The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY July 31, 2025
2025COA70
No. 24CA0855, Smith v. City and County of Denver — Government — Colorado Governmental Immunity Act — Sovereign Immunity a Bar — Interlocutory Appeal — Appeal Filed at Conclusion of Case
In this proceeding under the Colorado Governmental
Immunity Act (CGIA), a division of the court of appeals considers as
a matter of first impression whether section 24-10-108, C.R.S.
2024, requires a plaintiff to immediately appeal a district court’s
order dismissing some of the plaintiff’s claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction when some of the plaintiff’s other claims remain
unresolved. The division holds that, in those circumstances,
section 24-10-108 permits a plaintiff to challenge the court’s order
granting immunity to a public entity either in an immediate
interlocutory appeal or in an appeal filed at the conclusion of the
case. Because the plaintiffs here filed a timely appeal following the final disposition of the case, the division concludes that it has
jurisdiction to review the merits of the plaintiffs’ challenges to the
district court’s order dismissing their claims against a public entity
on CGIA grounds. And because the division further concludes that
the court didn’t err by determining that the public entity is immune
from liability under the CGIA, the division affirms the court’s
judgment of dismissal. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA70
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0855 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV30349 Honorable Jon J. Olafson, Judge
Ronald G. Smith and Jasper Armstrong, in his representative capacity and on behalf of Ronald G. Smith,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
City and County of Denver, a Colorado municipal corporation, and James Jenkinson,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE KUHN J. Jones and Moultrie, JJ., concur
Announced July 31, 2025
The Paul Wilkinson Law Firm LLC, Nelson Boyle, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants
Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, David Murphy, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) provides
that “[t]he court’s decision on [a motion asserting sovereign
immunity] shall be a final judgment and shall be subject to
interlocutory appeal.” § 24-10-108, C.R.S. 2024. In this appeal of
a district court’s order granting immunity to a public entity and
dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiffs’
claims affected by that ruling, we consider whether section
24-10-108 requires the plaintiff to immediately appeal such an
order when some of the plaintiff’s other claims remain unresolved.
¶2 We hold that when the district court grants a public entity’s
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
CGIA, but claims not affected by that ruling remain unresolved,
section 24-10-108 permits the plaintiff to challenge the order
granting immunity either in an interlocutory appeal or in an appeal
filed at the conclusion of the case. Consequently, we conclude that
we have jurisdiction over the appeal that plaintiffs, Ronald G. Smith
and Jasper Armstrong, in his representative capacity on behalf of
Smith, filed from the district court’s order dismissing their action
against defendants, the City and County of Denver (the City) and
James Jenkinson (jointly, the Denver Defendants), on CGIA
1 grounds. And because we further conclude that the court didn’t err
by determining that the Denver Defendants are immune from
liability under the CGIA, we affirm.
I. Background
¶3 We glean the following factual background from the record and
the order that the district court issued after conducting an
evidentiary hearing.
¶4 In January 2021, a Denver Fire Department firehouse received
a report of a fire at an apartment building. Jenkinson, a Denver
Fire Department engineer, started the truck. He then activated the
truck’s Opticom transmitter1 and its lights and sirens. After
confirming that his fellow firefighters were ready to respond to the
emergency, Jenkinson drove toward the reported fire.
¶5 En route, Jenkinson drove north on Lincoln Street before
turning left onto Speer Boulevard. As he approached a red light at
1 The Opticom system is a traffic control system that provides a
temporary right-of-way to emergency vehicles approaching a traffic light. A vehicle equipped with an Opticom transmitter sends a strobe signal to a receiver that is mounted on or near the traffic light. The receiver then generates a green light request to the traffic controller for the approaching emergency vehicle. See Igwe v. Skaggs, 258 F. Supp. 3d 596, 602-03 (W.D. Pa. 2017).
2 the intersection of Speer and Broadway, Jenkinson engaged the fire
truck’s exhaust brake by releasing the accelerator, hovered his foot
over the brake pedal to reduce his reaction time, and slowed down
to approximately twenty-two miles per hour. Then, believing that
he had cleared all six lanes of the cross traffic on Broadway that
had a green light, Jenkinson “accelerate[d] as fast as [he could] to
get through [the] intersection.” Simultaneously, a 2012 Honda
Civic in which Smith was a passenger entered the intersection from
Broadway at a speed of about forty miles per hour and hit the fire
truck’s front side.
