Simpson v. Hegstrom

873 F.2d 1294, 1989 WL 43914
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 4, 1989
DocketNo. 87-3507
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 873 F.2d 1294 (Simpson v. Hegstrom) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Simpson v. Hegstrom, 873 F.2d 1294, 1989 WL 43914 (9th Cir. 1989).

Opinion

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Defendants-appellants Hegstrom and Bowen (“the Secretary”) appeal the district court’s ruling that the Secretary’s interpretation of a regulation implementing the Aid to Families of Dependent Children program (AFDC), Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935 (“the Act”), was “unreasonable” and therefore invalid. At issue is the effect of one provision of the Act, which imposes sanctions on AFDC recipients who fail to cooperate with a State-run work incentive or “WIN” program, upon the Act’s provisions concerning the determination of eligibility and benefit amounts of AFDC applicants. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

States administering AFDC are required by statute to determine the eligibility of “assistance units” (the family) for benefits by comparing the unit’s net or “available” income to a “need standard” set by the State. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. Ill 1985). Roughly speaking, if “need” is greater than available income, the unit is eligible for assistance. The amount of assistance is the difference between income and need.

To determine the family’s net income, the State must “disregard” certain earned income of AFDC applicants. The relevant provisions, contained in § 602(a), state:

A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must....
(7) except as otherwise provided in paragraph (8) ... provide that the State agency—
(A) shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent children, or of any other individual (living in the same home as such child and relative) whose needs the State determines should be considered in determining the need of the child or relative claiming such aid;....
(8)(A) provide that, with respect to any month, in making the determination under paragraph (7), the State agency — ...
(ii) shall disregard from the earned income of any child or relative applying for or receiving aid to families with dependent children, or of any other individual (living in the same home as such relative and child) whose needs are taken into account in making such determination, the first $75 of the total of such earned income for such month;
(iii) shall disregard from the earned income of any child, relative, or other individual specified in clause (ii), an amount equal to expenditures for care in such month for a dependent child ... receiving aid to families with dependent children and requiring such care for such month, to the extent that such amount (for each such dependent child ...) does not exceed $160....

42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7), (8).

Under these provisions a State welfare agency must “disregard” child care expenses and other work-related expenses (which have been “capped” at $160 and $75, respectively). See P.L. 97-35, § 2301, 95 Stat. 843 (Aug. 13,1981). The child care and work expense deductions are referred to as “earned income disregards,” or “EID’s.” By “disregarding” certain classes of income that would otherwise be counted in the eligibility and benefits determinations, more families are deemed eligible for assistance than would otherwise be the case, and their benefits are increased. The EID provisions

flow from Congress’ recognition that the AFDC system can create a financial incentive not to work_ The EID ... reflected Congress’ awareness that because increased income reduces the size of the AFDC grant, members of AFDC families may have little financial incentive to work.

Drysdale v. Spirito, 689 F.2d 252, 254 (1st Cir.1982). To counter this “perverse incentive,” id. at 255, Congress enacted the EID provisions that exclude from net income child care and other work related expenses.

An AFDC applicant or recipient may, however, lose his EID’s if he

[1296]*1296(I) terminate^] his employment or reduce^] his earned income without good cause ...
(II) refuse[s] without good cause ... to accept employment ... or
(III) failfs] without good cause to make a timely report ... to the State agency of earned income received in such month....

42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(B)(i). These provisions (the “disregard sanctions”) are the only statutory source for sanctions which deprive persons of their EID’s. The parties to this litigation agree that plaintiffs are not subject to this particular sanction.

Another part of the AFDC program, § 645(b)(1)(B), permits the State to set up a work incentive or “WIN” program in which the State may require the participation of AFDC recipients. 42 U.S.C. § 645(b)(1)(B) (1982). Congress intended these work programs “to decrease welfare dependency, and [to] emphasize the principle that AFDC should not be regarded as a permanent income guarantee.” S.Rep. No. 189, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 502-503, reprinted in 1981 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 396, 769.

Congress also incorporated sanctions for failure to cooperate with WIN programs. Section 602(a)(19)(F) provides that if ... any child, relative or individual has been found by the Secretary of Labor ... to have refused without good cause to participate under a work incentive program. ...

then the standard of need for the assistance unit to which the child, relative or individual belongs will not include the needs of the sanctioned person. (This opinion will refer to the § 602(a)(19)(F) sanction as the “need sanction.”) The income of the sanctioned person will still be taken into account for purposes of making the eligibility determination under § 602(a)(7)(A), but the needs of the sanctioned person are not considered. In the context of this case, this means that the income of plaintiffs, caretaker-relatives who have incurred the “need sanction,” will be attributed to the needy children they care for in the eligibility determination, but the need standard of the assistance unit containing the child and caretaker relative will not include the caretaker-relative’s needs.

Plaintiffs in this case (and the class of persons they represent) are caretaker-relatives who have been sanctioned for failure to participate in a State WIN program. They do not dispute the imposition on them of the statutory “need sanction” of § 602(a)(19)(F).1 They do point out, however, that none of the plaintiffs has performed any of the work-related actions which trigger the “disregard sanction” of § 602(a)(8)(B)(i), supra, a claim defendants do not dispute.

Nonetheless, in addition to incurring the “need sanction” of § 602(a)(19)(F) for their failure to participate in the State WIN program, plaintiffs were also deprived of their child care and work-expense EID’s.

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