United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 2009-1262
SIRF TECHNOLOGY, INC., E-TEN CORP., PHAROS SCIENCE & APPLICATIONS, INC., MITAC INTERNATIONAL CORP., and MIO TECHNOLOGY LIMITED, USA,
Appellants,
v.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Appellee,
and
BROADCOM CORPORATION and GLOBAL LOCATE, INC.,
Intervenors.
Gregory A. Castanias, Jones Day, of Washington, DC, argued for appellants. With him on the brief were Thomas J. Davis; Thomas V. Heyman, Todd R. Geremia and Iman Lordgooei, of New York, New York.
Daniel E. Valencia, Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, United States International Trade Commission, of Washington, DC, argued for appellee. With him on the brief were James M. Lyons, General Counsel, and Andrea C. Casson, Assistant General Counsel.
William F. Lee, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts, argued for intervenors. With him on the brief were Michael J. Summersgill; James L. Quarles, III, Michael D. Esch and Todd C. Zubler, of Washington, DC; S. Calvin Walden of New York, New York.
Appealed from: United States International Trade Commission United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 2009-1262
SIRF TECHNOLOGY, INC., E-TEN CORP., PHAROS SCIENCE & APPLICATIONS, INC., MITAC INTERNATIONAL CORP., and MIO TECHNOLOGY LIMITED, USA,
Appellee.
On appeal from the United States International Trade Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-602.
___________________________
DECIDED: April 12, 2010 ___________________________
Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, CLEVENGER, and DYK, Circuit Judges.
DYK, Circuit Judge.
SiRF Technology, Inc. (“SiRF”), E-TEN Information Systems Co., Ltd. (“E-TEN”),
Pharos Science & Applications, Inc. (“Pharos”), MiTAC International Corp. (“MiTAC”),
and Mio Technology Limited, USA (“Mio”) (collectively, “appellants”) appeal from a
decision of the International Trade Commission (“Commission”). The Commission
found that appellants violated section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1337) through the unlawful importation, sale for importation, and sale after importation of
certain Global Positioning System (“GPS”) devices and products containing these
devices that infringe certain patents owned by Global Locate, Inc. and Broadcom Corp.
(“Broadcom”) (collectively, “Global Locate”). 1 The Commission issued a limited
exclusion order and a cease and desist order. In re Certain GPS Devices & Prods.
Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-602 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Jan. 15, 2009) (“Final
Determination”). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Global Locate owns U.S. Patent No. 6,417,801 (“the ’801 patent”), U.S. Patent
No. 6,606,346 (“the ’346 patent”), U.S. Patent No. 6,651,000 (“the ’000 patent”), U.S.
Patent No. 6,704,651 (“the ’651 patent”), U.S. Patent No. 6,937,187 (“the ’187 patent”),
and U.S. Patent No. 7,158,080 (“the ’080 patent”). These six patents are in the field of
GPS technology. GPS is a satellite navigation system comprising thirty-two satellites
orbiting Earth that were placed in orbit by the United States and are operated by the
United States. These satellites and their orbits are arranged so that at least four
satellites are always in a direct line-of-sight to any point on Earth. The GPS system
permits a GPS-enabled receiver to detect signals from at least four satellites and use
that information to compute its distance from each satellite, and thus its precise position
on Earth, through a process known as trilateration. Each satellite transmits two types of
information to a GPS-receiver—(1) a pseudorandom noise (“PN” or “PRN”) code, and
(2) the Navigation (“NAV”) message. PRN codes are used by the receiver to determine
1 Intervenor Broadcom Corp. acquired Global Locate in July of 2007, and was added as a complainant in this investigation on February 5, 2008.
2009-1262 2 the distance to the satellite. NAV messages contain information regarding when the
received signals were sent by the satellite, ephemeris data which is data regarding the
location and trajectory of the satellite, and almanac information which is information
regarding the position of other satellites in the constellation. Conventional GPS
receivers depend on both the PRN code and the NAV message to calculate their
position. The GPS system itself is not patented. However, there are various patents in
devices, systems, and methods for processing GPS satellite signals.
It is difficult to receive the NAV message in certain environments due to poor
signal reception. In order to solve this problem, Assisted-GPS (“A-GPS”) was
developed. In A-GPS systems, the NAV message is collected by a receiving station
with an unobstructed view of the sky, and then transmitted to GPS receivers via
computer servers and over a connection such as the Internet or a wireless telephone
network.
