerous moving machinery and unprotected heights. He is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple 4 instructions and make simple, work-related decisions in a routine work setting. He can frequently interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. 5 6 (Doc. 7-3 at 22). 7 At Step Four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “is unable to perform any past 8 relevant work.” (Doc. 7-3 at 28). 9 At Step Five, the ALJ, in considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, 10 and RFC, found that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 11 economy that the [Plaintiff] can perform.” (Doc. 7-3 at 28). Examples of such jobs include 12 order caller, photocopying machine operator, and agriculture produce sorter. (Doc. 7-3 at 13 29). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled, “as defined in the 14 Social Security Act, from June 26, 2022, through the date of [the] decision.” (Doc. 7-3 at 15 29). 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 This Court may not set aside a final denial of disability benefits unless the ALJ 18 decision is “based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 19 Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Benton ex rel. Benton v. 20 Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003)). “Substantial” evidence involves “more 21 than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 22 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that “a reasonable mind 23 might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 24 Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)). The Court, in its review, must 25 consider the record in its entirety, “weighing both the evidence that supports and evidence 26 that detracts from the [ALJ’s] conclusion.” Id. (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 27 1009 (9th Cir. 2007)). 28 The ALJ—not this Court—is responsible for resolving ambiguities, resolving 1 conflicts in medical testimony, determining credibility, and drawing logical inferences 2 from the medical record. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 3 Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 4 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984)). Therefore, when the evidence of record could result in more 5 than one rational interpretation, “the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 6 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 7 (9th Cir. 2004) (“When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational 8 interpretation, [the Court] must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.”). Further, this Court may 9 only review the reasons the ALJ provides in the disability determination; it “may not affirm 10 the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010. The Court 11 will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, which exists 12 if the error is “‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination,’ or if, despite 13 the legal error, ‘the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned . . .’” Brown-Hunter v. 14 Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Plaintiff appeals the SSA’s denial of Social Security benefits, alleging that the ALJ’s 17 findings are unsupported by substantial evidence and the ALJ erred as a matter of law. 18 More specifically, Plaintiff argues that (1) that ALJ failed to consider the SSR 16-3p factors 19 in evaluating credibility; (2) the ALJ “usurped” medical experts in its consideration of an 20 MRI; (3) the ALJ failed to consider Dr. Bonilla’s opinion regarding an annular tear; and 21 (4) the ALJ improperly discredited Plaintiff and Dr. Brooks with respect to yoga and tai 22 chi. (Doc. 9 at 15-22). The Court considers each claim in turn. 23 a. SSR 16-3p factors 24 Under SSR 16-3p, an ALJ must use the following factors when “evaluat[ing] the 25 intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of an individual’s symptoms:”

26 1. Daily activities; 2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; 27 3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; 4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an individual 28 takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; 5. Treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has received for relief 1 of pain or other symptoms; 6. Any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used to relieve pain 2 or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and 3 7. Any other factors concerning an individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. 4 5 SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at * 7-8 (Oct. 25, 2017). 6 These factors “are a recitation of the factors set forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. 7 §§ 404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3). The regulations state only that the ALJ will consider 8 these factors and not that the ALJ is required to specifically discuss each of these factors 9 in the opinion.” White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-00615-BAM, 2023 WL 10 3977506, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2023) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). In 11 other words, “SSR 16-3p does not require the ALJ to discuss expressly each of these 12 factors.” Id.; see also SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at * 8 (ALJ need only “discuss the 13 factors pertinent to the evidence of record.”). 14 Here, Plaintiff repeatedly says that the ALJ did not consider all the factors the ALJ 15 was required to consider under SSR 16-3p. (Doc. 9 at 15-16; Doc. 14 at 1). In doing so, 16 Plaintiff not only improperly speculates regarding the ALJ’s decision-making process, but 17 Plaintiff conflates what the ALJ is required to do; while the ALJ must consider the factors, 18 she need not discuss each factor in the opinion. And, here, the ALJ indicated that she 19 considered each factor. (See Doc. 7-3 at 22 (“[T]he undersigned has considered all 20 symptoms . . . based on the requirements of . . . SSR 16-3p.”)). Nonetheless, the Court will 21 interpret Plaintiff as arguing that the ALJ failed to discuss a factor that was pertinent to the 22 evidence of record. 