Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Clark & Clark

157 F.2d 725, 70 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 382, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 3910
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedAugust 6, 1946
Docket9048
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 157 F.2d 725 (Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Clark & Clark) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Clark & Clark, 157 F.2d 725, 70 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 382, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 3910 (3d Cir. 1946).

Opinion

BIGGS, Circuit Judge.

The suit at bar was brought by Smith,. Kline & French Laboratories (SKF), a Pennsylvania corporation, against Clark & Clark (Clark), a New Jersey corporation, and Charles L. Morris and Robert Brinton Morris, citizens of New Jersey, trading as Professional Laboratories (Laboratories) and others who need not be named here. 1 Two causes of action are alleged in the complaint. SKF charges that Clark and Laboratories infringed the two claims of Alies’ Patent No. 1,879,003 issued on September 27, 1932, upon an application filed on September 2, 1930; SKF also asserts that Clark and Laboratories are guilty of unfair competition. Clark and Laboratories filed an answer denying the validity of the patent or that they had infringed it, denied any unfair trade practices and asserted by way of counterclaim that SKF itself was guilty of unfair competition. .

■ The court below found that the patent was valid and that claim 1 was infringed. 2 It also found Clark and Laboratories guilty of unfair competition. Dismissing the counterclaim, it issued an injunction and ordered an accounting. See D.C., 62 F. Supp. 971-1012. Clark and Laboratories Ijave appealed. We will deal first with the patent and next with the questions of unfair competition.

The Patent Case

The patent deals with “Salts of 1-Phenyl-2-Aminopropane”. l-phenyl-2-am- *727 inopropane is also known as amphetamine 3 and phenylisopropylamine. The specification states, “This invention relates to a new composition of matter useful for therapeutic purposes. The composition of matter of my present invention consists of a salt of l-phenyl-2-aminopropane, CeHs-CHs-CH (CHs) NH2, with an acid. Various acids may be used, the most useful being hydrochloric or sulphuric. The salts of this l-phenyl-2-aminopropane are physioT logically active and produce effects in animals and man similar to the effect of the salts of ephedrine. * * *” There follows a description of a method of making salts, including the hydrochloride and the sulphate, which need not be set out here. The patent contains only two claims, as follows: “1. As a new composition of matter, a salt of l-phenyl-2-aminopro-pane.”, and “2. As a new composition of matter, the hydrochloride of l-phenyl-2-aminopropane.”

On August 29, 1934 Alies filed a disclaimer disclaiming “so much of claim 1 * * * as is in excess of the following: ‘As a physiologically active therapeutic agent capable of producing effects in animals and man similar to the effect of salts of ephedrine, a salt of l-phenyl-2-aminopropane. ”, and disclaiming “so much of claim 2 * * * as is in excess of the following: ‘As a physiologically active therapeutic agent capable of producing effects in. animals and man similar to the effect of salts of ephedrine, the hydrochloride of 1-phenyl-2-aminopropane.

It is very difficult to evaluate the patent or to determine the impact of the disclaimers on the claims. The fact is that Alies by his specification and by his disclaimers claims effects. The claims of a patent must be read in the light of its specifications. 4 A patentee can add nothing to a claim by a disclaimer. 5 A patentee may not claim effects for a new composition of matter. The reason that a patentee may not claim effects for a chemical compound is that the compound works its effects by virtue of its nature and not by reason of any claim made for it by the patentee. It is also established that a patent may not issue for a new use discovered for an old composition of matter. 6 A patent must be liberally construed, however, to sustain the just claim of the inventor. The principle' last stated may not, however, be carried to the point to exclude what is in a claim or to interpolate new matter into it. Liberality of construction rather than strictness is the touchstone. 7

Wé think that it would be unfair to destroy Alies claim 1 because he has claimed effects by his disclaimer when, by reason of the rule that a claim must be read in the light of the specification, claim 1, even without benefit of the disclaimer, would preempt, if the claiming of effects were permissible, “As a new composition of matter, a salt of l-phenyl-2-aminopropane, capable of producing effects in animals and man similar to the effect of the salts of ephedrine.” 8 But since Alies may not claim effects, claim 1 must stand precisely as printed in the patent, viz., “As a new composition of matter, a salt of 1-phenyl-2-aminopropane.33

Alies, however, has not designated any particular salt of amphetamine in claim 1. His specification states that “Various acids may be used [to create the salt], the most useful being hydrochloric or sulphuric.” The adjective “Various” means “different; diverse; several; manifold * * 9 Interpreting this language (as well as that employed in the disclaimers), the conclusion is inevitable that salts created by the reaction of some acids with *728 amphetamine will have the ephedrine-like quality asserted by Alies but that other salts created by the reaction of other acids with amphetamine will not create salts which will work the desired effect. Since effects may not be claimed, not even experimentation, prohibited by R.S. § 4888, 35 U.S.C.A. § 33, would serve to designate the salts which Alies has claimed in claim 1. This would mean, if there was no alternative construction, that Alies claimed all salts of amphetamine without regard to their effects. Such a conclusion seems absurd for the specification itself shows that Alies lays great store on his discovery that amphetamine salts, particularly the hydrochloride and sulphate, have effects like those of the salts of ephedrine on both the central and the sympathetic nervous systems of animals and man. To hold a patent, based on effects attributed by the inventor to chemical compounds, valid, when the effects insisted on by him may not be claimed, seems unrealistic to a high degree.

Does a possible, albeit narrower, alternative in favor of the patent present itself and require acceptance? Construing claim 1 in the light of the specification may we read the second of the two salts named in Alies’ specification, viz., the sulphate (the hydrochloric being already preempted by claim 2) into claim 1 ? In other words, may we treat amphetamine sulphate as a salt claimed in claim 1? We conclude that we may and should do so. 10 Reading Alies’ specification and claim 1 together we entertain no doubt that he intended to include amphetamine sulphate in the monopoly and that that compound is within the scope of the claim.

What then is the state of the prior art? This has been very fully discussed in the opinion of the court below. We will deal with it only to the extent that we deem it to be pertinent.

In 1887, Edeleano, a German scientist, prepared a paper for the Berichte der Duetschen Chemischen Gesellschaft (Ber.

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Bluebook (online)
157 F.2d 725, 70 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 382, 1946 U.S. App. LEXIS 3910, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-kline-french-laboratories-v-clark-clark-ca3-1946.