25CA1395 Hart v Appling 07-02-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1395 Weld County District Court No. 24CV30469 Honorable Todd Taylor, Judge
William Hart,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Rhonda Appling,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE TOW Harris and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 2, 2026
J. O’Keefe, PLLC, Joseph O’Keefe, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff- Appellant
Wick & Trautwein, LLC, Michael S. Samelson, Cassie L. Williams, Amanda E. Adam, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 Plaintiff, William Hart, appeals the trial court’s judgment,
entered after a bench trial, dismissing his unjust enrichment claim
and finding for defendant, Rhonda Appling, on her tortious
interference with contract counterclaim. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 At a bench trial, the court heard evidence of the following.
¶3 Hart and Appling began a relationship and later moved into a
house in Denver that they purchased together. When Appling
discovered that Hart consistently abused alcohol, she ended their
relationship and moved out of the house.
¶4 Appling rented a different house in Loveland. In December
2022, Appling sent a text to Hart that said, “[F]or us to be
together[,] you need to be sober and committed to staying sober.”
Hart responded, “Okay. I cannot do this anymore by myself. I have
tried to so much.”
¶5 Hart moved into Appling’s guest room. After Hart started
drinking again, however, Appling made him leave. Hart rented his
own place near Appling’s house.
¶6 Hart was later charged with assault after breaking his
neighbor’s nose. He entered into a plea agreement requiring that he
1 receive probation supervision and that he, among other things,
complete a substance abuse evaluation and treatment and abstain
from drinking. Appling allowed Hart to stay in the guest room in
her house again because he could not return to his apartment (due
to a restraining order being issued following the assault) and
because he was once again abstaining from alcohol.
¶7 Hart and Appling agreed to start looking to buy another house
where they could live together. But because Hart’s drinking had
essentially forced Appling to move out of their Denver house,
Appling wanted to be sure that that would not happen again. She
said that Hart had agreed that everything could be in her name, so
that if something happened, she would not have to move again and
the house would be hers.
¶8 After finding a house to purchase in Windsor (the Windsor
house) and at the mortgage company’s behest, Hart executed a gift
letter in which he gave $200,000 to Appling to be applied toward
the purchase. The gift letter stated, “[N]o repayment of this gift is
expected or implied either in the form of cash or future services of
the recipient,” and “[A]ny funds given to the homebuyer were not
2 made available to the donor from any person or entity with an
interest in the sale of the property.”
¶9 Appling testified that she would not have moved forward with
the Windsor house purchase had Hart not signed the gift letter.
She testified that at the time of the gift letter’s execution, by signing
the document, she understood that Hart would not ask for the
money back and did not have any ownership interest in the
Windsor house. She testified that she looked up gift letters online
and learned that the funds do not need to be paid back, and if they
are, it is mortgage fraud. Hart and Appling were not engaged at the
time of the execution of the gift letter.
¶ 10 Appling purchased the Windsor house in May 2023 and is the
sole owner. The down payment was approximately $125,000.
Appling and Hart moved into the Windsor house.
¶ 11 Hart was released from his probation supervision early. The
following day, Hart was drunk, which led to a dispute with Appling.
Appling obtained a temporary and then permanent civil protection
order against Hart. Hart moved out and was served with the
protection order.
3 ¶ 12 Months later, Hart sent multiple false and threatening
communications to Appling’s employer, Boyd Lake Veterinary
Center. Hart also published a false Google review of Boyd Lake
Veterinary Center referencing Appling. And Hart filed a complaint
against Appling with the State Board of Veterinary Medicine, which
was subsequently dismissed. Hart’s actions impacted Appling’s
ability to work, but her employer took no adverse actions against
her or her employment status.
¶ 13 Hart sued Appling for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment. Appling filed a counterclaim against Hart for tortious
interference with contract.
¶ 14 Before the case proceeded to trial, Appling moved to dismiss
Hart’s breach of contract claim under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), and the
court granted the motion.