¶6 The car “became lodged on the front of [the fire truck]” from
the force of the collision. It was pushed roughly sixty-five feet
beyond the point of impact. Two occupants in the car died. Smith
suffered severe injuries but ultimately survived the accident.
¶7 Smith filed a lawsuit in connection with the accident. After
amending his complaint several times, Smith asserted claims
against the City, Jenkinson, and Global Traffic Technologies, LLC
(GTT), the company that designed and manufactured the Opticom
3 system at the intersection.2 Specifically, Smith asserted claims for
negligence against the City and GTT, negligence per se and
negligent operation of an emergency vehicle against Jenkinson,
vicarious liability against the City for Jenkinson’s conduct, and
product liability against GTT.
¶8 The Denver Defendants filed a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that they
were immune from liability under the CGIA because Jenkinson was
operating an emergency vehicle at the time of the accident. See
§ 24-10-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024. In his response to the motion,
Smith contended that the Denver Defendants had waived sovereign
immunity because Jenkinson violated section 42-4-108(2) and (3),
C.R.S. 2024. More specifically, Smith argued that Jenkinson
proceeded through the red light without slowing down as was
necessary for the safe operation of the fire truck. See
§ 42-4-108(2)(b). Smith cited various vehicle guidelines from
outside entities in support of his argument that Jenkinson was
2 Smith alleged that although the intersection of Speer and
Broadway was equipped with an Opticom receiver, the system malfunctioned, and the traffic light didn’t change from red to green as Jenkinson approached the intersection.
4 required, and failed, to (1) come to a complete stop before entering
the intersection; (2) “[e]stablish eye contact or other assurances
with each auto in the converging lanes of traffic” before passing
through the red light; and (3) drive past each lane of cross traffic
“as though each lane [were] its own intersection” while maintaining
a speed that would have allowed Jenkinson to stop immediately.
¶9 In February 2024, the district court conducted an evidentiary
hearing on that motion. See Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. City of
Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993). In a written order issued
on February 13, the court determined that Smith hadn’t carried his
burden of proving that Jenkinson failed to slow down as was
necessary for the safe operation of the fire truck. Accordingly, the
court concluded that the Denver Defendants have immunity under
the CGIA and dismissed the claims against them for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
¶ 10 On March 28, the district court granted a joint stipulation for
the dismissal of the claims against GTT, the remaining defendant.
Smith then filed a notice of appeal on May 14, challenging the
court’s decision to dismiss his complaint against the Denver
Defendants.
5 II. Appellate Jurisdiction
¶ 11 The Denver Defendants contend that we lack jurisdiction to
consider the merits of Smith’s challenges to the district court’s
order dismissing his claims on CGIA grounds because he failed to
timely appeal that order. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
¶ 12 “Before reaching the merits of an appeal, we must first
determine whether we have jurisdiction.” Stone Grp. Holdings LLC
v. Ellison, 2024 COA 10, ¶ 15. Indeed, because we have an
independent duty to ensure that limits on our jurisdiction are
observed, we may raise jurisdictional defects nostra sponte. See
Colo. Cmty. Bank v. Hoffman, 2013 COA 146, ¶ 20; Brookhart v.
Reaman, 2023 COA 93, ¶ 18 (“We must determine independently
our jurisdiction over an appeal, nostra sponte if necessary.”
(quoting Allison v. Engel, 2017 COA 43, ¶ 22)).
¶ 13 “Appellate jurisdiction boils down to three basic concepts:
subject matter jurisdiction, timeliness, and finality.” Chavez v.
Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 18. The appeal before us implicates the
latter two concepts.
6 ¶ 14 The timely filing of a notice of appeal in accordance with the
Colorado Appellate Rules is a mandatory prerequisite for us to
review an appeal. See L.H.M. Corp., TCD v. Martinez, 2021 CO 78,
¶ 29; see also Goodwin v. Homeland Cent. Ins. Co., 172 P.3d 938,
943 (Colo. App. 2007). With exceptions not relevant here, C.A.R.
4(a)(1) provides that a notice of appeal in a civil case must be filed
“within [forty-nine] days after entry of the judgment, decree, or
order being appealed.” Because we generally only have jurisdiction
over appeals from final judgments, see § 13-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2024,
the deadline for filing a notice of appeal begins to run when a final
judgment is entered in the case, Goodwin, 172 P.3d at 943.
