1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CANDACE SMITH, Case No. 1:25-cv-00420-JLT-BAM 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION 13 v. WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 14 CITY OF FRESNO, et al., (Doc. 1) 15 Defendants. FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE 16 Plaintiff Candace Smith (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated 17 this action on April 10, 2025. Plaintiff’s complaint is currently before the Court for screening. 18 (Doc. 1.) 19 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 20 The Court screens complaints brought by persons proceeding in pro se and in forma 21 pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to 22 dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 23 granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 24 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 25 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 26 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 27 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 28 1 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 2 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 3 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 4 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 6 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 7 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 8 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 9 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 10 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 11 I. Summary of Plaintiff’s Allegations 12 Plaintiff names the City of Fresno, FAX Bus System, Naomi Chavez, and Hedi Briggs as 13 defendants. Plaintiff utilized this Court’s complaint form to prepare her complaint. In the section 14 of the form regarding the basis of this Court’s jurisdiction, Plaintiff alleges federal question. 15 (Doc. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff asserts the following as the specific federal statutes, federal treaties, and/or 16 provision of the United States Constitution that are at issue: “Attempted Bus Crash Refusal to 17 pay doctor Bills & Injury Compensation.” (Id. at 4.) In the statement of claim section of the 18 form, Plaintiff alleges that the bus abruptly and violently stopped. She flew out of the seat and 19 landed on both legs and arms. She alleges “[t]errible injuries” and right arm bruising. (Id. at 5.) 20 Plaintiff seeks monetary and medical relief. 21 II. Discussion 22 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 23 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and 24 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 25 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 26 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 27 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 28 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 1 at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are 2 not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557. 3 Plaintiff’s amended complaint is not a plain statement of her claims. While short, 4 Plaintiff does not clearly state what happened, including the circumstance, when and where the 5 events happened, or who was involved. Plaintiff also fails to link any of defendant to her 6 allegations. Indeed, there are no specific allegations as to any of the individually named 7 defendants. The complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief. 8 The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 8. 9 B. Federal Court Jurisdiction 10 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may adjudicate only those cases 11 authorized by the Unites States Constitution and Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 12 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “Federal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, ‘unless the contrary 13 appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) 14 (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986)). Without 15 jurisdiction, the district court must dismiss the case. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. 16 California State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Generally, there are 17 two bases for subject matter jurisdiction: (1) diversity jurisdiction; and (2) federal question 18 jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. The complaint fails to adequately allege this Court’s 19 subject matter jurisdiction. Although Plaintiff lists the basis of this Court’s jurisdiction as 20 federal question, the Court will assess both diversity jurisdiction and federal question 21 jurisdiction. 22 1. Diversity of Citizenship 23 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction over civil 24 actions “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,” and where the 25 matter is between “citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 26 Here, the complaint does not provide a specific dollar amount, nor does it allege the 27 citizenship of any party. To the extent Plaintiff is a citizen of California, she cannot establish 28 complete diversity of citizenship because she has named the City of Fresno as a defendant. See 1 Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CANDACE SMITH, Case No. 1:25-cv-00420-JLT-BAM 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION 13 v. WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 14 CITY OF FRESNO, et al., (Doc. 1) 15 Defendants. FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE 16 Plaintiff Candace Smith (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated 17 this action on April 10, 2025. Plaintiff’s complaint is currently before the Court for screening. 18 (Doc. 1.) 19 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 20 The Court screens complaints brought by persons proceeding in pro se and in forma 21 pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to 22 dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 23 granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 24 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 25 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 26 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 27 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 28 1 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 2 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 3 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 4 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 6 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 7 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 8 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 9 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 10 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 11 I. Summary of Plaintiff’s Allegations 12 Plaintiff names the City of Fresno, FAX Bus System, Naomi Chavez, and Hedi Briggs as 13 defendants. Plaintiff utilized this Court’s complaint form to prepare her complaint. In the section 14 of the form regarding the basis of this Court’s jurisdiction, Plaintiff alleges federal question. 15 (Doc. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff asserts the following as the specific federal statutes, federal treaties, and/or 16 provision of the United States Constitution that are at issue: “Attempted Bus Crash Refusal to 17 pay doctor Bills & Injury Compensation.” (Id. at 4.) In the statement of claim section of the 18 form, Plaintiff alleges that the bus abruptly and violently stopped. She flew out of the seat and 19 landed on both legs and arms. She alleges “[t]errible injuries” and right arm bruising. (Id. at 5.) 