23 Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ’s “short sentence summary” that the Plaintiff 24 “testified he has back pain” “does not include all factors the ALJ was required to consider 25 by SSR 16-3p.” (Doc. 9 at 15-16). Plaintiff similarly argues that the ALJ was required to 26 discuss Plaintiff’s specific testimony regarding (1) “sharp, shooting pains that go from [his] 27 feet all the way up to [his] back,” (2) his inability to unload the dishwasher or microwave 28 1 food, and (3) his inability to sit “for a long time.”1 (Doc. 9 at 16). 2 The Court rejects these arguments for the following reasons. First, it is permissible 3 for the ALJ to summarize Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. See, e.g., Stewart v. 4 Kijakazi, No. 1:22-cv-00189-ADA-HBK, 2023 WL 4162767, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 22, 5 2023), findings and recommendations adopted, 2023 WL 5109769 (Aug. 8, 2023) (ALJ is 6 “not require[d] . . . to perform a line-by-line exegesis of the claimant’s testimony, nor [are] 7 they require[d] [] to draft dissertations when denying benefits.”). Second, this is not the 8 ALJ’s only reference to Plaintiff’s testimony. The ALJ references various other, specific 9 parts of Plaintiff’s testimony throughout her analysis.2 Third, the ALJ identifies 10 inconsistencies between the objective medical evidence and Plaintiff’s testimony and gives 11 specific reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. For example, the ALJ 12 discusses Plaintiff “needing the assistance of his support dog to pick up items he has 13 dropped” and contrasts this with a consultative examination that suggests Plaintiff has “a 14 substantial residual ability to stand, walk, sit, lift, and carry.” (Doc. 7-3 at 23). The ALJ 15 discusses Plaintiff’s report that (1) knee injections were effective and relieved his pain for 16 six months, and (2) that “his medications are effective,” both of which cut against 17 Plaintiff’s alleged limitations. (Doc. 7-3 at 24). The ALJ discusses Plaintiff’s report “that 18 he does yoga/tai-chi and enjoys walking his dogs”3 and explains how this, in combination 19 1 Curiously, in Plaintiff’s reply, Plaintiff seemingly abandons these arguments and instead 20 argues that the ALJ “cherry-pick[ed] evidence” and should have considered “Dr. Bonilla’s expert opinion that the MRI results may in fact confirm the validity of the Plaintiff’s 21 complaints.” (Doc. 14 at 2). The Court discusses Dr. Bonilla’s opinion below. 2 See, e.g., Doc. 7-3 at 22-23, 25: 22 The claimant testified he is unable to work due to difficulty concentrating and difficulty handling stressful situations. He testified he does not like traffic or 23 crowds, does not like people and does not do well in spaces where he is around others. He explained he has support dogs that help him with panic attacks and with 24 picking up items he may drop. He testified he has back pain and knee pain. He explained he wears a knee brace daily and has been using a cane for 2 years and a 25 walker for 4-6 months due to his knee problems. . . . 26 The claimant testified he is unable to work due to difficulty concentrating and difficulty handling stressful situations. He testified he does not like traffic or 27 crowds, does not like people and does not do well in spaces where he is around others. He explained he has support dogs that help him with panic attacks. 28 3 Additionally, this discussion shows the ALJ’s consideration of another 16-3p factor: daily activities. 1 with medical evidence, cuts against “finding a hand-held assistive device is medically 2 required.” (Doc. 7-3 at 24). These are just a few examples; the ALJ devotes six, single- 3 spaced pages to explaining why Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, 4 persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the 5 medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Doc. 7-3 at 27). Accordingly, it is 6 clear that the ALJ’s reference to the 16-3p factors, combined with the ALJ’s in-depth 7 discussion of Plaintiff’s testimony and evidence in the record, are sufficient to support the 8 ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. The ALJ gave specific, clear, 9 and convincing reasons for this decision and the Court affirms the ALJ. 10 b. Plaintiff’s MRI 11 First, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ not referencing or including “photographs 12 or scans of the actual film or imaging scans reviewed in the first instance by the radiologist 13 and perhaps treating physician(s).” (Doc. 9 at 16). The Commissioner responds that “it is 14 unclear why such evidence is necessary, especially since Plaintiff argues (correctly) that 15 the ALJ is a lay person and would not have the expertise to interpret the results.” (Doc. 13 16 at 8). The Court agrees with the Commissioner and does not find this omission to constitute 17 error. 18 Second, Plaintiff takes issue with how the ALJ “interpret[ed] [] the radiologist’s 19 summary report of [] highly technical medical evidence,” arguing that this constitutes the 20 ALJ “playing doctor.” (Doc. 9 at 17). The ALJ found that: “While these imaging reports 21 document some abnormalities, they do not show more significant findings, like central 22 canal compromise, significant stenosis, nerve root impingement or herniation, nor were 23 there any other objective findings consistent with the level of pain he has alleged.” (Doc. 24 7-3 at 23). The first part of this statement is a simple fact: either a medical provider found 25 that the imaging reports do not show those conditions, or those conditions were not 26 referenced by any medical provider.4 The second part of the statement is supported by the