¶ 15 A judgment is final if it ends the particular action and leaves
nothing further for the court to do to completely determine the
rights of the parties involved in the proceeding. Wilson v. Kennedy,
2020 COA 122, ¶ 7. But while, ordinarily, “‘an entire case must be
decided before any ruling in that case can be appealed[,]’ . . . there
are limited circumstances in which a party to a civil case may take
an interlocutory appeal before an entire case is final.” Id. at ¶ 8
(quoting People in Interest of R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO 31, ¶ 37). For
example, C.R.C.P. 54(b) permits a court in an action involving
7 multiple claims or parties to “direct the entry of a final judgment as
to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties” if the
court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay in
entering a final judgment.
¶ 16 As relevant to this case, the CGIA provides that the court’s
“decision on [a motion asserting sovereign immunity] shall be a final
judgment and shall be subject to interlocutory appeal.”
§§ 24-10-108, -118(2.5), C.R.S. 2024. The purpose of these
statutory provisions “is to provide immediate appellate review of the
governmental immunity issue before a trial on the merits.”
Richland Dev. Co. v. E. Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation Dist.,
899 P.2d 371, 372-73 (Colo. App. 1995). Because a district court’s
immunity ruling is “appealable immediately, without more,” a party
need not obtain a C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification to appeal that ruling.
Id. at 373.
B. Standard of Review
¶ 17 We consider de novo whether we have jurisdiction over Smith’s
appeal. See McDonald v. Zions First Nat’l Bank, N.A., 2015 COA 29,
¶ 33. Likewise, we interpret statutes, including the CGIA, de novo.
Hice v. Giron, 2024 CO 9, ¶ 10.
8 ¶ 18 Our goal in interpreting the CGIA is to give effect to the
legislature’s intent. Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, ¶ 15.
To do so, we begin by considering the plain language of the statute,
reading the words and phrases in context and construing them
according to their plain and ordinary meanings. Stickle v. County of
Jefferson, 2022 COA 79, ¶ 16, aff’d, 2024 CO 7. “We look to the
entire statutory scheme to give consistent, harmonious, and
sensible effect to all of its parts, and we avoid constructions that
would render any words or phrases superfluous or that would lead
to illogical or absurd results.” Roane v. Elizabeth Sch. Dist., 2024
COA 59, ¶ 24.
C. Smith’s Appeal is Timely
¶ 19 The Denver Defendants contend that Smith’s appeal is
untimely because, under section 24-10-108, he was required to file
his notice of appeal within forty-nine days of the district court’s
February 13 order dismissing his claims against them on sovereign
immunity grounds. Relying on Buckles v. State, 952 P.2d 855
(Colo. App. 1998), the Denver Defendants argue that the CGIA order
was a final judgment from which Smith’s C.A.R. 4(a)(1) deadline
started to run.
9 ¶ 20 In Buckles, individual plaintiffs sued several public entities,
alleging that they improperly constructed and used a road that ran
through the plaintiffs’ property. Id. at 855. The plaintiffs asserted
claims for common law trespass, inverse condemnation, and
violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Buckles, 952 P.2d
at 855. The district court dismissed the trespass claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the CGIA, a ruling that the
plaintiffs didn’t immediately appeal. Id. at 856. Instead, the
plaintiffs appealed the immunity ruling only after the court
dismissed their remaining claims roughly two and a half months
later. Id. A division of this court dismissed the appeal as untimely
under those circumstances. Id. The division observed that under
the plain terms of section 24-10-108, a court’s determination that a
public entity was entitled to immunity constituted a final judgment
“even if the order [did] not dispose of an entire claim or [was]
otherwise interlocutory.” Id. “Therefore, unlike provisions which
may allow for, but do not require, an appeal from an interlocutory
order, [section] 24-10-108 requires that the appeal of the dismissal
of a claim as barred by the [C]GIA must be sought immediately,
within the time requirements of C.A.R. 4(a), or it is barred.” Id.
10 ¶ 21 Less than a year after Buckles was announced, the Colorado
Supreme Court considered a similar issue in Walton v. State, 968
P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998). In that case, Walton filed a negligence action
against the State of Colorado and one of its public employees for
injuries that she had allegedly suffered while cleaning an art
storage room at the state university where she was a student. Id. at
638-39. The State responded with a motion to dismiss on the
pleadings, invoking sovereign immunity under the CGIA. Id. at 639.