The patents-in-suit are owned by Global Locate and are directed to various
improvements over conventional A-GPS technology. The ’346 patent is entitled
“Method and Apparatus for Computing Signal Correlation.” It is directed to a novel
method of performing signal correlation, which is the process by which GPS receivers
compare incoming signals to locally generated codes in order to identify the satellite
sending the signal and the “offset” between the received signal and the stored code.
The ’651 patent is entitled “Method and Apparatus for Locating Mobile Receivers Using
a Wide Area Reference Network for Propagating Ephemeris.” The ’651 patent teaches
sending satellite ephemeris to a mobile GPS receiver through an A-GPS network and
using the ephemeris at the receiver to more precisely locate the satellites and narrow
2009-1262 3 the search for weak signals, thereby improving the receiver’s acquisition sensitivity. The
’000 patent is entitled “Method and Apparatus for Generating and Distributing Satellite
Tracking Information in a Compact Format.” The patent teaches the compaction of
satellite ephemeris data in order for it to be received more quickly by GPS receivers
than uncompacted data. The ’080 patent is entitled “Method and Apparatus for Using
Long Term Satellite Tracking Data in a Remote Receiver.” It teaches using certain
algorithms to predict ephemeris data for satellites in the future, receiving that “long term”
data at a GPS receiver, and using it to locate satellites and calculate position. The ’801
patent is entitled “Method and Apparatus for Time-Free Processing of GPS Signals.” It
teaches a GPS receiver that can calculate its position without having to wait to receive
time information from a satellite, thereby allowing the receiver to calculate its position
more quickly and even in weak-signal environments. The ’187 patent is entitled
“Method and Apparatus for Forming a Dynamic Model to Locate Position of a Satellite
Receiver.” This patent is a continuation-in-part of the ’801 patent. It extends the
solution of the ’801 patent from the discrete calculation of a GPS receiver’s position at a
particular moment to the use of a “dynamic model” that allows the improved, repeated
calculation of a GPS receiver’s position as it changes over time.
SiRF, which is accused of both direct and induced infringement, developed,
manufactured, and sold certain GPS chips. SiRF’s SiRFstarIII chips are accused of
being involved in the infringement of the ’000, ’080, ’651, ’801, and ’187 patents. SiRF’s
InstantGPS chips are accused of being involved in the infringement of the ’346, ’801,
and ’187 patents. These chips, when incorporated into end-user GPS devices, allow
such devices to compute absolute position using the GPS system. SiRF’s
2009-1262 4 SyncFreeNav is software embedded in SiRFstarIII chips that calculates current
positional information for the GPS receiver.
E-TEN, Pharos, MiTAC, and Mio, also accused of direct and induced
infringement, incorporate SiRF chips into end-user, consumer GPS devices, such as
portable navigation devices, personal digital assistants, and cell phones, and maintain
intermediate servers. The products of these companies that contain SiRFstarIII chips
are accused of being involved in the infringement of the ’000, ’080, ’651, ’801, and ’187
patents. The consumer devices incorporating SiRF chips and software are imported
into and sold in the United States.
SiRF’s InstantFix service is an A-GPS system that provides server-generated
extended-ephemeris (“EE”) files to end-user GPS devices, which then use the EE files
for signal acquisition and satellite position computation. The service is provided through
a SiRF-operated server. 2 This server generates EE files once per day by receiving and
downloading past GPS satellite information, including ephemeris data, from Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (“JPL”). SiRF’s server uses this data to predict future satellite
2 The Commission found as a factual matter that the servers at issue were in the United States based on the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition testimony of Makarand Phatak and Peter Kuykendall. At trial, Ashutosh Pande testified that the servers (with the exception of the server that serves Research in Motion (“RIM”)) were then located in the United Kingdom and in Bangalore, India. Contrary to the suggestion in appellants’ brief, Pande did not testify that the servers were moved after the date of Kuykendall’s deposition. The Commission was justified in treating this testimony as conflicting and relying on Kuykendall’s 30(b)(6) deposition testimony. If in fact the servers are now located outside of the United States, appellants are not without a remedy as appellants may petition for a modification or a rescission of an exclusion order or a cease and desist order under 19 C.F.R. § 210.76 if appellants are “no longer in violation of [section 337].” We express no opinion as to whether the facts here would support a modification or rescission.
