Smith v. Anonymous Joint Enterprise

487 Mich. 102

Opinions

WEAVER, J.

In this case, we decide whether plaintiff, Derith Smith, presented clear and convincing evidence at trial to support the jury’s finding that defendants John Stanek, Donald Barrows, and Noel Flohe defamed plaintiff by mass-mailing copies of a personnel report containing false information about her. After conducting an independent review of the record, we conclude there exists clear and convincing evidence that Stanek and Barrows acted with “actual malice,” but that plaintiff has failed to meet her evidentiary burden as to Flohe.

Accordingly, we affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals as to Flohe, but reverse the result it reached as to Stanek and Barrows. We remand this matter to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendants’ other issues, including whether the handwritten caption on the mailed report constitutes a non-defamatory statement of opinion when considered in its context within the report as a whole, whether the caption is provable as false, and whether defendants are entitled to the protection afforded by Michigan’s statutory fair reporting privilege.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This defamation action arises from the mass mailing of a personnel report written about plaintiff, Derith Smith. Plaintiff worked for the village of Suttons Bay (the Village) in Leelanau County. Plaintiffs supervisor, Suttons Bay Village Manager Charles Stewart, composed the personnel report (the Stewart report), which includes allegations that plaintiff was an independent contractor but had been compensating herself as an employee. The Stewart report also includes allegations that plaintiff had never been issued a W-2 form, received benefits to which she was not entitled, paid herself at a higher rate than the rate for which she was approved, and was not a “team player.” Stewart presented his report to the Village’s personnel committee, and the committee voted to terminate plaintiffs employment.

Plaintiff filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits. The Village opposed plaintiffs claim, arguing that plaintiff was not an employee but rather an independent contractor and, therefore, not entitled to benefits. A subsequent investigation and review revealed that various allegations against plaintiff in the report were false. Accordingly, the Village withdrew its opposition to plaintiffs claim.

Plaintiff believed that she was wrongfully terminated, but did not institute a lawsuit against the Village because she had secured employment as the Elmwood Township Supervisor in the November 2004 election. On May 17, 2005, while serving as Elmwood Township Supervisor, plaintiff received an anonymous mailing. The mailing included a copy of the Stewart report, with an additional handwritten caption stating, “Attention: Suttons Bay Villagers Alledged [sic] Misuse of Village Taxpayer Funds?” and “Derrick [sic] Smith.” Plaintiff later learned that copies of the Stewart report, including the caption, had been mailed to hundreds of citizens in Leelanau County.

At the time of the mass mailing, defendants Stanek, Barrows, and Flohe were involved in an informal group of concerned Leelanau County citizens. The group met fairly regularly to discuss various issues, including local politics and elections. It is undisputed that Stanek, Barrows, and Flohe were displeased with plaintiffs performance as township supervisor and were responsible for the mass-mailing of the Stewart report.¹

The record establishes that Barrows contacted Suttons Bay Village Treasurer Jerry VanHuystee on several occasions in 2004, asking whether VanHuystee had any information about plaintiff. VanHuystee testified that he told Barrows that he did not know of anything illegal done by plaintiff. After several requests for information from Barrows, VanHuystee retrieved the Stewart report from the Village’s records and made a copy of it.² VanHuystee put the copy of the Stewart report in an envelope and marked it with Barrows’s name. VanHuystee then dropped off the envelope at his sister-in-law’s home, where Barrows was to pick it up. The copy of the Stewart report contained no handwritten caption at this time.

Barrows testified that he picked up the envelope containing the Stewart report and brought a copy of the report to a citizens’ meeting held at Stanek’s office during the first week of May 2005. Stanek, Barrows, and Flohe were all present at this meeting, although the trial testimony indicated that Flohe arrived late. At this particular meeting, copies of the Stewart report were available for attendees to view, and there was discussion regarding whether the Stewart report should be mailed to other citizens. The trial testimony establishes that some attendees favored mailing the report, while others did not. George Preston was also present at this meeting, and he testified that he had expressed hesitation about mailing the Stewart report. Preston told the other attendees at the meeting that he would contact Stewart to verify the report’s accuracy.

Preston and Stewart testified that Preston had contacted Stewart and informed him of the concerned citizens’ intent to mail the Stewart report. Stewart confirmed with Preston that plaintiff had done nothing illegal and that the report should not be distributed. Preston and Stanek both testified that Preston relayed this information to Stanek; however, the trial testimony is somewhat conflicting with regard to exactly when he did so.

