Dobler v. CDOC

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 9, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0201
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0201 Dobler v CDOC 07-09-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0201 El Paso County District Court No. 24CV154 Honorable Eric Bentley, Judge

Zachariah Dobler,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Colorado Department of Corrections,

Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL DISMISSED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE KUHN Freyre and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 9, 2026

Zachariah Dobler, Pro Se

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rebekah Ryan, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this prisoner earned time dispute, the trial court attempted

to retroactively alter post-trial proceedings to effectively toll the

deadline for an untimely notice of appeal. But because the trial

court lacked the authority to remedy such a jurisdictional defect,

we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Background

¶2 Plaintiff, Zachariah Dobler, pleaded guilty in 2012 in two

separate cases. In the first case, he was sentenced to six years in

the custody of Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC)1 for

second degree burglary. That sentence ran concurrently to another

sentence in an older case. In the second 2012 case, Dobler was

convicted of vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of an accident

involving death and sentenced to twenty-four years in the custody

of the CDOC on each count, with the two sentences running

consecutively to each other.

¶3 While in custody, Dobler obtained an associate degree from an

accredited higher education institution. According to Dobler,

1 Dobler brought the underlying case against the “Colorado

Department of Corrections Agent for Time Computation Department” as the defendant. In this appeal, we refer to the defendant agent and the department collectively as the CDOC.

1 because he obtained the degree, section 17-22.5-405(3.7)(a)(II),

C.R.S. 2025, entitled him to a one-year deduction of earned time

from his overall sentence. The CDOC disagreed and refused to

deduct the earned time.

¶4 After exhausting his administrative remedies, Dobler filed a

petition for mandamus relief in the trial court, seeking to compel

the CDOC to deduct one year of earned time from his sentence. The

CDOC moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, and

the trial court granted the motion, ruling that Dobler’s sentence for

second degree burglary disqualified him from the deduction

according to section 17-22.5-405(5)(b).

II. Analysis

¶5 Dobler appeals, contending that because the second degree

burglary sentence has been discharged, it doesn’t bar him from

receiving the earned time deduction. However, we don’t reach the

merits of his contention because we determine that he untimely

filed his notice of appeal.

A. Standard of Review

¶6 We have an independent duty to determine whether we have

jurisdiction before reaching the merits of an appeal. Smith v. City &

2 County of Denver, 2025 COA 70, ¶ 12. Appellate jurisdiction is

determined by subject matter jurisdiction, timeliness, and finality.

Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 18. “The timely filing of a notice

of appeal in accordance with the Colorado Appellate Rules is a

mandatory prerequisite for us to review an appeal.” Smith, ¶ 14.

¶7 We interpret court rules under the same principles used for

statutory interpretation. In re Estate of Ybarra, 2024 COA 3, ¶ 8.

“Accordingly, we apply the plain and ordinary meanings of the

words in the rules, attempt to give effect to each word, and, where

possible, interpret each provision in the rules in harmony with the

rules’ overall design.” Id.

¶8 We broadly construe briefs filed by a pro se litigant “to ensure

that they are not denied review of important issues because of their

inability to articulate their argument like a lawyer.” Jones v.

Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5. But we may not rewrite the briefs or act

as an advocate for a self-represented party. Johnson v. McGrath,

2024 COA 5, ¶ 10.

B. Applicable Law

¶9 An appellant must file a notice of appeal in a civil case within

forty-nine days of the final judgment. Chavez, ¶ 20 (citing C.A.R.

3 4(a)). However, “[t]he running of the time for filing a notice of

appeal is terminated as to all parties when any party timely files a

motion in the lower court pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59.” C.A.R. 4(a)(3).

¶ 10 Rule 59(a) permits parties to move for post-trial relief within

fourteen days of the final judgment “or such greater time as the

court may allow pursuant to a request for an extension of time

made within that [fourteen]-day period.” Failure to timely file a

post-trial motion within the fourteen-day period — or within an

extended period of time allowed by the court — “deprives the court

of jurisdiction to act under [Rule] 59.” In re Marriage of McSoud,

131 P.3d 1208, 1212 (Colo. App. 2006); accord Parker Excavating,

Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 2012 COA 180, ¶ 10.