2009-1262 5 orbits and clock information for all satellites in the GPS constellation in order to
generate EE files. These EE files are then ultimately transmitted to remote GPS
receivers by way of SiRF’s customers’ servers via the Internet, a wireless link, or a
combination of the two. The InstantFix service, in utilizing SiRF’s chips and the
software that implements the InstantFix service, is alleged to infringe the ’080, ’000, and
’651 patents.
On April 30, 2007, at the request of Global Locate, the Commission initiated an
investigation to determine whether violations of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19
U.S.C. § 1337) had occurred by the importation into the United States, the sale for
importation, or the sale within the United States after importation of certain GPS devices
that allegedly were involved in infringing Global Locate’s patents. See In re Certain
GPS Devices & Prods. Containing Same, 72 Fed. Reg. 25,777-78 (Int’l Trade Comm’n
May 7, 2007) (notice of investigation). SiRF, E-TEN, MiTAC, Pharos, and Mio were
named as respondents. The Commission Investigative Staff (“Staff”) was also a party to
the investigation.
Global Locate alleged that appellants infringed fifteen claims of the six asserted
patents. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held an evidentiary hearing and issued a
216-page Initial Determination. See In re Certain GPS Devices & Prods. Containing
Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-602 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Aug. 8, 2008) (“Initial Determination”).
The ALJ found violations of section 337 by each of the respondents, and with respect to
each of the six patents. Specifically, the ALJ found infringement of claims 1, 2, and 11
of the ’801 patent; claims 4 and 11 of the ’346 patent; claims 1, 2, and 5 of the ’000
patent; claims 1 and 2 of the ’651 patent; claims 1 and 9 of the ’187 patent; and claims
2009-1262 6 1, 2, and 22 of the ’080 patent. Id. at 213-15. The ALJ also concluded that all six
patents were not invalid or unenforceable. Id. at 213-14. Appellants petitioned the
Commission for review of the ALJ’s decision, and the Commission determined that it
would review certain of the ALJ’s findings.
On January 15, 2009, the Commission issued its opinion. See Final
Determination. First, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision that Global Locate
had standing to assert the ’346 patent. Id. at 8-9. Second, the Commission concluded
that SiRF infringes the ’651 and ’000 patents. In doing so, the Commission modified the
ALJ’s findings, finding “that SiRF directly infringes” and concluded “that SiRF exercises
control over end users of the GPS receivers so as to cause infringement of the ’651 and
the ’000 patents.” Id. at 13. Third, the Commission addressed the issue of patentable
subject matter of certain method claims of the ’801 and ’187 patents in light of In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009),
and affirmed the ALJ’s decision that the disputed claims recite patentable subject
matter. 3 The Commission therefore affirmed the Initial Decision of the ALJ as modified
by the Commission’s opinion and adopted all findings of fact and legal conclusions in
the Initial Decision that were not inconsistent with the Commission’s opinion. Final
Determination, slip op. at 23.
On January 15, 2009, the same day as it issued its opinion, the Commission
issued a limited exclusion order prohibiting the entry into the United States of infringing
3 The Commission originally declined to review the ALJ’s findings on patentable subject matter but addressed this issue on appellants’ petition for reconsideration in light of In re Bilski, ultimately denying the petition as both as untimely and as without merit. Final Determination, slip op. at 14.
2009-1262 7 GPS devices that are manufactured abroad by or on behalf of, or imported by or on
behalf of, SiRF and other respondents. The Commission also issued a cease-and-
desist order against the respondents with U.S. operations: SiRF, Pharos, and Mio. The
Commission’s determination became final on March 16, 2009, at the conclusion of the
sixty-day presidential review period. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(4). An appeal to this
court was timely filed, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6).
DISCUSSION
This appeal challenges not only the determinations by the full Commission, but
also aspects of the decision of the ALJ that the Commission declined to review relating
to claim construction, invalidity, and infringement. We have considered appellants’
arguments as to the issues that the Commission declined to review and find them
unpersuasive; we think it unnecessary to treat these issues separately in this opinion.
We do however find that three issues addressed by the Commission merit further
discussion.
I Standing to Assert the ’346 Patent
Appellants challenge the Commission’s finding that Global Locate had standing
to assert the ’346 patent. The question of standing to assert a patent claim is
jurisdictional, and we review that question de novo. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56
F.3d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995). However, we review underlying factual
determinations upon which a conclusion of standing is based for substantial evidence.