¶ 15 The case proceeded to trial on Hart’s unjust enrichment claim
and Appling’s counterclaim.1 At the conclusion of the trial, the trial
1 At trial, in addition to the $125,000 down payment, Hart claimed
he was entitled to $5,000 for furniture he purchased for the Windsor house and $32,000 for payments he allegedly made towards Appling’s loans, so that she could qualify for a lower monthly mortgage payment. The trial court found that Hart presented no evidence to substantiate these amounts.
4 court found that Appling was credible and Hart was not. The court
found that Appling insisted that the Windsor house be titled only in
her name in case Hart started drinking again and that Hart’s ability
to continue residing in the Windsor house was conditioned on him
remaining sober. The court found that Hart, a former corporate
attorney, was aware of the significance of signing the gift letter.
And the court found that Hart intentionally and improperly
interfered with Appling’s employment.
¶ 16 The trial court found for Appling on both claims and therefore
dismissed the unjust enrichment claim. The court ordered Hart to
pay Appling $60,560 in damages.
II. Hart’s Compliance with C.A.R. 28
¶ 17 As an initial matter, Appling contends that we should strike
Hart’s opening brief because it failed to comply with C.A.R. 28 and
misrepresented the trial court’s judgment. Appling primarily takes
issue with the fact that Hart lists over twenty “statement[s] of
issues” presented for review but then does not repeat many of these
in his argument sections. We decline to strike Hart’s brief but,
instead, will consider these omissions insofar as they reflect a
failure to develop his arguments.
5 ¶ 18 Appling also contends that Hart’s brief fails to (1) demonstrate
preservation with record support; (2) identify his requested relief;
(3) cite legal authority; and (4) cite the trial court’s ruling. Though
Hart’s brief lacks a reference to the precise locations in the record
where the issues were raised, it does state, under separate
headings, whether the issues were preserved. Hart’s brief includes
a short conclusion stating the precise relief sought, cites legal
authority, and challenges the trial court’s judgment. Thus, while
Hart’s brief is not a model of clarity, we conclude that it sufficiently
complies with C.A.R. 28 such that striking it is not necessary. Cf.
O’Quinn v. Baca, 250 P.3d 629, 631 (Colo. App. 2010) (observing
that the appellate rules are not mere technicalities but rather are
designed to facilitate appellate review). Therefore, we exercise our
discretion to address Hart’s appeal on the merits, keeping in mind
that Hart bears the risk of his inadequate briefing to the extent he
failed to sufficiently develop or support his appellate claims.
III. Hart’s Unjust Enrichment Claim
¶ 19 As noted, we will only address Hart’s developed arguments
contained in the argument sections of his brief for these issues. In
other words, we will not address the items in Hart’s “statement of
6 issues” list to the extent he does not develop any argument as to the
purported error. See Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo. Ass’n
v. Metro. Homes, Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶¶ 39-40 (declining to address
conclusory assertions offered without supporting argument or
authority).
¶ 20 Hart contends that the trial court erred by rejecting his unjust
enrichment claim.2 In addition to his overriding challenge to the
judgment, as best we can discern, the specifically developed
challenges he asserts are that the court (1) acted against the weight
of the trial testimony; (2) relied solely on the gift letter to discern his
intent; and (3) misapplied the unclean hands doctrine. After
addressing the standard of review and applicable law, we address
each of his specific contentions, and then the more general
challenge to the judgment.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 21 Review of a judgment following a bench trial presents a mixed
question of fact and law. Sandstead-Corona v. Sandstead, 2018 CO
26, ¶ 37. We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error
2 Hart does not challenge the pretrial dismissal of his breach of
contract claim.
7 and its legal conclusions de novo. Kroesen v. Shenandoah
Homeowners Ass’n, 2020 COA 31, ¶ 55. A factual finding is clearly
erroneous only if it has no factual support in the record. Smith v.
City & County of Denver, 2025 COA 70, ¶ 35.
¶ 22 An unjust enrichment claim is an equitable cause of action.
Bd. of Governors of Colo. State Univ. v. Alderman, 2025 CO 9, ¶ 32.
