Singh Y. v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Detention Facility, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 SINGH Y.,

11 No. 1:25-cv-01965-TLN-AC Petitioner, 12 13 v. ORDER 14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 15 Respondents. 16

17 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Singh Y.’s (“Petitioner”) Motion for a 18 Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”).1 (ECF No. 5.) On December 29, 2025, Respondents 19 filed a response. (ECF No. 8.) For the reasons set forth below, for the Court GRANTS a 20 Temporary Restraining Order as described below. 21 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 22 Petitioner is a native and citizen of India who entered the United States in April 2022. 23 (ECF No. 8 at 1.) Petitioner has an asylum petition pending. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) 24 In December 2024, Petitioner was arrested by Fresno County Police Department. (ECF 25

26 1 Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) Based on the substance of Petitioner’s brief and the relief requested therein, the Court 27 construed Petitioner’s pleading as a motion for a temporary restraining order. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (stating that pleadings by pro se litigants must be held to less stringent 28 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers). 1 No. 8 at 2.) Three months later, in March 2025, Petitioner was arrested by the Department of 2 Homeland Security (“DHS”) during a routine check-in and taken into immigration custody. (ECF 3 No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 8 at 2.) On April 17, 2025, an immigration judge denied Petitioner a bond 4 hearing, finding that she lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter. (ECF No. 8-1 at 19.) The 5 judge also made an unexplained “danger” notation. (Id.) 6 II. STANDARD OF LAW 7 For a TRO, courts consider whether a petitioner has established “[1] that he is likely to 8 succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 9 relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public 10 interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Petitioner must “make a 11 showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 12 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a petitioner’s motion, a district court may weigh 13 petitioner’s showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger 14 showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a TRO even where the petitioner 15 shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows 16 that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. 17 Simply put, a petitioner must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were 18 raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in petitioner’s favor in order to 19 succeed in a request for a TRO. Id. at 1134–35. 20 III. ANALYSIS 21 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 22 Petitioner claims he is being unlawfully subjected to mandatory detention without a 23 hearing in violation of his due process rights. (ECF No. 1.) In response, Respondents argue 24 Petitioner’s detention is lawful as he is being detained pursuant to the mandatory detention 25 statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (“§ 1225(b)(2)”), and there is no regulatory, statutory, or 26 constitutional requirement that Petitioner be afforded a second bond hearing. (ECF No. 8 at 1.) 27 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an 28 individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 1 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 2 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) 3 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 4 noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These 5 due process rights extend to immigration proceedings, including deportation proceedings. Id. at 6 693–94; Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). 7 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there 8 exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the 9 procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 10 Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); 11 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, 12 the question remains what process is due.”). 13 a) Liberty Interest 14 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 15 physical restrain—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” 16 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or 17 over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their 18 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025). 19 The Court finds Petitioner has a substantial liberty interest based on his release from 20 immigration custody in April 2022.2 Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *6 (“Accordingly, a 21 noncitizen release from custody pending immigration proceedings has a protected liberty interest 22