After the trial court denied that motion, the State didn’t seek
immediate appellate review. Id. Instead, more than two years later,
it “sought reconsideration of the trial court’s order and requested an
evidentiary hearing on the jurisdictional issue of governmental
immunity.” Id. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and then denied the motion. The State filed an appeal within the
C.A.R. 4(a)(1) deadline from the second order. Id. at 639-41.
Walton challenged the timeliness of the appeal, arguing that the
State couldn’t seek appellate review of the immunity claim when it
had failed to file a timely “interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s
initial order denying its CGIA motion to dismiss on the pleadings.”
Id. at 639.
11 ¶ 22 The supreme court rejected this argument. It reasoned that
because the State didn’t have an obligation to immediately appeal
the initial denial order, its timely “interlocutory appeal after the trial
court held an evidentiary hearing” on the second motion to dismiss
was sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction. Id. The Walton court
observed that the “General Assembly did not consider the phrases
‘final judgment’ and ‘interlocutory’ [in sections 24-10-108 and
-118(2.5)] to be mutually exclusive terms.” Id. at 640-41. By using
the phrase “final judgment” in those statutory provisions, “the
legislature intended to authorize [public entities to] tak[e] . . . CGIA
interlocutory appeals and avoid the uncertainty of having to obtain
trial court certification under C.R.C.P. 54(b), a discretionary
matter.” Id. at 641.
¶ 23 But “[t]he General Assembly did not intend to mandate
immediate appeal of a CGIA jurisdictional ruling against the public
entity as the only means to preserve its governmental immunity
claim.” Id. Rather, because a public entity “has a right, not an
obligation, to take an interlocutory appeal” under the statute, it
may elect to forgo an immediate appeal of an adverse immunity
ruling “in favor of pursuing trial or settlement on the claims, while
12 preserving the CGIA issue in the event of an appeal following final
disposition of the case in the trial court.” Id. In support of this
construction of the statute, the supreme court deemed significant
that “the legislature provided that the trial court’s CGIA ruling [was]
‘subject to interlocutory appeal’ . . . , not that the right to file an
interlocutory appeal must be exercised to preserve the CGIA issue
in the case.” Id. (quoting §§ 24-10-108, -118(2.5)).
¶ 24 As the Denver Defendants point out, Walton involved a public
entity’s appeal of an order denying CGIA immunity. Here, like the
plaintiffs in Buckles, Smith challenges the district court’s order
granting such immunity even though he failed to bring that appeal
within forty-nine days from the date of the order. Based on all of
this, the Denver Defendants argue that the factual similarities
between Smith’s circumstances and those present in Buckles are
dispositive of our analysis.
¶ 25 But after noting that the CGIA doesn’t require an interlocutory
appeal to preserve a later challenge to a ruling, the Walton court
went on to say, “We disapprove of any suggestion to the contrary
contained in [Buckles].” Id. This context arguably suggests that the
supreme court disapproved of Buckles to the extent it held that a
13 district court’s ruling on the issue of CGIA immunity was a final
judgment that had to be challenged within the appeal deadline or
be barred from later consideration. Nonetheless, Walton is factually
distinguishable from the matter before us because Walton involved
a public entity’s appeal. So we must determine whether the rule
enunciated in Walton applies equally to a nongovernmental plaintiff
when, as here, the plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing his
complaint against a public entity on the grounds that the suit is
barred under the CGIA. Put differently, does section 24-10-108
permit a plaintiff like Smith to forgo an interlocutory appeal and
instead challenge a CGIA order in a final appeal after the district
court has resolved all of the remaining claims in the case? We
answer this question of first impression in the affirmative.
¶ 26 For starters, section 24-10-108 doesn’t differentiate between
orders granting or denying a motion to dismiss under the CGIA.
Indeed, the plain language of the statute provides that “[t]he court’s
decision on such motion shall be a final judgment and shall be
subject to interlocutory appeal.” § 24-10-108 (emphasis added).
Similarly, Walton provides that an immediate appeal is authorized,
but not required, in connection with an order denying sovereign
14 immunity. Yet the Denver Defendants read the statute as requiring
an immediate appeal for an order granting such immunity. This
interpretation would add a distinction to the statute that the
legislature didn’t include. See Kyle W. Larson Enters., Inc. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 2012 COA 160M, ¶ 25 (observing that if the
legislature intended to include a particular statutory requirement, it
would have clearly expressed its intent to do so). It would also
require us to read limiting words into the statute, which we cannot
do. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning K.M.S., 2025 CO
35, ¶¶ 12, 19; Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 2013 CO 38, ¶ 19.
