SMG, dba ASM STOCKTON v. THAT CERTAIN 1985 WELLCRAFT 3200 EXPRESS CRUISER MOTOR YACHT of Approximately 35.6-Feet in Length and 11-Feet 8 Inches in Beam, Registered With California DMV under CF Number 4111UC, AND ALL OF HER ENGINES, TACKLE, ACCESSORIES, EQUIPMENT, FURNISHINGS, AND ALL OTHER APPURTENANCES, in rem

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: October 28, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01008
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SMG, dba ASM STOCKTON, a No. 2:25-cv-1008 DC AC Pennsylvania general partnership, 12 Plaintiff, 13 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS v. 14 THAT CERTAIN 1985 WELLCRAFT 15 3200 EXPRESS CRUISER MOTOR YACHT of Approximately 35.6-Feet in 16 Length and 11-Feet 8 Inches in Beam, Registered With California DMV under CF 17 Number 4111UC, AND ALL OF HER ENGINES, TACKLE, ACCESSORIES, 18 EQUIPMENT, FURNISHINGS, AND ALL OTHER APPURTENANCES, in 19 rem, 20 Defendants. 21 22 This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for an interlocutory vessel sale. ECF 23 No. 24. Defendants have not appeared in this case. The motion is before the undersigned for 24 findings and recommendations. ECF No. 25. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned 25 recommends the motion be GRANTED. 26 I. Background 27 This case was commenced on April 3, 2025, with the filing of a complaint for vessel 28 arrest, interlocutory sale, and damages. ECF No. 1. According to the complaint, plaintiff 1 operates a marina located in Stockton, California. ECF No. 1 at 2. The defendant vessel is a 2 1985 Wellcraft 32000 Express Cruiser motor yacht approximately 35.6 feet in length, registered 3 with the California Department of Motor Vehicles under CF Number 4111UC. Id. 4 On or about October 17, 2024, the owner of the 1985 Wellcraft (“Defendant Vessel”), 5 Colton David Wood, executed a Maritime Contract for Private Wharfage pursuant to which 6 plaintiff provided a slip for berthing the Defendant Vessel and permitted Wood to inhabit her. Id. 7 Plaintiff attached a copy of the contract to the complaint as Exhibit A. The Defendant Vessel 8 arrived at the marina on October 24, 2024. ECF No. 1 at 2. Soon after, Wood started engaging in 9 bizarre and threatening conduct. Id. at 3. The complaint outlines multiple occasions on which 10 Wood used violent and racist language toward marina staff. Plaintiff alleges that Wood made 11 threats to employees, and that other marina tenants expressed concerns to the marina manager and 12 employees. 13 Paragraph 9 of the Wharfage Contract permits either party to terminate the Wharfage 14 Contract by providing the other party with at least 30 days’ advance written notice, and 15 paragraphs 1 and 12 prohibit behavior that disturbs the peaceful use of the marina by others and 16 allows for immediate termination of the contract in the event that a tenant creates disorder or 17 displays indecorous conduct. Id. at 4, ECF No. 1-1 at 6. Plaintiff’s attorney sent Wood a letter 18 on December 27, 2024, memorializing the incidents of Wood’s outrageous conduct, noting that 19 pursuant to the terms of the contract Wood’s behavior was grounds for immediate termination of 20 the tenancy, and informing Wood that the Defendant Vessel needed to be removed by midnight 21 on December 31, 2024, or she would be regarded as a trespasser and Wood’s access to the marina 22 would be restricted. Id. at 4-5. The letter also cautioned Wood that if the Defendant Vessel was 23 not removed, she would be subject to arrest pursuant to the Commercial Instruments and 24 Maritime Lein Act, and Supplemental Admiralty Rules C and E. Id. at 5. 