McMurray, Presiding Judge.
In early 1985, the Police Department of the City of East Point received reports that some of its officers were smoking marijuana in public. The chief of police was unable to find the offending officers through conventional investigative means. Accordingly, it was determined that urinalysis would be employed to ascertain the offending officers. In order to conduct the urinalysis “in a nonselective manner,” the chief of police and the city manager decided to give the tests to all employees of the city having police power.
Appellant Smith was a captain in the city’s fire department. He [660]*660was employed by the city as a fireman for 21 years. Smith was assigned the duties of fire inspector and, in that capacity, he was given police power. Thus, Smith was required to submit to urinalysis.
On March 3, 1985, with the assistant chief of police observing him, Smith provided a urine specimen. Three tests were performed on Smith’s urine: a radio immunoassay test, an enzyme immunoassay test, and a gas chromatograph mass spectrometer test. The results of the first two tests were inconclusive. (The results were negative but highly suggestive of marijuana use.) The third test came back positive. In short order, Smith was discharged for “conduct unbecoming to his position in that, while employed as a police officer with the City of East Point, he did use a controlled substance identified as THC (marijuana).”
Denying the charges against him, Smith appealed to the city’s personnel board. He asserted, inter alia, that the urinalysis constituted an unreasonable search and seizure and violated his rights under the federal and state constitutions. The personnel board determined that Smith’s constitutional rights were not abridged. It sustained the charges against him and decided he had been discharged properly. Smith sought a writ of certiorari in the superior court. Again Smith asserted the violation of his constitutional rights. The superior court denied Smith’s petition and we granted a discretionary appeal. Held:
1. On appeal, Smith presents argument in support of his state constitutional claim only. Although Smith insists that he is not waiving his Fourth Amendment rights, no argument is made in support of those rights. Inasmuch as Smith no longer addresses his federal constitutional claim, it must be considered abandoned. Taylor v. State, 177 Ga. App. 624, 628 (3) (340 SE2d 263).
As a practical matter, the abandonment of the Fourth Amendment claim is insignificant. After all, “Georgia has long granted more protection to its citizens than has the United States . . .” Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 515 (192 SE2d 350). And, although Georgia cannot provide less protection for its citizenry, it can provide more. Id. Furthermore, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII of the 1983 Constitution of Georgia is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment. Smoot v. State, 160 Ga. 744, 747 (128 SE 909). Thus, even though Smith makes no Fourth Amendment argument, Fourth Amendment cases will serve us well as signposts.
2. Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII of the 1983 Constitution of Georgia reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing the place or places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” [661]*661Plainly, this provision of the Georgia Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Was the “taking” of Smith’s urine an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Georgia Constitution? To answer this question, we must first decide whether a urinalysis constitutes a search and seizure. We think that it does.
“Urine, unlike blood, is routinely discharged from the body, so no governmental intrusion into the body is required to seize [it]. However, urine is discharged and disposed of under circumstances where the person certainly has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy. One does not reasonably expect to discharge urine under circumstances making it available to others to collect and analyze in order to discover the personal physiological secrets it holds, except as part of a medical examination. It is significant that both blood and urine can be analyzed in a medical laboratory to discover numerous physiological facts about the person from whom it came, including but hardly limited to recent ingestion of alcohol or drugs. One clearly has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in such personal information contained in his body fluids. Therefore, governmental taking of a urine specimen is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 FSupp. 482, 488-89 (N.D.Ga. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 FSupp. 1214, 1217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74, 81 (C.M.A. 1983).” McDonell v. Hunter, 612 FSupp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985). Accord Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 FSupp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 FSupp. 875, 879 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
Having decided that the urinalysis was a search and seizure, we must now determine whether it was reasonable. In search and seizure cases, reasonableness cannot be defined with precision. Each case requires the balancing of the public’s interest against the rights of the individual to be free from governmental intrusion.
Undoubtedly, the city has a compelling interest in keeping its police force away from drugs. The integrity and well-being of the department depend upon it. Thus, it is entirely proper for the city to take reasonable efforts to weed drug abusers out of law enforcement agencies. Balanced against this interest, we must weigh Smith’s personal rights. In doing so, we must decide whether Smith reasonably and legitimately had an expectation of privacy in the act of urination.