Barrows testified that he nonetheless took a copy of the Stewart report to a copy shop and paid to have approximately 500 copies made. Approximately 420 of those copies were placed into envelopes and sealed by the store’s staff. The envelopes were placed in boxes along with the remaining 80 copies of the Stewart report. Barrows testified that on May 16, 2005, he took the boxes to Stanek’s office where he, Stanek, and Flohe worked together to stamp and label the stuffed envelopes. The envelopes were then taken to the post office and mailed to citizens in Leelanau County. Citizens within the county began receiving the mailings by May 17, 2005, while the remaining copies of the Stewart report were displayed at citizen and township meetings.

Plaintiff subsequently brought a defamation claim against Stanek, Barrows, and Flohe.³ Defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that their actions were covered by the fair reporting privilege, MCL 600.2911(3).⁴ The trial court denied summary disposition, ruling that plaintiff had alleged sufficient evidence that if believed by a jury, would show that defendants mailed the Stewart report with actual knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for the truth of the report.^{5 6}The trial court additionally concluded that “if a jury finds that the publication was false and not made in good faith and with an honest belief that the report was true, the qualified privilege is defeated and damages may be awarded.”

A jury trial was held, and a verdict was reached in favor of plaintiff. The jury awarded plaintiff monetary damages and a public apology in the form of a legal notice. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for entry of a judgment of no cause of action, concluding that defamation could not be established as a matter of law because defendants’ failure to investigate the contents of the report did not constitute the “reckless disregard” required for a finding of actual malice⁶ and defendants could not be held liable for relying on a report that they did not prepare.⁷ The Court of Appeals noted that Stewart prepared the report, and it contained his “erroneous view of the status of plaintiffs employment.”⁸ With respect to the handwritten caption added to the report, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was merely an expression of opinion.⁹

This Court granted plaintiffs application for leave to appeal to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding of actual malice.¹⁰

II. STANDARD of review

The inquiry into whether evidence in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice presents a question of law. ¹¹ To determine whether the constitutional standard for defamation of a public figure¹² has been satisfied, a reviewing court must consider the factual record in full.¹³ The reason for this “independent review” of the record is “[o]ur profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment... .”¹⁴ Therefore, we must analyze the alleged defamatory statements at issue and their surrounding circumstances to determine whether those statements are protected under the First Amendment.¹⁵

The importance of protecting First Amendment liberties through an application of the “independent review” standard is well established.¹⁶ While this Court generally reviews questions of law de novo, “the independent review function is not equivalent to a ‘de novo’ review of the ultimate judgment itself, in which a reviewing court makes an original appraisal of all the evidence to decide whether or not it believes that judgment should be entered for plaintiff.”¹⁷ If the reviewing Court determines that actual malice has been established with convincing clarity, the judgment of the trial court may only be reversed on the ground of some other error of law or clearly erroneous finding of fact.¹⁸

Likewise, an appellate court should not conduct an independent review of credibility determinations, disregard findings of fact, or create new findings of fact.¹⁹ Instead, “the court should exercise independent judgment regarding whether, as a matter of constitutional law, the evidence in the record supports the verdict,”²⁰ while giving “due regard” to the trial court’s “opportunity to observe the demeanor, of the witnesses ... .”²¹ Credibility determinations made by the finder of fact must be examined to ascertain whether they are clearly erroneous.²²

III. ANALYSIS

A. LEGAL BACKGROUND

“ ‘A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.’ ”²³ Generally, to sustain a claim of defamation, the following elements must be established:

(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication.

[24]

In the seminal case of New York Times Co v Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court recognized the “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”²⁵ The Court concluded that a plaintiff who is a public official may only prevail in a defamation action if he or she establishes that the alleged defamatory statements were made with “actual malice.”²⁶ “Actual malice” exists when the defendant knowingly makes a false statement or makes a false statement in reckless disregard of the truth.²⁷ The high threshold established by the “actual malice” standard was codified by our Legislature in MCL 600.2911(6), which provides:

An action for libel or slander shall not be brought based upon a communication involving public officials or public figures unless the claim is sustained by clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether or not it was false.

Pursuant to this statute, a plaintiff who is a public official or public figure bears the burden of sustaining a defamation claim by clear and convincing proof that the alleged defamatory statement was made with actual malice, specifically, either knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether or not the statement was false. Clear and convincing proof is that which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the precise facts in issue.²⁸ Evidence may be uncontroverted and yet not be clear and convincing.²⁹ Conversely, evidence may be clear and convincing despite the fact that it has been contradicted.³⁰

After New York Times, the United States Supreme Court clarified the scope of the actual malice standard. In St Amant v Thompson, the Court explained that “actual malice” is a subjective concept.³¹ However, a defendant in a defamation case cannot “automatically insure a favorable verdict by testifying that he published with a belief that the statements were true.”³² Instead, “[t]he finder of fact must determine whether the publication was indeed made in good faith.”³³ The Court further held in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc v Connaughton that “only through the course of case-by-case adjudication can [a court] give content to [the actual malice] constitutional standard[].”³⁴ The term “malice” in the actual malice standard does not equate to a showing of ill will.³⁵ Rather, the standard requires a showing that, at minimum, the allegedly defamatory statements were made with a “reckless disregard for the truth.”³⁶