And because we’re not at liberty to add to, or subtract from, the
words that the legislature has chosen, Nieto v. Clark’s Mkt., Inc.,
2021 CO 48, ¶ 12, we must avoid adopting the construction of
section 24-10-108 that would violate this principle of statutory
interpretation.
¶ 27 Likewise, in interpreting the statute, we must also presume
that the legislature intended a just and reasonable result. Marcellot
v. Exempla, Inc., 2012 COA 200, ¶ 23. Given section 24-10-108’s
language, it would be unfair to construe the statute as imposing an
immediate appeal obligation upon plaintiffs while public entities
15 merely have an option to appeal under the same circumstances.
True, private parties and public entities occupy asymmetrical
positions in matters involving the CGIA, given that only public
entities may raise and waive immunity. Walton, 968 P.2d at 641
n.6. And given that the question of sovereign immunity implicates
the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim, see
City & Cnty. of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO 37, ¶ 9, a public entity
may raise that issue at any time in the proceeding, Walton, 968
P.2d at 640, including for the first time on appeal, Gestner v.
Gestner, 2024 COA 55, ¶ 20 n.4. Still, as we note above, we see no
basis in the text of section 24-10-108 to treat private parties
differently from public entities in appeals of jurisdictional rulings in
CGIA cases. Accordingly, we conclude that the effect of a CGIA
immunity ruling for purposes of appeal is the same, regardless of
whether the court grants or denies the motion to dismiss.
¶ 28 This interpretation is also consistent with the CGIA’s
purposes. One of the basic purposes of the statute is “to shield
public entities and employees from being forced to trial or exposed
to the other burdens of extended litigation, when the viability of the
proceedings is dependent on the resolution of an essentially legal
16 question.” Bresciani v. Haragan, 968 P.2d 153, 157 (Colo. App.
1998). When a public entity is dismissed from a suit by virtue of
the court’s grant of immunity, the entity is not required to
participate in further proceedings unless that ruling is reversed on
appeal. Thus, while it’s true that a subsequent appeal could bring
the public entity back into the case, the timing of the appeal itself
doesn’t impact how long the public entity is subject to the
underlying litigation.
¶ 29 Given all of this, we hold that when a district court grants a
public entity’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the CGIA, section 24-10-108 permits a plaintiff
to challenge that ruling either in an immediate interlocutory appeal
or in an appeal following the final disposition of the case.
¶ 30 Here, Smith filed his notice of appeal ninety-one days after the
district court’s February 13 CGIA order. But his appeal is
nonetheless timely because he filed it within forty-nine days of the
court’s March 28 order dismissing his remaining claims against
GTT, the last remaining defendant. Consequently, we conclude that
we have jurisdiction to review the merits of Smith’s appeal.
17 III. Smith’s Challenges to the District Court’s CGIA Order
¶ 31 Smith contends that the district court’s decision to dismiss his
claims against the Denver Defendants must be reversed because
(1) the court applied the incorrect legal standard and (2) it
consequently failed to consider certain facts in assessing whether
the CGIA barred those claims.3 We discern no error.
¶ 32 Generally, the CGIA bars any action against a public entity for
injuries that lie in tort or could lie in tort. § 24-10-106(1).
3 At oral argument, Smith’s counsel asserted for the first time that
the district court had applied the wrong legal standard in determining that Smith hadn’t met his burden of proving that the Denver Defendants had waived sovereign immunity under the CGIA. Relying on a supreme court case that was announced after briefing in this case had closed, he posited that the district court had failed to apply the “likelihood standard” in making that determination. See Jefferson County v. Dozier, 2025 CO 36, ¶¶ 2, 24 (“We hold that when disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of the existence of the facts necessary to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity.”). But we generally don’t review issues raised for the first time at oral argument, see Rucker v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 2016 COA 114, ¶ 35, and because Smith failed to argue in the district court that the likelihood standard (or indeed any other standard) applied to this case, his argument is unpreserved, see Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon L. Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 18. Therefore, we decline to consider it further.
18 “However, the CGIA also ‘withdraws and restores this immunity
through a series of immunity waivers, exceptions to those waivers,
and, in some cases, conditions relating to the exceptions.’”
Bilderback v. McNabb, 2020 COA 133, ¶ 7 (quoting Corsentino v.
Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Colo. 2000)). Accordingly, sovereign
immunity is waived if, in the course of employment, a public
employee injures another person while operating a motor vehicle
owned or leased by the public entity. § 24-10-106(1)(a).
