TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Aleck Simonía appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for attorney’s fees under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).
See
29 U.S.C. § 1132(g). We affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer’s health care plan in
Simonía v. Glendale Nissan/Infiniti Disability Plan,
No. 09-55569, 2010 WL 1896455 (9th Cir. May 12, 2010). We stayed consideration of his attorney’s fee appeal pending the Supreme Court’s disposition of
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.,
- U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2149, 2152-53, - L.Ed.2d - (2010). District courts must now determine whether an ERISA fee claimant has achieved “some degree of success on the merits” before awarding fees under § 1132(g).
Id.
But the Supreme Court expressly declined to foreclose the possibility that, once a court has determined that a litigant has achieved some degree of success on the merits, it may then evaluate the traditional five factors under
Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co.,
634 F.2d 446 (9th Cir.1980), before exercising its discretion to grant fees.
See Hardt,
130 S.Ct. at 2158 n. 8.
Because we continue to believe that “district courts should have guidelines to apply in the exercise of their discretion under § 1132(g),”
Hummell,
634 F.2d at 453, we hold that district courts must consider the
Hummell
factors after they have determined that a litigant has achieved “some degree of success on the merits,”
Hardt,
130 S.Ct. at 2152-53. Even assuming Simonia achieved some degree of success on the merits, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that fees are nonetheless inappropriate after applying the
Hummell
factors. We therefore affirm the denial of fees to Simonia.
I
Simonia became physically disabled on April 8, 2003, as the result of a herniated lumbar disc. On that date, Simonia possessed disability insurance under his employer’s ERISA plan, which was insured by the Continental Casualty Company (“Continental”). Shortly thereafter, Continental began paying Simonia disability in
surance benefits. On November 30, 2003, the Hartford Insurance Company (“Hartford”) bought Simonia’s policy from Continental and began paying Simonia’s benefits.
On April 19, 2007, Hartford determined that Simonia was no longer disabled due to a physical disability but was instead disabled based on a mental disorder subject to his ERISA plan’s twelve-month payment limit. On April 27, 2007, Hartford was informed that Simonia had been awarded $1,551 per month in Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits retroactively, effective October 1, 2004, which' — when combined with other forms of income — allegedly should have been offset to some extent against his payments from Hartford. Hartford retroactively recalculated Simonia’s benefits and determined that Simonía had allegedly been overpaid by $22,309.51.
On May 18, 2007, Hartford informed Simonía that (1) he would no longer be receiving payments for a physical disability, but rather for a mental disability subject to the plan’s twelve-month mental disorder limitation, and (2) he had been overpaid by $22,309.51 and would not be receiving any further benefits until Hartford received a personal check or money order in that amount.
II
Simonía filed his declaratory judgment lawsuit on December 12, 2007, challenging Hartford’s classification of his disability as a mental disorder subject to the plan’s twelve-month payment limit. Hartford counterclaimed for $8,589 — the amount Simonía had allegedly been overpaid based on his retroactive SSDI benefits less the amount recouped by withholding twelve months’ worth of Simonia’s mental disorder payments.
On October 16, 2008, Simonía informed Hartford that the Social Security Administration had retroactively reduced his SSDI award, and he requested that Hartford recalculate the alleged overpayment. On December 5, 2008, the parties settled the counterclaim and stipulated to its dismissal. Simonía did not prevail in his claims against Hartford for continuing benefits. Simonía thereafter filed a motion seeking $63,745 in attorney’s fees because he “was successful as a counter-defendant in that the defendant dismissed its counterclaim.”
The district court, applying the five factors in
Hummell,
634 F.2d at 453, denied the motion for fees. Simonia timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Ill
In an ERISA action, “the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). In
Hardt,
the Supreme Court held that “a fee claimant need not be a ‘prevailing party’ to be eligible for an attorney’s fees award under § 1132(g)(1).” 130 S.Ct. at 2156. Instead, the Court reasoned that
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,
463 U.S. 680, 694, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983), governs, and that “a fees claimant must show ‘some degree of success on the merits’ before a court may award attorney’s fees under § 1132(g)(1).”
Hardt,
130 S.Ct. at 2158-59 (quoting
Ruckelshaus,
463 U.S. at 694, 103 S.Ct. 3274).
The Court noted that a claimant does not satisfy that requirement by achieving a “ ‘trivial success on the merits’ or a ‘purely procedural victor[y].’ ”
Id.
(quoting
Ruckelshaus,
463 U.S. at 688 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 3274) (alteration in original). However, a claimant can satisfy that requirement if “the court can fairly call the outcome of the litigation some success on the merits without conducting a lengthy inquirfy] into the question whether a par
ticular party’s success was substantial or occurred on a central issue.”
