MAJORITY OPINION
EDELMAN, Justice.
Arthur Lee Simpson appeals a conviction for possession with intent to deliver over 400 grams of cocaine on the grounds that the trial court erred in denying his [327]*327motion to suppress because: (1) he was detained without reasonable suspicion once the arresting officer had completed his investigation of the initial traffic stop; (2) appellant’s consent to search his vehicle was not freely and voluntarily given; and (3) the officer’s search inside appellant’s spare tire in his trunk exceeded the scope of any consent requested by the officer. We affirm.
Background
While traveling along Interstate 10 one evening, appellant was stopped by Texas Highway patrolman Pablo Chavez because the light illuminating appellant’s rear license plate was burned out. Before concluding this traffic stop, Chavez asked appellant if he could search his vehicle, and appellant nodded his head affirmatively. Inside the spare tire in the trunk of appellant’s car, Chavez discovered a duct-taped box containing cocaine. Appellant was indicted for possession with intent to deliver over 400 grams of cocaine. Appellant filed, and the trial court denied, a motion to suppress the evidence found in appellant’s car. Appellant entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to seventeen years imprisonment.
Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts and mixed questions of law and fact which turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, but we review its application of law, such as on questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, de novo. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697-99, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). Where, as here, a trial court makes no explicit findings of historical fact, we presume it made findings necessary to support its ruling as long as those implied finds are supported by the record. See Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327-28.
Existence of Reasonable Suspicion
Appellant’s first point of error argues that after Chavez finished investigating the burned out license plate light, detaining appellant further was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because Chavez had no reasonable suspicion that appellant was involved in any criminal activity.
A routine traffic stop is a detention and thus, must be reasonable under the United States and Texas Constitutions. See Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). To be reasonable, a traffic stop must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243, 245. During a traffic stop, an officer may demand identification, a valid driver’s license, and proof of insurance from the driver, and may also check for outstanding warrants. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245 n. 6. However, once the reason for the stop has been satisfied, the stop may not be used as a fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243. Rather, any continued detention must be based on ar-ticulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a continued detention was justified, ie., that the detainee was or would soon be engaged in criminal activity. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244-45. In other words, once the purpose of the original detention has been effectuated, any continued detention must be supported by some additional reasonable suspicion, that is, something out of the ordinary that is occurring and some indication that the unusual circumstance is related to crime. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244-45 (holding that after officers determined that driver [328]*328was not intoxicated, continued detention of driver and search of his car without his consent was unreasonable where not supported by reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity).
To establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and un-particularized suspicion or hunch. See U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). However, the fact that an officer does not have in mind the reasons that justify the action does not invalidate the action as long as the circumstances justify it. See Robinette, 117 S.Ct. at 420-21. The determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000).
In Robinette, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a continued detention and request to search a detainee’s car following a traffic stop was reasonable, where consent was given, even though no circumstances were noted that would have constituted reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity. See Robinette, 117 S.Ct. at 420-21. By contrast, in Davis, the Court of Criminal Appeals found the officers’ conduct unreasonable where, after the detainee refused to consent to a search of his car, the officers nevertheless detained the vehicle and thus its occupants who had no other means to depart. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 241. We interpret Davis and Robinette to mean that an officer may request consent to search a vehicle after a traffic stop but may not detain the occupants or vehicle further if such consent is refused unless reasonable suspicion of some criminal activity exists.
In this case, both Chavez and appellant testified at the suppression hearing, and a video tape of the stop was played. According to Chavez’s testimony, which coincided with the events reflected in the video, he pulled appellant over because appellant’s taillamp was burned out.1 Chavez testified that as he put the patrol car in park, appellant immediately got out of his car, placed his keys in his pocket, and walked toward the patrol car. This raised Chavez’s suspicions because his experience had been that people stopped at night are usually “hesitant” to get out of their cars. He thought this behavior indicated that appellant was trying to hide something. Chavez then asked appellant for his driver’s license. Appellant pulled the license out of his pocket, gave it to Chavez and then, without request, also gave Chavez his insurance card. Although it is not clearly visible in the video, Chavez testified that appellant was shaking and seemed very nervous, even dropping his insurance card.
Chavez then radioed in appellant’s driver’s license number to check for outstanding warrants.
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MAJORITY OPINION
EDELMAN, Justice.
