Slater v. Pennsylvania Department of Education

725 A.2d 1248, 1999 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 85

Opinions

FRIEDMAN, Judge.

Carole P. Slater (Slater) appeals from an order of the Professional Standards and Practices Commission (Commission) granting the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Education’s (Department) motion to suspend Slater’s professional teaching certification.¹ We reverse.

On January 8, 1997, Slater was arrested on charges of endangering the welfare of children, selling/furnishing liquor to minors and corruption of minors.² (R.R. at la, 8a.) Because these charges involved crimes of moral turpitude, the Department filed a Notice of Charges and a motion for summary judgment with the Commission, seeking the suspension of Slater’s teaching certificates pursuant to section 5(a)(ll) of the Teacher Certification Law (Law).³ (R.R. at la-4a, 15a-19a.) Slater filed a response to the Notice of Charges and the motion for summary judgment requesting that the charges be dismissed; she also sought an evidentiary hearing in order to present evidence establishing that her husband instigated the charges to aid him in a contentious divorce action.⁴ (R.R. at 11a-12a, 21a-23a.) On August 11, 1997, following argument on the Department’s motion for summary judgment,⁵ the Commission granted the motion and ordered the suspension of Slater’s professional teaching certificates. (R.R. at 28a.)

Slater now appeals to this court,⁶ arguing that because section 5(a)(ll) of the Law mandates the suspension of her teaching certificates based solely on the existence of the indictment and the nature of the charges against her, the statute violates her constitutional due process rights by depriving her of a property interest without providing a meaningful pre-deprivation or post-deprivation hearing.⁷

In asserting that Slater improperly was denied a prompt, meaningful post-deprivation hearing, counsel for Slater raises an issue identical to that recently decided by this court in Petron v.. Department of Education, 726 A.2d 1091 (1999).⁸ In Petron, we determined that section 5(a)(11) of the Law, as applied to the petitioner in that case, violated the constitutional mandates of due process; thus, we reversed a Commission order granting the Department’s motion to suspend the petitioner’s professional teaching certification pursuant to that section. Our decision in Petron controls here and, based on the reasoning employed in that case, we now reverse the order of the Commission here and conclude that, as applied to Slater, section 5(a)(ll) of the Law did not afford Slater minimal due process protection.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 22nd day of February, 1999, the order of the Professional Standards and Practices Commission, dated August 11, 1997, at No. DI-97-14, is hereby reversed.

Concurring Opinion by Judge PELLEGRINI joined by Judge MeGINLEY.

Footnotes

1

. Slater holds Instructional I teaching certificates, issued by the Department, endorsed in the areas of Elementary and Early Childhood Education, and she is also certified by the Department as a Reading Specialist. (R.R. at la.)

2

. Specifically, Slater was accused of engaging in sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 18 and furnishing alcoholic beverages to persons under the age of 21 in the presence of her nine year old son. (R.R. at 6a-7a.)

3

. Act of December 12, 1973, P.L. 397, as amended, 24 P.S. § 2070.5(a)(11), which provides in relevant part:

(a) The [Commission] shall have the power and its duty shall be:

(11) ... to suspend the certificate of any professional educator indicted for a crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude ... whenever a certified copy of such indictment shall have been filed with the [Cjommission and to revoke the same upon conviction thereof whenever a certified copy of the verdict or judgment or sentence of the court shall have been filed with the [Cjommission, and to direct reinstatement of such certificate by the [Dje-partment in any case where after hearing the [Cjommission shall deem the same just and proper.

4

.In her responses, Slater admitted that a certified copy of the criminal information was attached to the Notice of Charges and the motion for summary judgment and that she was charged with endangering the welfare of children, furnishing liquor to minors and corruption of minors; however, Slater denied that these crimes involved moral turpitude or that she endangered the health, safety and welfare of students or others. (R.R. at 11a-12a, 21a-23a.)

5

. By letter dated June 19, 1997, the Commission notified Slater that it would consider the Department's motion for summary judgment on July 7, 1997. (Supp.R.R.)

6

. Our scope of review in this matter is limited to a determination of whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Startzel v. Commonwealth, Department of Education, 128 Pa.Cmwlth. 110, 562 A.2d 1005 (1989), appeal denied, 524 Pa. 636, 574 A.2d 76 (1990).

7

. In Firman v. State Board of Medicine, 697 A.2d 291 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), appeal denied, 550 Pa. 722, 706 A.2d 1215 (1998), we quoted from the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), and stated:

[A]n essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property [interests] be preceded by notice and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. We have described “the root requirement” of the Due Process Clause as being "that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest." This principal requires "some kind of a hearing” prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment.

Firman, 697 A.2d at 295 (citations omitted.) This procedural due process requirement is codified in the Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 504, which provides, "No adjudication of a Commonwealth agency shall be valid as to any party unless he shall have been afforded reasonable notice of a hearing and an opportunity to be heard.” See Commonwealth ex. rel. Ryan v. Rundle, 411 Pa. 613, 192 A.2d 362, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 948, 84 S.Ct. 358, 11 L.Ed.2d 277 (1963) (stating that due process implicates the two basic elements of notice and an opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself).

8

.In fact, Petron and the present case were argued before this court on the same date. We note that counsel for Petron asserted a violation of due process where Petron's professional teaching certification would be suspended without provisions for a prompt, meaningful post-deprivation hearing. In addition to making this same constitutional argument, counsel for Slater also challenges the lack of a pre-deprivation hearing as a violation of Slater’s due process rights. However, we need not address this latter issue in order to afford Slater the relief she requests. Slater has been acquitted of the charges filed against her and, thus, is entitled to reinstatement of her professional teaching certificate. However, Slater’s acquittal does not render this particular matter moot because, without our decision now, Slater has no remedy for the back pay she seeks and to which she is entitled.