The courts which have considered this question have determined that most people, including policemen and firefighters, have a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in this regard. See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 FSupp. 1507, 1514, supra; Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 FSupp. 875, 880, supra. We agree with this assessment. True, policemen and firemen have diminished expectations of privacy when compared to the general public. Lovvorn v. City [662]*662of Chattanooga, supra. (After all, “by the very nature of their job, police should anticipate that their employer would have serious concerns that their ability to discharge their duties be not impaired by drugs and should anticipate that the employer may place reasonable conditions on employment including scrutiny for drug use.” Caruso v. Ward, 506 NYS2d 789, 793 (Sup. 1986).) But this is not to say that police officers and firemen lose their constitutional rights when they put on their uniforms. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 FSupp. 1122, 1128, supra; Caruso v. Ward, supra. Policemen and firefighters do have a substantial right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Thus, although urine tests for police officers and firemen can be conducted in the absence of probable cause, a standard must be met before random urinalysis is imposed. Invariably, this standard is defined as a reasonable suspicion:
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
McMurray, Presiding Judge.
In early 1985, the Police Department of the City of East Point received reports that some of its officers were smoking marijuana in public. The chief of police was unable to find the offending officers through conventional investigative means. Accordingly, it was determined that urinalysis would be employed to ascertain the offending officers. In order to conduct the urinalysis “in a nonselective manner,” the chief of police and the city manager decided to give the tests to all employees of the city having police power.
Appellant Smith was a captain in the city’s fire department. He [660]*660was employed by the city as a fireman for 21 years. Smith was assigned the duties of fire inspector and, in that capacity, he was given police power. Thus, Smith was required to submit to urinalysis.
On March 3, 1985, with the assistant chief of police observing him, Smith provided a urine specimen. Three tests were performed on Smith’s urine: a radio immunoassay test, an enzyme immunoassay test, and a gas chromatograph mass spectrometer test. The results of the first two tests were inconclusive. (The results were negative but highly suggestive of marijuana use.) The third test came back positive. In short order, Smith was discharged for “conduct unbecoming to his position in that, while employed as a police officer with the City of East Point, he did use a controlled substance identified as THC (marijuana).”
Denying the charges against him, Smith appealed to the city’s personnel board. He asserted, inter alia, that the urinalysis constituted an unreasonable search and seizure and violated his rights under the federal and state constitutions. The personnel board determined that Smith’s constitutional rights were not abridged. It sustained the charges against him and decided he had been discharged properly. Smith sought a writ of certiorari in the superior court. Again Smith asserted the violation of his constitutional rights. The superior court denied Smith’s petition and we granted a discretionary appeal. Held:
1. On appeal, Smith presents argument in support of his state constitutional claim only. Although Smith insists that he is not waiving his Fourth Amendment rights, no argument is made in support of those rights. Inasmuch as Smith no longer addresses his federal constitutional claim, it must be considered abandoned. Taylor v. State, 177 Ga. App. 624, 628 (3) (340 SE2d 263).
As a practical matter, the abandonment of the Fourth Amendment claim is insignificant. After all, “Georgia has long granted more protection to its citizens than has the United States . . .” Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 515 (192 SE2d 350). And, although Georgia cannot provide less protection for its citizenry, it can provide more. Id. Furthermore, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII of the 1983 Constitution of Georgia is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment. Smoot v. State, 160 Ga. 744, 747 (128 SE 909). Thus, even though Smith makes no Fourth Amendment argument, Fourth Amendment cases will serve us well as signposts.
2. Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII of the 1983 Constitution of Georgia reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing the place or places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” [661]*661Plainly, this provision of the Georgia Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Was the “taking” of Smith’s urine an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Georgia Constitution? To answer this question, we must first decide whether a urinalysis constitutes a search and seizure. We think that it does.