27 4 The Court searched the record for “central canal compromise” and “nerve root impingement” and did not find any references. Dr. Suzie El-Saden, discussed more below, 28 found “[n]o disc herniation” and “[n]o spinal canal or significant foraminal stenosis.” (Doc. 8-2 at 84; Doc. 8-3 at 17-18). 1 medical opinion of Dr. Javier Torres. As the Commissioner points out, “Javier Torres, 2 M.D., reviewed the evidence, including the spinal x-rays and MRI, and determined that 3 Plaintiff did not have work preclusive limitations and could perform light work.”5 (Doc. 4 13 at 9 (emphasis added)). Plaintiff replies that Dr. Torres “did not have the benefit of the 5 actual MRI imaging scans or films.” (Doc. 14 at 3). Dr. Torres’ report references an MRI 6 and Dr. Torres concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled and can adjust to other work. (Doc. 7 7-4 at 20). Still, Plaintiff argues in the reply brief that “Dr. Torres’ medical opinion does 8 not relieve the ALJ of her duty to consider relevant medical evidence, and it certainly does 9 not empower the ALJ to reach her own medical conclusions.” (Doc. 14 at 3). However, 10 again, the ALJ considered the relevant medical evidence and did not reach any independent 11 medical conclusions beyond what is permissible.6 Consequently, the ALJ did not err in this 12 regard. 13 c. Dr. Bonilla 14 Dr. Gabriel Bonilla reported the following: “No mention of annular tear but I would 15 not be surprised [if] there is some sort of tear on the posterior aspect of the annulus based 16 on [how] the MRI looks.” (Doc. 8-3 at 51). The ALJ did not reference Dr. Bonilla’s report. 17 Plaintiff argues that this is an example of the ALJ “substitut[ing] her own lay knowledge 18 to interpret the results of imaging studies” and argues that the ALJ needed to “provide a 19 narrative discussion as to why her lay opinion would be correct instead of [Dr. Bonilla’s].” 20 (Doc. 9 at 17-18). 21 An ALJ must evaluate medical opinion evidence. “A medical opinion is a statement 22 from a medical source about what [a claimant] can still do despite [] impairment(s) and 23 whether [a claimant has] one or more impairment-related limitations or restrictions. . . .” 24 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2). The Court agrees with the Commissioner that this specific 25 5 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by stating that conditions that could “produce severe 26 pain” were not found because the MRI shows conditions that could “possibly produce significant pain.” (Doc. 9 at 17). However, Dr. Torres’ findings directly contradict this 27 argument. 6 As the Commissioner notes, under the regulations, the ALJ may “consider[] objective 28 medical evidence in the medical record and appropriately [make] findings about what it show[s].” (See Doc. 13 at 9-10). 1 sentence of Dr. Bonilla’s report is not a medical opinion because it was speculative in 2 nature. (See Doc. 13 at 10-11). As such, the ALJ was not required to include this in her 3 analysis and did not err in this regard. 4 d. Yoga and Tai Chi 5 Dr. Mitchell Brooks reported that Plaintiff had the following impairments (reported 6 in Plaintiff’s own words):

7 Squatting, kneeling, crawling, getting into and out of low cars, up from low seats, up from floors, pivoting, stairs down more than up, putting on trousers, shoes and 8 sox, sitting for more than 130 minutes all have some degree of functional interference. [Plaintiff] can only drive for 30 minutes and then must stop. He can 9 walk for 5 minutes [] and then must stop. [Plaintiff] can stand in place for 5 minutes.

10 (Doc. 8-4 at 92). 11 The ALJ found Dr. Brooks’ opinion “partially persuasive” because “[w]hile the 12 [Plaintiff] reasonably is unable to climb ladders or kneel and must avoid hazards and has 13 postural limitations, the indication the [Plaintiff] is unable to crouch and can only stand for 14 5 minutes is not consistent with the longitudinal medical record.” (Doc. 7-3 at 26). The 15 ALJ notes that Plaintiff “reports he does yoga and tai chi, and his strength is shown as full 16 (5/5), and his range of motion is not shown to be limited to the extent these activities would 17 be precluded.” (Doc. 7-3 at 27). Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ “assuming the yoga and 18 tai chi were somehow strenuous activities that exceeded the physical limitations opined to 19 by Dr. Brooks.” (Doc. 9 at 18). Plaintiff lists various record cites to support his argument 20 that Plaintiff’s yoga and tai chi involved “physical restrictions” such that the activities “do 21 not contradict the Plaintiff’s testimony . . . nor do they contradict Dr. Brooks’ expert 22 opinions.” (Doc. 9 at 19). 23 The ALJ did not entirely disregard Dr. Brooks’ opinion; rather, the ALJ found it 24 “partially persuasive.” The ALJ could reasonably infer that the practice of yoga and tai chi, 25 even if virtual or chair-based, suggests that Plaintiff’s range of motion is not as limited as 26 Dr. Brooks found. See Doney v. Astrue, 485 F. App’x 163, 165 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding 27 ALJ’s rejection of doctor’s opinion because it was “supported by reasonable inferences 28 drawn from the record.”). Additionally, yoga and tai chi are not the sole reason that the || ALJ found Dr. Brooks’ opinion partially persuasive; the ALJ also pointed to the fact that 2|| Plaintiffs strength “is shown as full (5/5).” Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ has provided || enough reasoning for the Court to meaningfully determine that the ALJ’s conclusion is 4|| supported by substantial evidence. See Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d || 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014). 6 IV. CONCLUSION 7 For the foregoing reasons, 8 IT IS ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED and the Clerk of the 9|| Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 10 Dated this 9th day of June, 2025. 11 12 a 13 14 _ James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-ll-