FRIEDMAN, Judge.
Joseph M. Petron (Petron) appeals from an order of the Professional Standards and Practices Commission (Commission) granting the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Education’s (Department) motion to suspend Petron’s professional teaching certification.1 We reverse.
On April 25, 1996, Petron was arrested on charges of simple assault and endangering the welfare of children.2 Based on the fact that these charges were for crimes involving moral turpitude, the Department filed a Notice of Charges and a motion for summary judgment with the Commission seeking the suspension of Petron’s teaching certificate pursuant to section 5(a)(ll) of the Teacher Certification Law (Law).3 (R.R. at 6a-13a.) [1092]*1092Petron filed a response, asserting that the charge for endangering the welfare of children had been nolle prossed and the charge for simple assault had been disposed of by his acceptance' into the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) Program.4 (R.R. at 17a-23a.) Petron maintained that: (1) the Commission could not suspend his teacher’s certification because, by virtue of his acceptance into the ARD program for the simple assault chárge, a criminal charge was no longer pending against him; and (2) the suspension of his teacher’s certification violates his constitutional due process rights.
In a reply letter to Petron’s response, the Department asserted that, despite Petron’s acceptance into the ARD program, the simple assault charge was still pending against Petron. The Department reasoned that, if Petron violated the ARD conditions prior to his completion of the program, Petron could still be prosecuted on that charge. Because prosecution for a crime involving moral turpitude remained a possibility, the Department maintained that the Commission had the authority to suspend Petron’s teaching certification, and that such a suspension did not violate Petron’s due process rights. (R.R. at 24a-25a.)
On July 1, 1997, Petron filed a letter responding to the Department’s letter; in that letter, Petron reiterated his position that, because he cannot be prosecuted on the simple assault charge unless and until he violates a condition of the ARD program, there is no charge pending against him that would warrant suspension of his teacher’s certification, and that such a suspension without a hearing violates his due process rights.5 (R.R. at 33a-34a.) On November 10, 1997, following argument on the matter, the Commission granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment.6
Petron filed a timely application for reconsideration, arguing that the Commission abused its discretion by failing to consider Petron’s July 1,1997 response to the Department’s motion for summary judgment and Notice of Charges. (R.R. at 26a-28a.) The Commission reconsidered the issue presented, rejected Petron’s argument that the charge of simple assault had been disposed of by virtue of Petron’s acceptance into the ARD program and, instead, determined that the charge of simple assault remained pending against Petron until his successful completion of the ARD program. Accordingly, upon consideration of the Department’s motion for summary judgment, the responses thereto and Petron’s request for reconsideration, the Commission vacated its order of November 10, 1997 and ordered the suspension of Petron’s teacher’s certification, with automatic reinstatement of the certification upon Petron’s successful completion of the ARD program.
Petron now appeals from that order to this court,7 repeating his arguments that: (1) by virtue of his acceptance into the ARD [1093]*1093program, the simple assault charge against him is postponed and, unless he violates a condition of the ARD program, his instructional teaching certificate may not be suspended pursuant to section 5(a)(ll) of the Law, 24 P.S. § 2070.5(a)(ll); and (2) because section 5(a)(ll) of the Law mandates the suspension of his teaching certification based solely on the existence of the indictment and the nature of the charges against him, the statute violates his constitutional due process rights by depriving him of a property interest without providing a meaningful pre-depri-vation or post-deprivation hearing.8 On the other hand, the Department reasserts its contention that, because the simple assault charge precipitating Petron’s entry into the ARD program is dismissed only after Petron successfully completes the ARD program, that charge remains pending until completion of the program, and thus, the Commission may suspend Petron’s teaching certification during Petron’s participation in the ARD program. We agree that section 5(a)(ll) of the Law, as applied, to Petron under these circumstances, denied Petron of his constitutional rights to due process.
Although prosecution is postponed during Petron’s participation in the ARD program, the charge of simple assault will not be dismissed unless and until Petron successfully completes the program.9 Therefore, because the charge against Petron remains pending, the Commission is required by section 5(a)(ll) of the Law to suspend his teacher’s certification. Thus, the question before us is whether the suspension of Petron’s teacher’s certification violates Petron’s constitutional rights of due process by depriving him of that property interest without providing a pre-deprivation or post-deprivation hearing.