23 2 Respondents contend Petitioner does not have a liberty interest because he is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2). Courts nationwide have overwhelmingly rejected 24 Respondents’ argument. See e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (estimating over 350 cases ruled DHS’s July policy 25 improper across 160 different judges sitting in about 50 different courts nationwide). These courts examined § 1225(b)(2) and concluded it applies only to noncitizens ‘seeking admission,’ a 26 category that does not include noncitizens like [Petitioner], living in the interior of the country.” 27 Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (collecting cases). For the same reasons, the Court finds Petitioner is not an 28 applicant “seeking admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). 1 in remaining out of custody.”). During that time, Petitioner enjoyed a life with his wife and his 2 parents. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) 3 b) Procedural Due Process 4 Having found a protected liberty interest, the Court examines what process is necessary to 5 ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. The Court 6 considers three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) 7 “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 8 probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the 9 Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 10 that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 11 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Due process rights in the immigration context “must account for the 12 government’s countervailing interests in immigration enforcement.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 13 1206. 14 As to the first Mathews factor – Petitioner’s private interest – as discussed above, 15 Petitioner has been out of custody. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) During those years, Petitioner established a 16 life and relationships. (Id.) The length of time Petitioner has been in the United States, as well as 17 his established relationships, create a powerful interest for Petitioner in his continued liberty. See 18 Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025). 19 As to the second Mathews factor – the risk of erroneous deprivation – the Court finds the 20 risk here to be considerable. The risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest is 21 high where he has received minimal procedural safeguards. A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV- 22 00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025). 23 Finally, as the third factor – the Government’s interest – the Court finds it is also 24 considerable given Petitioner’s serious pending criminal charges and the immigration judge’s 25 notation (despite lacking jurisdiction). R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4 (“Civil immigration 26 detention, which is nonpunitive in purpose and effect, is justified when a noncitizen presents a 27 risk of flight or danger to the community.”) (cleaned up). 28 Here, Petitioner’s immigration proceedings are ongoing and there is no removal order. 1 However, on or around December 29, 2024, Petitioner was arrested, and later charged, for: (1) 2 kidnapping, (2) false imprisonment, (3) infliction of corporal injury, and (4) robbery. (ECF No. 3 8-1 at 2.) In April 2025, Petitioner was before an immigration judge, but the judge denied 4 Petitioner a bond hearing for lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, Petitioner was not given a 5 meaningful opportunity to be heard and make a showing that he is not a danger or flight risk. 6 On balance, this Court finds the Mathews factors demonstrate Petitioner is entitled to a 7 bond hearing to determine whether detention is warranted. Respondents did not actually provide 8 a bond hearing when the immigration judge summarily found it did not have jurisdiction to 9 provide such a hearing. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown he is likely to succeed on the merits of 10 his procedural due process claim. 11 B. Irreparable Harm 12 Petitioner has also established he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO. 13 The Ninth Circuit recognizes “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration 14 detention,” including “the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result 15 of detention[.]” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. Such harm is present here. Petitioner has been 16 detained for over nine months and has been separated from his wife and community. Even if this 17 was not sufficient to establish irreparable harm, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of 18 constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 19 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). 20 C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 21 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the 22 balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat’l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. 23 Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 24 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds there is no equitable reason that would tip the balance in the 25 Government’s favor. First, it is clear on this record that the balance of equities tips decidedly in 26 Petitioner’s favor as the Government “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally 27 cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & 28 Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Indeed, bond hearings are routine practice for 1 | Respondents and a negligible burden, if any. Second, “it is always in the public interest to 2 | prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002. 3 In sum, these last two factors also weigh in Petitioner’s favor. Therefore, the Court 4 | GRANTS Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief (ECF No. 1) and issues a TRO ordering 5 | Respondents to provide a bond hearing within ten (10) days of this Order where Respondents bear 6 | the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence before a neutral decisionmaker that 7 | Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a flight risk. 8 IV. CONCLUSION 9 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 10 1. Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order is GRANTED; 11 2. Respondents must provide a bond hearing within ten (10) days of this Order where 12 Respondents bear the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence before a 13 neutral decisionmaker that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a flight risk. At 14 the hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present. If Petitioner is not found 15 to be a danger to society or flight risk at the hearing, Respondents must immediately 16 release Petitioner. Respondents may impose any restrictions or conditions determined to 17 be necessary by the neutral decisionmaker at the hearing. 18 3. By February 11, 2026, Respondents must file a notice of compliance with this Court’s 19 Order and identify the outcome of the bond hearing. 20 4. Respondents are hereby notified of their right to apply to the Court for modification or 21 dissolution of the TRO on two days’ notice to Petitioner. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4); and 22 5. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. Courts 23 regularly waive security in cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 24 (9th Cir. 2011). 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. ) / / 26 | Date: January 28, 2026 7, 27 TROY L. NUNLEY 28 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE