Singer v. Lagas

District Court, D. Kansas·Decided April 8, 2022·No. 2:21-cv-02111·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

ROSE SINGER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 21-cv-2111-JWB-TJJ ) CARMEL DURIAS LAGAS, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This case is before the Court on Defendant Werner Enterprises, Inc.’s Motion for Protective Order and Stay of Deposition (ECF No. 77). The case arises out of an accident on March 2, 2019 involving one of Defendant’s tractor-trailers and a Ford F-250 pickup truck pulling a camper. Plaintiff was a passenger in the pickup truck. The accident occurred on I-70 in “hazardous winter weather road conditions,” according to Plaintiff’s Complaint.1 Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Videotaped Deposition Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(B)(6) and Request for Production of Documents,” listing 140 topics for deposition and production of documents.2 Defendant’s motion contains objections to 66 of those topics, but through briefing and continued discussions, the parties have narrowed the topics remaining in dispute.3 For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s motion.

1 ECF No. 1 at ¶ 22. 2 ECF No. 63. 3 Defendant did not certify with its motion that the parties conferred in good faith as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) and D. Kan. Rule 37.2. Nevertheless, through the discussions presented in the briefing, the Court is satisfied that the parties have discussed these issues at length and made adequate and reasonable good faith efforts to confer. In the future, however, the parties are reminded of the prerequisite for filing a motion regarding a discovery dispute: Rule 26(c) requires “a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected I. LEGAL STANDARD Defendant moves for a protective order, but also claims that certain topics are not relevant. Therefore, the standards for both a protective order and relevancy are at issue here. The decision to enter a protective order is within the court’s broad discretion.4 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), a “court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a

party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]”5 Despite this broad discretion, “a protective order is only warranted when the movant demonstrates that protection is necessary under a specific category set out in Rule 26(c).”6 In addition, the party seeking a protective order bears the burden of establishing good cause.7 The moving party must make “a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.”8 Even upon a showing of good cause, however, the Court also considers other factors that were or could have been presented by the party seeking discovery to determine whether the totality of the circumstances justifies the entry of a protective order.9 The court has

parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action.” Rule 37.2 further requires the 26(c) certification to “describe with particularity the steps taken by all counsel to resolve the issues in dispute.” The Court trusts that the parties will not overlook this requirement again, and only excuses the oversight this time because it can ascertain by the briefing that the parties did, indeed, confer in good faith. 4 Thomas v. Int’l Bus. Machs., 48 F.3d 478, 482 (10th Cir. 1995); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). 6 Herrera v. Easygates, LLC, No. 11-CV-2558-EFM-GLR, 2012 WL 5289663, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 23, 2012) (citing Aikens v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., 217 F.R.D. 533, 534 (D. Kan. 2003)). 7 Layne Christensen Co. v. Purolite Co., 271 F.R.D. 240, 244 (D. Kan. 2010). 8 Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981). 9 See Citimortgage, Inc. v. Sanders, No. 11-CV-2540-EFM-GLR, 2012 WL 6024641, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 4, 2012). The Court makes specific reference to its consideration of the totality of the circumstances because all three briefs are short on legal authority and analysis. To some degree, the Court understands that the number of topics at issue here prevented in-depth analysis of any particular topic. But a deeper discussion about how the discovery connects to Plaintiff’s claims and what burden it presents to Defendant would have been helpful. broad discretion “to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.”10 The Supreme Court has recognized “[t]he trial court is in the best position to weigh the fairly competing needs and interests of the parties affected by discovery. The unique character of the discovery process requires that the trial court have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders.”11

Relevancy is to be “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on” any party’s claim or defense.12 Information still “need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”13 When the discovery sought appears relevant, the party resisting discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevancy by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the scope of relevancy as defined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevancy that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.14 Conversely, when the relevancy of the discovery request is not readily apparent on its face, the party seeking the discovery has the burden to show the relevancy of the request.15 Relevancy determinations are generally made on a case-by-case basis.16 And Rule 26(b)(2)(C)

provides “[o]n motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery

10 MGP Ingredients, Inc. v. Mars, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 497, 500 (D. Kan. 2007) (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984)). 11 Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 36. 12 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 14 Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. 637, 640 (D. Kan. 2003). 15 McBride v. Medicalodges, Inc., 250 F.R.D 581, 586 (D. Kan. 2008). 16 Brecek & Young Advisors, Inc. v. Lloyds of London Syndicate, No. 09-cv-2516-JAR, 2011 WL 765882, at *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2011). otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that . . . the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Along with these principles, this Court is mindful of its duty to construe and administer the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”17

II. ANALYSIS Before beginning the analysis, there are a few preliminary matters to mention.

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Related

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders
437 U.S. 340 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard
452 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
467 U.S. 20 (Supreme Court, 1984)
General Electric Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp.
215 F.R.D. 637 (D. Kansas, 2003)
Aikens v. Deluxe Financial Services, Inc.
217 F.R.D. 533 (D. Kansas, 2003)
MGP Ingredients, Inc. v. Mars, Inc.
245 F.R.D. 497 (D. Kansas, 2007)
Layne Christensen Co. v. Purolite Co.
271 F.R.D. 240 (D. Kansas, 2010)