Sinha v. State of California

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: October 25, 2024
• Docket: 4:24-cv-00046
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RAJESH K. SINHA, Case No. 24-cv-00046-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 27 10 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 11 Defendant.

12 13 Pending before the Court is Defendant State of California’s motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 14 27. The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is 15 deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS the 16 motion to dismiss. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 A. Factual Background 19 In January 2024, pro se Plaintiff Rajesh K. Sinha filed this case against the State of 20 California. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 3. Plaintiff amended the complaint in February 2024. See Dkt. No. 7 21 (“FAC”). The FAC alleges that Plaintiff has not been able to renew his passport with the federal 22 government because he is behind on his child support in excess of $2,500. See id. at 14, 18, 25. 23 Plaintiff appears to challenge the manner in which his child support was calculated. See, e.g., id. 24 at 13, 15–16, 20–21, 32–43. He suggests that the formula used to calculate his child support 25 payments as a non-custodial parent did not properly account for his basic living expenses. See id. 26 at 17, 20–21, 32–33. Although Plaintiff no longer has to pay ongoing child support, he still owes 27 child support arrears. See id. at 16–17, 20. Plaintiff alleges that despite his lack of income, he still 1 is garnished once a year. Id. Plaintiff urges that his lack of payment has not been willful—he is 2 simply unable to pay. See id. at 17, 19, 24, 26–27, 44. And Plaintiff explains that because interest 3 on his child support arrears continues to grow, he will never be able to pay all he owes. See id. at 4 19–21, 43. Plaintiff states that this has been exacerbated by his inability to renew his passport. He 5 alleges that he previously ran an exports business, which “came to a dead halt” because he could 6 not travel internationally without a passport. See id. at 14, 18–19, 22–23, 25, 28–29. Afterward, 7 he picked up odd jobs, but he could not earn enough money, and he even had to live out of his car 8 for a time. Id. at 14, 19, 25. Plaintiff’s father passed away in 2019 and he was unable to travel to 9 India to see him and be with his family. See id. at 14, 25, 33. Plaintiff also wanted to travel with 10 his mother back to India for her knee surgery, but he could not do so. See id. at 25–26. Plaintiff 11 alleges that he is also currently behind on his rent payments and is unable to pay his bills. See id. 12 at 21, 29, 44–46. 13 Plaintiff has brought two causes of action based on these allegations. First, Plaintiff 14 alleges that California has violated the Passport Denial Program and the Personal Responsibility 15 and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 654(31); 42 16 U.S.C. § 652(k). See FAC at 24–29. Despite the language of the PRWORA, Plaintiff appears to 17 contend that only individuals who are willfully failing to pay child support or seeking to travel to 18 evade their child support obligations should have their passport denied. See id. at 26. Second, 19 Plaintiff alleges that California has violated federal guidelines called the “Final Rule: Flexibility, 20 Efficiency, and Modernization in Child Support Enforcement Programs,” the Final Rule’s relevant 21 provisions, and Presidential Executive Order 13563, in calculating what he owes in child support. 22 See id. at 29–44. From what the Court can determine, Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that 23 California has not adjusted the formula for calculating child support for many years; the formula 24 does not adequately account for the basic subsistence needs of noncustodial parents; and although 25 California is in the process of finally revising the child support formula, Plaintiff was not provided 26 an opportunity to meaningfully participate in this process. See, e.g., id. at 30–44. Plaintiff asserts 27 that his “child support amount was exorbitant.” See id. at 32. Plaintiff asks the Court to allow 1 See id. at 44–46. He also asks for damages in the amount of $1,941,404.00. Id. 2 B. Procedural Background 3 On March 8, 2024, Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim issued an order directing that the case be 4 reassigned to a district judge with a report and recommendation that the action be dismissed. Dkt. 5 No. 8. Judge Kim reasoned that Plaintiff’s lawsuit is barred by sovereign immunity under the 6 Eleventh Amendment. Dkt. No. 8. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court declined to adopt 7 the report and recommendation, and directed the U.S. Marshal to serve the complaint. See Dkt. 8 No. 19. Defendant State of California then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. 9 Dkt. No. 27. 10 Rather than oppose the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff initially filed a request to amend the 11 complaint. See Dkt. No. 30. Plaintiff filed serial motions to extend his deadline to respond to the 12 motion to dismiss based on his intention to amend the complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 38, 42, 44. 13 Plaintiff eventually filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss on October 4, 2024. Dkt. No. 45. 14 Because of the overlap in arguments across the motion to dismiss and motion for leave to amend 15 the complaint, the Court considers the arguments raised in both sets of briefing. 