“Urine, unlike blood, is routinely discharged from the body, so no governmental intrusion into the body is required to seize [it]. However, urine is discharged and disposed of under circumstances where the person certainly has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy. One does not reasonably expect to discharge urine under circumstances making it available to others to collect and analyze in order to discover the personal physiological secrets it holds, except as part of a medical examination. It is significant that both blood and urine can be analyzed in a medical laboratory to discover numerous physiological facts about the person from whom it came, including but hardly limited to recent ingestion of alcohol or drugs. One clearly has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in such personal information contained in his body fluids. Therefore, governmental taking of a urine specimen is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 FSupp. 482, 488-89 (N.D.Ga. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 FSupp. 1214, 1217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74, 81 (C.M.A. 1983).” McDonell v. Hunter, 612 FSupp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985). Accord Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 FSupp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 FSupp. 875, 879 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
Having decided that the urinalysis was a search and seizure, we must now determine whether it was reasonable. In search and seizure cases, reasonableness cannot be defined with precision. Each case requires the balancing of the public’s interest against the rights of the individual to be free from governmental intrusion.
Undoubtedly, the city has a compelling interest in keeping its police force away from drugs. The integrity and well-being of the department depend upon it. Thus, it is entirely proper for the city to take reasonable efforts to weed drug abusers out of law enforcement agencies. Balanced against this interest, we must weigh Smith’s personal rights. In doing so, we must decide whether Smith reasonably and legitimately had an expectation of privacy in the act of urination.
The courts which have considered this question have determined that most people, including policemen and firefighters, have a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in this regard. See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 FSupp. 1507, 1514, supra; Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 FSupp. 875, 880, supra. We agree with this assessment. True, policemen and firemen have diminished expectations of privacy when compared to the general public. Lovvorn v. City [662]*662of Chattanooga, supra. (After all, “by the very nature of their job, police should anticipate that their employer would have serious concerns that their ability to discharge their duties be not impaired by drugs and should anticipate that the employer may place reasonable conditions on employment including scrutiny for drug use.” Caruso v. Ward, 506 NYS2d 789, 793 (Sup. 1986).) But this is not to say that police officers and firemen lose their constitutional rights when they put on their uniforms. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 FSupp. 1122, 1128, supra; Caruso v. Ward, supra. Policemen and firefighters do have a substantial right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Thus, although urine tests for police officers and firemen can be conducted in the absence of probable cause, a standard must be met before random urinalysis is imposed. Invariably, this standard is defined as a reasonable suspicion: “All courts which have ruled upon the validity of urine tests for public employees, including police officers and firemen, have required as a prerequisite some articulable basis for suspecting that the employee was using illegal drugs, usually framed as ‘reasonable suspicion.’ Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 FSupp. 1507, 1524 (D.N.J. 1986) (fire fighters); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 S2d 1322 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1985) (police officers and fire fighters); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A2d 1005 (D.C. App. 1985) (police officers); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 FSupp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (correctional officers); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 FSupp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (employees of City Board of Lights and Water working around high voltage electric wires); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education, 505 NYS2d 888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (teachers); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 FSupp. 1500 (D.C.C. 1986) (school bus drivers); Caruso v. Ward, 506 NYS2d 789 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (police officers in special organized crime control bureau).” Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 FSupp. 875, 881, supra.
We can find no facts demonstrating that the city had a reasonable suspicion to believe Smith was using controlled substances. To the contrary, the city candidly admits that it tested all policemen and firemen having police power “in a nonselective manner.” Thus, the taking of Smith’s urine was a clear violation of his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Inasmuch as Smith’s constitutional rights were violated by the unreasonable search and seizure of his urine, we find that the city discharged Smith without just cause. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 FSupp. 1507, 1521-22, supra. Accordingly, the superior court erred in denying the petition for a writ of certiorari.
In passing, we wish to make clear that our ruling is limited to the facts of this case in which a random urinalysis was used without direct or circumstantial evidence that the employee was involved with [663]*663drugs. We leave for another day questions concerning the constitutionality of urine tests which are used by governments to screen applicants for employment or as part of routine health examinations.
Judgment reversed.
Sognier, J., concurs in the judgment only. Beasley, J., concurs specially.