¶ 11 Timely Rule 59 motions toll the forty-nine-day period to file a

notice of appeal until a trial court disposes of the last Rule 59

motion or after sixty-three days — when Rule 59 motions are

automatically deemed denied. C.A.R. 4(a)(3); C.R.C.P. 59(j). That

said, a motion for extension of time alone, even if timely filed,

doesn’t toll the notice of appeal deadline. Ybarra, ¶¶ 15-16; cf. In re

Marriage of Forsberg, 783 P.2d 283, 284 n.2 (Colo. 1989) (noting a

C.R.C.P. 60 motion doesn’t toll the appeal deadline).

4 C. Additional Facts

¶ 12 Fourteen days after the trial court granted the motion to

dismiss, Dobler timely filed a motion for extension of time,

requesting an additional sixty days to file a Rule 59 motion.2 Then

nothing occurred in the case until after the forty-nine-day deadline

to file the notice of appeal lapsed on January 7, 2025.

¶ 13 The following day, the trial court denied Dobler’s motion for an

extension of time because “[t]he case has already been dismissed.”

Dobler objected to the denial about a week later, asserting, in part,

that the trial court had inadvertently abridged his right to appeal.

Two weeks after that, Dobler simultaneously filed a notice of appeal

in this court and a Rule 59 motion in the trial court.3

¶ 14 On February 11, 2025, the trial court issued an order

addressing Dobler’s objection and Rule 59 motion. In the order, the

court

2 The dates for Dobler’s notice of appeal and pleadings are

determined by when he deposited them in the CDOC’s internal mail system. See C.A.R. 4(d); C.R.C.P. 5(f).

3 Dobler’s C.R.C.P. 59 motion made claims similar to those he

raises on appeal.

5 • determined that it had erred by denying Dobler’s motion for

an extension of time based on the case having been

dismissed;

• vacated its denial of the motion for an extension of time and

retroactively granted the motion’s request for a sixty-day

extension;

• found Dobler’s Rule 59 motion timely based on the

• ruled that it retained jurisdiction to address the Rule 59

motion because Dobler filed it simultaneously with his

notice of appeal; and

• set a briefing schedule.

Following briefing, the trial court denied the Rule 59 motion.

However, the court issued its denial on May 4, 2025, ninety-six

days after Dobler filed his Rule 59 motion (and eighty-two days after

the court’s February 11 order).

¶ 15 Dobler subsequently filed an amended notice of appeal. A

motions division of this court struck the amended notice of appeal

on June 20, 2025, because Dobler filed it without leave. The

motions division also concluded that the trial court’s May 4 order

6 was void because the Rule 59 motion had been denied by operation

of law before the court ruled on it.

D. Lack of Jurisdiction

¶ 16 Dobler filed his notice of appeal weeks after the deadline

lapsed on January 7. See C.A.R. 4(a)(1). The notice of appeal was

thus untimely unless the deadline had been tolled. See C.A.R.

4(a)(3).

¶ 17 It is true that Dobler timely filed his motion for an extension of

time under Rule 59. But the trial court didn’t rule on that motion

before the forty-nine-day appeal deadline lapsed, and the court

denied the motion for an extension when the court did rule on it.

The trial court didn’t explain why it took thirty-six days to rule on

the motion. Regardless, Dobler provides us with no authority —

and we are aware of none — permitting him to rely on the court’s

inaction to toll the appeal deadline. See Moyer v. Empire Lodge

Homeowners’ Ass’n, 78 P.3d 313, 315 (Colo. 2003) (“A party seeking

an enlargement of time within which to take a required action,

delays beyond an as yet unextended deadline at [their] own peril.”);

cf. P.H. v. People in Interest of S.H., 814 P.2d 909, 912 (Colo. 1991)

(holding that an exception for a late filing of a notice of appeal

7 applied when the delayed filing was a “direct result of reliance on an

erroneous trial court ruling purporting to extend the deadline for

filing”). It follows that the mere filing of the motion for an extension

of time itself didn’t toll the time for Dobler to file his notice of appeal

before the deadline lapsed. See Ybarra, ¶¶ 15-16; see also

Campbell v. McGill, 810 P.2d 199, 200 (Colo. 1991) (holding that a

motion for an extension of time is “not itself a [Rule] 59 motion”).