See Finnigan Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 180 F.3d 1354, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
“Absent the voluntary joinder of all co-owners of a patent, a co-owner acting
alone will lack standing.” DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d
2009-1262 8 1284, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Isr. Bio-Eng’g Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d 1256,
1264-65 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). This rule applies equally in
ITC investigations. 4 The ’346 patent is directed to signal correlation and the named
inventors are Charles Abraham and Donald L. Fuchs. The patent names Global Locate
as the assignee. At issue is whether Magellan Corporation (“Magellan”) is a co-owner
of the ’346 patent. If Magellan is a co-owner, Global Locate lacks standing to assert the
’346 patent absent joinder of Magellan. The question of whether Magellan is co-owner
of the patent depends on whether one of the inventors (Abraham) assigned his interest
in the patent to Magellan.
Abraham conceived of the subject matter of the ’346 patent in October of 1999
while employed at Magellan. In 1996, Abraham had entered into an employee
inventions agreement with Ashtech, Inc. (“Ashtech”) (a predecessor to Magellan) which
assigned to Ashtech “all inventions . . . which are related to or useful in the business of
the Employer . . . and which were . . . conceived . . . during the period of the Employee’s
employment, whether or not in the course of the Employee’s employment.” Final
Determination, slip op. at 6. Apparently, Ashtech merged with Magellan in 1997. While
the record is unclear, it appears likely that Abraham’s agreement with Ashtech was
assigned to the merged company (which retained the name Magellan). Abraham
testified that at the time of conception of the invention, he was still subject to the original
4 See In re Certain Catalyst Components & Catalysts for the Polymerization of Olefins, Inv. No. 337-TA-307, 1990 ITC LEXIS 224, at *10, *26 (Int’l Trade Comm’n June 25, 1990) (noting that “infringement actions may only be brought by, or in the name of, all of the owners of the patent in suit or the exclusive licensee of all of the rights covered by the patent” because the Commission “strictly read[s] the federal standing precedent” into its rules); see also Final Determination, slip op. at 5.
2009-1262 9 Ashtech agreement. Abraham separated from Magellan in February 2000 and then
joined Global Locate. In May of 2001, he and his co-inventor applied for the ’346
patent, which was eventually assigned to Global Locate.
Initially, we conclude that the Abraham/Ashtech agreement provided for
automatic assignment. The question of whether or not an agreement provides for
automatic assignment is a matter of federal law. DDB Techs., 517 F.3d at 1290. “If the
contract expressly grants rights in future inventions, ‘no further act [is] required once an
invention [comes] into being,’ and ‘the transfer of title [occurs] by operation of law.’” Id.
(quoting FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
Here, the agreement provides that “[t]he Employee assigns all of his or her right,
interest, or title in any Invention to the Employer to the extent allowed by law.” Final
Determination, slip op. at 6. By using the language “Employee assigns,” the employee-
assignment agreement expressly grants rights with no further action needed on the part
of the employee. Therefore the provision is one of automatic assignment. See DDB
Techs., 517 F.3d at 1290 & n.3 (finding automatic assignment where the agreement
used “the present, automatic” language “agrees to and does hereby grant and assign”).
The question remains whether the invention is “related to or useful in the
business of the Employer” within the meaning of the agreement. That question is a
matter of state law—here, California law. See id. at 1290. Neither the agreement nor
the California Labor Code specifies what it means for an invention to be “related to or
useful in the business of the Employer.” The terms “related to” and “useful in” are
inherently ambiguous. Under California law, when a contract is ambiguous, “[e]xtrinsic
evidence is admissible to prove a meaning to which the contract is reasonably
2009-1262 10 susceptible.” Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach
Country Club, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 4th 944, 955 (Ct. App. 2003). Such extrinsic evidence
may include evidence of the nature of the employer’s business and the nature of the
employee’s work for the employer, as well as evidence of the conduct of the parties, i.e.,
evidence probative of whether or not they regarded the invention as falling within the
agreement. See DDB Techs., 517 F.3d at 1292; see also 11 Samuel Williston &
Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 32:14 (4th ed. 1999) (“[T]he
parties’ own practical interpretation of the contract—how they actually acted, thereby
giving meaning to their contract during the course of performing it—can be an important
aid to the court.”). Here, as in DDB Technologies, “resort to extrinsic evidence . . . is
necessary to determine whether the [contract] provision applies.” DDB Techs., 517
F.3d at 1292.