Here, the Department concedes that Pe-tron’s teaching certificate is a constitutionally protected property right entitled to due process protection. See Bradley v. Pittsburgh Board of Education, 913 F.2d 1064 (3rd Cir.1990) (holding that tenured teachers have a property interest in their positions which cannot be taken away without due process of law). However, the Department argues that there is only a minimal likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of an educator’s property interest because the Commission provides the educator with a “hearing” to determine whether the offense charged involves moral [1094]*1094turpitude. The Department, however, fails to address Petron’s contention that this “hearing” fails to meet the mandates of due process.
When determining whether a particular procedure satisfies the mandates of due process, we must consider: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of such interest as a consequence of the procedure used and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) a balancing of the state interest served by the use of a summary procedure against the burden that would be imposed by an additional, substitute or more rigorous procedure. Firman v. State Board of Medicine, 697 A.2d 291 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), appeal denied, 550 Pa. 722, 706 A.2d 1215 (1998) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).
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FRIEDMAN, Judge.
Joseph M. Petron (Petron) appeals from an order of the Professional Standards and Practices Commission (Commission) granting the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Education’s (Department) motion to suspend Petron’s professional teaching certification.1 We reverse.
On April 25, 1996, Petron was arrested on charges of simple assault and endangering the welfare of children.2 Based on the fact that these charges were for crimes involving moral turpitude, the Department filed a Notice of Charges and a motion for summary judgment with the Commission seeking the suspension of Petron’s teaching certificate pursuant to section 5(a)(ll) of the Teacher Certification Law (Law).3 (R.R. at 6a-13a.) [1092]*1092Petron filed a response, asserting that the charge for endangering the welfare of children had been nolle prossed and the charge for simple assault had been disposed of by his acceptance' into the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) Program.4 (R.R. at 17a-23a.) Petron maintained that: (1) the Commission could not suspend his teacher’s certification because, by virtue of his acceptance into the ARD program for the simple assault chárge, a criminal charge was no longer pending against him; and (2) the suspension of his teacher’s certification violates his constitutional due process rights.
In a reply letter to Petron’s response, the Department asserted that, despite Petron’s acceptance into the ARD program, the simple assault charge was still pending against Petron. The Department reasoned that, if Petron violated the ARD conditions prior to his completion of the program, Petron could still be prosecuted on that charge. Because prosecution for a crime involving moral turpitude remained a possibility, the Department maintained that the Commission had the authority to suspend Petron’s teaching certification, and that such a suspension did not violate Petron’s due process rights. (R.R. at 24a-25a.)
On July 1, 1997, Petron filed a letter responding to the Department’s letter; in that letter, Petron reiterated his position that, because he cannot be prosecuted on the simple assault charge unless and until he violates a condition of the ARD program, there is no charge pending against him that would warrant suspension of his teacher’s certification, and that such a suspension without a hearing violates his due process rights.5 (R.R. at 33a-34a.) On November 10, 1997, following argument on the matter, the Commission granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment.6
Petron filed a timely application for reconsideration, arguing that the Commission abused its discretion by failing to consider Petron’s July 1,1997 response to the Department’s motion for summary judgment and Notice of Charges. (R.R. at 26a-28a.) The Commission reconsidered the issue presented, rejected Petron’s argument that the charge of simple assault had been disposed of by virtue of Petron’s acceptance into the ARD program and, instead, determined that the charge of simple assault remained pending against Petron until his successful completion of the ARD program. Accordingly, upon consideration of the Department’s motion for summary judgment, the responses thereto and Petron’s request for reconsideration, the Commission vacated its order of November 10, 1997 and ordered the suspension of Petron’s teacher’s certification, with automatic reinstatement of the certification upon Petron’s successful completion of the ARD program.