¶ 18 Nonetheless, Dobler argues that the trial court tolled the

notice of appeal deadline ex post facto through its February 11

order. This is because, as Dobler claims, that order retroactively

vacated the initial denial of the motion for an extension of time and

granted Dobler’s requested sixty-day extension. Dobler argues that

the retroactive change then made his Rule 59 motion timely, thus

tolling the deadline.

¶ 19 But Dobler’s argument ignores the fact that the trial court

initially denied the motion for an extension of time. Because of that

denial, Dobler’s Rule 59 motion was untimely. See C.R.C.P. 59(a)

(requiring the Rule 59 motion to be filed within the fourteen-day

period following the final order). His failure to timely file his Rule

59 motion consequently “deprive[d] the [trial] court of jurisdiction to

8 hear any motion filed after the [fourteen]-day period ha[d] expired.”

Stone v. People, 895 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Colo. App. 1995); accord Nat’l

Acct. Sys., Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 634 P.2d 48, 49 (Colo. 1981); see also

C.R.C.P. 6(b) (A court “may extend the time for taking any action

under Rule 59 only as allowed by that rule.” (emphasis added));

C.A.R. 4(a)(3) (“The lower court continues to have jurisdiction to

hear and decide a motion under [Rule] 59 regardless of the filing of

a notice of appeal, provided the [Rule] 59 motion is timely filed

under [Rule] 59(a) . . . .” (emphasis added)).

¶ 20 As a result, on February 11, the judgment of dismissal was

final, and the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to rectify the lapsed

deadline by retroactively granting Dobler’s motion.4 See Dill v. Cnty.

Ct., 541 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Colo. App. 1975) (holding that neither the

trial court nor the parties can attempt to correct a jurisdictional

defect by trying to avoid the procedural rules of court). Therefore,

4 To the extent Dobler claims that the trial court had authority to

act retroactively under C.R.C.P. 60(b), such a claim doesn’t alter our disposition because Rule 60(b) can’t be used to toll a notice of appeal deadline. See In re Marriage of Forsberg, 783 P.2d 283, 284 n.2 (Colo. 1989).

9 the deadline wasn’t tolled and the notice of appeal remained

untimely.

¶ 21 Lastly, we are unpersuaded by Dobler’s argument that the

motions division’s June 20 order had already resolved the

jurisdictional issue in Dobler’s favor. That order only struck the

amended notice of appeal and correctly noted that the Rule 59

motion was deemed denied for all purposes before the trial court

ruled on it. See C.R.C.P. 59(j). Thus, the motions division didn’t

rule on the timeliness of the notice of appeal, and nothing in the

division’s order addressed jurisdictional prerequisites or the tolling

of deadlines.5 See Chavez, ¶ 15 (“Jurisdictional screening can

occur at any time during the life of an appeal . . . .”).

¶ 22 In sum, we appreciate the complexities of the procedural rules

for notices of appeal and Rule 59 motions. And we appreciate

Dobler’s sense that it is unfair that the trial court’s inaction

contributed to the untimeliness of his notice of appeal — especially

considering his limited access to legal resources while incarcerated.

5 Even if it had, we have an independent obligation to determine our

jurisdiction, Smith v. City & County of Denver, 2025 COA 70, ¶ 12, and we are not bound by a ruling of the motions division when resolving an appeal, Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 13.

10 Nonetheless, the appellate rules apply strictly to the notice of

appeal deadline. See Collins v. Boulder Urb. Renewal Auth., 684

P.2d 952, 954 (Colo. App. 1984) (holding that the rules for filing a

notice of appeal require strict compliance). And Dobler’s status as a

pro se party ultimately doesn’t excuse him from having to navigate

the rules’ requirements, which he failed to successfully do in this

case. See Negron v. Golder, 111 P.3d 538, 541 (Colo. App. 2004)

(holding that pro se parties are “bound by the same rules of civil

procedure as attorneys licensed to practice law”). Because he did

not timely file a notice of appeal within the period permitted by the

rules, we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of his claims.6

III. Disposition

¶ 23 The appeal is dismissed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

6 We also note that Dobler didn’t move this court to accept his late

notice of appeal as timely or assert excusable neglect, good cause, or unique circumstances after the CDOC raised the jurisdictional defect. Accordingly, we do not address those issues. See Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45 (addressing the party presentation principle, which limits our review to the issues raised by the parties); cf. Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, ¶ 10 (holding that it is not our role to act as advocate for self-represented parties).