The manner in which a plaintiff may establish “reckless disregard for the truth” for purposes of the actual malice standard cannot necessarily be expressed in a singular definition.³⁷ A plaintiff must prove something “more than a departure from reasonably prudent conduct.”³⁸ Likewise, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to justify a conclusion that the defendant made the allegedly defamatory publication with a “high degree of awareness” of the publication’s probable falsity,³⁹ or that the defendant “entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of the publication made.⁴⁰ And while “courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors, a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant’s state of mind through circumstantial evidence, and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry.”⁴¹

Finally, it is well settled that the failure to investigate the accuracy of a communication before publishing it, even when a reasonably prudent person may have done so, is not sufficient to establish that the defendant acted with reckless disregard for the truth.⁴² However, a “purposeful avoidance of the truth” is dissimilar from the mere “failure to investigate,” and “a deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of facts that might confirm the probable falsity” of a publication is sufficient to find reckless disregard.⁴³ Furthermore, when a defendant has reported a third party’s allegations, reckless disregard for the truth of the allegations “may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.”⁴⁴

B. APPLICATION OF ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD

1. STANEK

Plaintiff first relies on evidence that, during a meeting at which all three defendants were present, Preston expressed hesitation about mailing the Stewart report and stated that he would speak to Stewart to verify the accuracy of the report’s contents. Specifically, Preston testified that in response to a discussion about mailing the Stewart report, he informed others that it “probably wouldn’t be a good idea” because “no one had any real knowledge if in fact [the] document was true or not.”⁴⁵

With regard to Stanek’s liability, both Preston and Stanek testified that, at a monthly Elmwood Township meeting, Preston informed Stanek that he had spoken with Stewart and that Stewart confirmed that plaintiff had not done anything illegal. There were two monthly meetings at which this conversation could have occurred — either that of May 9, 2005, or that of June 13, 2005.

Preston testified that his conversation with Stanek occurred sometime in the spring, and that while he could not be certain of the month, he did not believe it was in June. In contrast, Stanek testified that he recalled that the conversation took place on June 13. In any event, Stanek did not deny that Preston informed him of Stewart’s confirmation that plaintiff had not done anything illegal. If the jury believed that the conversation between Preston and Stanek did not take place before June 13, as Stanek asserts, plaintiff would not be able to establish that Stanek knew the allegations in the Stewart report were false before the mass-mailing. However, if the jury believed that the conversation between Preston and Stanek occurred at the May 9 meeting, then plaintiff would be able to establish that Stanek mailed the Stewart report despite the knowledge that it contained false information.

On this record, it is apparent that the jury did not believe that Preston waited until June 13 to tell Stanek about the Stewart report when citizens already started receiving the report by mail almost a month earlier on May 17 and expressed their concerns with its contents shortly thereafter. The testimony reveals that Preston already knew by May 2 or 4 that defendants were considering mailing the Stewart report, and that he had contacted Stewart about this at some point before May 17. Thus, the jury apparently did not believe Stanek’s testimony that Preston did not report back to him until June 13, almost a month after the Stewart report had been distributed. Instead, the jury apparently chose to believe Preston’s testimony that he told Stanek about the Stewart report in the spring, but that he did not think it was as late as June.⁴⁶

Here, the illogical timeline of events presented by Stanek, coupled with Preston’s testimony that Stanek initially denied responsibility for the mailing and evidence that Stanek refused to make a retraction after admitting he knew that the contents of the Stewart report were false, lead us to conclude that the jury’s finding that Stanek knew that the Stewart report contained false information or was aware of the report’s probable falsity when he mailed copies of it was not clearly erroneous. We will not disturb the jury’s credibility determinations in this regard.⁴⁷

Moreover, we are satisfied that this evidence constitutes clear and convincing evidence that Stanek acted with actual malice. Although it is contradicted by Stanek’s own testimony that he did not have knowledge of the Stewart report’s falsity, his denial of such knowledge is not, in and of itself, sufficient to defeat plaintiffs claim that Stanek had the requisite knowledge to support a defamation claim.⁴⁸ The jury was undoubtedly presented with conflicting testimony here. Similarly, in Harte-Hanks, evidence was presented that, if believed, could effectively refute the claim of actual malice. However, as the United States Supreme Court explained in Harte-Hanks, we should not substitute for the judgment of the jury our own judgment of which testimony was most credible.⁴⁹ Accordingly, we do not find the jury’s credibility determinations clearly erroneous and, therefore, we agree with the jury’s finding with regard to Stanek’s liability.