Id.
(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Only after passing through the “some degree of success on the merits” door is a claimant entitled to the district court’s discretionary grant of fees under § 1132(g)(1). In
Hardt,
the Supreme Court said, “We do not foreclose the possibility that once a claimant has satisfied this requirement, and thus becomes eligible for a fees award under § 1132(g)(1), a court may consider the five factors adopted by the [Fourth Circuit] Court of Appeals ... in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees.” 130 S.Ct. at 2158 n. 8. In the Ninth Circuit, the discretionary decision to award fees has traditionally been governed by the five factors set forth in
Hummell,
634 F.2d at 453, which mirror the Fourth Circuit’s factors in
Hardt.
Those factors are:
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TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Aleck Simonía appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for attorney’s fees under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).
See
29 U.S.C. § 1132(g). We affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer’s health care plan in
Simonía v. Glendale Nissan/Infiniti Disability Plan,
No. 09-55569, 2010 WL 1896455 (9th Cir. May 12, 2010). We stayed consideration of his attorney’s fee appeal pending the Supreme Court’s disposition of
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.,
- U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2149, 2152-53, - L.Ed.2d - (2010). District courts must now determine whether an ERISA fee claimant has achieved “some degree of success on the merits” before awarding fees under § 1132(g).
Id.
But the Supreme Court expressly declined to foreclose the possibility that, once a court has determined that a litigant has achieved some degree of success on the merits, it may then evaluate the traditional five factors under
Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co.,
634 F.2d 446 (9th Cir.1980), before exercising its discretion to grant fees.
See Hardt,
130 S.Ct. at 2158 n. 8.
Because we continue to believe that “district courts should have guidelines to apply in the exercise of their discretion under § 1132(g),”
Hummell,
634 F.2d at 453, we hold that district courts must consider the
Hummell
factors after they have determined that a litigant has achieved “some degree of success on the merits,”
Hardt,
130 S.Ct. at 2152-53. Even assuming Simonia achieved some degree of success on the merits, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that fees are nonetheless inappropriate after applying the
Hummell
factors. We therefore affirm the denial of fees to Simonia.
I
Simonia became physically disabled on April 8, 2003, as the result of a herniated lumbar disc. On that date, Simonia possessed disability insurance under his employer’s ERISA plan, which was insured by the Continental Casualty Company (“Continental”). Shortly thereafter, Continental began paying Simonia disability in
surance benefits. On November 30, 2003, the Hartford Insurance Company (“Hartford”) bought Simonia’s policy from Continental and began paying Simonia’s benefits.
On April 19, 2007, Hartford determined that Simonia was no longer disabled due to a physical disability but was instead disabled based on a mental disorder subject to his ERISA plan’s twelve-month payment limit. On April 27, 2007, Hartford was informed that Simonia had been awarded $1,551 per month in Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits retroactively, effective October 1, 2004, which' — when combined with other forms of income — allegedly should have been offset to some extent against his payments from Hartford. Hartford retroactively recalculated Simonia’s benefits and determined that Simonía had allegedly been overpaid by $22,309.51.
On May 18, 2007, Hartford informed Simonía that (1) he would no longer be receiving payments for a physical disability, but rather for a mental disability subject to the plan’s twelve-month mental disorder limitation, and (2) he had been overpaid by $22,309.51 and would not be receiving any further benefits until Hartford received a personal check or money order in that amount.
II
Simonía filed his declaratory judgment lawsuit on December 12, 2007, challenging Hartford’s classification of his disability as a mental disorder subject to the plan’s twelve-month payment limit. Hartford counterclaimed for $8,589 — the amount Simonía had allegedly been overpaid based on his retroactive SSDI benefits less the amount recouped by withholding twelve months’ worth of Simonia’s mental disorder payments.
On October 16, 2008, Simonía informed Hartford that the Social Security Administration had retroactively reduced his SSDI award, and he requested that Hartford recalculate the alleged overpayment. On December 5, 2008, the parties settled the counterclaim and stipulated to its dismissal. Simonía did not prevail in his claims against Hartford for continuing benefits. Simonía thereafter filed a motion seeking $63,745 in attorney’s fees because he “was successful as a counter-defendant in that the defendant dismissed its counterclaim.”