Arthur Lee Simpson appeals a conviction for possession with intent to deliver over 400 grams of cocaine on the grounds that the trial court erred in denying his [327]*327motion to suppress because: (1) he was detained without reasonable suspicion once the arresting officer had completed his investigation of the initial traffic stop; (2) appellant’s consent to search his vehicle was not freely and voluntarily given; and (3) the officer’s search inside appellant’s spare tire in his trunk exceeded the scope of any consent requested by the officer. We affirm.
Background
While traveling along Interstate 10 one evening, appellant was stopped by Texas Highway patrolman Pablo Chavez because the light illuminating appellant’s rear license plate was burned out. Before concluding this traffic stop, Chavez asked appellant if he could search his vehicle, and appellant nodded his head affirmatively. Inside the spare tire in the trunk of appellant’s car, Chavez discovered a duct-taped box containing cocaine. Appellant was indicted for possession with intent to deliver over 400 grams of cocaine. Appellant filed, and the trial court denied, a motion to suppress the evidence found in appellant’s car. Appellant entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to seventeen years imprisonment.
Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts and mixed questions of law and fact which turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, but we review its application of law, such as on questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, de novo. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697-99, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). Where, as here, a trial court makes no explicit findings of historical fact, we presume it made findings necessary to support its ruling as long as those implied finds are supported by the record. See Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327-28.
Existence of Reasonable Suspicion
Appellant’s first point of error argues that after Chavez finished investigating the burned out license plate light, detaining appellant further was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because Chavez had no reasonable suspicion that appellant was involved in any criminal activity.
A routine traffic stop is a detention and thus, must be reasonable under the United States and Texas Constitutions. See Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). To be reasonable, a traffic stop must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243, 245. During a traffic stop, an officer may demand identification, a valid driver’s license, and proof of insurance from the driver, and may also check for outstanding warrants. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245 n. 6. However, once the reason for the stop has been satisfied, the stop may not be used as a fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243. Rather, any continued detention must be based on ar-ticulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a continued detention was justified, ie., that the detainee was or would soon be engaged in criminal activity. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244-45. In other words, once the purpose of the original detention has been effectuated, any continued detention must be supported by some additional reasonable suspicion, that is, something out of the ordinary that is occurring and some indication that the unusual circumstance is related to crime. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244-45 (holding that after officers determined that driver [328]*328was not intoxicated, continued detention of driver and search of his car without his consent was unreasonable where not supported by reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity).
To establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and un-particularized suspicion or hunch. See U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). However, the fact that an officer does not have in mind the reasons that justify the action does not invalidate the action as long as the circumstances justify it. See Robinette, 117 S.Ct. at 420-21. The determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000).
In Robinette, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a continued detention and request to search a detainee’s car following a traffic stop was reasonable, where consent was given, even though no circumstances were noted that would have constituted reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity. See Robinette, 117 S.Ct. at 420-21. By contrast, in Davis, the Court of Criminal Appeals found the officers’ conduct unreasonable where, after the detainee refused to consent to a search of his car, the officers nevertheless detained the vehicle and thus its occupants who had no other means to depart. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 241. We interpret Davis and Robinette to mean that an officer may request consent to search a vehicle after a traffic stop but may not detain the occupants or vehicle further if such consent is refused unless reasonable suspicion of some criminal activity exists.
In this case, both Chavez and appellant testified at the suppression hearing, and a video tape of the stop was played. According to Chavez’s testimony, which coincided with the events reflected in the video, he pulled appellant over because appellant’s taillamp was burned out.1 Chavez testified that as he put the patrol car in park, appellant immediately got out of his car, placed his keys in his pocket, and walked toward the patrol car. This raised Chavez’s suspicions because his experience had been that people stopped at night are usually “hesitant” to get out of their cars. He thought this behavior indicated that appellant was trying to hide something. Chavez then asked appellant for his driver’s license. Appellant pulled the license out of his pocket, gave it to Chavez and then, without request, also gave Chavez his insurance card. Although it is not clearly visible in the video, Chavez testified that appellant was shaking and seemed very nervous, even dropping his insurance card.
Chavez then radioed in appellant’s driver’s license number to check for outstanding warrants. While awaiting the information on the license check, Chavez questioned appellant about his trip and where he was employed. Chavez testified that appellant’s answers were “blurted” out and appellant seemed unsure in his responses. This further raised Chavez’s suspicions. Chavez then asked appellant about his arrest history and appellant responded that he had been arrested once for theft. Chavez informed appellant that he was waiting for the information on the license check but that if everything came back clear, Chavez would give appellant a written warning for the defective taillamp. At this point, the counter on the video tape reflected that approximately four minutes had elapsed since appellant had pulled his car over.