2. BARROWS

Barrows testified that following plaintiffs election as township supervisor, he repeatedly asked VanHuystee, at least five times,⁵⁰ for information about plaintiff. Specifically, Barrows inquired whether plaintiff had been involved in any criminal activity. VanHuystee testified that he told Barrows on each of the five occasions that he did not know of any illegal conduct by plaintiff. Furthermore, VanHuystee testified that the occasions on which he told Barrows that plaintiff had not been involved in illegal activity were prior to May 16, 2005, the date on which Stanek, Barrows, and Flohe mailed the Stewart report.

Barrows denied knowing that the statements in the Stewart report regarding plaintiff were false. Yet Barrows’s denial of such knowledge is not, in and of itself, sufficient to defeat plaintiffs claim that he had the requisite knowledge to support a defamation claim.⁵¹ Not only was Barrows aware of Preston’s initial hesitation to mail the Stewart report, but VanHuystee repeatedly told Barrows that he did not know of any illegal activity by plaintiff.

Indeed, Barrows’s testimony provides a sound basis for the jury’s finding of actual malice. The following exchange between plaintiffs counsel and Barrows is illustrative of Barrows’s purposeful avoidance of the truth:

Q. Did you hear Mr. Preston say that the group when he said don’t send it, Pm going to go investigate, some of the group at least some members he didn’t know how many, agreed that he should do that, did you hear him testify to that?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And, did you agree, were you one of those people that Mr. Stewart agreed Mr. Stewart should go check — Mr. Preston should go check with Mr. Stewart, or didn’t you agree with that?

' A. I think it was neutral, I didn’t care whether he went or not.

Q. You didn’t disagree with him going?

A. I didn’t care. I said he was going to do it, it wasn’t anything of real interest to me.

Q. What I’m asking about the meeting, didn’t [Preston] tell you at the meeting, you knew at the meeting he said don’t send it I’m going to go investigate, right?

A. That could very well be, I mean, that’s something that—

Q. And, that you know that those statements were made by Mr. Preston before the mailing went out, correct?

A. Oh, yes, sure.

Q. And, we know the mailing occurred on May 15 or 16, right?

A. Eight.

Q. No doubt about that because we have the envelope, right?

A. That’s right.

Q. So to wrap all those little beads together, you knew before you sent that mailing at least one person looked at it, said don’t send it, I’m going to investigate, I’m going to go to the guy that wrote this memo, you knew that, right?

A. Yes.

After considering the evidence presented, including this testimony, the jury apparently found that Barrows acted with actual malice. This conclusion is eminently reasonable given that Barrows conceded that Preston had recommended that he not send the report because he wanted to verify its accuracy. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Barrows acted with reckless disregard for the truth of the statements in the Stewart report. Although the evidence was controverted, we conclude that plaintiff sustained her burden of presenting the jury with clear and convincing proof that Barrows acted with actual malice when mailing the Stewart report.

We find further support for this conclusion in Harte-Hanks. In that case, the plaintiff, a candidate for an elective judicial office occupied by an incumbent, brought a defamation action against the defendant newspaper, which had published an article that damaged his personal and professional reputation. Shortly before the election, the plaintiff discovered evidence of a bribery scheme involving a member of the incumbent judge’s staff. The plaintiff located a witness to that bribery, Patsy Stephens, and tape-recorded a four-hour interview of her during which she provided details of the bribery scheme. Eight people were present during that interview, including Stephens’s sister, Alice Thompson.

The defendant endorsed the incumbent in the election and arranged a meeting with Thompson to discuss the alleged bribery scheme. Thompson asserted that the plaintiff had promised her and Stephens gifts and other consideration in exchange for Stephens’s statements implicating the incumbent’s staff in the bribery scheme. Before printing an article concerning Thompson’s allegations against the plaintiff, the defendant interviewed the plaintiff. The plaintiff categorically denied Thompson’s assertion that he had offered an improper quid pro quo for Stephens’ information, and provided the defendant with access to the tape recording of his interview with Stephens. The defendant did not listen to the recording. It nevertheless published a story alleging that the plaintiff had offered Thompson and Stephens jobs in exchange for their cooperation in building a bribery case against the incumbent’s staff.