While we review de novo whether the trial court applied the
appropriate test for unjust enrichment, we review the court’s ruling
on an unjust enrichment claim and the factual basis for that ruling
for an abuse of discretion. See id.; Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134,
1141 (Colo. 2008). A trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling
misconstrues or misapplies the law or is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair. Rinker v. Colina-Lee, 2019 COA 45, ¶ 63.
¶ 23 Unjust enrichment is a form of quasi-contract or contract
implied in law that does not depend on a promise or privity between
the parties. Bd. of Governors, ¶ 35. To recover under an unjust
enrichment theory, a plaintiff must show that (1) at the plaintiff’s
expense, (2) the defendant received a benefit, (3) under
circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain
the benefit without paying. Id. In situations involving close
8 confidants, the third prong is governed by the parties’ actions
expressing mutual purpose, and when confidants act with a mutual
purpose, unjust enrichment occurs when one party benefits from
an action that is a significant deviation from that mutual purpose.
Lewis, 189 P.3d at 1143.
B. Hart’s Specific Challenges
1. Trial Testimony
¶ 24 Hart contends that the trial court erred because its judgment
was manifestly against the weight of the trial testimony. We
disagree.
¶ 25 Hart challenges the trial court’s factual finding that the parties
agreed that the Windsor house would be titled solely in Appling’s
name and that Appling would live in it and keep the gifted money
should Hart drink again. In doing so, Hart essentially asks us to
reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Colonial Bank v.
Colo. Fin. Servs. Bd., 961 P.2d 579, 587 (Colo. App. 1998) (“It is not
the province of this court to measure the weight of the evidence or
to resolve the credibility of witnesses.”). In any case, we discern no
clear error.
9 ¶ 26 Hart contends that the court ignored that the text message
exchange (wherein Hart promised sobriety) occurred months before
the Windsor house purchase and that the Windsor house could not
be titled in Hart’s name because he was not employed at the time of
its purchase. But the court found otherwise based on Appling’s
testimony — which, again, the court found credible — that
• when the parties had previously lived together in Denver,
she had to move out of the house because of Hart’s
drinking;
• to avoid being in that situation again, she insisted that
the Windsor house be titled solely in her name;
• Hart’s ability to remain in the house was conditioned on
him not drinking; and
• if Hart resumed drinking, he would have to move out.
Because Appling’s testimony provides record support for the court’s
findings, we are bound to accept them. See Kruse v. Town of Castle
Rock, 192 P.3d 591, 603 (Colo. App. 2008).
¶ 27 Hart also argues that Appling did not realize that she did not
have to repay the gifted money until after the parties separated.
But Hart mischaracterizes Appling’s testimony in this regard.
10 Appling’s counsel asked her, “Why was it important to you that Mr.
Hart sign this gift letter in connection with the funds that he gifted
you?” Appling responded that she “read about gift letters online
and [if] you Google if a gift letter is provided for a mortgage, do you
have to pay back the gift letter? And it says, no, that that is
actually considered mortgage fraud.” While she did not specifically
state when she conducted this internet research, in context,
nothing in her answer suggests that it was after the fact. Indeed,
she testified that she would not have accepted the funds without
the gift letter because she knew she would be unable to pay Hart
back. Moreover, even if the inference Hart asks us to draw were a
reasonable one, we would not be permitted to substitute it for the
inference the trial court, as fact finder, reasonably drew. See In re
Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 22 (“It is the trial court’s sole
province . . . to determine . . . the inferences to be drawn from the
evidence.” (citation omitted)).
¶ 28 In view of the trial court’s record-supported factual findings,
we conclude that the court did not err by entering judgment in favor
of Appling.
11 2. Gift Letter
¶ 29 Hart contends that there was no other evidence of his intent to
gift the money to Appling besides the gift letter. But Hart cites no
published Colorado case, nor are we aware of any, stating that the
trial court cannot consider a gift letter to determine the intent of the
transferor. See Boydstun v. Loveless, 890 P.2d 267, 269 (Colo. App.