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 A. Rule 12(b)(1) 18 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss based on the 19 court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Subject matter 20 jurisdiction can never be forfeited or waived and federal courts have a continuing independent 21 obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.” See Leeson v. Transam. 22 Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 975, n.12 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). The party 23 invoking subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction exists. 24 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 25 B. Rule 12(b)(6) 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain 27 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A 1 granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is 2 appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support 3 a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th 4 Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a 5 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 6 A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw 7 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 8 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 9 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the 10 complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 11 Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, 12 courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 13 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 14 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). 15 Additionally, “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). 16 “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than 17 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation 18 omitted). However, even a “liberal interpretation of a . . . complaint may not supply essential 19 elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 20 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[P]ro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure,” 21 Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995), which require “a short and plain statement of 22 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 23 III. DISCUSSION 24 A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 25 California first argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case 26 because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. See Dkt. No. 27 at 4–6. 27 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court has no authority to review state court 1 v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923). The doctrine applies to “‘cases brought by 2 state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the 3 district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 4 judgments.’” Mothershed v. Justs. of Supreme Ct., 410 F.3d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 2005), as amended 5 on denial of reh’g (July 21, 2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 6 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). “The doctrine bars a district court from exercising jurisdiction not only 7 over an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal, but also over the ‘de facto equivalent’ of such an 8 appeal.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012). To determine whether a plaintiff is 9 bringing such a de facto appeal, the Court must “pay close attention to the relief sought by the 10 federal-court plaintiff.” Id. (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). “It is a forbidden de facto 11 appeal under Rooker–Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal 12 wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” 13 Id. at 777–78 (quotation omitted). 14 Here, Plaintiff suggests that he is not trying to litigate “the same case of child support 15 modification/determination in federal district court.” See Dkt. No. 45 at 5. He also suggests that 16 he is referencing his child support orders “in a different context,” and is only seeking relief based 17 on California’s failure to comply with federal law. Id. However, Plaintiff explicitly asks the 18 Court to review and recalculate his child support payments and arrears as previously determined 19 by the Sonoma County Superior Court. See FAC at 46. For this Court to give Plaintiff this 20 specific relief, it would have to find that the state court child support orders were incorrect in some 21 way. But the Court may not review state child support orders. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff 22 is asking the Court to review and recalculate his child support orders and the child support arrears, 23 the Court finds that such claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and GRANTS the 24 motion to dismiss on this basis. 25 B. Standing 26 California next argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to request the renewal of his passport. 