The Commission, in concluding that Global Locate has standing to assert the
’346 patent, found that there was “no evidence that the invention of the ’346 patent was
‘related to or useful in’ its business.” Final Determination, slip op. at 8-9. In reaching
this conclusion, the Commission pointed out that “none of the evidence to which
[appellants] have cited relates the specific invention of the ’346 patent to any particular
aspects of Magellan’s business.” Id. at 7. The Commission also relied on the fact that
“[i]n light of Magellan’s awareness of the invention of the ’346 patent and its failure to
assert ownership of the invention at any time, . . . Magellan itself did not consider the
invention of the ’346 patent ‘related to or useful in’ its business within the meaning of . . .
the employee inventions agreement.” Id. at 8.
2009-1262 11 All parties agree that Global Locate had the burden to establish standing. Global
Locate attempted to satisfy this burden by showing that Abraham and Fuchs, the
inventors, had assigned the patent to Global Locate, and that Global Locate is shown as
the assignee of the patent as issued. 5 The question is whether Global Locate also had
the burden of establishing that an interest in the patent had not been previously
assigned by Abraham to Magellan. We think that that the Commission properly found
that that burden rests with the appellants. 6 The recording of an assignment with the
PTO is not a determination as to the validity of the assignment. See 37 C.F.R. § 3.54.
However, we think that it creates a presumption of validity as to the assignment and
places the burden to rebut such a showing on one challenging the assignment. Such
5 “The inventor is presumed to be the owner of a patent application, and any patent that may issue therefrom, unless there is an assignment.” 37 C.F.R. § 3.73(a); see also Isr. Bio-Eng’g Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d 1256, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1991); 8 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 22.01 (2006) (“The presumptive owner[s] of the property right in a patentable invention [are] . . . the several human inventors, in the case of a joint invention.”). The statute provides that “[p]atents may be granted to the assignee of the inventor of record in the Patent and Trademark Office, upon the application made and the specification sworn to by the inventor.” 35 U.S.C. § 152. 6 Appellants argue that the burden rests with Global Locate as a matter of California law because under California law, the burden falls on “the employee” to prove that “[an] agreement does not apply to an invention which qualifies fully [to be retained by the employer] under the provisions of Section 2870.” Appellants’ Br. 19-20 (citing Cal. Lab. Code § 2872). Section 2870 provides that employee-invention assignment agreements may not provide for the assignment of certain inventions that “the employee developed entirely on his or her own time without using the employer’s equipment, supplies, facilities, or trade secret information.” Section 2870 allows an employee who claims the benefit of that section to render unenforceable an agreement that attempts to provide for such an assignment. Section 2872 provides that “[i]n any suit or action arising [under section 2870], the burden of proof shall be on the employee claiming the benefits of its provisions.” As this is not a suit arising under section 2870 of the California Labor Code to render the contract unenforceable, this provision is inapplicable.
2009-1262 12 an understanding is consistent with and supported by the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 261.
That section provides that the recordation of an assignment with the PTO can be the
basis for a bona fide purchaser defense (“An assignment, grant or conveyance shall be
void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration,
without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three
months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage.”).
Given that the burden of proof on this issue rested with appellants, we think that
the Commission’s determination that appellants have not sustained their burden is
supported by substantial evidence.
Because the phrase “related to or useful in” is inherently ambiguous, the
Commission was correct in looking to the parties’ own interpretation of this language as
being determinative. Here, there is evidence that the parties indeed interpreted the
agreement in a way that is fatal to appellants’ interpretation. In June of 2000, Magellan
sued Global Locate as well as Abraham personally (one of the named inventors of the
’346 patent) for trade secret misappropriation. At the time of the litigation, Abraham had
already commenced working for Global Locate, and apparently had assigned his rights
to the ’346 invention to Global Locate. The litigation was concluded by settlement in
March of 2001. At the time of settlement, the application for the ’346 patent had not
been filed, and the rights to the patent were not directly involved in the trade secret
action. Abraham’s agreement with Magellan or Ashtech covered not only patented
inventions, but also inventions that were not patented (including inventions represented
by trade secrets) that were “related to or useful in the business of the Employer.” See
Final Determination, slip op. at 6. During the litigation, Magellan was provided with
2009-1262 13 documents prepared by Abraham while at Magellan relating to the conception of the
subject matter of the '346 patent. As part of the settlement agreement, although there
was no compensation flowing from Magellan to Global Locate, Magellan and Abraham
appeared to recognize that Global Locate was the owner of the invention in question,
stating that “nothing in this Agreement shall preclude Global Locate from using any of
the following technical concepts: . . . (vi) Shortening the signal shift register (with the
number of bits being divisible into 1023).” Initial Determination, slip op. at 39. The
parties agree that this is the technology involved in the asserted claims of the ’346
patent. Id. If Magellan and Abraham recognized that Global Locate was the owner of
the trade secret rights to the invention, it logically follows that Magellan and Abraham
did not think that Magellan was the owner of similar rights that eventually became the
subject of the ’346 patent. Further, following the settlement, Magellan informed one of
its customers that after “a diligent examination of information produced during
discovery,” there was no evidence of trade secret misappropriation by Global Locate
and Abraham. J.A. 13,516. If Magellan had owned the invention, the disclosure of its
trade secrets by Abraham to Global Locate would have been misappropriation. It is
therefore reasonable to conclude that during the trade secret litigation, Magellan
determined that it was not the owner of the invention.