25 Wood failed to remove the Defendant Vessel by December 31, 2024, and she remained 26 there as of the time the complaint was filed. Id. Plaintiff’s attorney, who maintains his primary 27 office in San Diego, received a letter from Wood dated January 16, 2025 in which Wood 28 threatened, “Also, I’ll draft [sic.] 500 miles to settle a score. I got business in San Diego 1 anyway.” Id. On February 1, 2025, plaintiff’s marina manager was informed that Wood brought 2 a second vessel to the marina and secured her there without contractual, statutory, to other 3 authority. Id. The manager advised Wood that he was not allowed to bring a second vessel to the 4 marina. Id. Wood called the Stockton Police Department, who referred the call to the County 5 Sherriff, which operates marine patrol. Id. The marina manager provided the officers with a 6 copy of a Temporary Restraining Order, obtained January 21, 2025, which prohibits Wood from 7 deviating from the route between his car and the Defendant Vessel. Id. Wood was admonished 8 that if he deviated from this route on the marina property, he would be subject to arrest. Id. 9 On February 1, 2025, Wood posted a YouTube video in which he used racist slurs in 10 reference to the marina manager and threatened the marina managers’ children using vulgar, 11 racist language. Id. at 5-6. On February 5, 2025, Wood harassed a marina security guard and the 12 marina manager. Id. at 6. The City of Stockton Police responded and arrested Wood, charging 13 him with felony threatening crime and intent to terrorize the marina manager, misdemeanor 14 annoying calls to 911, misdemeanor contempt of court, and disobedience of a court order. Id. 15 Plaintiff is informed and believes that Wood posted bail in the amount of $85,000 and was 16 released that day. Id. On February 21, 2025, plaintiff’s attorney sent Wood an email noting that 17 although more than six weeks had elapsed since counsel provided notice of the termination of the 18 wharfage contract, the Defendant Vessel remained at the marina, and that she and Wood were 19 trespassing. Id. The same day, Wood responded, in relevant part, “I guess I will abandon the 20 boat on the water or maybe burn it or something to keep people from profiting off my 21 misfortune.” Id. at 7. 22 On February 21, 2025, a criminal protective order was issued against Wood to protect the 23 Marina Manager. Id. at 7. On February 22, 2025, Wood was arrested and charged with a felony 24 for making a false bomb report and a misdemeanor for annoying calls to 911. Id. On February 25 28, 2025, a Workplace Violence Restraining Order was issued against Wood at plaintiff’s request, 26 requiring him to stay at least 25 yards away from the marina manager and three other marina 27 employees. Id. Between March 2 and Mrach 5, 2025, Wood posted multiple videos to YouTube 28 memorializing his harassment of people at the marina and his threatening behavior. Id. 1 On Mrach 26, 2025, two mental health professionals, accompanied by approximately 2 eight City of Stockton police officers and at least two San Juaquin County Boat Patrol officers, 3 arrived at the marina to speak with Wood. Id. Wood retreated into the Defendant Vessel and 4 refused to leave, documenting the event on YouTube. Id. at 8. The same day, the Defendant 5 Vessel was moved to another dock and the security guard presented Wood with a letter informing 6 him of the movement and the provision under the contract allowing the movement. Id. Wood 7 was also informed that he could access the Defendant Vessel through the locked gate by calling 8 security personnel. Id. On March 27, 2025, Wood used a power angle grinder, in the presence of 9 security personnel, to cut off the locking mechanism of the dock with the Defendant Vessel was 10 berthed. Id. Plaintiff then installed a chain lock as a temporary measure to secure the dock. Id. 11 Wood came back later that day and used the same tool to cut the chain, posting a video of himself 12 on YouTube during the process. Id. 13 Plaintiff retained welders to re-secure the lock mechanism, but while the welders were 14 working Wood accosted them and demanded that they stop. Id. The marina manager attempted 15 to intervene, at which point Wood used his cell phone to strike the marina manager in the head, 16 causing a laceration and profuse bleeding. Id. Wood forced the marina manager to the ground. 17 Id. The two welders restrained Wood while the police were summoned. Id. Plaintiff is informed 18 and believes that Wood has an extensive arrest record, including multiple arrests for trespassing 19 and battery. Id. at 9-10. 