¶ 33 But the statute also creates an exception to the immunity
waiver for authorized emergency vehicles — such as fire
trucks — that are being operated in compliance with section
42-4-108(2) and (3). § 24-10-106(1)(a); see also § 42-1-102(6),
C.R.S. 2024 (defining “authorized emergency vehicle” as including a
publicly owned fire truck “operated by or for a governmental agency
to protect and preserve life and property”). As relevant to this
appeal, section 42-4-108(2)(b) provides that, when responding to an
emergency call or a fire alarm, the driver of “an authorized
emergency vehicle” may “[p]roceed past a red or stop signal or stop
sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe
operation” of the vehicle. To qualify under this exception, the driver
19 must also employ visual or audible signals as required by section
42-4-213, C.R.S. 2024. § 42-4-108(3). Thus, if an emergency
vehicle driver complies with section 42-4-108(2) and (3) while
responding to an emergency, CGIA immunity is restored and is a
bar to any tort action for injuries arising out of the driver’s conduct.
See Corsentino, 4 P.3d at 1086-87.
¶ 34 As noted above, a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss on the
grounds of sovereign immunity under the CGIA implicates the
district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Dennis, ¶ 9. The
plaintiff has the burden of proving that the court has jurisdiction.
City of Longmont v. Henry-Hobbs, 50 P.3d 906, 908 (Colo. 2002).
But “this burden is relatively lenient, as the plaintiff is afforded the
reasonable inferences from [his] undisputed evidence.” Dennis,
¶ 11.
¶ 35 The application of sovereign immunity under the CGIA
presents a mixed question of fact and law. Maphis, ¶ 14. We defer
to the district court’s factual findings and its resolution of factual
disputes upon which jurisdiction may turn unless they are clearly
erroneous, finding no support in the record. Id. But we review de
20 novo the court’s determination of questions of law, including
whether the court properly interpreted a statute or applied the
correct legal standard.4 Corsentino, 4 P.3d at 1087-88.
¶ 36 Because the CGIA operates in derogation of the common law,
we strictly construe the statute’s immunity provisions and broadly
construe its waiver provisions to promote “the interest of
compensating victims of governmental negligence.” Heidel v. Rio
Blanco Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 2023 COA 41, ¶ 14 (quoting Springer v.
City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 798 (Colo. 2000)). “This means
4 The parties dispute which standard of review applies to the district
court’s determination that Jenkinson passed through the red light “after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation” of the fire truck, within the meaning of section 42-4-108(2)(b), C.R.S. 2024. Smith contends that de novo review applies, and the Denver Defendants contend that clear error review is appropriate. While it’s true that ultimate immunity determinations are usually reviewed for clear error, the court’s application of a legal standard to the historical facts of a case is a question of law. Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082, 1087-88 (Colo. 2000) (citing People v. Romero, 953 P.2d 550, 555 (Colo. 1998)); see also Friends of the Black Forest Reg’l Park, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 80 P.3d 871, 882 (Colo. App. 2003) (noting that we review de novo a district court’s application of facts to a statute); Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, ¶ 16 (reviewing de novo whether the condition of a public road met the criteria for a “dangerous condition” under the immunity waiver provision in section 24-10-106(1)(d)(I), C.R.S. 2024). We thus review this determination de novo, but we would affirm under either standard.
21 that we also strictly construe exceptions to those waivers, which are
effectively grants of immunity.” Hice, ¶ 9.
C. The Applicable Legal Standard Under Section 42-4-108(2)(b)
¶ 37 Smith contends that in evaluating whether Jenkinson
qualified for the immunity waiver exception in section
42-4-108(2)(b), the district court was required, but failed, to
consider whether Jenkinson (1) acted with due regard for the safety
of other drivers within the meaning of section 42-4-108(4) and
(2) satisfied an objective “reasonable emergency vehicle operator”
standard.
¶ 38 Smith’s first argument fails. Section 42-4-108(4) provides that
“[t]he provisions of th[at] section shall not relieve the driver of an
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard
for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the
driver from the consequences of such driver’s reckless disregard for
the safety of others.” But the supreme court held in Fogg v.
Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271, 277 (Colo. 1995), that the duty of care
referenced in that section doesn’t apply to the sovereign immunity
analysis under section 42-4-108(2) and (3). Fogg remains good law
22 and is dispositive of this argument. To the extent Smith asks us to
depart from this precedent, we decline the invitation. It is our
supreme court’s prerogative alone to overrule its prior decisions.
