Small v. Internal Revenue Service

820 F. Supp. 163, 1992 WL 473216
District Court, D. New Jersey·Decided March 9, 1992·No. Civ. A. 90-4550·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinion

OPINION

BROTMAN, District Judge.

Presently before the court are the motions of defendant Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to strike “Plaintiffs Response to IRS Response DTD June 6, 1991” and for summary judgment. 1

Plaintiff Ronald J. Small filed his complaint on November 19, 1990 seeking the release of documents from the IRS pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Specifically, Small requests all of the documents related to the IRS audit of his tax returns for the years 1985 and 1986. 2 Plaintiffs request encompasses 1049 pages of material compiled by the IRS. On March 29, 1991 and on April 30, 1991, the IRS released a total of 512 of these pages to Small. It contends that the other 537 3 pages are exempt from disclosure under FOIA exemptions (2), (3), (5), (7)(C), (7)(D) and (7)(E). (5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(2), (3), (5), (7)(C), 7(D) and (7)(E)).

I. MOTION TO STRIKE

The IRS moves that this court strike “Plaintiffs Response to IRS Response *165 DTD June 6,1991” since it constitutes a sur-reply brief which is not allowed under Rule 12 of the General Rules for the District of New Jersey. A sur-reply brief can be disregarded at the discretion of the judge. In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 103 F.R.D. 130, 149 (D.N.J.1984). The court will deny the IRS’s motion since Small is acting pro se but expects all parties to comply with the rules of procedure in the future.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The standard for granting summary judgment is a stringent one. A court may grant summary judgment only when the materials of record “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Hersh v. Allen Prods. Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir.1986); Lang v. New York Life Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 118, 119 (3d Cir.1983). In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact the court must view all doubt in favor of the non-moving party. Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n. 2 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1091, 104 S.Ct. 2144, 79 L.Ed.2d 910 (1984); Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir.1972). The threshold inquiry is whether there are “any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Recent Supreme Court decisions mandate that “a motion for summary judgment must be granted unless the party opposing the motion can produce evidence which, when considered in light of that party’s burden of proof at trial, could be the basis for a jury finding in that party’s favor.” J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir.1987) (Becker, J., concurring) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Moreover, once the moving party has carried its burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, “its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to .material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Thus, if the non-movant’s evidence is merely “color-able” or is “not significantly probative,” the court may grant summary judgment. Anderson, ATI U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

In a FOIA case in which defendant is seeking summary judgment, the defendant must provide the court with detailed affidavits indicating why the withheld documents fall into categories that are exempt from disclosure under FOIA. Patterson by Patterson v. FBI, 893 F.2d 595, 599 (3d.Cir.1990); Lame v. United States Department of Justice, 654 F.2d 917, 921 (3d.Cir.1981); see United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. 749, 775, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 1483, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989).

III. FOIA EXEMPTIONS FOR DOCUMENTS WITHHELD

a. Discriminant Function Scores

The IRS contends that the discriminant function (“DIF”) scores 4 are exempt from disclosure under FOIA exemptions (3) as it incorporates 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2), and (7)(E). The IRS has withheld three pages in part because they contain Small’s DIF scores. FOIA exemption (3) incorporates other statutes which prohibit disclosure provided that such statutes either 1) require that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue or 2) establish particular criteria for withholding or refer to particular types of matters to be withheld. The last sentence of 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) provides that the IRS does not have to disclose standards used or to be used for the selection of returns for examination, or data used or to be used for determining such standards if such disclosure will seriously impair assessment, collection or enforcement under the internal reve *166 nue laws. See Grasso v. Internal Revenue Service,

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Small v. Internal Revenue Service, 820 F. Supp. 163, 1992 WL 473216 (D.N.J. 1992).

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