20 Plaintiff filed the complaint in this case on April 3, 2025, raising several causes of action: 21 Foreclosure on a Maritime Tort Lein, Brach of Maritime Contract for Necessaries, and Quantum 22 Meruit. Id. at 2-12. On April 14, 2025, a warrant for arrest of the Defendant Vessel was issued 23 by the court. ECF No 10. On June 16, 2025, an order of publication was signed ordering a 24 Notice of Vessel Arrest to be published in the Stockton Record pursuant to Rule C(4) of the 25 Supplemental Admiratory Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. ECF No. 18. An 26 Affidavit of Publication was filed on July 8, 2025. ECF No. 19. Defendant did not appear, and 27 the Clerk of Court entered default against the Defendant Vessel on July 17, 2025. ECF No. 22. 28 On August 1, 2025, the motion at bar for interlocutory vessel sale was filed. ECF No. 24. On 1 August 21, 2025, the District Judge referred the motion to the undersigned for findings and 2 recommendations. ECF No. 25. On August 21, plaintiff re-noticed the motion before the 3 undersigned for hearing on October 15, 2025. ECF No. 27. The matter was taken under 4 submission on the papers pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). No opposition was filed. 5 II. Analysis 6 A. Legal Standards Governing Motion for Interlocutory Vessel Sale 7 Federal courts are vested with admiralty jurisdiction under the Constitution and federal 8 statute. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). A contract for wharfage is a maritime 9 contract, Ex Parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68, 75 (1877), and accordingly a case is within admiralty 10 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “if wharfage is provided to a specific vessel.” Royal Ins. Co. 11 of America v. Pier 39 Ltd. P’ship, 738 F.2d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Ex Parte Easton, 12 95 U.S. 68, 24 L.Ed. 373 (1877)). A maritime lien on the vessel is established in favor of those 13 who provide necessaries for the benefit of a vessel. 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a) (“a person providing 14 necessaries to a vessel on the order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner - (1) has a 15 maritime lien on the vessel; and (2) may bring a civil action in rem to enforce the lien”). Here, 16 plaintiff seeks foreclosure on its maritime lien arising under the wharfage contract at issue 17 through the interlocutory sale of the Defendant Vessel. 18 “The interlocutory sale of a vessel is not a deprivation of property but rather a necessary 19 substitution of the proceeds of the sale, with all of the constitutional safeguards necessitated by 20 the in rem process.” Ferrous Fin. Servs. Co. v. O/S Arctic Producer, 567 F. Supp. 400, 401 21 (W.D. Wash. 1983). Rule (E)(9)(a)1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Supplemental Rules 22 for Admiralty and Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Claims (“Supplemental Admiralty 23 Rules”), governs interlocutory vessel sales and provides, in relevant part: 24 (i) On application of a party, the marshal, or other person having custody of the property, the court may order all or part of the property 25 sold—with the sales proceeds, or as much of them as will satisfy the judgment, paid into court to await further orders of the court—if: 26 (A) the attached or arrested property is perishable, or liable to 27 deterioration, decay, or injury by being detained in custody pending the action; 28 1 (B) the expense of keeping the property is excessive or disproportionate; or 2 (C) there is an unreasonable delay in securing release of the property. 3 4 Fed. R. Civ. P., Suppl. Adm. R. E(9)(a). “To justify an interlocutory sale, Plaintiff need only 5 establish the existence of one of the three provisions listed in Rule E(9)(a)(i).” Rainaldi Family 6 Trust Dated February 26, 2004 v. M/Y Excalibur, U.S.C.G. Official No. 1057893, Case No. 7 SACV 19-00684 AG (JDEx), 2019 WL 6794218, at *2, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217421 (C.D. 8 Cal. Aug. 6, 2019) (citation omitted); Merchants Nat’l Bank of Mobile v. Dredge Gen. G.L. 9 Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1981) (“In order to prevail, the lienors need only show 10 one of the three criteria.”). 