See Nation SLP, LLC v. Bruner, 2022 COA 76, ¶ 29 (noting that we
are bound by the decisions of the supreme court).
¶ 39 Smith’s second argument fares no better. He contends that
section 42-4-108(2)(b) envisions an objective “reasonable emergency
vehicle operator” standard, and, under that standard, the relevant
inquiry is whether Jenkinson proceeded through the red light only
after taking certain specific precautions recommended by various
outside emergency response organizations. On appeal, Smith
reiterates the argument he made in the district court — a
reasonable emergency vehicle operator would have come to a
complete stop before entering the intersection, established eye
contact with other drivers in the intersection, and proceeded past
each lane of cross traffic as if it were a separate intersection. We’re
not persuaded by this argument.
¶ 40 For starters, the plain language of section 42-4-108(2)(b)
undercuts Smith’s argument. The statute permits an operator of an
emergency vehicle to pass through, as relevant here, a red light
23 “after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation” of the
vehicle. § 42-4-108(2)(b). In doing so, section 42-4-108(2)(b)
prescribes the manner in which an emergency responder must act
to be entitled to sovereign immunity under the CGIA. But it doesn’t
provide that the operator must take the specific steps that Smith
asserts are required in his briefing. Had the General Assembly
intended to impose those requirements, it would have employed
language to do so. See Hobbs v. City of Salida, 2024 COA 25, ¶ 33
(“We presume the General Assembly acts intentionally when
selecting the words used in a statute.”) (cert. granted Sept. 30,
2024). We see no such indication in the statute.
¶ 41 Likewise, Corsentino doesn’t command the outcome Smith
urges. In that case, the supreme court held that the applicable
“standard for determining whether an emergency vehicle operator
was responding to an emergency call under section 42-4-108(2) is
an objective standard from the perspective of a reasonable
emergency vehicle operator.” Corsentino, 4 P.3d at 1088 (emphasis
added). Thus, Corsentino does describe the objective test that
courts must apply to decide the threshold issue of whether an
operator was responding to an emergency.
24 ¶ 42 But the court didn’t extend that same test to the exceptions
contained in section 42-4-108(2)(a) to (d). Instead, the supreme
court instructed that in assessing the applicability of section
42-4-108(2)(c)’s exception allowing an emergency vehicle driver to
speed so long as the driver does not endanger life or property,
“courts should limit their inquiry to the relationship between the
conduct of the emergency operator prior to the accident and the
circumstances surrounding the conduct.” Id. at 1093. The
Corsentino court noted that “[i]mportant factors relating to the
circumstances include, but are not limited to, the legal speed limit
in the area, the speed at which the operator was driving, the
conditions of the road, and the type of area in which [the operator]
was driving.” Id.
¶ 43 Similarly, a division of this court has recognized that the
application of subsection (2)(b)’s red light exception entails
examining the circumstances of the case. See Bilderback, ¶¶ 11-16.
“[T]he phrase ‘as may be necessary for safe operation’ calls for the
court to take into account how the [driver] proceeded through the
intersection,” not just how the driver entered the intersection. Id. at
¶ 15. The division further observed that what constitutes safe
25 operation within the meaning of section 42-4-108(2)(b) varies from
case to case and includes consideration of the circumstances
surrounding the intersection at issue. Id. at ¶ 16.
¶ 44 In light of these authorities, then, we conclude that a court
should consider the conduct of the operator and the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the accident in deciding whether an
emergency vehicle operator’s conduct qualifies for the exception
contained in section 42-4-108(2)(b).
D. The District Court Didn’t Err by Determining that the CGIA Barred Smith’s Claims Against the Denver Defendants
¶ 45 Here, the district court examined the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the accident and determined that the
Denver Defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity under the
relevant emergency vehicle exception to the immunity waiver. The
court properly noted that “the existence of the [a]ccident [was] not
enough on its own to demonstrate that the Denver Defendants
acted contrary to [section 42-4-108(2)(b)].” Rather, the court
observed that under Corsentino, its analysis must focus on the
connection between the emergency operator’s conduct and the
circumstances surrounding that conduct. And the court further
26 noted that it should consider the factors that the Corsentino court
identified.