A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.⁵² The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the lower courts had properly applied the New York Times actual malice standard and whether the plaintiff had presented clear and convincing evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

The Court initially noted that the jury’s verdict was largely premised on credibility determinations. In concluding that the plaintiff had satisfied his burden of proving his case by clear and convincing evidence, the Court relied heavily on circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s actual malice. Notably, the Court cited the defendant’s failure to review the tape recording of the plaintiffs interview with Stephens that would have confirmed or refuted portions of its article. The Court reasoned that “one might reasonably infer .. . that the decision not to listen to the tapes was motivated by a concern that they would raise additional doubts concerning Thompson’s veracity.”⁵³ The Court further stated:

It is also undisputed that [the plaintiff] made the tapes of the Stephens interview available to the [defendant] and that no one at the newspaper took the time to listen to them. Similarly, there is no question that the [defendant] was aware that... Stephens was a key witness and that they failed to make any effort to interview her. Accepting the jury’s determination that [the defendant’s] explanations for these omissions were not credible, it is likely that the newspaper’s inaction was a product of a deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of facts that might confirm the prohable falsity of Thompson’s charges. Although failure to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice, the purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category.[54]

In this case, as in Harte-Hanks, Barrows could have readily confirmed the accuracy of the Stewart report by doing exactly what Preston had done — contact Stewart directly. It appears the jury found that Barrows made a conscious decision not to hear from the person most capable of confirming the truth or falsity of the report. This is significant in light of the fact that at a meeting, Preston impressed on Barrows (and others, including Stanek) that the report should not be distributed because its accuracy had not been verified. And given the fact that Barrows repeatedly sought out VanHuystee and VanHuystee told Barrows on at least five separate occasions that he did not know of anything illegal done by plaintiff, the jury had ample evidence from which it could conclude that Barrows acted in purposeful avoidance of the truth.

The Stewart report contained relatively specific allegations of wrongdoing by plaintiff, including allegations of acts that would clearly constitute a misuse of taxpayer funds. Barrows knew that VanHuystee did not know of anything illegal done by plaintiff and that members of the group of concerned citizens that Barrows belonged to expressed concern about mailing the Stewart report and a desire to verify its accuracy. Thus, the jury was presented with relevant evidence aside from a mere allegation that Barrows obtained the Stewart report and mailed it without any investigation. As in Harte-Hanks, on the basis of the evidence presented and the testimony apparently believed by the jury, the jury in this case most certainly could have inferred that Barrows’s decision not to confirm the accuracy of the report was motivated by a concern that doing so would raise additional doubts concerning its veracity. Therefore, we do not find the jury’s credibility determinations clearly erroneous, and we agree with the jury’s finding with regard to Barrows’s liability.⁵⁵

3. FLOHE

In contrast to the evidence against Stanek and Barrows, the evidence presented against Flohe is less Convincing. Unlike for Stanek, there is no evidence indicating that Flohe was ever told that Stewart himself, as author of the report, confirmed that the report contained false information. In addition, unlike for Barrows, there is no evidence that VanHuystee had repeatedly informed Flohe that he had no knowledge of any illegal activity by plaintiff. Moreover, the evidence indicates that Flohe was not even present at the beginning of the meeting at which Preston expressed his reluctance to mail the report and indicated that he would verify its accuracy with Stewart. Thus, the record contains little, if any, evidence to counter Flohe’s contention that he was unaware that the report contained false information. Accordingly, we conclude that while the jury apparently did not find Flohe’s testimony to be credible, there was not clear and convincing evidence remaining to support its finding that Flohe acted with actual malice.

For these reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that plaintiff presented insufficient evidence of actual malice as to Stanek and Barrows, but affirm its conclusion that plaintiff presented insufficient evidence of actual malice as to Flohe.

C. DEFAMATORY MEANING OF THE HANDWRITTEN CAPTION

Defendants additionally argue that they are not liable for the added handwritten caption because the caption is not defamatory.⁵⁶ The caption added to the Stewart report states, “Attention: Suttons Bay Villagers Alledged [sic] Misuse of Village Taxpayer Funds?” and “Derrick [sic] Smith” written next to the line stating, “Subject: Personnel meeting scheduled for August 10, 2004.” The Court of Appeals conclusively determined that the caption alone is incapable of defamatory meaning as a matter of law because the term “alleged” was used and a question mark was included, indicating that the caption was nothing more than an expression of opinion.

However, we note that a statement of “opinion” is not automatically shielded from an action for defamation because “expressions of ‘opinion’ may often imply an assertion of objective fact.”⁵⁷ As explained by the United States Supreme Court, the statement “In my opinion Jones is a liar” may cause just as much damage to a person’s reputation as the statement “Jones is a liar.”⁵⁸ If a statement of opinion is about a matter of public concern, it is protected speech under the First Amendment, unless it can be objectively proven to be false.⁵⁹ Thus, a statement of opinion that can be proven to be false may be defamatory because it may harm the subject’s reputation or deter others from associating with the subject. The dispositive question with regard to the handwritten caption is whether a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the statement implies a defamatory meaning.⁶⁰

The handwritten caption “Attention: Suttons Bay Villagers Alledged [sic] Misuse of Village Taxpayer Funds?” and “Derrick [sic] Smith” may he defamatory if it implies that defendants have information that would indicate a misuse of taxpayer funds by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals noted that the caption is phrased in a manner that asserts that any misuse of funds is only alleged, and it is punctuated with a question mark, indicating that defendants are not conclusively stating that plaintiff misused taxpayer funds.