In sum, we find that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s
finding that Global Locate had standing to assert the ’346 patent.
2009-1262 14 II Infringement of the ’651 and ’000 Patents
Appellants contend that the Commission erred in concluding that SiRF directly
infringes claims 1 and 2 of the ’651 patent 7 and claims 1, 2, and 5 of the ’000 patent. 8
The resolution of this issue depends in part on claim construction, which is an issue of
law and is subject to de novo review. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Appellants argue that the claims are only infringed when actions are taken by
SiRF’s customers and by the end users of the GPS devices; that SiRF accordingly can
infringe the patents only when it is a joint infringer together with the customers and the
7 Claim 1 of the ’651 patent reads as follows:
1. A method of receiving global positioning system (GPS) satellite signals comprising: receiving satellite ephemeris at a first location; communication [sic] the satellite ephemeris to a mobile GPS receiver at a second location; and processing satellite signals received at the mobile GPS receiver using the ephemeris to reduce code and frequency uncertainty in the mobile GPS receiver to improve acquisition sensitivity of the mobile GPS receiver. 8 Claim 1 of the ’000 patent reads as follows:
1. A method of creating and distributing compact satellite orbit models comprising: receiving satellite signals from at least one satellite and at least one receiving station; extracting at least a portion of the satellite tracking data from said satellite signal, representing said data in a first format; transmitting the formatted data to a remote receiver; and at the remote receiver, representing said formatted data in a second format supported by the remote receiver.
2009-1262 15 end users; and that the requirements for joint infringement are not satisfied because
SiRF does not control or direct the customers or end users. See Muniauction, Inc. v.
Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Commission found joint
infringement. We do not reach the question of joint infringement because we do not
read the relevant claims as requiring that any of the specified actions be taken by
SiRF’s customers or by the end users of the GPS devices. This is not a situation where
a method claim specifies performance of a step by a third party, or in which a third party
actually performs some of the designated steps, and thus control or direction of the
performance of that step by the accused infringer is required. 9 Rather, the method
claims at issue here are drawn to actions which can be performed and are performed by
a single party. As they do not require that any of the steps be performed here by the
customers or the end users, and the disputed steps are not in fact performed by third
parties, we conclude that SiRF directly infringes.
First, at issue are the second, “communicati[ng]” step of claim 1 of the ’651
patent and the third, “transmitting” step of the ’000 patent. The second step of claim 1
of the ’651 patent provides for “communication [sic] the satellite ephemeris to a mobile
GPS receiver at a second location.” ’651 patent col.10 ll.64-65. The third step of claim
1 of the ’000 patent provides for “transmitting the formatted data to a remote receiver.”
’000 patent col.6 l.47. Appellants argue that the performance of these steps necessarily
9 For example, in Muniauction, the method at issue required actions to be taken by both a “bidder” and an “issuer.” See 532 F.3d at 1322. In BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the parties “agree[d] [that] Paymentech [the accused infringer] does not perform every step of the method at issue in this case.”
2009-1262 16 involves actions by SiRF’s customers and by the end users of the GPS devices. They
argue that in order for the data to be “communicat[ed]” or “transmit[ed]” to the GPS
receiver, the data must travel first from SiRF’s server to the servers of its customers (the
intermediate distributors and GPS product manufacturers). Then, SiRF’s customers
must forward this data to the mobile GPS receivers, and the end users of the GPS
devices must download the data from the customers’ servers.
