nited States District Court for the s2orthern District of Oklahoma
Case No. 23-cv-354-JDR-JFJ
MEGAN SLINKARD; JON SLINKARD, Plaintiffs, versus INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DistRIcT No. 1 OF TULSA COUNTY, also known as TULSA PUBLIC SCHOOLS; ALPHA BENSON, Interim Princi- pal, in his official and personal capacity, DEBORAH GIST, Superintendent, in her official and personal capacity, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
On March 31, 2025, the Court entered an opinion and order granting Defendants Alpha Benson and Deborah Gist’s motion to dismiss and denying Plaintiffs Jon and Megan Slinkards’ motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 44. Plaintiffs now ask the Court to enter final judgment on the dismissal of those claims and on the denial of their motion for summary judgment to allow ap- peal of the Court’s opinion and order. Dkt. 60. Defendant Tulsa Public Schools objects, arguing that Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim against TPS is still pending before the Court and entering final judgment on the other claims would allow “piecemeal appeals.” Dkt. 62 at 2. The Court agrees and denies Plaintiffs’ motion. The underlying facts of the Slinkards’ claims are recited in the Court’s opinion and order. Dkt. 44. The Slinkards’ complaint alleged the following claims: (1) Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1376 is facially unconstitutional; (2) Defend- ants unconstitutionally applied Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1376 to Ms. Slinkard; (3)
No. 23-cv-354
Defendants violated Ms. Slinkard’s procedural due process rights; (4) De- fendants retaliated against Ms. Slinkard for exercising her First Amendment rights; and (5) Defendants violated Mr. Slinkard’s First Amendment Rights. Dkt. 1. Following the Court’s opinion and order [Dkt. 44], the Slinkards as- sert that the only remaining claim is Ms. Slinkard’s First Amendment retali- ation claim. Dkt. 60 at 3. TPS disagrees and argues that, along with Ms. Slinkard’s First Amendment claim, all other claims remain pending against TPS even though the claims “are foreclosed by the Court’s ruling on Defend- ants Benson and Gist’s motions to dismiss.” Dkt. 62 at 2 n.1. For purposes of this order, the Court will assume that only Ms. Slinkard’s First Amendment retaliation claim remains pending. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a court to enter a judg- ment on some claims even though other claims remain pending. Rule 54(b) provides: When an action presents more than one claim for relief ... or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be re- vised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities. But “trial courts should be reluctant to enter Rule 54(b) orders since the pur- pose of this rule is a limited one: to provide a recourse for litigants when dis- missal of less than all their claims will create undue hardships.” Okla. Tpk. Auth. v. Bruner, 259 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gas-A-Car, Inc. »v. Am. Petrofina, Inc., 484 F.2d 1102, 1105 (10th Cir. 1973)). A district court should only certify a judgment under Rule 54(b) where “ ‘the claims resolved are distinct and separable from the claims left unresolved.” Niemi ».
