Sloane v. Anderson

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 3, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-04700
StatusUnknown

This text of Sloane v. Anderson (Sloane v. Anderson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sloane v. Anderson, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DEREK SLOANE, Petitioner, 19-CV-4700(CM) -against- ORDERTO AMEND ADRIAN H. (BUTCH) ANDERSON, SHERIFF, Respondent. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Petitioner,currently incarcerated at Coxsackie Correctional Facility, brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpusunder 28 U.S.C. §2254,challenging his March 19, 2015 convictions in the Justice Court of the Town of Wappinger, Dutchess County. By order dated June 18, 2019, the Court granted Petitioner’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.For the following reasons, the Court directs Petitioner to file an amended petition within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(a). Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing §2254 Cases, the Court has the authority to review and dismiss a §2254 petition without ordering a responsive pleading from the state “[i]f it plainly appears from the petitionand any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rules Governing §2254 Cases, Rule 4; seeAcosta v. Nunez, 221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 2000). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro sepleadings liberally and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original); seeGreen v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, a pro selitigant is not exempt “from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Triestman, 470 F.3d at 477 (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the petition and accompanying papers: on March 15, 2015,in the Justice Court of the Town of Wappinger, Dutchess County,Petitioner pleaded guilty to criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth and fifth degrees. Petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive one-year jail terms. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the New York State Supreme Court,Appellate Term, Second Department (Appellate Term), and on May 10, 2018, that court issued a decision affirming the convictions. SeePeople v. Sloane, 59 Misc.3d 143(A), 2018 NY Slip Op 50697(U)(App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists.2018).The New York Court of Appeals denied Petitioner leave to appeal on August 1, 2018. (ECF No. 1 at 22.) Petitioner brings this habeasaction asserting the following grounds for relief: (1) the Appellate Term “mistakenly refused” to consider issues that had been waived only because

Petitioner’s trial counsel failed to allege any errors in a filed affidavit of errors (ECF No. 1 at 2); and (2) Petitioner’s trial counsel provided “less than meaningful assistance” of counsel when he waived legal issues by failing to raise them in the affidavit of errors (id. at 10.). Petitioner has fully served his sentences. DISCUSSION A. CustodyRequirement The United States district courts have jurisdiction to entertain petitions for habeas corpus relief only from persons who are “ in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(3); 28 U.S.C. §2254(a). The United States Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions as “ requiring that thehabeas petitioner be ‘in custody’ under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989); see also Nowakowski v. New York, 835 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 2016) (“In order for a federal court to have jurisdiction over a habeaspetition, the petitioner must be ‘in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court’ at the time that petition is filed.”).

Habeas corpusrelief is not restricted only to situations in which the applicant is in actual, physical custody,Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 300 (1984), but it is available so long as a petitioner suffers from substantial restraints not shared by the general public, see,e.g.,Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491; Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (“The custody requirement of the habeas corpus statute is designed to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty.”). Courts have allowed state petitioners on bail, parole, supervised release, and those released on their own recognizance who are subjected to restraints to pursue such petitions.See, e.g.,Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351 (a petitioner who has been released on his own recognizance pending execution of his sentence is

“in custody” because he is “subject to restraints not shared by the public generally”); Nowakowski, 835 F.3d at 217 (one-year conditional discharge requiring performance of one day of community service is sufficient restraint on liberty to satisfy the custody requirement); Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Post-release supervision, admitting of the possibility of revocation and additional jail time, is considered to be ‘custody.’”). But “once a sentence has been completely served and thus expired, an individual is no longer ‘in custody’ under that conviction.”Valdez v. Hulihan, 640 F. Supp. 2d 514, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citations omitted). At the time Petitioner submitted this petition, he had fully served his sentences for his March 19, 2015 convictions. He does not allege facts showing that heis subject to restraints on his libertythat render him “in custody” within the meaning of §2254. For example, Petitioner does not allege that he is required to be physically present at particular times or locations, or that he is exposed to “future adverse consequences on discretion of the supervising court.” Nowakowski, 835 F.3d at 216.Because Petitioner does not allege that he “suffers [a] present restraint from [his] conviction”or that his liberty is curtailed in anyway as a result of his 2015

convictions,he does not appear to be in custody and cannot challenge theconvictions in a §2254 petition. Maleng,490 U.S. at 492. B. Leave to Amend Petition The Court grants Petitioner leave to submit an amended petition within sixty days of the date of this order. Should Petitioner decide to file an amended petition, he must allege facts to show why this application should not be denied because he does not meet the in custody statutory requirement.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon
466 U.S. 294 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Maleng v. Cook
490 U.S. 488 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Sean Earley v. Timothy Murray
451 F.3d 71 (Second Circuit, 2006)
Valdez v. Hulihan
640 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D. New York, 2009)
Nowakowski v. New York
835 F.3d 210 (Second Circuit, 2016)

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Bluebook (online)
Sloane v. Anderson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sloane-v-anderson-nysd-2019.