Approximately eight minutes after the stop began, Chavez received the license check information. The report indicated [329]*329that although appellant’s license was valid and he had no outstanding warrants, appellant’s criminal record reflected two additional charges, for aggravated battery and aggravated burglary. Chavez testified that this further aroused his suspicion in that appellant was “not telling the truth for some reason.” Immediately, Chavez exited his patrol car, approached appellant, and asked him if he had anything illegal in his car such as weapons, drugs, or contraband. Appellant responded that he did not. Chavez then asked if appellant would consent to a search of his car and “everything within the vehicle.” Initially, appellant began walking away from Chavez, taking a couple of steps, but Chavez called him back and again asked if appellant would consent to a search of his car. Appellant responded by nodding his head affirmatively. At this point, Chavez had neither written a warning or citation, nor returned appellant’s license or insurance card, and the video recorder reflected that approximately nine minutes had elapsed since the stop began.
As noted above, we interpret Robinette and Davis to allow Chavez to have asked for consent to search appellant’s vehicle. However, even if they do not, we believe Chavez had reasonable suspicion to do so based on appellant’s: (1) immediate exit of his car upon being stopped and putting his keys in his pocket; (2) abrupt and unsure answers to Chavez’s questions; (3) nervousness;2 and (4) misstatement of his criminal history. The totality of these factors, combined with commonsense inferences about human behavior, suggest that appellant was nervously attempting to direct Chavez’s attention away from appellant’s car as well as his criminal history. This, in turn, supported a reasonable suspicion that appellant could have illegal items in his car and justified a continued detention.3 Because appellant’s first point of error thus fails to establish that his detention to request a search of his car violated his Fourth Amendment rights, it is overruled.
Consent
Appellant’s second point of error argues that the nod of his head, in response to Chavez’s request for consent to search appellant’s car, was not sufficient to show that he had freely ánd voluntarily consented to a search.
Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40, 117 S.Ct. 417. In order to be voluntary, the consent must not be coerced by covert force, implied threat, or otherwise. See Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 331. The Texas Constitution requires that the State show by clear and convincing evidence that the consent was freely given. See id. The voluntariness of a consent to search in[330]*330volves mixed questions of law and fact. See Stephenson v. State, 494 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tex.Crim.App.1973). Therefore, we afford almost total deference to the trial courts’ determinations of such questions where they are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor and are supported by the record. See Maldonado v. State, 998 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).
In this case, Chavez’s testimony and the video tape clearly indicated that appellant nodded affirmatively to Chavez’s request to search the car. During his cross-examination at the suppression hearing, appellant testified that when he nods his head up and down it means “yes-” However, he stated that when he nodded to Chavez, he was responding to a question previously asked by Chavez, as to whether Chavez could cheek to see if there was a passenger in the car. Appellant later stated that he had nodded affirmatively because he thought he had no choice in the matter. After further questioning, appellant again stated that his nodding was in response to Chavez’s request to look for a passenger.
In light of the conflicting evidence, we must defer to the trial court’s implied determination that appellant’s reason for nodding was to consent to the search rather than because he thought he had no choice or was responding to a previous question. Accordingly, appellant’s second point of error is overruled.
Scope of the Search
Appellant’s third point of error asserts that Chavez’s search of appellant’s spare tire exceeded the scope of the consent expressly requested by Chavez. Appellant argues that because Chavez’s second request for consent referred only to appellant’s “vehicle” and did not include the phrase “and everything in it,” as used in his first request, an objectively reasonable person would conclude that the consent pertained only “to the vehicle itself, and not to anything inside of the vehicle.”
The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of “objective” reasonableness, i.e., what the typical reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). The scope of a search is also defined by its expressed object, and a suspect is free to delimit the scope of the search to which he consents. See id. at 251-52, 111 S.Ct. 1801.
Unless an officer’s request, or a suspect’s consent, limits a search to a particular area of the vehicle, such as the passenger compartment or trunk, we believe that a request for a search “of the car” reasonably includes all areas of the vehicle and excludes none. Moreover, although Chavez’s initial request specifically included the phrase “everything in it” and the second request did not, both requests were made in the same context and were so closely connected as to reasonably indicate that the second request was merely an abbreviated version of the first. In addition, because Chavez had asked appellant whether he had any weapons, drugs, or contraband in the vehicle immediately before asking to search the vehicle, the object of the search would be construed by a reasonable person as encompassing any area of the car in which such objects could be concealed. Therefore, we overrule appellant’s third point of error and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.