Nevertheless, even a statement of opinion may be defamatory when it implies assertions of objective facts. Noting that context matters in analyzing an allegedly defamatory statement, the United State Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that a statement must be examined “in its totality in the context in which it was uttered or published.”⁶¹ In addition, the First Circuit has explained that a court must consider all the words used in allegedly defamatory material, “not merely a particular phrase or sentence.”⁶² This Court has similarly supported the notion that “context” must be considered when an alleged defamatory statement is reviewed for a determination of whether it implies a defamatory meaning.⁶³

We agree that allegedly defamatory statements must be analyzed in their proper context. To hold otherwise could potentially elevate form over substance. Thus, on remand, the handwritten caption in this case should be viewed in context with the Stewart report as a whole, instead of relying merely on the use of a question mark as punctuation and use of the word “Alledged [sic]” to determine whether it is capable of defamatory meaning.

Finally, we note that the Court of Appeals failed to address the issue of the falsity of the handwritten caption. Such an inquiry is required for plaintiff to sustain her defamation claim, and must be addressed by the Court of Appeals on remand.

m CONCLUSION

Plaintiff presented clear and convincing evidence to support the jury’s finding that both Stanek and Barrows acted with actual malice. We reach this conclusion after conducting an independent review of the record and giving due regard to the ability of the finder of fact — the jury — to view the witnesses’ demeanor and to make appropriate credibility judgments. The concurrence/dissent’s approach to the independent review function is mistaken and reaches out to conduct essentially a de novo review in order to replace, with the concurrence/dissent’s own, all of the jury’s findings as to the defendants’ liability.⁶⁴

Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Stanek and Barrows are not liable for defaming plaintiff. However, we also conclude that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Flohe acted with actual malice. Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Flohe is not liable for defaming plaintiff.

Accordingly, we remand this matter to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendants’ additional arguments, including whether the added handwritten caption on the Stewart report constitutes a non-defamatory statement of opinion when considered in its context within the Stewart report as a whole, whether the caption is provable as false, and whether defendants are entitled to the protection afforded by Michigan’s statutory fair reporting privilege.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Kelly, C.J., and Cavanagh and Hathaway, JJ., concurred with Weaver, J.

1 The trial testimony revealed apparent political discourse between plaintiff and defendants. Stanek and Flohe were Elmwood Township officials in 2003, and plaintiff was involved in a group of citizens who started a recall campaign against them. While both Stanek and Flohe survived the recall, they were defeated in the 2004 election. Stanek and Barrows had been supporters of Flohe in his 2004 bid for re-election; however, plaintiff was elected to replace Flohe as Elmwood Township Supervisor.

2 Plaintiff does not allege on appeal that the Stewart report was improperly obtained from the Village’s records or that it was not a “public record.”

3 Plaintiff initially filed suit against the village of Suttons Bay, Stewart, and Preston as well. However, those defendants were dismissed from the litigation.

4 MCL 600.2911(3) provides, in pertinent part:

Damages shall not be awarded in a libel action for the publication or broadcast of a fair and true report of matters of public record, a public and official proceeding, or of a governmental notice, announcement, written or recorded report or record generally available to the public, or act or action of a public body, or for a heading of the report which is a fair and true headnote of the report.

5 The trial court specifically noted the following evidence presented by plaintiff: Barrows’s deposition testimony that it was his idea to mail the Stewart report to the masses and that he did so with Stanek and Flohe; a letter written by Stewart, but not sent, to Barrows in which Stewart recounts telling Preston prior to the mass mailing that plaintiff did not engage in any criminal wrongdoing; an email dated May 19,2005, sent by Stewart to plaintiff, acknowledging that the allegations in the Stewart report were inaccurate; Stewart’s deposition testimony that he told Preston prior to the mass mailing that plaintiff did not engage in any wrongdoing; and Preston’s deposition testimony that he advised defendants not to send the mailing until he could investigate the truthfulness of the report; and Preston’s deposition testimony that he advised Stanek, among others, that the allegations of wrongdoing in the report were false.

6 A public official or public figure plaintiff may prevail in a defamation action if he or she establishes that the alleged defamatory statements were made with “actual malice.” New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 279-280; 84 S Ct 710; 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964).