11 B. The Conditions for Interlocutory Sale are Established 12 Though plaintiff need only show that one condition for an interlocutory vessel sale is met 13 to justify the sale, plaintiff has established all three. 14 1. The Defendant Vessel is in Deteriorating Condition 15 Plaintiff contends that the Defendant Vessel is deteriorating in condition and value by 16 reason of her idleness while in custody. ECF No. 24 at 9. In support of this assertion, plaintiff 17 submitted a declaration from Ray Jones, President of Long Beach Sales, Inc. and a licensed yacht 18 broker for approximately 42 years, who has sold many thousands of vessels over the years and 19 has served as an expert in cases involving vessel condition and valuation matters several dozens 20 of times. Jones Decl. at ¶¶ 1, 2. (ECF No. 24-3). Jones opined that with respect to the 21 Defendant Vessel and her deterioration while under arrest that: “It is commonly understood 22 among experienced vessel owners, yacht brokers and others who routinely deal with boats that 23 even well and regularly maintained vessels inevitably deteriorate in condition and value over 24 time. Such deterioration is substantially exacerbated when vessels (as in this case) sit idle under 25 arrest, without routine maintenance for extended periods in a saltwater environment.” Id. 26 (emphasis original). Based on these uncontested representations, the court concludes plaintiff has 27 sufficiently established the deterioration criteria under Supplemental Admiralty Rules. 28 //// 1 2. The Expense of Keeping the Defendant Vessel is Excessive and 2 Disproportionate 3 Plaintiff also contends that the cost of maintaining the Defendant Vessel is “excessive or 4 disproportionate.” ECF No. 27 at 10. Jones avers that the fair market value of the Defendant 5 Vessel is approximately $2,500.00. Jones Decl. at ¶3. This court’s Order Appointing Substitute 6 Custodian (ECF No. 8) provides that the custodian of the Defendant Vessel shall be compensated 7 for storage of the vessel and general custodial services at the rate of $3.00 per foot of vessel 8 length per day, which is $106.80 per day. At the time of this writing, the vessel has been arrested 9 for nearly six months. Accordingly, custodial fees for vessel storage and general custodial 10 service will have accrued in an amount well over $15,000. In addition, the Order Appointing 11 Substitute Custodian provides for further compensation in the amount of $250.00 per week, for 12 inspections of the interior of the Defendant Vessel to check for watertight integrity, excessive 13 bilge water, fuel leaks and other problems. ECF No. 8. Thus, further custodian fees for such 14 services will have accrued an additional expense of over $5,000. Because the presumed value of 15 the Defendant Vessel is $2,500.00 and the custodial fees incurred amount to well over 16 $20,000.00, plaintiff has established that costs are excessive and disproportionate within the 17 meaning of the Supplemental Admiralty Rules. 18 3. There is an Unreasonable Delay in Securing the Release of the Property 19 Finally, plaintiff contends that no security has been posted, and no offer has been made to 20 post security for almost six months since the Defendant Vessel’s arrest. “As a general rule, 21 defendants are given at least four months to bond a vessel absent some other considerations.” 22 Bartell Hotels v. S/L Talus, 445 F. Supp. 3d 983, 988 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (internal quotation 23 omitted).1 Here, the Vessel was arrested on April 15, 2025, just over six months ago. ECF No. 9. 24 Default has been entered and no person claiming interest in the vessel has come forward to secure 25 the Defendant Vessel’s release. Therefore, there has been an unreasonable delay in securing the 26 release of the vessel. Plaintiff has established unreasonable delay within the meaning of the 27 1 The original quote can be found in United States v. F/V Fortune, No. A86-445 CIVIL, 1987 28 WL 27274, at *1 (D. Alaska Apr. 14, 1987). 1 Supplemental Admiralty Rules. 2 C. Authorization to Credit Bid 3 Plaintiff asks the court to credit bid at the U.S. Marshal auction for the Defendant Vessel. 