20 Plaintiff seeks monetary and medical relief. 21 II. Discussion 22 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 23 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and 24 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 25 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 26 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 27 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 28 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 1 at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are 2 not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557. 3 Plaintiff’s amended complaint is not a plain statement of her claims. While short, 4 Plaintiff does not clearly state what happened, including the circumstance, when and where the 5 events happened, or who was involved. Plaintiff also fails to link any of defendant to her 6 allegations. Indeed, there are no specific allegations as to any of the individually named 7 defendants. The complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief. 8 The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 8. 9 B. Federal Court Jurisdiction 10 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may adjudicate only those cases 11 authorized by the Unites States Constitution and Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 12 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “Federal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, ‘unless the contrary 13 appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) 14 (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986)). Without 15 jurisdiction, the district court must dismiss the case. See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. 16 California State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Generally, there are 17 two bases for subject matter jurisdiction: (1) diversity jurisdiction; and (2) federal question 18 jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. The complaint fails to adequately allege this Court’s 19 subject matter jurisdiction. Although Plaintiff lists the basis of this Court’s jurisdiction as 20 federal question, the Court will assess both diversity jurisdiction and federal question 21 jurisdiction. 22 1. Diversity of Citizenship 23 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction over civil 24 actions “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,” and where the 25 matter is between “citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 26 Here, the complaint does not provide a specific dollar amount, nor does it allege the 27 citizenship of any party. To the extent Plaintiff is a citizen of California, she cannot establish 28 complete diversity of citizenship because she has named the City of Fresno as a defendant. See 1 Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973) (recognizing that a political subdivision of a 2 State is a citizen of the State for diversity purposes); see also Smith v. Chick-Fil-A, No. 1:24-cv- 3 01471-JLT-HBK, 2025 WL 489752, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2025) (taking judicial notice that 4 defendant City of Fresno is a citizen of the State of California for diversity purposes). Thus, on 5 its face, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to establish this Court’s diversity jurisdiction. 6 2. Federal Question 7 Plaintiff asserts that the basis of this Court’s jurisdiction is federal question. Pursuant to 8 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts have jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the 9 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” “A case ‘arises under’ federal law either 10 where federal law creates the cause of action or ‘where the vindication of a right under state law 11 necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.’” Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 12 277 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers 13 Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983)). The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction 14 is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint rule.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 15 (1987). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal 16 question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Id. 17 Plaintiff does not allege any violation arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 18 the United States upon which relief in this civil action may be premised. Plaintiff does not cite 19 any particular constitutional provision that would be applicable to the allegations in her 20 complaint. Plaintiff also does not cite or otherwise reference any federal laws to establish federal 21 question jurisdiction. Rather, Plaintiff is apparently pursuing a claim for personal injury while 22 riding the bus, which would be a state law claim. Although the Court may exercise supplemental 23 jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff cannot pursue such claims in this Court without first 24 stating a cognizable claim under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Plaintiff has not stated any 25 cognizable federal claim over which this Court may assert federal question jurisdiction under 28 26 U.S.C. § 1331. 27 C. Leave to Amend 28 When dismissing a complaint, the Ninth Circuit has consistently held that “leave to amend 1 should be granted unless the district court determines that the pleading could not possibly be 2 cured by the allegation of other facts.” Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 3 2001) (internal quotation omitted). Granting Plaintiff leave to amend in this action would be 4 futile considering Plaintiff’s history of deficient filings and repeated advisement by the Court of 5 the very same pleading and legal requirements stated in this order. See Smith v. Fittness, No. 6 1:24-CV-01561-SAB, 2025 WL 278023, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2025) (collecting twelve cases 7 filed by Plaintiff in this Court advising her of the Rule 8 standard and/or subject matter 8 jurisdiction requirements). Plaintiff is therefore well aware that any complaint must contain 9 sufficient facts showing she entitled to relief and that she must establish that the Court has subject 10 matter jurisdiction over this action. Given Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 8 or to establish 11 this Court’s jurisdiction, the Court finds that allowing for further amendment of the complaint 12 would be futile. The Court will therefore recommend that this action be dismissed without leave 13 to amend. 14 III. Conclusion and Recommendation 15 For the reasons stated, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed 16 without leave to amend. 17 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 18 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 19 fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may 20 file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 21 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed 22 fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 number if already in the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page 2 limit may not be considered. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 3 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 4 findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter 5 v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
8 Dated: April 21, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9
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