The district court, applying the five factors in
Hummell,
634 F.2d at 453, denied the motion for fees. Simonia timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Ill
In an ERISA action, “the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). In
Hardt,
the Supreme Court held that “a fee claimant need not be a ‘prevailing party’ to be eligible for an attorney’s fees award under § 1132(g)(1).” 130 S.Ct. at 2156. Instead, the Court reasoned that
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,
463 U.S. 680, 694, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983), governs, and that “a fees claimant must show ‘some degree of success on the merits’ before a court may award attorney’s fees under § 1132(g)(1).”
Hardt,
130 S.Ct. at 2158-59 (quoting
Ruckelshaus,
463 U.S. at 694, 103 S.Ct. 3274).
The Court noted that a claimant does not satisfy that requirement by achieving a “ ‘trivial success on the merits’ or a ‘purely procedural victor[y].’ ”
Id.
(quoting
Ruckelshaus,
463 U.S. at 688 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 3274) (alteration in original). However, a claimant can satisfy that requirement if “the court can fairly call the outcome of the litigation some success on the merits without conducting a lengthy inquirfy] into the question whether a par
ticular party’s success was substantial or occurred on a central issue.”
Id.
(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Only after passing through the “some degree of success on the merits” door is a claimant entitled to the district court’s discretionary grant of fees under § 1132(g)(1). In
Hardt,
the Supreme Court said, “We do not foreclose the possibility that once a claimant has satisfied this requirement, and thus becomes eligible for a fees award under § 1132(g)(1), a court may consider the five factors adopted by the [Fourth Circuit] Court of Appeals ... in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees.” 130 S.Ct. at 2158 n. 8. In the Ninth Circuit, the discretionary decision to award fees has traditionally been governed by the five factors set forth in
Hummell,
634 F.2d at 453, which mirror the Fourth Circuit’s factors in
Hardt.
Those factors are:
(1) the degree of the opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an award of fees against the opposing parties would deter others from acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions.
Id.
We conclude, as we did in
Hummell,
that these factors provide a helpful guideline to both district courts and litigants. We therefore hold that after determining a litigant has achieved some degree of success on the merits, district courts must
still consider the
Hummell
factors before exercising their discretion to award fees under § 1132(g)(1).
IY
We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision on a motion for attorney’s fees.
See Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co.,
200 F.3d 1223, 1235 (9th Cir.2000). The district court denied Simonia’s motion for fees before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Hardt.
As a result, the district court proceeded to the
Hummell
analysis without deciding whether or not Simonía had achieved some degree of success on the merits. We will therefore assume, without deciding, that Simonía has satisfied this requirement.
However, we must conclude that the district court’s application of the
Hummell
factors certainly reveals no abuse of discretion.
First, there is no “culpability” or “bad faith” evidenced by Hartford’s actions. Simonia began receiving retroactive SSDI benefits in 2006. Under Simonia’s policy, these benefits — when combined with certain forms of income — offset his award from Hartford. At the time Hartford filed its counterclaim, it had a good faith belief that Simonia had been overpaid by $22,309.51, and that the deduction of Simonia’s remaining mental disorder benefits would result in a balance due of $8,589. Hartford was then informed that Simonia’s SSDI benefits had been retroactively reduced. Hartford thereafter stipulated to a dismissal of the counterclaim. These actions evidence good faith.
Second, Hartford undoubtedly has the ability to satisfy an award of fees. However, no single
Hummell
factor is necessarily decisive.
See Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. Russell,
726 F.2d 1410, 1416 (9th Cir.1984). Third, given Hartford’s good faith actions, we do not wish to deter others from acting in the same manner. Fourth, in seeking to settle the counterclaim following the Social Security Administration’s retroactive reduction in benefits, Simonía did not seek “to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA.”
Hummell,
634 F.2d at 453. Instead, as the district court found, Simonía sought to benefit only himself. Finally, the district court correctly noted that the counterclaim was meritorious when it was filed. When the Social Security Administration’s adjustment allegedly deprived the counterclaim of merit, Hartford settled and voluntarily dismissed. The district court did not exceed the permissible bounds of its discretion in determining that the
Hummell
factors weigh against an award of attorney’s fees.
Even assuming that, as Simonía argues, Hartford mistakenly calculated the amount of overpayment and the counterclaim was of questionable merit when filed, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that Hartford acted in bad faith. On the contrary, Hartford’s subsequent voluntary dismissal is indicative of its good faith in this matter. Simonia’s claim would therefore still fail after considering all of the factors.
y
In order to grant fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), courts must first determine whether a litigant has achieved some degree of success on the merits. If so, courts must then determine whether the
Hummell
factors weigh in favor of awarding that litigant attorney’s fees. Only if both of these conditions are met may a district court award fees. On this record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Simonia’s motion for his attorney’s fees.
AFFIRMED.