No. 23-cv-354
Lasshofer, 770 F.3d 1331, 1341-42 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Okla. Tpk. Auth., 259 F.3d at 1243). To certify a judgment under Rule 54(b), the Court must find that (1) the judgment is final; and (2) there is no just reason for delay of entry of its judgment. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 259 F.3d at 1242. The Slinkards do not satisfy the first element . A final judgment is “an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956)). “[A] ‘claim’ is generally understood to include all factually or legally connected elements of a case.” Okla. Tpk. Auth., 259 F.3d at 1242. Accordingly, “a judg- ment is not final for the purposes of Rule 54(b) unless the claims resolved are distinct and separable from the claims left unresolved.” /d. at 1243. The Slinkards argue that Ms. Slinkard’s First Amendment retaliation claim is distinct and separate from the dismissed claims brought against Prin- cipal Benson and Superintendent Gist. Dkt. 60 at 3. They also argue that, under Monell, Ms. Slinkard’s First Amendment retaliation claim against TPS “has been functionally extinguished” because a claim against TPS is reliant on an underlying violation by Principal Benson or Superintendent Gist. Jd. But the Court’s First Amendment retaliation analysis focused on Ms. Slinkard’s ban from TPS property, not her termination. Dkt. 44 at 25-26. Ms. Slinkard’s First Amendment retaliation claim against TPS for her termina- tion is still active. And there is no question that Ms. Slinkard’s sole remaining claim is factually connected to the dismissed claims against Principal Benson and Superintendent Gist because her termination was a result of the ban. Thus, the dismissed claims remain intertwined with Ms. Slinkard’s pending First Amendment retaliation claim against TPS for her termination, and the Court’s order and opinion does not constitute a final judgment. The Slinkards also fail to satisfy the second element . “The purpose of Rule 54(b) ‘is to avoid the possible injustice of a delay in entering judgment
No. 23-cv-354
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
nited States District Court for the s2orthern District of Oklahoma
Case No. 23-cv-354-JDR-JFJ
MEGAN SLINKARD; JON SLINKARD, Plaintiffs, versus INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DistRIcT No. 1 OF TULSA COUNTY, also known as TULSA PUBLIC SCHOOLS; ALPHA BENSON, Interim Princi- pal, in his official and personal capacity, DEBORAH GIST, Superintendent, in her official and personal capacity, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
On March 31, 2025, the Court entered an opinion and order granting Defendants Alpha Benson and Deborah Gist’s motion to dismiss and denying Plaintiffs Jon and Megan Slinkards’ motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 44. Plaintiffs now ask the Court to enter final judgment on the dismissal of those claims and on the denial of their motion for summary judgment to allow ap- peal of the Court’s opinion and order. Dkt. 60. Defendant Tulsa Public Schools objects, arguing that Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim against TPS is still pending before the Court and entering final judgment on the other claims would allow “piecemeal appeals.” Dkt. 62 at 2. The Court agrees and denies Plaintiffs’ motion. The underlying facts of the Slinkards’ claims are recited in the Court’s opinion and order. Dkt. 44. The Slinkards’ complaint alleged the following claims: (1) Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1376 is facially unconstitutional; (2) Defend- ants unconstitutionally applied Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1376 to Ms. Slinkard; (3)
No. 23-cv-354
Defendants violated Ms. Slinkard’s procedural due process rights; (4) De- fendants retaliated against Ms. Slinkard for exercising her First Amendment rights; and (5) Defendants violated Mr. Slinkard’s First Amendment Rights. Dkt. 1. Following the Court’s opinion and order [Dkt. 44], the Slinkards as- sert that the only remaining claim is Ms. Slinkard’s First Amendment retali- ation claim. Dkt. 60 at 3. TPS disagrees and argues that, along with Ms. Slinkard’s First Amendment claim, all other claims remain pending against TPS even though the claims “are foreclosed by the Court’s ruling on Defend- ants Benson and Gist’s motions to dismiss.” Dkt. 62 at 2 n.1. For purposes of this order, the Court will assume that only Ms. Slinkard’s First Amendment retaliation claim remains pending. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a court to enter a judg- ment on some claims even though other claims remain pending. Rule 54(b) provides: When an action presents more than one claim for relief ... or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be re- vised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities. But “trial courts should be reluctant to enter Rule 54(b) orders since the pur- pose of this rule is a limited one: to provide a recourse for litigants when dis- missal of less than all their claims will create undue hardships.” Okla. Tpk. Auth. v. Bruner, 259 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gas-A-Car, Inc. »v. Am. Petrofina, Inc., 484 F.2d 1102, 1105 (10th Cir. 1973)). A district court should only certify a judgment under Rule 54(b) where “ ‘the claims resolved are distinct and separable from the claims left unresolved.” Niemi ».