¶ 46 Applying this framework, the district court concluded that
Jenkinson complied with section 42-4-108(2)(b) and (3) at the time
of the accident because “he did slow down before [he] proceeded
through the red light as necessary for safe operation[]” of the fire
truck. In support of this conclusion, the court found that
Jenkinson (1) used the fire truck’s lights and sirens while
responding to the emergency call; (2) slowed down before reaching
the intersection; (3) cleared each lane of traffic on Broadway before
proceeding through the intersection; (4) accelerated only after he
determined that it was safe for him to pass through the
intersection; and (5) operated the fire truck well under the speed
limit, even after he accelerated through the intersection. The record
supports these findings.
¶ 47 First, it’s undisputed that, as Jenkinson entered the
intersection, he slowed down and utilized the fire truck’s lights and
sirens. During the Trinity hearing, Jenkinson testified that another
firefighter used the air horn as they approached the intersection.
Jenkinson engaged the fire truck’s exhaust brake when he took his
27 foot off the accelerator and placed it over the brake pedal to reduce
his reaction time. He also testified that the fire truck further
decelerated because the area of Speer leading up to the intersection
was sloped uphill. Similarly, Detective Christopher Cesarec
testified that the data he gathered in conducting his accident
reconstruction was consistent with the fire truck slowing down.
¶ 48 Next, Jenkinson testified that he had accounted for each lane
of cross traffic before accelerating through the intersection. The
record shows that none of the vehicles on southbound Broadway
were moving, even though the traffic light had just turned green for
them. Indeed, Jenkinson observed that one vehicle had
“jumped . . . , meaning they actually started to proceed,” but then
stopped after “they saw the firetruck and heard the firetruck.”
While the lane through which the car containing Smith entered the
intersection was open, Jenkinson said that he looked “all the way
[up]” Broadway and didn’t see any oncoming traffic. And according
to Jenkinson, he stopped covering the brake pedal and began
accelerating through the intersection only after he had cleared all
lanes of the southbound traffic. The court found Jenkinson’s
testimony credible.
28 ¶ 49 Finally, Detective Cesarec testified that the fire truck was
traveling roughly twenty-seven miles per hour at the time of the
collision. Given that the parties stipulated the posted speed limit
on Speer was thirty-five miles per hour, the record demonstrates
that Jenkinson drove under the speed limit even after he started
accelerating through the intersection.
¶ 50 In his briefing, Smith directs us to evidence presented at the
Trinity hearing that he argues supports his position that Jenkinson
failed to slow down as was necessary for the safe operation of the
fire truck. For example, Smith repeatedly points out that
Jenkinson told the police after the accident that he thought he had
a green light. Relying on that statement, Smith goes on to argue
that “a reasonable engineer would have known the light was red
while approaching the intersection.” But during the hearing,
Jenkinson explained his earlier statement regarding the color of the
light and clarified that he no longer believed that the light was green
when he entered the intersection. At any rate, it was the district
court’s role as the fact finder to resolve this and any other
conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses, and
decide what weight to give each piece of evidence. See Owners Ins.
29 Co. v. Dakota Station II Condo. Ass’n, 2021 COA 114, ¶ 50. That is
not our role as an appellate court. Id.
¶ 51 In sum, we conclude that the district court didn’t err by
determining that Smith’s claims against the Denver Defendants
must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
CGIA because, at the time of the accident, Jenkinson operated the
fire truck in compliance with section 42-4-108(2)(b) and (3) and,
therefore, he was covered by immunity under section
24-10-106(1)(a).
IV. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 52 Lastly, the Denver Defendants request an award of appellate
“attorney[] fees and costs incurred in responding to the appeal
pursuant to C.A.R. 28(b).” C.A.R. 28(b) sets forth the requirements
of an appellee’s answer brief, and the provision does provide that
“[t]he answer brief must also contain any request for attorney fees.”
But a request for attorney fees on appeal “must include a specific
request, under a separate heading, and must explain the legal and
factual basis for an award of attorney fees.” C.A.R. 39.1; see also
Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 22 (stating that a party’s
request for appellate attorney fees must identify a legal basis under
30 which those fees are recoverable). The Denver Defendants’ brief
does not satisfy these requirements. Accordingly, we deny the
Denver Defendants’ request for appellate attorney fees.
¶ 53 But the Denver Defendants are entitled to their appellate costs
under C.A.R. 39(a)(2), which provides, “[I]f a judgment is affirmed,
costs are taxed against the appellant.” The Denver Defendants may
pursue those costs in the district court by following the procedure
set forth in C.A.R. 39(c)(2).
V. Disposition
¶ 54 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.