7 Smith v Anonymous Joint Enterprise, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 3, 2009 (Docket Nos. 275297, 275316, and 275463), pp 5-6.

8 Id. at 5.

9 Id.

10 Smith v Anonymous Joint Enterprise, 485 Mich 870 (2009).

11 See Bose Corp v Consumers Union of United States, Inc, 466 US 485, 510-511; 104 S Ct 1949; 80 L Ed 2d 502 (1984).

12 The parties do not dispute that plaintiffs status as an elected township official renders her a public figure or a public official.

13 Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc v Connaughton, 491 US 657, 688; 109 S Ct 2678; 105 L Ed 2d 562 (1989); see also Bose Corp, 466 US at 511 (“Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of ‘actual malice.’ ”).

14 Harte-Hanks, 491 US at 686.

15 New York Times, 376 US at 285.

16 See id. (stating that “[w]e must ‘make an independent examination of the whole record,’ so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression”) (citation omitted).

17 Bose Corp, 466 US at 514 n 31.

¹⁸

19 Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n, 438 Mich 84, 112 n 17; 476 NW2d 112 (1991) (suggesting that the independent review standard does not extend to “credibility determinations”).

²⁰

21 Bose Corp, 466 US at 499-500.

22 Harte-Hanks, 491 US at 688.

23 Nuyen v Slater, 372 Mich 654, 662 n *; 127 NW2d 369 (1964) (citation omitted).

24 Mitan v Campbell, 474 Mich 21, 24; 706 NW2d 420 (2005).

25 New York Times, 376 US at 270.

26 Id. at 279-280; see also Curtis Publishing Co v Butts, 388 US 130; 87 S Ct 1975; 18 L Ed 2d 1094 (1967) (extending the New York Times actual malice standard to public figures).

27 New York Times, 376 US at 280.

28 In re Martin, 450 Mich 204, 227; 538 NW2d 399 (1995) (citation omitted).

²⁹

³⁰

31 St Amant v Thompson, 390 US 727, 731; 88 S Ct 1323; 20 L Ed 2d 262 (1968).

32 Id. at 732.

³³

³⁴

35 Id. at 666.

36 Id. at 667.

37 St Amant, 390 US at 730.

³⁸

39 Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64, 74; 85 S Ct 209; 13 L Ed 2d 125 (1964).

40 St Amant, 390 US at 731. The Supreme Court has additionally recognized that even a false statement may be protected from defamation claims if it cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual. Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co, 497 US 1, 16-17; 110 S Ct 2695; 11 L Ed 2d 1 (1990). So too has our Court of Appeals. In Ireland v Edwards, 230 Mich App 607, 611-612; 584 NW2d 632 (1998), an attorney representing the father in a custody dispute commented on the mother’s actions and her fitness as a parent. The mother, in turn, filed a defamation claim against the attorney. The Court of Appeals concluded that many of the allegedly defamatory statements, when read or heard in context, “could not reasonably be understood as stating actual facts” about the mother and that the attorney’s statements about the time the mother spent with the child amounted to “ ‘rhetorical hyperbole.’ ” Id. at 618-619. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the statements were not actionable. Id. at 619.

41 Harte-Hanks, 491 US at 668, citing Herbert v Lando, 441 US 153, 160; 160 L Ed 2d 115; 99 S Ct 1635 (1979). See also Battaglieri v Mackinac Ctr for Pub Policy, 261 Mich App 296, 306; 680 NW2d 915 (2004), which noted that circumstantial evidence may he introduced to show actual malice because it would be rare for a defendant to admit that he or she acted with actual malice.

42 St Amant, 390 US at 731, 733.

43 Harte-Hanks, 491 US at 692.

44 St Amant, 390 US at 732.

45 Preston additionally testified that there were probably fewer than 10 people present at the meeting, and he “definitely” thought that the group heard him say he wanted to investigate the accuracy of the Stewart report. Barrows testified that he heard Preston say that he would talk to Stewart about the report. In addition, Barrows testified that there was debate about whether the Stewart memo should be sent out or not. Stanek, however, testified that those who expressed hesitance to mail the Stewart report did not indicate their reasons, and that he did not hear Preston say he would talk to Stewart about the report.

46 We reject the eoneurrence/dissent’s proclamation that Preston’s testimony — that the conversation took place in “late spring, so that’s May, June” — somehow definitively means that the earliest the conversation could have occurred was the third week of May. Tempting as it may be, we likewise decline to substitute our subjective interpretation of the record for that of the jury. Findings of fact, although not necessarily immune from review, and the opportunity to observe first-hand the demeanor of witnesses, even in the contejd of defamation claims subject to enhanced First Amendment scrutiny, remain inherently within the province of the jury. See Steadman v Lapensohn, 408 Mich 50, 53-54; 288 NW2d 580 (1980); Cochrane v Wittbold, 359 Mich 402, 408; 102 NW2d 459 (1960); Bose Corp, 466 US at 512.