1995) (“[A]n essential requirement of a gift inter vivos is the clear
and unmistakable intention to make a gift, and in this regard the
intent of the transferor or putative donor is determinative.”). Thus,
we discern no error in the court’s reliance on the gift letter to do so.
3. Unclean Hands
¶ 30 The trial court did not rely on the unclean hands doctrine in
its judgment.3 Thus, we do not need to address Hart’s argument
that the unclean hands maxim is inapplicable.
3 Hart cites to the order dismissing his breach of contract claim, as
opposed to the judgment, as preserving this issue, but Appling only raised an unclean hands defense as to Hart’s unjust enrichment claim. Thus, we construe his argument as challenging the court’s judgment.
12 C. Elements of Unjust Enrichment
¶ 31 Turning to Hart’s overarching challenge, we reject his
contention that the trial court erroneously rejected his unjust
enrichment claim.
¶ 32 The supreme court has stated,
Courts considering the third prong of an unjust enrichment claim arising from a confidential relationship should look to the factual support establishing the mutuality of purpose of both the giving and receiving parties. This includes a determination by the trial court of whether both parties’ actions indicate that each party possessed the same or similar purpose. In particular, the trial court should consider whether either party acted in furtherance of or detrimentally relied on the gift or agreement. Finally, the court should consider the length of time that the parties acted in furtherance of this misunderstanding. In the event that the parties intended the same outcome or the parties’ mutual purpose is easily discernable, the trial court should seek by its equity determination to fulfill this failed mutual purpose when one party benefits from acting in significant deviation with this mutual purpose.
¶ 33 The trial court found as follows:
Hart has failed to sustain his burden of proof as to all the elements of unjust enrichment. Because there was no mutual intent for the
13 repayment of these amounts — and because the parties’ mutual agreement was that Hart must refrain from abusing alcohol in order to remain living at the . . . property — Hart has not proved that Appling has been unjustly enriched by retaining his gifts to her. To the contrary, Appling relied to her detriment on Hart’s promise that she could retain these funds in the event that he began drinking again and their relationship ended.
¶ 34 Even assuming, without deciding, that Hart met the first two
prongs, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that
he did not meet the third. Hart contends that there was a
significant deviation from the parties’ mutual intent because the
parties were twice engaged and purchased the Windsor house to
“forever live a fairytale life together.” He contends that this was
clearly Hart’s intent and that Appling’s intent can be inferred from
her agreement to marry him the second time.
¶ 35 But the parties were not engaged when Hart executed the gift
letter. Indeed, the parties did not get engaged for the second time
until a few months after they moved into the Windsor house. Thus,
Appling’s later engagement to Hart does not necessarily
demonstrate her intent at the time of the execution of the gift letter
and the Windsor house purchase. And Hart points to no other
14 basis to conclude that he established the third prong of his claim.
Thus, we will not disturb the court’s judgment on this claim.
IV. Appling’s Tortious Interference with Contract Claim
¶ 36 Hart contends that the trial court erred by finding against him
on Appling’s tortious interference with contract claim because “the
plain testimony indicated [Appling’s] bond with her employer was
strengthened, not weakened, by the acknowledged acts.” His
contentions are both unsupported by the record and
underdeveloped.
¶ 37 Hart argues Appling’s office manager, Karen McBeth, had
stated that she had “seen quite a few bad breakups and this one
was nothing different.” But Hart mischaracterizes McBeth’s
testimony. (Notably, Hart does not identify where in the trial
transcript McBeth made any such statement.) McBeth
acknowledged that this was not the first time in her fifteen years as
an office manager (not thirty years, as Hart incorrectly asserts) that
personal relationships impacted someone at work. But she said
nothing about whether Appling’s situation was comparable to other
such incidents.
15 ¶ 38 That being said, we acknowledge that Hart correctly suggests
that McBeth’s testimony generally demonstrated that Appling’s
employer was supportive, and even protective, of Appling. But he
makes no effort in his opening brief to explain how that fact
undercuts Appling’s claim. For example, he does not recite the
elements of tortious interference with contract or identify any
element that was not met. Indeed, Hart cites no authority
whatsoever in the section of his opening brief setting forth his
argument about the tortious interference claim. See C.A.R.
