Smith v. City of Montgomery, Alabama (MAG+)

District Court, M.D. Alabama·Decided August 4, 2023·No. 2:22-cv-00298·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

PETER J. SMITH, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CASE NO. 2:22-cv-298-MHT-JTA ) (WO) CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ) ALABAMA, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE Before the court is frequent pro se Plaintiff Peter J. Smith’s Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit. (Doc. No. 10.) For the reasons set forth below, it is ORDERED that the motion is DENIED. Further, it is the RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE that this case be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute and for failure to comply with the court’s orders, and in accordance with the court’s inherent authority to manage its docket to secure the orderly and expeditious disposition of the cases on its docket. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW “A district court has inherent authority to manage its own docket ‘so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)). Consistent with this authority, and also pursuant to Rule 41(b)1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “the court may dismiss a plaintiff's action sua sponte for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or a court order.” Centurion Sys., LLC v. Bank of New York Melon, No. 8:21-CV-726-SDM-AAS, 2021 WL 7448071, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2021) (citing Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1983)), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Centurion Sys., LLC v. Bank of New York Mellon, No. 8:21-CV-726- SDM-AAS, 2021 WL 7448080 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2021). “Included within this inherent power is the authority to ‘impose formal sanctions upon dilatory litigants.’” Nurse v.

Sheraton Atlanta Hotel, 618 F. App’x 987, 989 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Co–op. of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989)). “‘The power to invoke this sanction [of dismissal for failure to prosecute] is necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.’” Equity Lifestyle, 556 F.3d at 1240 (quoting Durham v. Fla. E. Coast Ry.

Co., 385 F.2d 366, 367 (5th Cir. 1967).2 Whether to dismiss a complaint under Rule 41(b) “is a matter committed to the district court’s discretion.” Id. at 1240 n.14 (citing Gratton v. Great Am. Commc’ns, 178

1 Though Rule 41(b) refers specifically to dismissal on a defendant’s motion, “[a] federal district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) if the plaintiff fails to comply with a court order.” Rodriguez v. Lawson, 848 F. App’x 412, 413 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2005)). 2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981. F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999)). “The legal standard to be applied under Rule 41(b) is whether there is a ‘clear record of delay or willful contempt and a finding that lesser

sanctions would not suffice.” Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Jones, 709 F.2d at 1458). Further, if a court finds a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff, dismissal for failure to comply with court orders may be a dismissal with prejudice. See McKinley v. F.D.I.C., 645 F. App’x 910, 911 n.3 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing McKelvey v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 789 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986)). “[S]uch dismissal [with prejudice] is a sanction of last resort, applicable only in

extreme circumstances, and generally proper only where less drastic sanctions are unavailable.” McKelvey, 789 F.2d at 1520. Extreme circumstances justifying dismissal with prejudice “must, at a minimum, be based on evidence of willful delay; simple negligence does not warrant dismissal.” Id. (citations omitted). II. THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Peter J. Smith has filed numerous lawsuits against Defendant City of Montgomery, its police officers, and its employees, five of which are currently pending in this court.3 In this case, Smith asserts claims against the City of Montgomery, Montgomery

3 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Montgomery, Alabama et al., 2:23-cv-00023-ECM-SMD (dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court orders); Smith v. City of Montgomery, Alabama, et al., Case No. 2:23-cv-00021-RAH-KFP (dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with orders to pay the filing fee after the motion to proceed in forma pauperis was denied); Smith v. City of Montgomery, Alabama, et al., Case No. 2:22-cv-00668-WKW-CWB (dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with court orders to properly amend the complaint and pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted); Smith v. City of Montgomery, Alabama, et al., Case No. 2:22-cv-00307-WKW-JTA (pending); Smith v. City of Montgomery, Alabama, et al., Case No. 2:22-cv-00298-MHT-JTA (pending); Smith v. Boyd, et al., 2:22-cv-00199-MHT-JTA (after Plaintiff failed to pay the filing fee or timely file a proper motion to proceed in forma pauperis, case dismissed with prejudice City Employee Sara Foster, the Juliette Morgan Hampton Memorial Library, Montgomery Mayor Steven L. Reed, Montgomery Police Chief Darryl Albert, and Montgomery City

Councilmembers Oronde K. Mitchell, Brantley Lyons, Glen O. Pruitt, Jr., Marche Johnson, Clay Anderson McInnis, Cornelius C.C. Calhoun, Ed Grimes, Charles Jinright, and Audrey Graham. Smith alleges that, “on a Saturday in April of 2022,” Foster brought a large dog to the sliding glass doors of the Morgan Library. (Doc. No. 1 at 1-2.) The dog was not allowed in the library because it was not a service dog. (Id. at 2.) Smith contends that Foster brought

the dog to the library door specifically just to target him because of his race, age, and gender, and to harass and retaliate against Smith for suing her (Foster, not the dog) on a previous occasion. (Id. at 2-3.) Smith states, “I believe that bringing the dog to the library where I was known to frequent was also just another step in creating a hostile library environment for myself in this ongoing conspiracy against me.” (Doc. No. 1 at 3.)

Notably, Smith provides no factual allegations to substantiate his bare accusations and belief that Foster’s motives were unlawful, retaliatory, or discriminatory. Further,

pursuant to FRCP 41

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