No. 23-cv-354
Lasshofer, 770 F.3d 1331, 1341-42 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Okla. Tpk. Auth., 259 F.3d at 1243). To certify a judgment under Rule 54(b), the Court must find that (1) the judgment is final; and (2) there is no just reason for delay of entry of its judgment. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 259 F.3d at 1242. The Slinkards do not satisfy the first element . A final judgment is “an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956)). “[A] ‘claim’ is generally understood to include all factually or legally connected elements of a case.” Okla. Tpk. Auth., 259 F.3d at 1242. Accordingly, “a judg- ment is not final for the purposes of Rule 54(b) unless the claims resolved are distinct and separable from the claims left unresolved.” /d. at 1243. The Slinkards argue that Ms. Slinkard’s First Amendment retaliation claim is distinct and separate from the dismissed claims brought against Prin- cipal Benson and Superintendent Gist. Dkt. 60 at 3. They also argue that, under Monell, Ms. Slinkard’s First Amendment retaliation claim against TPS “has been functionally extinguished” because a claim against TPS is reliant on an underlying violation by Principal Benson or Superintendent Gist. Jd. But the Court’s First Amendment retaliation analysis focused on Ms. Slinkard’s ban from TPS property, not her termination. Dkt. 44 at 25-26. Ms. Slinkard’s First Amendment retaliation claim against TPS for her termina- tion is still active. And there is no question that Ms. Slinkard’s sole remaining claim is factually connected to the dismissed claims against Principal Benson and Superintendent Gist because her termination was a result of the ban. Thus, the dismissed claims remain intertwined with Ms. Slinkard’s pending First Amendment retaliation claim against TPS for her termination, and the Court’s order and opinion does not constitute a final judgment. The Slinkards also fail to satisfy the second element . “The purpose of Rule 54(b) ‘is to avoid the possible injustice of a delay in entering judgment
No. 23-cv-354
on a distinctly separate claim or as to fewer than all of the parties until the final adjudication of the entire case by making an immediate appeal availa- ble” □ Okla. Tpk. Auth., 259 F.3d at 1241 (citation omitted). The Court must act as a “dispatcher” under Rule 54(b) by “tak[ing] into account judicial ad- ministrative interests as well as the equities involved” to “preserve[] the his- toric federal policy against piecemeal appeals.” Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 8 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 U.S. at 435, 438). The Slinkards argue that “[i]mmediate appeal will promote judicial ef- ficiency, preserve party resources, and allow higher court review of threshold constitutional questions before any further proceedings occur.” Dkt. 60 at 4. The Court disagrees. Given the facts of this case, it would make little sense to enter final judgment on the dismissed claims without first resolving Ms. Slinkard’s First Amendment retaliation claim against TPS, whether that be via dispositive motions or trial. Allowing the Slinkards to take a piecemeal approach to their appeals would not “expedite[] the ultimate termination of [this] action,” but would instead require the Tenth Circuit to “repeatedly fa- miliarize [itself] with the facts of [their] case.” Okla. Tpk. Auth., 259 F.3d at 1241. The only hardship the Slinkards state is that the parties would be re- quired to “prepare for trial on a claim that may ultimately be legally nonviable if the Tenth Circuit reverses,” which is a risk that all plaintiffs face when they file a case. Because of the Tenth Circuit’s preference for “one appeal in a sin- gle action,” zd., and because requiring the Slinkards to wait for a final judg- ment on all claims creates no undue hardship in this case, there is reason to delay appellate review until adjudication of all claims is final. The Slinkards’ motion for entry of final judgment [Dkt. 60] is denied. While the Slinkards’ motion was pending, they filed a motion for ex- tension of time to serve their first request for production of documents and requested a stay of discovery pending resolution of their motion for entry of final judgment. Dkt. 61. The Slinkards state that their failure to serve the re- quests on time “‘was not due to bad faith or disregard of the Court’s order,
dA
No. 23-cv-354
but rather the product of a confluence of difficult circumstances.” Jd. at 2. TPS asks the Court to deny the motion. Dkt. 63. Because the Court has re- solved the Slinkards motion for entry of final judgment, their request to stay discovery is moot. The Court grants their motion to extend the deadline to serve requests for production of documents to fourteen days from the issu- ance of this order. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Slinkards’ motion for entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) [Dkt. 60] is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Slinkards’ motion to stay discovery [Dkt. 61] is moot. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Slinkards’ request to ex- tend the deadline to serve their first requests for production of documents [Dkt. 61] is granted; the Slinkards have fourteen days from the issuance of this order to serve the requests. DATED this 14th day of July 2025.
JOHN D. RUSSELL United States District Judge