4 No. 24-6 at 9. The Local Rules in the Eastern District of California do not expressly authorize 5 credit bidding in a vessel arrest action, in contrast to the local rules of the Northern District, the 6 Central District and the Southern District, all of which permit a plaintiff with a claim senior to all 7 other parties to credit bid at U.S. Marshal auctions, up to the total indebtedness, provided an 8 affidavit is filed and served in advance of the auction, establishing the amount of the 9 indebtedness. See N.D. Cal. Local Admiralty Rule 9-2(b) (“Notwithstanding the above, a 10 plaintiff or intervening plaintiff foreclosing a properly recorded preferred mortgage on, or other 11 valid security interest in the vessel may bid, without payment of cash, certified check or cashier’s 12 check, up to the total amount of the secured indebtedness as established by affidavit filed and 13 served by that party on all other parties no later than 14 days prior to the date of sale”); C.D. Cal. 14 Local Admiralty Rule E.15(b); S.D. Cal. Admiralty Rule E.1(e)(2). Though the Local Rules of 15 this court do specifically contemplate credit bidding (see E.D. Cal. Local Rule 570(b)), courts in 16 this district have permitted a plaintiff to credit bid certain unpaid wharfage fees, U.S. Marshal 17 fees, fees for the publication of the notice of vessel arrest, fees for publication of the notice of 18 vessel sale, and substitute custodian fees as authorized by the Court’s Order appointing plaintiff 19 as the substitute custodian. See, Benicia Harbor Corp. v. Louise, 2024 WL 281301, 2024 U.S. 20 Dist. LEXIS 16481 (E.D. Cal. 2024). 21 Here, no party apart from plaintiff has asserted any maritime lien claim against the 22 Defendant Vessel. As the only maritime lien claim, plaintiff’s claim is, by definition, senior to all 23 other claims in this action. The undersigned therefore concludes that it is reasonable, just and 24 proper for it to permit plaintiff to credit bid at the U.S. Marshal auction of the Defendant Vessel 25 in an amount up to the lien amount attested to in both the currently filed Declaration of Chris 26 Magro (ECF No. 24-4) and in the complaint ($3,150.00), plus its actual and demonstrable costs of 27 suit, including substitute custodian and other custodia legis expenses, to be calculated through the 28 date of the vessel sale at the above specified rates, and as provided by this Court’s Order 1 | Appointing Substitute Custodian and Authorizing Movement of Vessel, provided plaintiff 2 || establishes such damages by way of a declaration filed and served at least 14 days in advance of 3 || the U.S. Marshal auction. 4 Il. Conclusion 5 Accordingly, the undersigned recommends as follows: 6 1. Because plaintiff has demonstrated that all three factors of Rule (E)(9)(a) have been met, 7 the plaintiff's motion for interlocutory vessel (ECF No. 24) sale should be GRANTED. 8 2. Plaintiff should be ordered entitled to credit bid at the U.S. Marshal auction an amount 9 equal to its lien amount attested to in its Verified Complaint, $3,150, plus the above 10 specified custodian fees $20,379.20 (totaling $23,529.20), calculated through the date the 11 motion was filed (September 19, 2025), plus other costs of suit thereafter accruing until 12 the date of the U.S. Marshal auction of the Defendant Vessel, excluding attorneys’ fees. 13 3. The U.S. Marshal should be ordered to sell the Defendant Vessel at public auction as soon 14 as possible, and that at such auction plaintiff may credit bid in the above specified amount, 15 provided plaintiff at least fourteen (14) days before the auction establishes such 16 indebtedness by a filed declaration. 17 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 18 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one days 19 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 20 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a 21 || document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 22 || Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 23 || appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 24 | v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 25 || DATED: October 28, 2025 f /

26 ALLISONCLAIRE. 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28