Neither the claim language nor the patent specification requires that the
communication/transmission be direct. In fact, indirect communication is specifically
contemplated. See ’651 patent col.3 ll.42-48 (“The link may be a landline, or other
direct communications path . . . . Alternatively, this link may have several parts . . . .”)
(label numbers omitted). Therefore, we construe these limitations as encompassing
“communicating, whether direct or indirect” and “transmitting, whether direct or indirect.”
With respect to infringement, under this construction it is clear that SiRF performs
the step of communicating/transmitting the files to the end users’ devices because SiRF
initiates the process of transmitting and communicating, and the files are actually
transmitted to the end users. The entire “end-to-end service,” as SiRF’s marketing
describes it, J.A. 16,206, was designed by SiRF so that the EE files would be
transmitted to end-user GPS devices containing SiRF chips and software. Indeed, the
EE files generated by SiRF only work in the end-user devices of those devices
containing SiRF chips and SiRF software. Here, it is true that the “communicati[ng]” or
“transmitting” can only occur if the customer forwards the data to the end user and the
end user downloads the data. However, the actions of “forwarding” or “downloading”
are not required by the claims, and, therefore, the fact that other parties perform these
2009-1262 17 actions does not preclude a finding of direct infringement. By analogy, if a claim for a
method of making a telephone call included the limitation: “placing a telephone call to a
telephone at a second location,” the fact that the call must first be routed through a
switched telephone network, and then eventually to the eventual recipient, would not
prevent this claim limitation from being satisfied. Therefore, we conclude SiRF indirectly
transmits or communicates the files to the GPS receivers and thereby meets these
claim limitations.
Second, at issue are the third step of claim 1 of the ’651 patent, which requires
“processing [the] satellite signals received at the mobile GPS receiver,” ’651 patent
col.10 ll.66-67 and the fourth step of claim 1 of the ’000 patent, which requires
“representing [the] formatted data in a second format supported by the remote receiver,”
’000 patent col.6 ll.48-49. With respect to the ’651 patent, the ALJ noted that the
processing “occurs at the mobile GPS receiver.” Initial Determination, slip op. at 140-
42. With respect to the ’000 patent, the ALJ noted that “[t]he parties are in agreement
that [this limitation] is to be construed as ‘converting the data received in the first format
to a second format supported by the remote receiver.’” Id. at 125-26. The parties agree
that the “processing” and “representing” steps must take place in the mobile GPS
device.
Appellants argue that SiRF does not perform this step because though the GPS
receivers employ SiRF chips and InstantFix software, end users must actually initiate
the process of downloading the EE data by connecting the device to the Internet and
activating the InstantFix functionality. Then, the end user must either enable the “auto
update” feature or enable the “manual update” feature in order for EE files to be
2009-1262 18 transmitted to the receiver. Appellants argue that this action by an end user negates
performance by SiRF of the “processing” or “representing” claim limitations.
Appellants’ argument misreads the claim limitations. There exists no method
step in any of the disputed claims that requires “enabling” or “activating” the devices that
perform these claim limitations. Nor is there a step which requires “downloading” the
data into the GPS receiver. Appellants, in essence, ask us to read such limitations into
the claims. We decline to do so. See, e.g., Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc.,
183 F.3d 1334, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 1999). We therefore construe the “processing” and
“representing” steps of the asserted claims as taking place in a GPS receiver that is
enabled and ready to process data.
When properly construed, it is clear that SiRF infringes as its devices and
software dictate the performance of the “processing” and “representing” steps. Once
the technology is enabled, SiRF’s SiRFstarIII chip and software, designed and built by
SiRF, automatically perform the disputed steps of the claims at issue because the
SiRFstarIII chips are programmed by SiRF to use the InstantFix ephemeris data
automatically if it has been transmitted to the remote device. Neither SiRF’s customers
(the equipment manufacturers and software developers) nor the end users of the GPS
receivers can modify the use of the EE files by SiRF’s software or the functionality of the
SiRFstarIII chip. Once the GPS receiver is enabled and ready to process the data, only
SiRF’s actions are involved in “processing” or “representing” the data.
SiRF performs all of the claim limitations of claim 1 of the ’651 patent and claim 1
of the ’000 patent, and therefore directly infringes the asserted claims.