27 See Dkt. No. 27 at 7–8. Specifically, the State explains that Plaintiff cannot establish causation or 1 State simply provides the federal government with a list of individuals who owe child support 2 arrearages exceeding $2,500. See 42 U.S.C. § 652(k); cf. Eunique v. Powell, 302 F.3d 971, 972– 3 73 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting argument that statute and regulation authorizing denial of passport 4 due to child support arrears were unconstitutional). Yet Plaintiff asks, at least in part, for the 5 Court to “allow” him “to renew [his] passport and citizenship card . . . .” See FAC at 44. The 6 Court agrees that California does not make these determinations, and even if Plaintiff could 7 prevail on some claim against the State, the Court has no power to order the State to renew 8 Plaintiff’s passport. Plaintiff has no standing, therefore, to seek this specific relief from California 9 and the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss on this basis.1 10 C. Sovereign Immunity 11 California also argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by sovereign immunity. See Dkt. 12 No. 27 at 8–9. “The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits federal 13 courts from hearing suits brought by private citizens against state governments, without the state’s 14 consent.” Nat. Res. Def. Council v. California Dep’t of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996) 15 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14 (1890)). There are only three exceptions to this 16 immunity: (1) “a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment defense”; (2) “Congress may abrogate 17 the States’ sovereign immunity by acting pursuant to a grant of constitutional authority”; and (3) a 18 plaintiff may seek prospective injunctive relief to remedy violations of federal law, under the Ex 19 Parte Young doctrine. See Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 20 2001). 21 Here, none of these exceptions appear to apply. California has not consented to being sued 22 and instead has explicitly asserted its Eleventh Amendment defense. See Dkt. No. 27 at 8–10. 23 Congress also has not abrogated California’s sovereign immunity as to Plaintiff’s causes of action. 24 To do so, Congress must have “unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the states’ immunity 25 in the legislation itself.” See Douglas, 271 F.3d at 818 (quotation omitted). But none of the 26

27 1 To the extent that Plaintiff urges that the United States Secretary of State is a federal entity and 1 statutes or regulations that Plaintiff cites in the FAC indicate that Congress “unequivocally” 2 intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Id. 3 Additionally, despite Plaintiff’s passing reference to it, Dkt. No. 45 at 10, the Ex Parte 4 Young doctrine does not apply here. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908). Plaintiff 5 has not named a state official as a defendant, and Plaintiff primarily seeks monetary damages to 6 remedy retrospective harms. See Douglas, 271 F.3d at 821, n.6; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 7 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996). Specifically, Plaintiff seeks almost $2 million for things like the loss of 8 his business, the deterioration of his health, and outstanding debts including his child support 9 arrears, that he claims are due to the improper calculation of his child support and his inability to 10 renew his passport. See FAC at 44–46. 11 Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that California somehow “lost its sovereign immunity” by 12 depriving him of “life, liberty, and property” under the Fourteenth Amendment because of its 13 “irrational acts,” Dkt. No. 45 at 11, is also not supported. Even assuming such a claim was not 14 subject to sovereign immunity, the FAC does not include a Fourteenth Amendment claim. See 15 generally FAC. In his opposition brief, Plaintiff lists other Constitutional provisions and statutes. 16 See id. at 12. And in his motion for leave to amend the complaint Plaintiff urges that this “case is 17 primarily related to Procedural & Substantive due process violation[s] and deprivation[s] of 18 fourteenth amendment rights of life, liberty, and property (and some others).” See Dkt. No. 30 at 19 2. But again, these purported violations are not alleged in the FAC either and it is not clear what 20 cause of action Plaintiff could assert under the circumstances. Plaintiff has repeatedly expressed 21 his frustration with California’s child support policies and procedures, and believes that changes 22 are necessary. But Plaintiff’s mere disagreement with these policies is not enough to overcome 23 California’s sovereign immunity. 24 As Judge Kim explained in her report and recommendation, this Court is one of limited 25 jurisdiction, and federal courts can adjudicate only cases that the Constitution or Congress 26 authorizes them to adjudicate. See Dkt. No. 8 at 3 (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 27 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). The Court therefore GRANTS the motion to dismiss on this 1 D. Leave to Amend 2 In both his opposition brief and motion for leave to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff 3 suggests that California simply misapprehends the nature of his case. At various points he 4 suggests that he is challenging the constitutionality of California’s child support regime. Even if 5 || this were clearly alleged, however, it is not clear how Plaintiff could overcome California’s 6 sovereign immunity. Still, out of an abundance of caution, the Court will grant Plaintiff one last 7 opportunity to amend his complaint. Plaintiff is cautioned that he should clearly explain what 8 California has allegedly done, which laws Plaintiff believes this conduct violated, and why such 9 claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 10 IV. CONCLUSION 11 The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 27. Plaintiff may therefore file an 12 amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order. This order also TERMINATES AS 5 13. || MOOT Dkt. Nos. 30, 38, 42, and 44. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 || Dated: = 10/25/2024 Alaura § Sbl_|) HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28