Petron now appeals from that order to this court,7 repeating his arguments that: (1) by virtue of his acceptance into the ARD [1093]*1093program, the simple assault charge against him is postponed and, unless he violates a condition of the ARD program, his instructional teaching certificate may not be suspended pursuant to section 5(a)(ll) of the Law, 24 P.S. § 2070.5(a)(ll); and (2) because section 5(a)(ll) of the Law mandates the suspension of his teaching certification based solely on the existence of the indictment and the nature of the charges against him, the statute violates his constitutional due process rights by depriving him of a property interest without providing a meaningful pre-depri-vation or post-deprivation hearing.8 On the other hand, the Department reasserts its contention that, because the simple assault charge precipitating Petron’s entry into the ARD program is dismissed only after Petron successfully completes the ARD program, that charge remains pending until completion of the program, and thus, the Commission may suspend Petron’s teaching certification during Petron’s participation in the ARD program. We agree that section 5(a)(ll) of the Law, as applied, to Petron under these circumstances, denied Petron of his constitutional rights to due process.
Although prosecution is postponed during Petron’s participation in the ARD program, the charge of simple assault will not be dismissed unless and until Petron successfully completes the program.9 Therefore, because the charge against Petron remains pending, the Commission is required by section 5(a)(ll) of the Law to suspend his teacher’s certification. Thus, the question before us is whether the suspension of Petron’s teacher’s certification violates Petron’s constitutional rights of due process by depriving him of that property interest without providing a pre-deprivation or post-deprivation hearing.
Here, the Department concedes that Pe-tron’s teaching certificate is a constitutionally protected property right entitled to due process protection. See Bradley v. Pittsburgh Board of Education, 913 F.2d 1064 (3rd Cir.1990) (holding that tenured teachers have a property interest in their positions which cannot be taken away without due process of law). However, the Department argues that there is only a minimal likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of an educator’s property interest because the Commission provides the educator with a “hearing” to determine whether the offense charged involves moral [1094]*1094turpitude. The Department, however, fails to address Petron’s contention that this “hearing” fails to meet the mandates of due process.
When determining whether a particular procedure satisfies the mandates of due process, we must consider: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of such interest as a consequence of the procedure used and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) a balancing of the state interest served by the use of a summary procedure against the burden that would be imposed by an additional, substitute or more rigorous procedure. Firman v. State Board of Medicine, 697 A.2d 291 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), appeal denied, 550 Pa. 722, 706 A.2d 1215 (1998) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).
Petron does not dispute that there may be a valid state objective in removing teachers from the classroom when those teachers may constitute a threat to the health, safety or welfare of the students, the teachers or the school; however, Petron maintains that the importance of this interest justifies only a temporary suspension prior to a hearing to determine if the threat is real. Petron argues that because section 5(a)(ll) of the Law mandates a suspension based only on the fact of an indictment filed against him for a crime involving moral turpitude, the statute creates an irrebuttable presumption that he is unfit to teach, and Petron maintains that such an irrebuttable presumption violates his due process rights where the presumption is not always correct. Accordingly, Petron maintains that due process requires that the Commission hold a meaningful hearing to consider whether Petron’s conduct, when measured by the standards applicable to all teachers, warrants disciplinary action.
Under section 5(a)(ll) of the Law, an educator is essentially deemed unfit to teach by virtue of the filing of an indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Although not specifically providing for a pre-deprivation or post-deprivation hearing at which facts relevant to that determination may be considered, section 5(a)(11) of the Law nevertheless does not prohibit such due process protection. While we recognize the importance of the state’s interest in preserving the integrity of its teaching staff and profession, we cannot ignore the rights of individual teachers, particularly where a prompt, post-deprivation hearing would satisfy the requirements of due process while addressing the concerns of the state.10 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 108 S.Ct. 1780, 100 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988). These concerns are particularly relevant here where the existence of the pending charge against Petron would deprive Petron of his livelihood even though, ultimately, the charge may never be prosecuted. Because Petron was not afforded minimal due process protection and, as a result, was presumed unfit to teach based on section 5(a)(ll) of the Law, that statute, as applied to Petron, violates the constitutional mandates of due process.11
On this basis, we reverse the order of the Commission.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 22nd day of February, 1999, the order of the Professional Standards and Practices Commission, dated December 2, 1997, at No. DI-97-21, is hereby reversed.
Concurring opinion by Judge PELLEGRINI.