28(a)(7)(B) (requiring the appellant to set forth in the argument
section of the opening brief “a clear and concise discussion of the
grounds” upon which the appellant relies in seeking a reversal of
the judgment “with citations to the authorities and parts of the
record on which the appellant relies”).
¶ 39 True, for the first time in his reply brief, Hart cites Radiology
Professional Corp. v. Trinidad Area Health Ass’n, 577 P.2d 748
(Colo. 1978), for the proposition that there can be no liability where
the third party did not breach the contract. But we decline to
consider this reference for two reasons.
16 ¶ 40 First, we will not consider arguments raised for the first time
in the reply brief. See Saint John’s Church in the Wilderness v.
Scott, 2012 COA 72, ¶ 9 n.3. This is particularly true here, where
the argument in the opening brief reads more as a contention that
Appling failed to prove damages, not that she was required to prove
a breach and did not do so.
¶ 41 Second, we will not consider “a bald legal proposition
presented without argument or development.” Barnett v. Elite
Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010).4 Hart’s reply
brief merely reiterated the argument made in the opening brief
about how Appling’s employer supported her through Hart’s
inappropriate conduct — again without mentioning in the text of
the argument that a showing of breach is required — and inserted
the cite to Radiology Professional Corp. with a parenthetical
4 To be clear, we take no issue with the general statement of the law
articulated in Radiology Professional Corp. v. Trinidad Area Health Ass’n, 577 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1978), that the third party’s breach of the contract is an element of tortious interference with contract. We simply conclude that Hart does not sufficiently develop an argument that the evidence did not demonstrate such a breach. See Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45 (“Under our adversarial system of justice, we adhere to the party presentation principle, which relies on the parties to frame the issues to be decided and assigns to courts the role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised.”).
17 explaining the holding of the case. He did not attempt to tie that
holding to his argument or the facts of this case.
¶ 42 Similarly, Hart’s contention that “the trial court award[] [of]
damages against a single reporting to a licensing board is plainly
inconsistent with Appellant’s First Amendment rights to petition” is
an undeveloped argument, and we therefore do not address it
further. See id.
¶ 43 In short, because Hart fails to adequately develop or support
any of his challenges to the court’s resolution of Appling’s tortious
interference claim, he has not demonstrated that the trial court
erred.
V. Appling’s Request for Sanctions
¶ 44 For the same reasons that Appling contends that we should
dismiss Hart’s appeal, she also asserts that we should award her
attorney fees and double costs as a sanction under C.A.R. 38.
¶ 45 While we acknowledge that Hart’s briefs are far from a model
of clarity, we were able to glean the substance of at least some
arguments (as, it appears, was Appling). Cf. Castillo v. Koppes-
Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 292 (Colo. App. 2006) (holding that an
appeal “‘lacks substantial justification’ and is ‘substantially
18 frivolous’ under [section] 13-17-102(4)[, C.R.S. 2025], when the
appellant’s briefs fail to set forth, in a manner consistent with
C.A.R. 28, a coherent assertion of error, supported by legal
authority”).
¶ 46 Nor does the protection order against Hart in a different
proceeding demonstrate that he acted vexatiously in this case. See
Zivian v. Brooke-Hitching, 28 P.3d 970, 974 (Colo. App. 2001) (“A
vexatious claim or defense is one brought or maintained in bad
faith. Bad faith may include conduct that is arbitrary, vexatious,
abusive, or stubbornly litigious, and may also include conduct
aimed at unwarranted delay or disrespectful of truth and
accuracy.”); see also Black v. Black, 2020 COA 64M, ¶¶ 134-37
(concluding that arguments did not unnecessarily expand the
proceedings and were not substantially frivolous, groundless, or
vexatious). Finally, while Hart mischaracterized the trial testimony,
he did not — contrary to Appling’s contention — repeatedly misstate
the court’s findings.
¶ 47 Thus, although this is admittedly a close call, we decline
Appling’s request for sanctions.
19 VI. Disposition
¶ 48 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE BROWN concur.