III Patentable Subject Matter of the Asserted Claims of the ’801 and ’187 Patents
2009-1262 19 Appellants also challenge the Commission’s finding that the asserted claims of
the ’801 and ’187 patents recite patentable subject matter. Whether a claim is drawn to
patent-eligible subject matter is an issue of law that we review de novo. Bilski, 545 F.3d
at 951. At issue are claim 1 of the ’801 patent, as well as claims 2 and 11, both of
which depend from claim 1. Claim 1 recites:
1. A method for calculating an absolute position of a GPS receiver and an absolute time of reception of satellite signals comprising: providing pseudoranges that estimate the range of the GPS receiver to a plurality of GPS satellites; providing an estimate of an absolute time of reception of a plurality of satellite signals; providing an estimate of a position of the GPS receiver; providing satellite ephemeris data; computing absolute position and absolute time using said pseudoranges by updating said estimate of an absolute time and the estimate of position of the GPS receiver.
Also at issue is Claim 1 of the ’187 patent. That claim recites:
1. A method, comprising: estimating a plurality of states associated with a satellite signal receiver, the plurality of states including a time tag error state, the time tag error state relating a local time associated with said satellite signal receiver and an absolute time associated with signals from a plurality of satellites; and forming a dynamic model relating the plurality of states, the dynamic model operative to compute position of the satellite signal receiver.
The ’187 patent is a continuation-in-part of the ’801 patent. The ALJ held that the
asserted method claims are “tied to a specific machine—a GPS receiver” and therefore
found them directed to patentable subject matter. See Initial Determination, slip op. at
174-75, 205-06.
2009-1262 20 After the Initial Determination, but before review by the Commission, this court
decided In re Bilski. In Bilski, we held that “[a] claimed process is surely patent-eligible
under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a
particular article into a different state or thing.” 545 F.3d at 954. We also held that the
machine-or-transformation test has a further aspect: “the use of a specific machine or
transformation of an article must impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope to
impart patent-eligibility.” Id. at 961 (see also Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo
Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2009). We agree with the
Commission that the claims in question satisfy this test. 10
We have defined a “machine” as “a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of
certain devices and combination of devices. This includes every mechanical device or
combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a
certain effect or result.” In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting
In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A GPS receiver is a machine and is integral to each of the claims at issue. Claim
1 of the ’801 patent is expressly directed in its preamble to “calculating an absolute
position of a GPS receiver.” ’801 patent col.12 ll.28-29. It also refers to “computing
absolute position” by updating an “estimate of position of the GPS receiver,” providing
10 The Commission originally declined to review the ALJ’s decision on this issue, but after our decision in Bilski addressed the issue, appellants sought reconsideration. The Commission’s decision with respect to timeliness does not present an independent ground for affirmance of the ALJ’s decision with respect to patentable subject matter since that issue would be properly before us even if the Commission had declined to review the issue at all. The Commission, like this court, is bound to apply the current law. Therefore, it is appropriate to address this issue on the merits.
2009-1262 21 an estimate of the time at which a GPS receiver receives a plurality of satellite signals,
and computing the position “of the GPS receiver.” Id. col.12 ll. 28-40. Further, claim 1
requires “pseudoranges” that estimate the distance from “the GPS receiver to a plurality
of GPS satellites.” Id. col.12 ll.31-32. Pseudoranges, which are the distances or
estimated distances between satellites and a GPS receiver, can exist only with respect
to a particular GPS receiver that receives the satellite signals. Claim 1 of the ’187
patent is similarly tied to a GPS receiver. It requires the estimation of “states” that are
“associated with a satellite signal receiver,” and the formation of a “dynamic model . . .
to compute [the] position of the satellite signal receiver.” See ’187 patent col.20 ll.46-
54. It is clear that the methods at issue could not be performed without the use of a
GPS receiver; indeed without a GPS receiver it would be impossible to generate
pseudoranges or to determine the position of the GPS receiver whose position is the
precise goal of the claims.
We also think that the presence of the GPS receiver in the claims places a
meaningful limit on the scope of the claims. In order for the addition of a machine to
impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in
permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an
obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through
the utilization of a computer for performing calculations. We are not dealing with a
situation in which there is a method that can be performed without a machine. Contrary
to appellants’ contention, there is no evidence here that the calculations here can be
performed entirely in the human mind. Here, as described, the use of a GPS receiver is
essential to the operation of the claimed methods.
2009-1262 22 In conclusion, we hold that the claims at issue are properly directed to patentable
subject matter as they explicitly require the use of a particular machine (a GPS receiver)
and could not be performed without the use of such a receiver.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
2009-1262 23