47 Harte-Hanks, 491 US at 688; Locricchio, 438 Mich at 112 n 17. Although the concurrence/dissent iterates on five separate occasions that it has conducted an independent review of the record, it does not appreciate the scope of that review. Specifically, it does not recognize that an independent review of the record is not the equivalent of having carte blanche to adjudicate the merits of a case. Indeed, it is the concurrence/dissent that does not heed well-established United States Supreme Court precedent holding that,

in cases involving the area of tension between the First and Fourteenth Amendments on the one hand and state defamation laws on the other, we have frequently had occasion to review “the evidence in the ... record to determine whether it could constitutionally support a judgment” for the plaintiff. [Time, Inc v Pape, 401 US 279, 284; 91 S Ct 633; 28 L Ed 2d 45 (1971).]

Thus, the proper inquiry, misunderstood by the concurrence/dissent, is to ensure that a constitutionally sufficient quantum of evidence supports a judgment consistent with First Amendment principles.

48 St Amant, 390 US at 732 (“The defendant in a defamation action brought by a public official cannot.. . automatically insure a favorable verdict by testifying that he published with a belief that the statements were true. The finder of fact must determine whether the publication was indeed made in good faith.”).

49 On the issue of credibility determinations in defamation actions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated, “[W]e read Bose and Harte-Hanks as creating a ‘credibility exception’ to the New York Times rule of independent review.” Newton v Nat’l Broadcasting Co Inc, 930 F2d 662, 671 (CA 9, 1990). Noting that the fact-finding function involves “ ‘credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts,’ ” id. at 671 n 13 (citation omitted), the court explained that the United States Supreme Court had drawn a thin line “between highly deferential review of credibility determinations and less deferential review of the factfinder’s evaluation of other evidence relevant to the actual malice issue,” id. at 672.

50 In response to a question asking whether Barrows recalled talking to VanHuystee on five different occasions and requesting information showing that plaintiff had done something illegal, Barrows answered, “It could have been more than five, I don’t remember.”

51 See St Amant, 390 US at 730.

52 Connaughton v Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc, 842 F2d 825 (CA 6, 1988).

53 Harte-Hanks, 491 US at 684.

54 Id. at 692 (citations omitted).

55 The coneurrence/dissent’s claim that the Stewart report was available to the public under FOIA is inapposite to whether any of the defendants acted with actual malice. Moreover, the concurrence/dissent relies heavily on the fact that Barrows testified that he had no reason to investigate the veracity of the Stewart report. But it does not consider the central tenet of St Amant, 390 US at 732, that

[t]he defendant in a defamation action brought by a public official cannot... automatically insure a favorable verdict by testifying that he published with a belief that the statements were true. The finder of fact must determine whether the publication was indeed made in good faith. Professions of good faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for example, where a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call. Nor will they be likely to prevail when the publisher’s allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in circulation. Likewise, recklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.

56 All defendants deny responsibility for writing the caption on the Stewart report and deny knowing who wrote it. We note that this is irrelevant to our analysis, as defendants all admit to mailing the report and it is undisputed that the mailed copies included the handwritten caption.

57 Milkovich, 497 US at 18.

58 Id. at 18-19.

59 Id. at 19-20.

60 See id. at 21.

61 Amrak Productions, Inc v Morton, 410 F3d 69, 72-73 (CA 1, 2005).

62 Id. at 73.

63 See, e.g., Gustin v Evening Press Co, 172 Mich 311, 314; 137 NW 674 (1912) (noting that a publication must be considered as a whole when testing its libelous quality); O’Connor v Sill, 60 Mich 175, 181; 27 NW 13 (1886) (noting that an allegedly defamatory article must be read as a whole, without severing parts of it).

64 The concurrence/dissent’s approach does not acknowledge or apply the guidance provided hy the United States Supreme Court and this Court regarding credibility determinations made by the fact-finder — the jury — in defamation cases. See Bose Corp, 466 US at 514 n 31. An appellate court should not conduct an independent review of credibility determinations, disregard findings of fact, or create new findings of fact. Locricchio, 438 Mich at 112 n 17. Credibility determinations made by the finder of fact must be examined to ascertain whether they are clearly erroneous. Harte-Hanks, 491 US at 688. The jury in this case was presented with conflicting testimony and was required to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Giving due regard to the jury’s credibility determinations, we conclude that the evidence presented supports the jury’s verdict with regard to Stanek and Barrows, but not with regard to Flohe.